Shook v. Wilson

New Mexico
Office of the Director Compilation
'00'06- 10:50:20 2025.08.04 Commission

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2025-NMSC-022

Filing Date: April 10, 2025

No. S-1-SC-39689

SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP,

Petitioner,

v.

HON. MATTHEW J. WILSON,
District Court Judge,
First Judicial District Court,

Respondent,

and

HENRY TRUJILLO, SHAMIE SPENCE,
SAMUEL MONTOYA, THERESA
MONTOYA, and MICHAEL BARR,

Real Parties in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP
Eric R. Burris
Debashree Nandy
Albuquerque, NM

Williams & Connolly LLP
Lisa S. Blatt
Margaret A. Keeley
Amy Mason Saharia
Washington, DC

for Petitioner Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP

Peifer, Hanson, Mullins & Baker, P.A.
Charles R. Peifer
Matthew E. Jackson
Albuquerque, NM

for Petitioner Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP

Hinkle Shanor LLP
Kurt B. Gilbert
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner Covington & Burling LLP

Durham, Pittard & Spalding LLP
Rosalind B. Bienvenu
Caren I. Friedman
Justin R. Kaufman
Philip M. Kovnat
Santa Fe, NM

Jaramillo Law Firm, P.C.
David J. Jaramillo
Albuquerque, NM

The Alverez Law Firm
Alex Alverez
Coral Gables, FL

for Real Parties in Interest

CONSOLIDATED WITH

No. S-1-SC-39706

WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP,

Petitioner,

v.

HON. MATTHEW J. WILSON and
HON. MARIA SANCHEZ-GAGNE,
District Court Judges,
First Judicial District Court,

Respondents,

and

HENRY TRUJILLO; SHAMIE SPENCE;
SAMUEL MONTOYA; THERESA MONTOYA;
MICHAEL BARR; CHRIS SANDOVAL;
ISABEL SANDOVAL; CICCELO SOLANO;
BRENDA MASSEY; PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.;
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP; COVINGTON
& BURLING LLP; ALLSUP’S CONVENIENCE
STORES, LLC; ALLSUP’S, LLC; G & J BROOKS
ENTERPRISES, INC.; THE MICHAEL ROMERO
FAMILY, INC.; TOBACCO XPRESS LLC; and
TIWA ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Real Parties in Interest.

Peifer, Hanson, Mullins & Baker, P.A.
Charles R. Peifer
Matthew E. Jackson
Albuquerque, NM

for Petitioner

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Kaythee Hlaing, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondents

Durham, Pittard & Spalding LLP
Rosalind B. Bienvenu
Caren I. Friedman
Justin R. Kaufman
Philip M. Kovnat
Santa Fe, NM

Jaramillo Law Firm, P.C.
David J. Jaramillo
Albuquerque, NM

The Alverez Law Firm
Alex Alverez
Coral Gables, FL

for Real Parties in Interest

AND

No. S-1-SC-39725
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP,

Petitioner,

v.

HON. MATTHEW J. WILSON and
HON. MARIA SANCHEZ-GAGNE,
District Court Judges,
First Judicial District Court,

Respondents,

and

HENRY TRUJILLO; SHAMIE SPENCE;
SAMUEL MONTOYA; THERESA MONTOYA;
MICHAEL BARR; CHRIS SANDOVAL;
ISABEL SANDOVAL; CICCELO SOLANO;
BRENDA MASSEY; PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.;
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP;
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP;
ALLSUP’S CONVENIENCE STORES, LLC;
ALLSUP’S, LLC; G & J BROOKS ENTERPRISES, INC.;
THE MICHAEL ROMERO FAMILY, INC.;
TOBACCO XPRESS LLC; and
TIWA ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Real Parties in Interest.

Hinkle Shanor LLP
Kurt B. Gilbert
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Durham, Pittard & Spalding LLP
Rosalind B. Bienvenu
Caren I. Friedman
Justin R. Kaufman
Philip M. Kovnat
Santa Fe, NM

Jaramillo Law Firm, P.C.
David J. Jaramillo
Albuquerque, NM
The Alverez Law Firm
Alex Alverez
Coral Gables, FL

for Real Parties in Interest

OPINION

VIGIL, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

{1} Before a state may render an enforceable judgment against a defendant, that
defendant must possess certain “minimum contacts” with the state “such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). This personal jurisdiction requirement can be satisfied in
one of two ways: (1) through general personal jurisdiction which extends to all claims
against the defendant, or (2) through specific personal jurisdiction which “extends only
to claims that arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum” state.
Chavez v. Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, 2022-NMSC-006, ¶ 23, 503 P.3d
332 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A state may exercise general
personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant is “essentially at home in the
forum State.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 24 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 139 (2014)). In contrast, a state may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant if the defendant has purposefully directed its activities towards
the forum state such that it can reasonably foresee being brought into court there. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Co. v. Hiatt, 1994-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 8-9, 117 N.M. 461, 872 P.2d 879. With
the narrow basis for general personal jurisdiction, specific personal jurisdiction has
become the primary means of ensuring that a nonresident defendant remains
answerable for the damages it causes in a state.

{2} In this extraordinary writ proceeding, we consider a theory of specific personal
jurisdiction premised on a defendant’s participation in a civil conspiracy. For ease of
reference, we refer to this theory as “conspiracy jurisdiction.” Conspiracy jurisdiction
permits a state to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
who participates in a civil conspiracy if the acts that the defendant’s co-conspirators
take in furtherance of the civil conspiracy create minimum contacts with the state. In
Santa Fe Technologies v. Argus Networks, Inc., our Court of Appeals held that
conspiracy jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible and may serve as a basis for
asserting specific personal jurisdiction in New Mexico. 2002-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 31-39, 131
N.M. 772, 42 P.3d 1221. We now consider three petitions for writ of prohibition
challenging that holding.

{3} The petitioners here—Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP (Shook), Covington & Burling
LLP (Covington), and Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP (Womble) (collectively, the
Law Firms)—are alleged to have conspired with cigarette manufacturers and other
tobacco industry organizations to defraud the public about the dangers of cigarette
smoking. In two underlying lawsuits, the First Judicial District Court cited Santa Fe
Technologies and asserted jurisdiction over the Law Firms on the basis of their
involvement in the alleged civil conspiracy. The Law Firms now ask us to disavow
conspiracy jurisdiction, arguing that it violates due process. The Law Firms further argue
that, even if conspiracy jurisdiction satisfies due process, Plaintiffs in the underlying
lawsuits (Real Parties in Interest here) have not made a prima facie case of conspiracy
jurisdiction. The Law Firms thus seek an extraordinary writ prohibiting the district court
from asserting personal jurisdiction over them.

{4} We conclude that conspiracy jurisdiction satisfies due process if tailored to focus
on those aspects of the defendant’s conduct that evidence the defendant’s purposeful
availment of the forum state through participation in the civil conspiracy. Specifically, we
conclude that conspiracy jurisdiction satisfies due process if tailored to focus on the
defendant’s conduct in joining a civil conspiracy targeting the forum state. We confirm
that specific personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant who participates in
a civil conspiracy that the defendant knows will include acts creating minimum contacts
with our state. Applying this standard to the record of the underlying proceedings, we
conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to show grounds for specific personal jurisdiction
over the Law Firms. The Law Firms must be dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

{5} This proceeding has its origins in two lawsuits that Plaintiffs filed against cigarette
manufacturer Philip Morris USA, Inc. (Philip Morris), the Law Firms, and several local
cigarette retailers and distributors. Sandoval v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D-101-CV-2022-
00794 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. filed May 5, 2022); Trujillo v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D-101-
CV-2022-00798 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. filed May 5, 2022). Plaintiffs allege that the Law
Firms conspired with Philip Morris and other tobacco industry organizations to
misrepresent the dangers of cigarette smoking, leading to Plaintiffs’ personal injuries.
Only the Law Firms, Philip Morris, and the tobacco industry organizations are alleged to
have participated in this conspiracy; Plaintiffs do not claim the local distributors and
retailers took part.

{6} Plaintiffs are all New Mexico residents. The Law Firms are all nonresidents:
Shook is established in and principally operates out of Missouri; Covington is organized
and primarily does business in the District of Columbia; and Womble is based in North
Carolina. None of the Law Firms have significant ties, contacts, or relations in New
Mexico. Plaintiffs concede that New Mexico lacks general personal jurisdiction over the
Law Firms. Plaintiffs instead allege that specific personal jurisdiction is proper, in part,
because the Law Firms joined with Philip Morris and other tobacco organizations in a
nationwide civil conspiracy to commit fraudulent misrepresentation and that this
nationwide civil conspiracy included New Mexico.

{7} The Law Firms filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting
that Plaintiffs could not show that they took any actions related to the suit that
specifically occurred in or were aimed at New Mexico. The Law Firms also argued that
conspiracy jurisdiction is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs responded that jurisdiction is
appropriate over the Law Firms under both conspiracy jurisdiction and traditional due
process principles, and attached several hundred pages of exhibits in support of their
responses.

{8} Plaintiffs proffered the exhibits to show that the Law Firms served on the
“Committee of Counsel,” an association of lawyers representing cigarette manufacturers
and tobacco industry organizations whose goal was to coordinate a public relations
campaign to defraud the public about the adverse health impacts of smoking. The
exhibits, which are not accompanied by an affidavit, appear to be documents pulled
from publicly available online archives about the tobacco industry. 1 The exhibits mostly
describe out-of-state conduct. But interspersed within the exhibits are a few references
to New Mexico. For example, Plaintiffs attached a few tobacco advertisements and
pamphlets distributed in New Mexico. Other exhibits include various letters and
memoranda citing New Mexico laws or regulations, identifying smoking-related state
court litigation, discussing studies conducted by New Mexico research institutions, or
documenting campaign contributions to local officials. We discuss Plaintiffs’ exhibits in
more detail below.

{9} The district court denied the Law Firms’ motions to dismiss. The district court
specifically cited Santa Fe Technologies, 2002-NMCA-030, as the basis for asserting
personal jurisdiction over the Law Firms, explaining that Plaintiffs had shown that the
Law Firms actively participated in a civil conspiracy that “reached into New Mexico.” The
district court also refused to certify the matter for interlocutory appeal. See NMSA 1978,
§ 39-3-4 (1999).

{10} Each of the Law Firms separately petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition to
restrain the district court from exercising personal jurisdiction over them. We initially
denied Covington’s petition but later withdrew the order and consolidated the three
petitions. After oral argument, we granted the petitions and issued an extraordinary writ
instructing the district court to dismiss the Law Firms from the underlying lawsuits. We
held that conspiracy jurisdiction is constitutional but determined that the district court
lacked jurisdiction over the Law Firms on the record presented. We now write to explain
our reasoning.

III. STANDARD FOR A PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

{11} The Law Firms seek to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction in prohibition. N.M.
Const. art. VI, § 3. The writ of prohibition is “an extraordinary writ, issued by a superior
court to an inferior court to prevent the latter from exceeding its jurisdiction, either by
prohibiting it from assuming jurisdiction in a matter over which it has no control, or from
going beyond its legitimate powers in a matter of which it has jurisdiction.” State ex rel.
Harvey v. Medler, 1914-NMSC-055, ¶ 17, 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376. In assessing the
propriety of a writ of prohibition, “this Court is concerned with whether the district court

1See Univ. of Cal. S.F., Truth Tobacco Industry Documents,
https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/tobacco (last visited Apr. 2, 2025).
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute and over each of the parties to the
dispute.” In re Extradition of Martinez, 2001-NMSC-009, ¶ 7, 130 N.M. 144, 20 P.3d
126. The relevant question is “‘not whether the court had a right to decide the issue in a
particular way, but did it have the right to decide it at all.’” Id. (quoting State ex rel.
Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 1962-NMSC-134, ¶ 23, 70 N.M. 475, 375
P.2d 118).

{12} A writ of prohibition “is never allowed to serve the purpose of appeal, writ of error,
or certiorari, or any other process known to the common law by which the action of an
inferior court may be reviewed.” Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. Dist. Ct., 1894-
NMSC-006, ¶ 14, 7 N.M. 486, 38 P. 580 (Freeman, J., dissenting); accord State v.
Valerio, 2012-NMCA-022, ¶ 23, 273 P.3d 12 (“It is well established that the
extraordinary writ of prohibition is generally available only in cases where there is no
adequate remedy at law.”). This Court may issue a writ of prohibition as a matter of
“sound judicial discretion, to be granted or withheld according to the circumstances of
each particular case, to be used with great caution for the furtherance of justice when
none of the ordinary remedies provided by law are applicable.” Medler, 1914-NMSC-
055, ¶ 23.

{13} This is one of those extraordinary occasions in which we will consider a writ of
prohibition based on an asserted lack of personal jurisdiction. The Law Firms’ petitions
present a novel question of law addressing a unique theory of specific personal
jurisdiction. That question is of substantial public concern and implicates the Law Firms’
fundamental due process rights. This Court first alluded to conspiracy as a basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction in Sanchez v. Church of Scientology of Orange Cnty.,
1993-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 11-12, 115 N.M. 660, 857 P.2d 771, but had no occasion to
consider whether to adopt the theory under the facts presented in that matter. Based
partly on Sanchez, our Court of Appeals adopted conspiracy jurisdiction in 2002. Santa
Fe Techs., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 32, 34. This Court has not had an opportunity to review
the theory since then. Judicial economy is promoted by considering the issues now
rather than on any possible appeal. We, therefore, exercise our discretion to entertain
the Law Firms’ petitions due to the novelty and importance of the questions involved.

IV. DISCUSSION

{14} The Law Firms advance two main arguments against the district court’s assertion
of personal jurisdiction: (1) conspiracy jurisdiction violates due process because it relies
on contacts created by the unilateral conduct of a third party and not by the defendant
itself, and (2) even if conspiracy jurisdiction does not violate due process, Plaintiffs have
failed to show that jurisdiction may be exercised over them. We address each argument
in turn.
A. Conspiracy Jurisdiction Satisfies Due Process

1. Overview of personal jurisdiction requirements

{15} “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States
Constitution] limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment
against a nonresident defendant.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 291 (1980); Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 n.10 (1982) (explaining that personal jurisdiction limitations “must be seen as
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause”). Specifically, the Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. Personal
jurisdiction limitations also promote comity and federalism by “ensur[ing] that States with
little legitimate interest in a suit do not encroach on States more affected by the
controversy.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 360 (2021)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{16} Under the Due Process Clause, a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant if the defendant possesses “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)). The United States Supreme Court recognizes two types of personal
jurisdiction, specific and general. Chavez, 2022-NMSC-006, ¶ 23. General personal
jurisdiction extends to all claims against a defendant; specific personal jurisdiction
extends only to claims arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state. Id.; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
nn.8 & 9 (1984).

{17} Conspiracy jurisdiction is a type of specific personal jurisdiction. Santa Fe
Techs., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 31. New Mexico courts may exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) the defendant committed an act
enumerated in our long-arm statute, NMSA 1978, § 38-1-16 (1971); (2) the plaintiff’s
cause of action arises from or relates to the defendant’s acts; and (3) the defendant has
minimum contacts with New Mexico necessary to satisfy due process. Sanchez, 1993-
NMSC-034, ¶ 8. We have construed our long-arm statute as extending personal
jurisdiction as far as constitutionally permissible, and thus, the first and third steps of
this test “collapse[] into a single search for the outer limits of what due process permits.”
Hiatt, 1994-NMSC-044, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the
overall inquiry into specific personal jurisdiction considers whether the defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to render the exercise of jurisdiction
fair, in practice, courts evaluating personal jurisdiction often separate the inquiry into a
“contacts” prong and a “reasonableness” prong. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 144 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).

{18} In analyzing the sufficiency of contacts with the forum state, we “focus[] on the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To exercise
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant must have
sufficient contacts with a forum state such that it “should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there”; however, the foreseeability of litigation “has never been a
sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, 297. Rather, “it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

{19} We have explained, “the purposeful availment test of Hanson is the ‘key focus’ in
analyzing minimum contacts questions.” Hiatt, 1994-NMSC-044, ¶ 9 (emphasis omitted)
(citation omitted). This “purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will
not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated
contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); accord Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (“The unilateral activity of those who claim
some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State.”). The defendant’s contacts with the forum state “must be
the defendant’s own choice and . . . show that the defendant deliberately reached out
beyond its home—by, for example, exploiting a market in the forum State or entering a
contractual relationship centered there.” Ford Motor, 592 U.S. at 359 (brackets, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{20} Even if the party asserting jurisdiction meets its burden regarding the contacts
prong, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must still be reasonable. Burger King, 471
U.S. at 476-78. “This determination is made by balancing five factors: the burden on the
defendant, New Mexico’s interest, the plaintiff’s interest, the interest in an efficient
judicial system, and the interest in promoting public policy.” Zavala v. El Paso Cnty.
Hosp. Dist., 2007-NMCA-149, ¶ 12, 143 N.M. 36, 172 P.3d 173 (citing Burger King, 471
U.S. at 476-77). Of these factors, the burden on the defendant is of “primary”
importance. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 263 (2017).

2. Santa Fe Technologies and conspiracy jurisdiction

{21} In Santa Fe Technologies, our Court of Appeals held that specific personal
jurisdiction could be exercised over a nonresident defendant on the basis of the
defendant’s participation in a civil conspiracy. 2002-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 31-36. The plaintiff
in Santa Fe Technologies was a New Mexico corporation that had entered into an
agreement with several nonresident defendants to pursue a bid on a federal
government contract. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants later conspired
to replace it with another corporation on the bid. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. The plaintiff sued under
intentional tort theories, and the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 11. The district court denied the motions to dismiss. Id.

{22} On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed that personal jurisdiction was proper
over the defendants who had either acted in New Mexico or who had sent agents to
New Mexico to act on their behalf. Id. ¶¶ 23, 27-29. However, one defendant, DeNino,
had neither come to New Mexico nor sent an agent here. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 30, 37. Yet DeNino
knew of and had agreed to the other defendants’ in-state acts. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 37. The Court
of Appeals, therefore, considered whether jurisdiction could be asserted over DeNino on
the basis of his participation in a civil conspiracy with the other defendants. Id. ¶ 30.

{23} The Santa Fe Technologies Court explained, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction based on
conspiracy is premised on the concepts that jurisdictional contacts of one in-state
conspirator may be imputed to a non-resident co-conspirator.” Id. ¶ 31. The Court of
Appeals acknowledged a split on the constitutionality of conspiracy jurisdiction, noting
that some courts hold that it violates due process because it relies on contacts created
by a co-conspirator rather than contacts created by the defendant itself. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless adhered to precedent approving of an “appropriately
limited” view of conspiracy jurisdiction. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. The Court reasoned that conspiracy
jurisdiction satisfies due process because it “is based on the principles of agency,” as
under the substantive law of civil conspiracy, the actions of one co-conspirator may be
attributed to the other co-conspirators. Id. ¶ 34. The Court of Appeals further reasoned
that a defendant who voluntarily participated in a civil conspiracy with knowledge of its
acts or effects in the forum state could be said to have purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities there. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.

{24} The Santa Fe Technologies Court explained that DeNino had participated in a
civil conspiracy with the other defendants and had approved the other defendants’ in-
state efforts to remove the plaintiff from the bid. Id. ¶ 37. The Court reasoned that
DeNino’s “activities were directed toward New Mexico because he knew or should have
known that [a co-conspirator], upon his agreement, would perform in New Mexico the
actions in furtherance of the conspiracy of which he had approved.” Id. ¶ 38. Because
DeNino “gave his approval” to the tortious in-state acts, the Court of Appeals concluded
“personal jurisdiction of the state’s courts over DeNino as a co-conspirator . . . [was]
sound.” Id. ¶ 39.

3. Conspiracy jurisdiction satisfies due process if limited to focus on the
defendant’s conduct in joining a conspiracy targeting the forum state

{25} The Law Firms ask this Court to limit Santa Fe Technologies to the extent that
the opinion adopts conspiracy jurisdiction as a basis to assert specific personal
jurisdiction. The Law Firms argue that conspiracy jurisdiction contravenes due process
because the theory relies on forum contacts unilaterally made by a third party instead of
contacts made by the defendant itself. The Law Firms suggest that two recent United
States Supreme Court opinions, Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014), and Bristol-
Myers, 582 U.S. 255, demonstrate that conspiracy jurisdiction is incompatible with due
process. Plaintiffs respond that neither Walden nor Bristol-Myers addressed conspiracy
jurisdiction and that Santa Fe Technologies remains good law.

{26} Plaintiffs correctly note that neither Walden nor Bristol-Myers addressed
conspiracy jurisdiction; however, both opinions shed light on the validity of the theory by
clarifying that specific personal jurisdiction may be exercised by the forum state only
when the claim-related contacts of the defendant are sufficient. In Walden, the Supreme
Court considered whether Nevada courts could exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant for claims arising from the defendant’s seizure of the plaintiff’s property in
Georgia. 571 U.S. at 279. The defendant, a federal agent working at the Hartsfield-
Jackson Atlanta International Airport, seized the plaintiffs’ property during a flight
layover. Id. at 280. The plaintiffs traveled home to Nevada and brought suit there for
intentional tort. Id. at 281.

{27} The Walden Court held that jurisdiction was not properly exercised over the
defendant in Nevada, explaining: “The proper focus of the ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry in
intentional-tort cases is ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.’ And it is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create
contacts with the forum State.” Id. at 291 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court explained that Nevada lacked personal jurisdiction because all of the relevant
conduct took place in Georgia; the fact that the defendant knew the plaintiffs would be
injured in Nevada was insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Id. “The proper question is not
where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s
conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id. at 290.

{28} In Bristol-Myers, a large group of plaintiffs, including residents and nonresidents,
filed suit in California against a nonresident drug manufacturer for injuries allegedly
sustained from a medication. 582 U.S. at 258. The California Supreme Court analyzed
whether to assert jurisdiction over the manufacturer using a sliding scale approach,
reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claims could have less of a connection with the forum state
when the defendant possessed extensive contacts with the state. Id. at 260. On review,
the United States Supreme Court rejected this sliding-scale approach, affirming that
specific personal jurisdiction extends only to claims connected to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state. Id. at 263-64. “When there is no such connection, specific
jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in
the State.” Id. at 264.

{29} The Bristol-Myers Court held that California could not exercise jurisdiction over
the manufacturer because the nonresidents’ claims were not connected to the state. Id.
at 264-65. This lack of connection between the forum and the nonresident plaintiffs’
claims defeated jurisdiction in spite of the fact that California could exercise jurisdiction
over identical claims raised by the plaintiffs who were residents of the forum. Id. “As we
have explained, a defendant’s relationship with a third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction. This remains true even when third parties (here, the
plaintiffs who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those brought by the
nonresidents.” Id. at 265 (ellipsis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{30} Neither Walden nor Bristol-Myers addressed the question presented here,
namely, whether specific personal jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident
defendant based on the defendant’s participation in a civil conspiracy. However, both
opinions emphasize that the defendant itself must make the relevant forum contacts and
that the defendant’s relationship with others, standing alone, is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction. Walden, 571 U.S. at 291; Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 264-65. Thus, Walden
and Bristol-Myers seemingly undermine conspiracy jurisdiction to the extent that the
theory attributes contacts to a defendant based on its relationship with its co-
conspirators. Indeed, several courts have rejected conspiracy jurisdiction because the
theory arguably shifts the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry away from “the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” and commingles the jurisdictional
inquiry with the potential merits of a civil conspiracy claim. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see, e.g.,
Ashby v. State, 779 N.W.2d 343, 361 (Neb. 2010) (“The difficulty with establishing
personal jurisdiction based on an alleged conspiracy is that it merges the jurisdiction
issue with the merits of the case.”); Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769,
773 (Tex. 1995) (“Conspiracy as an independent basis for jurisdiction has been
criticized as distracting from the ultimate due process inquiry: whether the out-of-state
defendant’s contact with the forum was such that it should reasonably anticipate being
haled into a court in the forum state.”).

{31} Yet Walden and Bristol-Myers do not foreclose conspiracy jurisdiction. And other
jurisdictions have recognized that conspiracy jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible
after Walden and Bristol-Myers because the law of civil conspiracy is closely related to
principles of agency. See, e.g., Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP v. Kim, 537 P.3d
1154, 1162 (Haw. 2023) (“Walden recognized that an agent’s in-state acts operate as a
‘relevant contact’ for due process purposes. . . . While conspiracy and agency
relationships are not exactly the same, they are closely related.”); Raser Techs., Inc. v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, 2019 UT 44, ¶ 79, 449 P.3d 150 (“[B]ecause a conspiracy
is a type of agency relationship, an act taken during the course of a conspiracy
relationship may lead to specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant.”); Tricarichi v.
Coop. Rabobank, U.A., 440 P.3d 645, 652-53 (Nev. 2019) (“[B]ecause co-conspirators
are deemed to be each other’s agents, the contacts that one co-conspirator made with a
forum while acting in furtherance of the conspiracy may be attributed for jurisdictional
purposes to the other co-conspirators.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
And there are sound policy reasons for recognizing the theory, as a state has an
interest in providing an accessible forum for plaintiffs to sue defendants for conduct that
bears a substantial connection with the state. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.

{32} We accept this policy justification and agree with the underlying rationale that
conspiracy jurisdiction is constitutionally sound because it is aligned with principles of
agency. As noted by our Court of Appeals, under a claim for civil conspiracy, the acts of
one co-conspirator in furtherance of the civil conspiracy become the acts of all co-
conspirators. Santa Fe Techs., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 34. Indeed, a substantive claim for
civil conspiracy is not a separately actionable tort, Armijo v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 1954-
NMSC-024, ¶¶ 28-29, 58 N.M. 166, 268 P.2d 339, but is instead a means “to impute
liability to make members of the conspiracy jointly and severally liable for the torts of
any of its members.” Ettenson v. Burke, 2001-NMCA-003, ¶ 12, 130 N.M. 67, 17 P.3d
440. Accordingly, the acts that a co-conspirator takes in furtherance of a civil conspiracy
“are not unilateral because conspiratorial acts have at their foundation an agreement
and the involvement of other co-conspirators.” Santa Fe Techs., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 34.
{33} In this regard, conspiracy jurisdiction merely recognizes that a defendant can
purposefully direct its activities towards a forum state by agreeing that a co-conspirator
may perform acts targeted at the state in furtherance of their joint objective. Our long-
arm statute permits a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction based on the acts
of an agent. See § 38-1-16(A) (“Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this
state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this
subsection thereby submits himself or his personal representative to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state.” (emphasis added)). And, despite emphasizing the importance
of basing jurisdiction on a defendant’s own conduct, Walden recognizes that a
defendant may make relevant forum contacts through indirect or vicarious means, such
as through the acts of an agent. 571 U.S. at 285. We agree that such vicariously
created contacts encompass contacts created by a defendant’s co-conspirator when
acting in furtherance of a joint civil conspiracy.

{34} The Law Firms nevertheless contend that there is one crucial difference between
an agent and a co-conspirator: control. The Law Firms reason “[a]gency relationships
are premised on control,” and thus “[i]t follows that in the jurisdictional context, an in-
state agent’s contacts are imputed to an out-of-state principal only when the principal
controls the agent and consents to the agent’s acts.” We disagree.

{35} Under the substantive law of agency, the requirement of control is essential to a
finding of respondeat superior liability. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01,
at 17 (2005) (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on
the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests
assent or otherwise consents so to act.” (emphasis added)); UJI 13-402 NMRA
(providing that for a principal to be liable for acts of its agent, the principal must have
“had the right to control the manner in which the details of the work were to be
performed at the time of the occurrence, even though the right of control may not have
been exercised”). But all that due process requires for an assertion of specific personal
jurisdiction is that the defendant “deliberately reached out” to the forum state, Ford
Motor, 592 U.S. at 359 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), such that it can
be said to have fairly “invok[ed] the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson, 357
U.S. at 253. We assess that a defendant can deliberately reach out to a forum state by
participating in a civil conspiracy directed at the state even if the defendant does not
control the details of its co-conspirator’s acts for purposes of respondeat superior.

{36} The United States Supreme Court has previously held that an intentional
tortfeasor may be held to account for out-of-state conduct that is aimed at and
foreseeably causes injuries in a forum state. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-91. This is true
even if the intentional tortfeasor does not control the entities or instrumentalities that
carry out the effects of the defendant’s intentional conduct in the state. Id. at 789-90
(permitting jurisdiction over a defendant for an allegedly libelous article targeted at the
forum state even though the defendant was not responsible for distributing the article in
the forum state). A defendant’s control over its co-conspirators is therefore irrelevant to
the question of specific personal jurisdiction. See Schwab Short-Term Bond Mkt. Fund
v. Lloyds Banking Grp. PLC, 22 F.4th 103, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2021) (rejecting a
requirement of the defendant’s direction, supervision, or control of a co-conspirator for
conspiracy jurisdiction). Nevertheless, we discern that the purposeful availment
requirement demands that a defendant have intentionally targeted the forum state for
specific personal jurisdiction to apply. For jurisdiction to lie based on intentionally
tortious conduct, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that a “forum
State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based
on intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary contacts with the
forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added). Due process requires that the
defendant committed an intentional act that is directed at the forum state, not just at the
plaintiff. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.

{37} Thus, even though a defendant does not need to control its co-conspirator, we
conclude that a defendant, in participating in a civil conspiracy, must have intentionally
targeted the forum state for specific personal jurisdiction to apply. We concur with Santa
Fe Technologies that a defendant’s intent to target a forum state can be shown through
the defendant’s active participation in a civil conspiracy and knowledge that, on its
agreement, a co-conspirator will perform acts in furtherance of the civil conspiracy that
are targeted at the forum state. Santa Fe Techs., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 32, 36. With this
knowledge requirement, conspiracy jurisdiction focuses on the defendant’s own conduct
in knowingly joining a conspiracy targeted at the forum state and not merely on the
defendant’s relationship with its co-conspirators.

{38} We, therefore, endorse the following limited standard for evaluating an assertion
of specific personal jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant’s participation in a civil
conspiracy. A plaintiff seeking to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the
basis of a civil conspiracy must allege with particularity or, on challenge, show that: (1)
the defendant actively and voluntarily participated in a civil conspiracy, (2) the defendant
knew of a co-conspirator’s acts in furtherance of the civil conspiracy that occurred in or
were aimed at New Mexico, and (3) these acts created minimum contacts with New
Mexico such that the defendant could reasonably foresee being brought into court here.
As with other exercises of specific personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s claims must arise
from or relate to the contacts imputed to the defendant on the basis of its participation in
the civil conspiracy. Ford Motor, 592 U.S. at 361-62. The defendant’s contacts must
also “be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King,
471 U.S. at 476 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

4. We limit Santa Fe Technologies to the extent it conflicts with our holding

{39} We thus agree with Santa Fe Technologies that conspiracy jurisdiction satisfies
due process. 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 36. We also agree that the facts of Santa Fe
Technologies supported an assertion of conspiracy jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant in that case. In Santa Fe Technologies, DeNino knew that his co-
conspirators, on his agreement, would take tortious actions in New Mexico, which
foreseeably caused injuries here. Id. ¶¶ 8, 44. DeNino was, therefore, properly brought
into our courts based on his conduct in participating in a civil conspiracy that he knew
would involve acts creating minimum contacts with our state. Id. ¶¶ 37-39.
{40} Although we approve of the result in Santa Fe Technologies, we nevertheless
must correct and limit that opinion to the extent that its analysis of conspiracy
jurisdiction conflicts with our own.

{41} First, we disapprove of Santa Fe Technologies’ suggestion that a defendant’s
knowledge of a conspiracy’s effects in a forum state is sufficient to satisfy due process.
Id. ¶¶ 32, 34. It is not enough that a defendant anticipated that a civil conspiracy would
have effects in the forum state. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Rather, the defendant’s
conduct in participating in the civil conspiracy must demonstrate an intent to target the
forum, which may be shown by the defendant’s knowledge of conspiratorial acts
directed towards the forum state.

{42} Second, Santa Fe Technologies improperly injected an objective knowledge
inquiry into the analysis of conspiracy jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated,
“DeNino’s activities were directed toward New Mexico because he knew or should have
known that [a co-conspirator], upon his agreement, would perform in New Mexico the
actions in furtherance of the conspiracy of which he had approved.” Santa Fe Techs.,
2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 38 (emphasis added). Due process demands that a defendant
purposefully direct its activities at a forum, Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253, so the defendant
must actually know about a co-conspirator’s in-state or forum-targeted acts. We,
therefore, limit Santa Fe Technologies to the extent it suggests that personal jurisdiction
may be exercised over a defendant who “should have known” of a co-conspirator’s acts
in or aimed at our state. As we have explained, conspiracy jurisdiction will lie only when
the defendant has actual knowledge of the relevant conspiratorial acts.

{43} Third, we clarify that conspiracy jurisdiction does not require the in-state
presence of a co-conspirator. In Santa Fe Technologies, our Court of Appeals
suggested that a co-conspirator must have a “physical, in-state presence,” or have
committed acts inside the state for conspiracy jurisdiction to apply. 2002-NMCA-030, ¶¶
32, 36. Other jurisdictions have similarly required that a plaintiff show that the defendant
knew of the acts a co-conspirator took inside the state. See EIG Energy Fund XIV, L.P.
v. Petróleo Brasileiro, S.A., 246 F. Supp. 3d 52, 91 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[F]ollowing Walden,
a plaintiff who seeks to establish jurisdiction over a defendant based on a co-
conspirator’s contacts must plead, at a minimum, that the defendant knew his co-
conspirator was carrying out acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in the forum.”
(emphasis omitted)); Kim, 537 P.3d at 1163 (adopting conspiracy jurisdiction with a
standard requiring the plaintiff to show that “the defendant knew of the co-conspirator’s
acts in the forum”). However, Calder recognizes that a defendant may be subject to
jurisdiction for out-of-state conduct intentionally aimed at a forum state. Calder, 465
U.S. at 789. Thus, we disagree that a co-conspirator’s in-state presence is required. A
defendant can be subjected to personal jurisdiction based on its knowledge of a co-
conspirator’s acts expressly aimed at a forum state, as well as a co-conspirator’s acts
occurring in the forum state. We, therefore, limit Santa Fe Technologies to the extent
that the opinion may have required an in-state co-conspirator.
B. The District Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over the Law Firms

{44} We now consider whether jurisdiction may be exercised over the Law Firms in
the two civil lawsuits underlying this writ proceeding. The Law Firms argue that the
district court exceeded its jurisdiction in denying each of their motions to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ lawsuits. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had shown a civil
conspiracy that “reached into New Mexico” but did not make any specific findings of
fact. In the absence of any specific findings, we review the record de novo to determine
whether Plaintiffs have shown personal jurisdiction over the Law Firms. Tercero v.
Roman Cath. Diocese of Norwich, 2002-NMSC-018, ¶ 5, 132 N.M. 312, 48 P.3d 50.

{45} Because no evidentiary hearing was held in the underlying suits, Plaintiffs bear
the burden to make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction may be properly exercised
over the Law Firms. Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Boise, Inc., 1996-NMCA-057, ¶ 9,
121 N.M. 738, 918 P.2d 17. With respect to conspiracy jurisdiction, a “prima facie
showing consists of specific facts that, if proven, would allow a factfinder to find the
existence of a conspiracy” that the defendant knew involved acts occurring in or directly
aimed at our state. Santa Fe Techs., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 41. “Mere allegations are not
sufficient, but all factual disputes are resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Id. (citation
omitted). Notwithstanding the holding today and its procedural posture, we acknowledge
that a plaintiff’s burden of showing a prima facie case of conspiracy jurisdiction may not
be best suited in all cases for a decision by the court on a motion to dismiss. It might
require, in most circumstances, jurisdiction discovery so the court can properly apply the
test set forth in this opinion, and the parties have the opportunity to gather the facts
necessary to advance their arguments.

{46} A civil conspiracy is “a combination by two or more persons to accomplish an
unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.” Las Luminarias
of the N.M. Council of the Blind v. Isengard, 1978-NMCA-117, ¶ 5, 92 N.M. 297, 587
P.2d 444. A claim for “civil conspiracy unlike criminal conspiracy, is not of itself
actionable; the gist of the action is the damage arising from the acts done pursuant to
the conspiracy.” Armijo, 1954-NMSC-024, ¶ 28. Thus, “[w]ithout an actionable civil case
against one of the conspirators, . . . an agreement, no matter how conspiratorial in
nature, is not a separate, actionable offense.” Ettenson, 2001-NMCA-003, ¶ 12.

{47} Plaintiffs allege that the Law Firms conspired with Philip Morris and other tobacco
industry organizations to commit fraudulent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs describe a civil
conspiracy starting in the early 1950s wherein Philip Morris and other tobacco industry
organizations combined together to engage in a public relations campaign designed to
downplay and create controversy about growing scientific research into the adverse
health effects of smoking. Plaintiffs’ complaints describe the acts of tobacco industry
executives in some detail. However, Plaintiffs’ allegations against the Law Firms are not
supported by particularized facts.

{48} Instead, Plaintiffs broadly allege that the Law Firms participated in the civil
conspiracy by screening and directing scientific studies favorable to the tobacco
industry, carrying out document destruction policies protecting tobacco organizations,
sheltering behind baseless assertions of attorney-client privilege, overseeing public
positions and statements, clearing advertisements, providing false and misleading
testimony and submissions to governmental agencies, and hiding the source of money
for special projects. Plaintiffs proffer that, as members of the Committee of Counsel, the
Law Firms served as the “supreme authority” of the alleged conspiracy and set the “high
policy of the industry on all smoking and health matters.” But, in the absence of specific
allegations of fact showing the Law Firms’ conduct, Plaintiffs have failed to prima facie
show the Law Firms’ active participation in a civil conspiracy to fraudulently
misrepresent the health effects of tobacco use.

{49} Plaintiffs have also failed to demonstrate the Law Firms knew of acts in
furtherance of the alleged civil conspiracy, which create minimum contacts with our
state. In an effort to demonstrate a connection between the alleged civil conspiracy and
New Mexico, Plaintiffs submitted hundreds of pages of exhibits, including a few
advertisements published in New Mexico promoting filtered or low-tar cigarettes, the
transcript of a national television interview of a Philip Morris executive that aired in New
Mexico, a “Tobacco Facts” pamphlet distributed by the New Mexico Tobacco & Candy
Distributors organization, and a list of tobacco industry members in the region. Plaintiffs,
in particular, suggest that the publication of a full-page advertisement titled A Frank
Statement to Cigarette Smokers in the Albuquerque Journal on January 4, 1954, “was
the first of many messages to the New Mexican public intended to create doubt about
whether smoking is linked to disease or death.”

{50} While these exhibits show that the alleged conspiracy reached into New Mexico,
none of these exhibits mention the Law Firms. Nor do the exhibits show that the Law
Firms knew of any co-conspirator’s acts in or aimed at New Mexico. Plaintiffs broadly
allege that the Law Firms, as members of the Committee of Counsel, “vetted”
documents such as these exhibits. But the referenced exhibits do not substantiate these
allegations. And Plaintiffs’ mere allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the Law
Firms’ participation and knowledge in a conspiracy targeting our state.

{51} As additional support for an assertion of jurisdiction, Plaintiffs proffer several
exhibits that can fairly be described as the Law Firms’ attorney work product. Some of
these documents mention New Mexico alongside numerous other states. For example,
Plaintiffs submitted a report distributed by Shook on regulatory developments relating to
cigarette smoking, including developments in New Mexico. Similarly, Plaintiffs identify
several documents prepared by Womble that mention New Mexico, including an “R&D
Weekly Highlights” memo which mentions a Santa Fe study on burn rate control, a
memo noting another New Mexico study on tobacco effects on a small Hispanic
population, an agenda for a meeting held in Womble’s offices which briefly mentions
New Mexico, and a memo listing New Mexico as a state with employment discrimination
laws related to smoking. Other exhibits include the minutes from a Tobacco Institute
meeting showing that a Covington attorney attended the meeting. The agenda for the
meeting lists a smoking restriction initiative in Los Alamos, New Mexico. And yet
another exhibit from Covington includes a legislative summary that referenced proposed
indoor smoking ordinances in Carlsbad and Mesilla, New Mexico.
{52} When viewed in Plaintiffs’ favor, these attorney work product documents suggest
that the Law Firms participated in discussions with their clients about state laws and
regulations or studies occurring in New Mexico. However, these documents do not
reveal an agreement to defraud between the Law Firms and their clients. The
documents also do not mention any actions in furtherance of the alleged civil conspiracy
that occurred in or were aimed at New Mexico. Nor do these documents reveal the Law
Firms’ knowledge of any in-state or forum-targeted conspiratorial acts.

{53} In the absence of this targeted conduct, we cannot attribute any forum contacts
to the Law Firms from these documents. Simply “[r]epresenting a client is not enough.”
Kim, 537 P.3d at 1165-66. Due process demands that Plaintiffs show the Law Firms
participated in some act purposefully directed towards New Mexico. Hiatt, 1994-NMSC-
044, ¶¶ 8-9. The Law Firms are not subject to our courts’ jurisdiction simply because
they may have advised their clients about our state’s laws and regulations or kept track
of scientific studies being conducted in our state.

{54} Plaintiffs also proffered a few exhibits that mention the Law Firms and acts
occurring in or aimed at New Mexico. But even these exhibits fail to show that the Law
Firms knew of overt acts in furtherance of the alleged civil conspiracy such that they
could reasonably foresee being haled into court here. For example, Plaintiffs suggest
that one exhibit shows that Covington advised a client regarding New Mexico lobbying
laws, while another exhibit later indicates that an alleged co-conspirator made campaign
contributions to New Mexico regulators. Another exhibit shows that Covington retained
local counsel for a New Mexico resident’s smoking-related lawsuit against her employer
and monitored the progress of the litigation. Viewing these exhibits in Plaintiffs’ favor,
these documents suggest that Covington was aware of some actions that an alleged co-
conspirator may have taken in New Mexico and perhaps directly participated in another
forum-related act. But these few exhibits are isolated among the hundreds of pages
proffered against Covington, and personal jurisdiction cannot be based on “random,
isolated, or fortuitous” contacts. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774. These exhibits simply do not
connect the alleged conspiracy with New Mexico in a meaningful way. See Walden, 571
U.S. at 290 (“The proper question is . . . whether the defendant’s conduct connects him
to the forum in a meaningful way.”).

{55} Similarly, Plaintiffs proffered several documents about a grant application for a
research study at the University of New Mexico Hospital and a letter addressed to a
Shook lawyer commenting on the grant application. Plaintiffs also submitted a letter
written by a New Mexico resident quoting a Shook lawyer’s advice about not putting
anything in writing. Viewing these exhibits in Plaintiffs’ favor, these documents suggest
that Shook knew that a tobacco industry organization vetted and sponsored a scientific
study in New Mexico and that a Shook lawyer spoke with a New Mexico resident. But
these isolated acts do not demonstrate a substantial connection between the alleged
conspiracy and New Mexico such that Shook could reasonably foresee being brought
into court here.

{56} In sum, Plaintiffs’ allegations and exhibits do not show that the Law Firms
participated in a civil conspiracy to commit fraudulent misrepresentation or that the Law
Firms knew of acts in furtherance of this alleged civil conspiracy creating minimum
contacts with this state. The record, therefore, does not support a prima facie case of
personal jurisdiction over the Law Firms on the basis of civil conspiracy. Additionally,
even though the district court did not consider whether jurisdiction was appropriate
under a traditional analysis, on de novo review, we determine that Plaintiffs’ allegations
and exhibits do not support any traditionally recognized basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction over the Law Firms. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not established that the Law
Firms had “minimum contacts” with New Mexico “such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 316 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do not reach the
reasonableness prong of the due process analysis, Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77,
because the minimum contacts prong is not satisfied and the parties have not briefed
the issue.

{57} A writ of prohibition is warranted. Thus, in the interests of justice, we previously
ordered the district court to dismiss the Law Firms from the underlying suits.

V. CONCLUSION

{58} We hold that conspiracy jurisdiction comports with due process if properly limited
to focus on the defendant’s conduct in actively participating in a civil conspiracy that the
defendant knows will target a forum state. We endorse conspiracy jurisdiction under the
limited standard articulated herein. We additionally limit Santa Fe Technologies as
discussed in this opinion. On review of the record, we determine that Plaintiffs have not
shown that specific personal jurisdiction may be properly exercised over the Law Firms.
We, therefore, direct that the Law Firms be dismissed.

{59} IT IS SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

WE CONCUR:

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice