Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. for Albuquerque Pub. Schs.

Office of the New Mexico
Director Compilation
Commission
09:26:34 2025.08.04
'00'06-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2025-NMSC-014

Filing Date: January 23, 2025

No. S-1-SC-39961

MCKENZIE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR
ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
and MARY JANE EASTIN,

Defendants-Petitioners.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Benjamin Chavez, District Judge

Walsh Gallegos Trevino Kyle & Robinson, P.C.
Roxie Rawls-De Santiago
Albuquerque, NM

for Petitioner Board of Education for the Albuquerque Public Schools

Robles, Rael and Anaya
Luis Robles
Albuquerque, NM

for Petitioner Mary Jane Eastin

Parnall & Adams Law
Charles S. Parnall
David M. Adams
Albuquerque, NM

ACLU of New Mexico
Leon Howard
Maria Martinez Sánchez
Preston Sanchez
Albuquerque, NM

NM Center on Law and Poverty
Sovereign Hager
Verenice Peregrino Pompa
Albuquerque, NM

for Respondent

University of New Mexico School of Law
Barbara L. Creel, Professor of Law
Albuquerque, NM

for Amici Curiae Native American Budget and Policy Institute, Native American
Disability Law Center, and University of New Mexico Law Professors

OPINION

THOMSON, Chief Justice.

{1} Defendants Mary Jane Eastin and the Board of Education for Albuquerque Public
Schools (APS) challenge the Court of Appeals’ holding that the plain language of the
New Mexico Human Rights Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (1969, as amended
through 2019) (NMHRA or the Act), defines a public school as a public accommodation,
thereby subjecting public schools to suit for discriminatory conduct. Johnson v. Bd. of
Educ. for Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 2023-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 1-2, 535 P.3d 687; see § 28-1-
2(H) (2007) (defining “public accommodation”) and § 28-1-7(F) (2019) (making
discriminatory conduct in a public accommodation unlawful). 1

{2} We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that a public school is a public
accommodation under the NMHRA and that the Court of Appeals did not err in refusing
to apply Human Rights Commission of New Mexico v. Board of Regents of University of
New Mexico College of Nursing (Regents), 1981-NMSC-026, 95 N.M. 576, 624 P.2d
518. We conclude that Regents’ holding that a public university in its “manner and
method of administering its academic program” is not a public accommodation was
incorrect and that Regents is no longer good law. Id. ¶ 11.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

{3} Defendant Eastin allegedly perpetrated discriminatory acts against both
Mckenzie Johnson (Plaintiff), a sixteen-year-old Native American student at Cibola High
School, and another Native American student in her class on Halloween in 2018.
Plaintiff alleges that Eastin cut off a portion of another Native American student’s
braided hair and then referred to Plaintiff, whose Halloween costume included fake
blood, as a “‘bloody Indian.’” Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, alleging violation

1The original NMHRA definition of “public accommodation” was amended in 2023 and now includes “any
governmental entity.” Compare § 28-1-2(H) (2023), with 1969 N.M. Laws, ch. 196, § 2(F).
of the NMHRA’s prohibitions against discrimination in public accommodations. The
district court dismissed the suit based on the finding that APS and its public secondary
schools are not “public accommodations.”

{4} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that “a secondary public
school[] is a public accommodation” based on “the plain language of the NMHRA, the
differing circumstances of this case,” and this Court’s language in Regents limiting its
holding to the university at issue’s “‘manner and method of administering its academic
program.’” Johnson, 2023-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 1-2 (quoting Regents, 1981-NMSC-026, ¶
16). We granted certiorari on two questions: (1) “Did the Court of Appeals err when it
determined that a public school in New Mexico can be classified as a public
accommodation under the [NMHRA]” and (2) did the Court of Appeals err in its
interpretation and application of Regents?

B. History of Discrimination in Public School Accommodations

{5} The NMHRA’s protections against numerous forms of discrimination must be
read against the backdrop of this state’s unfortunate history of race-based
discrimination, including that history transpiring within our public schools. The intent to
prohibit discrimination in public schools has been apparent since the inception of
statehood. Article XII, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution requires, “A uniform
system . . . sufficient for the education of . . . all the children of school age in the state
shall be established and maintained.” To ensure that discrimination would not interfere
with the enjoyment of this right, Article XII, Section 10 provides in part, “Children of
Spanish descent in the state of New Mexico shall never be denied the right and
privilege of admission and attendance in the public schools . . . but shall forever enjoy
perfect equality with other children in all public schools and educational institutions of
the state.”

{6} Despite general and specific constitutional protections, New Mexico schools have
been used to further efforts of assimilation and cultural erasure among Native American
and Hispanic children. The historical experience of Native American children has been
described in academia as one of assimilation through education “that intentionally
sought to destroy their cultural ways of life.” Preston Sanchez, Esq. & Rebecca Blum
Martinez, PhD., A Watershed Moment in the Education of American Indians: A Judicial
Strategy to Mandate the State of New Mexico to Meet the Unique Cultural and Linguistic
Needs of American Indians in New Mexico Public Schools, 27: Issue 5, Am. U. J.
Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 183, 185 (2019). In addition, notwithstanding explicit
constitutional protections, the mandatory use of English in educational spaces furthered
the effort to erase the Spanish language. Robert Milk, The Issue of Language in
Education in Territorial New Mexico, 7 Bilingual Rev./LA Revista Belingüe 212, 214
(1980). An understanding of this history is important because its impact continues to
echo throughout the experience of New Mexico’s children in modern-day educational
institutions, 2 and “has the potential to determine their future outcomes in post-secondary
education, the workforce, and in life.” Sanchez, supra, at 192.

{7} The Legislature enacted the NMHRA to address the effects of New Mexico’s past
and to further the Act’s purpose to “eliminate and prevent discrimination on the basis of
race” in the future. Keller v. City of Albuquerque, 1973-NMSC-048, ¶ 23, 85 N.M. 134,
509 P.2d 1329, overruled on other grounds by Green v. Kase, 1992-NMSC-004, ¶ 2,
113 N.M. 76, 823 P.2d 318. The holding of this opinion is firmly grounded in the plain
language of the NMHRA. However, the statute’s history and background demonstrate
that the Legislature intended for public schools to be public accommodations and
therefore in some ways accountable under the NMHRA. See Key v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d 350 (providing that this Court
may “consider the statute’s history and background” to determine the Legislature’s
intent).

II. DISCUSSION

{8} Whether a public school is a public accommodation under the NMHRA is a
question of law that we review de novo. Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2002-NMSC-
020, ¶ 16, 132 N.M. 382, 49 P.3d 61. “Statutory interpretation is driven primarily by the
language in a statute, and the language of remedial statutes, including the
[NM]HRA . . . , must be liberally construed.” See Herald v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
N.M., 2015-NMCA-104, ¶ 25, 357 P.3d 438.

A. The Plain Language of the NMHRA Informs Us That a Public School Is a
Public Accommodation

{9} Because “[t]he plain language of the statute is our primary guide to legislative
intent,” this Court first looks to the language of the NMHRA. Elane Photography, LLC v.
Willock, 2012-NMCA-086, ¶ 13, 284 P.3d 428 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), aff’d, 2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53. “[W]hen a statute contains language
which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from
further statutory interpretation.” Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37, 147
N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{10} The language of the NMHRA prohibits discrimination by “any person in any
public accommodation.” Section 28-1-7(F) (2019) (emphasis added). Broken into
operable parts the NMHRA defines “public accommodation” as “any establishment that
provides or offers its services . . . to the public.” Section 28-1-2(H) (2007). There is an
exception: “a bona fide private club or other place or establishment that is by its nature
and use distinctly private” does not fall within the statutory definition. Id. We address

2For example, New Mexico’s Department of Education and the University of New Mexico identified
themes in education that created barriers to the educational success of Native American students. The
study determined that the performance of Native American students was greatly affected by 1) educators
who were uninformed about Native American culture and values, 2) Native American students’ low self-
esteem and high rates of absenteeism, and 3) their experience of prejudice and low academic
expectations set by educators. Sanchez, supra, at 201.
each part of the statute in turn and begin with whether a public school, as a state entity,
can be considered a “person.”

1. A public school, as a state entity, is a person under the NMHRA

{11} A public, or state operated, entity may be subject to suit under the NMHRA
because it is a “person” under the Act. The statute clearly prohibits discrimination by
“any person in any public accommodation” and the Act defines “person” to include “the
state and all of its political subdivisions.” Section 28-1-7(F) (2019); 3 § 28-1-2(A) (2007)
(defining “person”). As applied to this case, a state actor is prohibited from
discriminating in public accommodations, and a public school, which is operated by the
state, may be subject to suit. See State v. Hoshijo ex rel. White, 102 Hawai’i 307, 76
P.3d 550, 560-61 (2003) (holding that a state university is a public accommodation and
subject to suit under Hawaii’s human rights statute where the definition of a “person”
includes “the State, or any governmental entity or agency” and the statute mandates
that a “person” shall not discriminate in public accommodations (emphasis added)).

2. A public school is an “establishment that provides or offers its services . . .
to the public”

{12} The Court of Appeals held that “[a] public secondary school . . . is decidedly an
institution” which is defined as: “‘An established organization, esp[ecially] one of a public
character.’” Johnson, 2023-NMCA-069, ¶ 9 (alteration in original) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). We agree and reject Defendants’ assertion that the Court of
Appeals impermissibly added words to the statutory definition in its reliance on a legal-
dictionary term. Johnson, 2023-NMCA-069, ¶ 8. In 1968, the year before the enactment
of the NMHRA, “school” was defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) as “[a]n
institution or place for instruction or education.” The 2019 definition is nearly identical:
“An institution of learning and education, esp[ecially] for children.” School, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The Court of Appeals did not err in using legal-dictionary
definitions nor did it go beyond the statute’s language to determine that a public school
is an establishment because it is an institution.

{13} We now turn to whether a public school “provides or offers its services . . . to the
public” and, therefore, satisfies the statute’s second requirement. Section 28-1-2(H)
(2007). Plaintiff makes a common-sense assertion that “APS’s educational services are
open to all students in the Albuquerque area who are in the appropriate age ranges for
elementary, middle school and high school,” and thus that APS provides and offers its
services to the public. In the APS mission statement, operation goals assert that APS
and the school district superintendent “work together and in partnership with families

3The NMHRA established that “[i]t is an unlawful discriminatory practice for . . . any person in any public
accommodation to make a distinction, directly or indirectly, in offering or refusing to offer its services,
facilities, accommodations or goods to any person because of race, religion, color, national origin,
ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, pregnancy, childbirth or condition related to
pregnancy or childbirth, spousal affiliation, physical or mental disability or military status . . . ,” Section 28-
1-7(F) (2024), a provision that essentially remains unchanged since the NMHRA enactment, see 1969
N.M. Laws, ch. 196, § 7(F).
and the community in a systematic way to ensure that all students succeed.” Because
APS itself has acknowledged public schools as institutions that not only offer services to
all school age children but also collaborate with their families and communities, APS
therefore embraces the plain language of the statute that a public school is an
“establishment that provides or offers its services . . . to the public.” Id.

3. The single statutory exception to the definition of a public accommodation
does not apply to public schools

{14} Confronting strong headwinds in the statute’s inclusive language, the statute’s
exception is the only potential refuge for APS’s position. The exception provides that a
public school is not a public accommodation if it is “a bona fide private club or other
place or establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private.” Section 28-1-2(H)
(2007). This sole exception to the broadly worded definition of public accommodation is
inapplicable to the facts of this case. See Elane Photography, 2012-NMCA-086, ¶¶ 14,
18 (holding that the exception did not apply to a photography company which is a public
accommodation under the NMHRA). The sole exception’s inapplicability is the other
side of APS’s argument that it does not provide services to the public and is the reason
APS’s argument fails. We agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that public
schools do “not restrict [their] services in such a way that could be said to be by its
nature and use distinctly private.” Johnson, 2023-NMCA-069, ¶ 13. The constitutional
mandate that public schools in New Mexico be “open to[] all the children” refutes any
argument to the contrary. See N.M. Const. art. XII, § 1.

B. The Regents Court’s Holding That a Public University Is Not a Public
Accommodation Under the NMHRA Was Incorrectly Decided and Is
Overruled

{15} In Regents, this Court considered “whether the University of New Mexico, in
administering its academic program, is a ‘public accommodation’” under the NMHRA.
1981-NMSC-026, ¶ 6. In that case, a nursing student alleged unlawful racial
discrimination when the University gave her a failing grade and did not allow her to
immediately retake the course. Id. ¶ 1. The Court held that the University of New Mexico
is not a “public accommodation,” specifically within “the University’s manner and method
of administering its academic program.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 16. The Court declined to reach the
“question of whether in a different set of circumstances the University would be a ‘public
accommodation.’” Id. ¶ 16. This holding created a distinction for discriminatory conduct
perpetrated in the “manner and method of administering its academic program” without
citing authority and without supporting analysis.

{16} The Court of Appeals held that Regents did not apply to this case. Johnson,
2023-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 1-2. Specifically, the distinction established in Regents did not
apply because the facts of this case arose from “the spontaneous actions and remark
. . . by a single teacher on a single occasion” rather than “any specified manner or
method of administration, such as admission processes.” Id. ¶ 6. Defendants argue that
the Court of Appeals “[i]mpermissibly [r]ejected the [a]pplication of Regents” and that
the Regents Court’s judicially created exception for the “‘manner and method of
administering [an] academic program’” shields Defendants from suit under the NMHRA.
We disagree.

{17} The Regents Court’s holding is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute
and is unsupported by precedent or legislative history. First, the Regents Court’s
determination that “[u]niversities are not public accommodations in the ordinary and
usual sense of the words” is unsupported. 1981-NMSC-026, ¶ 15. Further, this
statement is incorrect, based on the plain language of the statute. As we have
explained, “establishment” and “institution” are synonyms under the Act. The legal-
dictionary definition of “college” in the version of Black’s Law Dictionary available to the
Regents Court provides that a college “[i]n the most common use of the word, . . .
designates an institution of learning. . . . Also applied to all kinds of institutions from
universities, or departments thereof.” College, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). 4
Based on our plain language interpretation of the statute, the Regents Court erred in
determining, “Universities are not public accommodations.” Regents, 1981-NMSC-026,
¶ 15.

{18} In addition, the Regents Court misinterpreted federal law and the evolution of
state public accommodations laws in construing the NMHRA. Id. ¶¶ 11-15. The Court
began its analysis by dedicating two of the three paragraphs of historical review to a
review of public accommodations laws, citing to two federal authorities in support. Id. ¶¶
12-13. The Court began by citing to the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in stating
that, at common law, public accommodations laws applied only to places of lodging,
eating, and entertainment. Regents, 1981-NMSC-026, ¶ 12. The Court explained that
some state statutes expanded upon these establishments and specifically included
universities. Id. ¶ 13. Noting that Title II of the Civil Rights Act did not make such a
change, and that New Mexico’s Public Accommodations Act did not specifically include
universities, the Court then concluded, without supportive authority, that New Mexico’s
adoption of a “general, inclusive clause in the Human Rights Act” did not mean the
Legislature intended to include establishments that had been traditionally excluded. Id.
¶ 13-14. However, the Regents Court neglected to take into consideration that New
Mexico’s Public Accommodations Act went far beyond the common law categories of
“lodging, eating, and entertainment,” and included such establishments as dispensaries,
hospitals, clinics, and public libraries.

{19} Regents errs in its analysis of legislative history and misconstrues the 1955
Public Accommodations Act, which the NMHRA repealed upon its enactment twelve
years before Regents. See 1969 N.M. Laws, ch. 196 (repealing 1955 N.M. Laws,
“Chapter 192, Sections 1 through 6”). Refusing to look beyond the historic definition, the
Court stated, “We do not feel that the legislature, by including a general, inclusive
clause in the [NMHRA], intended to have all establishments that were historically
excluded, automatically included.” Id. This is a misapprehension of the Public
Accommodations Act, which did not incorporate only the common law categories, but
instead applied to a wide range of establishments. Public Accommodations Act, 1955

4The current edition also defines “college” as “[a]n institution of learning . . . .” College, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
N.M. Laws, ch. 192, § 5. In light of this, the Legislature’s decision to adopt a general
inclusive definition in the NMHRA can hardly be read as evidence that it intended to
exclude establishments not included at common law. Accordingly, we overturn Regents
in its holding that a university in its “manner and method of administering its academic
program” is not a public accommodation.

{20} Defendants suggest two additional reasons to support their argument that a
public school is not a public accommodation under the NMHRA. First, they argue that
public schools do not warrant independent evaluation as to whether they are public
accommodations because schools are traditional and historic and existed at the time
the 1955 Public Accommodations Act was enacted. Second, they argue that a public
accommodation must be a commercial business. Defendants fail on both points.

{21} Defendant’s reasoning why schools fall outside of the statute fails to ensure a
harmonious reading of the NMHRA and the NMHRA’s legislative history in pari materia,
which confirms the legislative intent that public schools are public accommodations
prohibited from discriminatory conduct. State v. Sena, 2023-NMSC-007, ¶ 2, 528 P.3d
631 (reaffirming that it is the Court’s role to read statutes harmoniously if possible).
Section 28-1-4 (1987) documents the powers and duties of the Human Rights
Commission, see § 28-1-3 (1987) (establishing that Commission), and the Labor
Relations Division, see § 28-1-2(D) (1987) (identifying that Division), including their
responsibility to address discrimination in public education. The statute provides that in
its “endeavor to eliminate prejudice and to further good will,” the Division “in cooperation
with the state department of public education and local boards of education shall
encourage an educational program for all residents of the state, calculated to eliminate
prejudice, its harmful effects and its incompatibility with principles of fair play, equality
and justice.” Section 28-1-4(B)(4) (1987). Therefore, the Legislature intended the
NMHRA to address discrimination in public schools in an “endeavor to eliminate
prejudice.” Id.

{22} The Public Accommodations Act, the predecessor to the NMHRA, defined public
accommodations with a listing of specific, qualifying establishments that did not
explicitly include public schools. 1955 N.M. Laws, ch. 192, § 5. In 1969, the NMHRA
replaced this listing with the definition of a public accommodation: “any establishment
that provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to the public,”
1969 N.M. Laws, ch. 196, § 2.G, a provision that persists in Section 28-1-2(H) (2007).
“[T]he Legislature explicitly amended the wording of the statute to remove the narrow
and specifically enumerated traditional places of public accommodation.” See Elane
Photography, 2012-NMCA-086, ¶ 14 (emphasis added); see also § 28-1-7(F) (2019)
(listing numerous, categorically discriminatory practices prohibited “in any public
accommodation” under the NMHRA).

{23} The “‘language of the federal Civil Rights Act’” and the context of the civil rights
movement that predate the NMHRA support the conclusion that the Legislature did not
intend to limit the definition of a “public accommodation” when it replaced the Public
Accommodations Act’s definition. See Ocana v. American Furniture Co., 2004-NMSC-
018, ¶ 23, 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d 58 (citation omitted). “[W]e may look at federal civil
rights adjudication for guidance in interpreting the NMHRA.” Id. The “federal 1964 Civil
Rights Act” provided that a public accommodation includes ‘[e]stablishments . . .
supported in their activities by [s]tate action.” Johnson, 2023-NMCA-069, ¶ 17
(alterations in original) (citation omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(b) (prohibiting,
under the federal act’s public accommodations subchapter, “discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin” in “places of public
accommodation . . . affecting interstate commerce”). The Legislature would not have
intended for its 1969 definition of a “public accommodation” to restrict the NMHRA’s
protections to protections under the federal definition of “public accommodation” and in
the context of the civil rights movement.

{24} The Legislature’s intent to protect a specific class of people, from a specific form
of discrimination, during a specific time in our state’s history, does not mean that the
Legislature did not have the general intent to prohibit discrimination in public schools.
The unfortunate fact that our state and federal law have sought to prohibit discrimination
against different groups at different points in history does not influence our analysis and,
if considered, would continue to perpetuate historic inequities. 5 Adopting Defendant’s
logic that this Court should not consider race-based history because the NMHRA
protects against other categories of discrimination would mean that we would be limited
to the history of the specific form of discrimination at issue and, for example, would have
a great amount of difficulty proving a legislative intent to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation at the NMHRA’s enactment in 1969. Accordingly, the plain
language of the NMHRA and legislative history do not support Defendant’s argument
that a public school is not a public accommodation, because it existed at the Public
Accommodations Act’s enactment.

{25} In addition, the history of the NMHRA supports our holding that the definition of a
public accommodation is not limited to commercial businesses. The Public
Accommodations Act defined the term with a list of qualifying establishments. This list
was followed by the explicit exclusion of “any institution, club, or place of
accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private.” Public Accommodations Act,
1955 N.M. Laws, ch. 192, § 5. Many of the listed places were commercial businesses,
but the list also included establishments that are traditionally public, like swimming
pools, public libraries, and public transportation. Id. Therefore, the Legislature intended
for the definition to apply to previously unlisted, but not previously excluded,
establishments such as public schools.

{26} Additionally, caselaw does not create such bright line limitations on an
establishment’s commercial nature as Defendants suggest in reliance on Elane
Photography, 2012-NMCA-086. There, the Court of Appeals considered whether a
photography company that refused to photograph a same sex commitment ceremony
was a public accommodation under the NMHRA. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. The Court addressed the

5For example, in 1954, Brown v. Board of Education held that the segregation of public schools based on
race was unconstitutional. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). It was not until 1995 that a federal court explicitly
extended the same equal protection principles to Native American children on the Navajo Nation without
access to a public school. Meyers v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan Sch. Dist., 905 F. Supp. 1544, 1563-64 (D.
Utah 1995).
argument that the “artistic nature” of the company’s services meant that it was not a
public accommodation. Id. ¶ 17. The opinion clarified that the company was a public
accommodation because it did “offer its goods or services to the general public as a part
of modern commercial activity.” Id. Thus, Elane Photography did not impose the
requirement that a public accommodation must be a commercial business, but it
analyzed the application of the NMHRA to a commercial business. 2012-NMCA-086, ¶¶
12, 18 (“[T]his Court should independently evaluate the applicability of the NMHRA in all
future cases.” (emphasis added)).

{27} Adopting the narrow construction of the NMHRA, as advanced by Defendants,
would contravene the Legislature’s intent that the NMHRA combat discrimination and
provide no real remedy for discrimination in public schools. Defendants argue that the
application of the NMHRA to include public schools will hinder important academic
discussions about controversial historical topics due to concerns that academic
discussion veers to discrimination. This argument could be compelling. However, as
one of the first steps in the administrative process, the Human Rights Commission is
tasked with determining whether discrimination has occurred and is equipped to weigh
the facts of a case and the interests of meaningful academic discussions to reach their
determination. See § 28-1-4(A)(1)-(2) (providing that the commission may hear
complaints, issue orders, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, and take testimony); see
also § 28-1-11(E) (stating that the commission “shall make written findings of fact,
conclusions of law[,] and its decision based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of
law” if “the commission finds from the evidence presented at any hearing . . . that the
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory practice”); see also Sonntag v. Shaw,
2001-NMSC-015, ¶ 13, 130 N.M. 238, 22 P.3d 1188 (holding that a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies “before bringing an action in district court” under the
NMHRA). An interpretation that public schools are a public accommodation under the
NMHRA would not “defeat the legislature’s intentions” in the way that refusing to apply
the NMHRA to public schools as a public accommodation would. See generally Trujillo
v. Romero, 1971-NMSC-020, ¶ 18, 82 N.M. 301, 481 P.2d 89 (“We should consider the
consequences of various possible constructions and should not adopt a construction
which would defeat the legislature’s intentions, or lead to absurd results.”).

{28} Absent application of the NMHRA, there is no available remedy for such
discrimination under New Mexico law. The New Mexico Torts Claims Act (TCA) would
not protect against discriminatory acts unless they resulted in “bodily injury, wrongful
death, or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while acting
within the scope of their duties . . . .” See NMSA 1978 § 41-4-6(A) (2007). Providing no
state remedy to students who are the target of discrimination that does not result in the
TCA’s requisite damages would be inconsistent with the purpose of the NMHRA to
eliminate such discrimination. See Keller, 1973-NMSC-048, ¶ 23. We conclude that
“Finding that educational institutions are public accommodations under the [NMHRA]
would be the most logical way to provide a remedy for discrimination by educational
institutions, because no remedy is otherwise expressly provided in New Mexico.” Todd
Heisey, Human Rights Commission v. Board of Regents: Should a University Be
Considered a Public Accommodation under the New Mexico Human Rights Act, 12
N.M. L. Rev. 541, 547-48 (1982).
III. CONCLUSION

{29} We overrule Regents and hold that a public school is a public accommodation
under the plain language of the NMHRA. We therefore affirm the holding of the Court of
Appeals and we remand to the district court for review consistent with this opinion.

{30} IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice