State ex rel. Franchini v. Toulouse Oliver

Office of the
Director New Mexico
Compilation
2022.08.23 Commission
'00'06- 12:58:51
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2022-NMSC-016

Filing Date: June 2, 2022

No. S-1-SC-38977

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel.,
HON. NANCY J. FRANCHINI,
HON. ROBERT DAVID PEDERSON,
HON. BRYAN BIEDSCHEID,
HON. RICHARD JACQUEZ,
As New Mexico State District Court Judges
And Citizens of New Mexico,
THE DISTRICT METROPOLITAN COURT
JUDGES’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,
HON. LINDA ROGERS,
HON. ROSEMARY COSGROVE-AGUILAR,
As Metropolitan Court Judges and
Citizens of the State of New Mexico,

Petitioners,

v.

MAGGIE TOULOUSE OLIVER,
Secretary of State for the
State of New Mexico,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

The Vargas Law Firm, LLC
Ray M. Vargas, II
Albuquerque, NM

for Petitioners

Office of the Secretary of State
Dylan Kenneth Lange, General Counsel
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

InAccord, P.C.
Daniel A. Ivey-Soto
Albuquerque, NM

for Amicus Curiae

OPINION

BOHNHOFF, Judge.

{1} In this case, we address the constitutionality of legislation that staggers retention
elections for New Mexico district and metropolitan court judges. In November 2020,
New Mexico voters approved an amendment to Article XX, Section 3 of the New Mexico
Constitution that authorized the Legislature to enact legislation “to . . . stagger the
election of officers for a particular state, county or district office throughout the state.”
N.M. Const. art. XX, § 3(C). In early 2021, the Legislature passed and the Governor
approved Senate Bill 266, which amended NMSA 1978, Sections 1-26-5 and -6 (2021),
to provide for staggered retention elections of district court and metropolitan court
judges, respectively. S.B. 266, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2021),
https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/21%20Regular/final/SB0266.pdf. Petitioners, sitting district
and metropolitan court judges and their association, brought this mandamus proceeding
to challenge the constitutionality of this legislation. Petitioners contend that Article VI,
Section 33 of the New Mexico Constitution mandates that retention elections of all
district and metropolitan court judges must be held at the same time, and as the more
specific provision, it controls over Article XX, Section 3. Following oral argument on
December 2, 2021, we denied the petition, concluding that amended Article XX, Section
3 authorized the Legislature to stagger the retention election cycles for district and
metropolitan court judges. We issue this opinion to explain our reasoning.

I. JURISDICTION

{2} This Court has original jurisdiction to hear petitions for writs of mandamus. N.M.
Const. art. VI, § 3. Mandamus is a proper remedy to test the constitutionality of a statute
when the petitioner has no “plain, speedy, [or] adequate remedy at law.” Bartlett v.
Cameron, 2014-NMSC-002, ¶ 8, 316 P.3d 889 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 1974-NMSC-059, ¶ 6, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d
975. Mandamus may be used in appropriate circumstances to “prohibit unconstitutional
official action.” State ex rel. Sugg v. Toulouse Oliver, 2020-NMSC-002, ¶ 7, 456 P.3d
1065 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioners grounded their request
for mandamus relief on the fact that, based on the current language of Sections 1-26-5
and -6, Respondent would take action in the near future to place district and
metropolitan court judges on the 2022 general election ballot, action which otherwise
would be unauthorized. Respondent does not contest jurisdiction. We agree that our
jurisdiction was properly invoked to address the constitutionality of Respondent’s
contemplated action.
II. BACKGROUND

{3} Prior to 1988, “our Constitution required partisan election of the entire judiciary,
with the governor filling judicial vacancies by appointment.” State ex rel. Richardson v.
Fifth Jud. Dist. Nominating Comm’n, 2007-NMSC-023, ¶ 16, 141 N.M. 657, 160 P.3d
566 (citations omitted); accord State ex rel. King v. Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶ 6,
356 P.3d 1096. At that time, Article XX, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution
provided that, following the governor’s appointment of a district judge to fill a vacancy,
“such appointee shall hold such office until the next general election. His successor
shall be chosen at such election and shall hold his office until the expiration of the
original term.” (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Swope v. Mechem, 1954-NMSC-011, ¶
22, 58 N.M. 1, 265 P.2d 336, construed this provision to reflect an intent that the terms
of all district judges would be uniform. That is, the terms of all district judges throughout
the State would end at the same time every six years, regardless of when or whether
the seat became vacant or newly occupied, and consequently all district judges would
be subject to re-election at the same time:

[The last sentence of Article XX, Section 4] applies to all vacancies
following an incumbent; assuming the death of an incumbent in the office
of . . . district judge, there can be no doubt that the appointee or his
successor elected at the general election following his appointment serves
only until the termination date of the term of the original incumbent.

This means that, under all equations of vacancy in these offices,
. . . the terms of district judges . . . will begin and end at the same time.

Swope, 1954-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 21-22.

{4} New Mexico’s system for selecting its judges underwent major revision in 1988.
In that year,

the Constitution was amended to institute a merit selection system, in
which the governor now fills judicial vacancies by appointment from a list
of applicants who are evaluated on a variety of merit-based factors and
recommended by a judicial nominating commission. N.M. Const. art. VI,
§§ 35-37. The appointed judge is then subject to one partisan election in
the next general election, after which he or she is subject to nonpartisan
retention election, requiring a fifty-seven percent supermajority to be
retained in office. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 33.

Fifth Jud. Dist. Nominating Comm’n, 2007-NMSC-023, ¶ 16 (footnote omitted).

{5} Article VI, Section 35, which addresses the appointment and initial election of
appellate judges, provides that “[a]ny person appointed [as a Supreme Court justice or
Court of Appeals judge] shall serve until the next general election. That person’s
successor shall be chosen at such election and shall hold the office until the expiration
of the original term.” We have held that pursuant to Article VI, Section 36, which states
that “[e]ach and every provision of Section 35 of Article [VI] of this constitution shall
apply to the district judges nominating committee,” the foregoing language in Article VI,
Section 35 is applicable to district court judges. Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶ 13
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We now similarly conclude that pursuant
to Article VI, Section 37, which provides that “[e]ach and every provision of Section 35
of Article [VI] of this constitution shall apply to the metropolitan court judicial nominating
committee,” that language in Article VI, Section 35 also is applicable to metropolitan
court judges.

{6} In Raphaelson, this Court addressed whether, under the 1988 amendments to
Article VI of our Constitution, a district court judge elected in a partisan election is
subject to retention in the sixth 1 year of his or her predecessor judge’s term or in the
sixth year following the partisan election in which he or she was first elected.
Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶ 1. The Court observed that in Swope, 1954-NMSC-11,
¶ 22, it had concluded that under Article XX, Section 4, “the terms for all district court
judges were designed to be on the same schedule, beginning and ending at the same
time every six years regardless of when or whether the seat became vacant or newly
occupied.” Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶ 23. The Court noted that “[t]he language of
former Article XX, Section 4 is substantially similar to the language of current Article VI,
Section 35.” Id. ¶ 25. The Court then reasoned that Article VI, Sections 33, 35, and 36
should be given the same construction as Article XX, Section 4:

The Swope opinion encapsulates the common understanding and
interpretation of terms of office for district judges, not only at the time, but
up to the successful amendment of the Constitution in 1988. In light of this
Court’s clear holding in Swope, the framers of the 1988 amendments had
a choice. They could have altered the definition of a term of office . . . . But
they did not do so. Far from a change in direction, the 1988 amendments
enshrine the same understanding and interpretation as Swope.

Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶ 27; see also id. ¶ 31. The Court also reiterated the
public purpose, previously noted in Swope, 1954-NMSC-011, ¶ 22, served by this
approach to judicial elections: “It fosters consistency and uniformity thereby avoiding
confusion in the electorate. Both judges and the people who will sit in judgment of their
performance know exactly when that opportunity arises—and when to focus on that
performance—every six years across the state.” Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶ 30.

{7} By 2019, however, the wisdom of continued adherence to a policy of a uniform
date for the retention election of all district and metropolitan judges was being
questioned. The impetus for revisiting the issue was the increase in the number of
district judges in some judicial districts as well as the number of metropolitan judges in
Bernalillo County, the State’s only metropolitan court, and the impact that those
numbers had on election ballots. In 2014, for example, the Bernalillo County general

1Article VI, Subsections 33(C) and (D) prescribe six- and four-year terms for district court judges and
metropolitan court judges, respectively.
election ballot included twenty district judges and twelve metropolitan judges who were
subject to retention election. N.M. Sec’y of State, Canvass of Results of General
Election Held on November 4, 2014 – State of New Mexico. 2 In 2018, the County’s
general election ballot included eighteen metropolitan court judges who were subject to
retention election, and in 2020 the ballot included seventeen district court judges who
were subject to retention election. N.M. Sec’y of State, Canvass of Results of General
Election Held on November 6, 2018 – State of New Mexico; 3 N.M. Sec’y of State,
Canvass of Results of General Election Held on November 3, 2020 – State of New
Mexico. 4 In theory, in 2026, twenty-seven district court judges and nineteen
metropolitan court judges could be on the County’s general election ballot. This
development, which would contribute to lengthier ballots printed with smaller fonts,
generated concern among legislators and election administrators. See, e.g., Verified
Response of the Secretary of State filed herein at 2 (“[V]oting is very different today
than it was in 1954. Now ballot crowding, voter fatigue, and high costs of elections are
the major concerns of every election administrator . . . .”); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Legislative Sponsors at 29-30, State ex rel. Sommer v. Oliver, S-1-SC-37785 (N.M. July
18, 2019) (discussing prospect that absent staggered retention elections for district and
metropolitan court judges, the addition of forty-six retention questions to the Bernalillo
County general election ballot every twelve years could “have the potential to
overwhelm voters”).

{8} The Legislature attempted to address these concerns in 2019 when it passed
and the Governor approved House Bill 407, which included the Nonpartisan Judicial
Retention Act, codified at NMSA 1978, §§ 1-26-1 to -6 (2019, amended 2021). H.B.
407, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019),
https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20Regular/final/HB0407.pdf. That Act generally
provided for staggered retention elections of Supreme Court justices and Court of
Appeals, district court, and metropolitan court judges. In particular, Section 1-26-5(B)
(2019) provided:

Terms of office for positions on the district court in each judicial
district shall be staggered, as follows:

(1) the term of office for division 1 and for every third division
number thereafter shall expire in 2020 and every six years thereafter;

(2) the term of office for division 2 and for every third division
number thereafter shall expire in 2022 and every six years thereafter; and

2Available at https://www.sos.state.nm.us/voting-and-elections/election-results/past-election-results-2014/
(last visited April 22, 2022) (follow the “2014 Statewide General Election Results Statewide Summary”
hyperlink).
3Available at https://www.sos.state.nm.us/voting-and-elections/election-results/past-election-results-2018/
(last visited April 22, 2022) (follow the “2018 General Election Results Statewide Summary” hyperlink).
4Available at https://www.sos.state.nm.us/voting-and-elections/election-results/election-results-2020/ (last
visited April 22, 2022) (follow the “2020 General Election Candidate Summary Results Report” hyperlink).
(3) the term of office for division 3 and for every third division
number thereafter shall expire in 2024 and every six years thereafter.

In similar manner, Section 1-26-6(B) (2019) provided for staggering the expiration of the
terms of office of metropolitan court judges in 2022 and 2024 and every four years
thereafter.

{9} Soon thereafter, certain district and metropolitan court judges brought a
mandamus action challenging the constitutionality of Sections 1-26-5 and -6 (2019) as
impermissibly extending their terms of office. See Verified Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, Sommer, S-1-SC-37785 (N.M. July 2, 2019). In Sugg, 2020-NMSC-002, ¶¶
1, 13, we agreed with the petitioning judges and found that the statutes were
unconstitutional. 5 However, in that case the constitutional infirmity at issue was not
grounded in the conflict between the mandate of uniform judicial elections found in
Article VI, Sections 33 and 35, and the legislation’s provision for staggering those
elections, see id. ¶ 11, and we therefore had no occasion to revisit Swope or
Raphaelson. Rather, “the narrow but important question” that we addressed was the
Legislature’s authority to alter terms of office and thus election cycles that are
established by the Constitution: “whether the challenged provisions of HB 407, in
delaying [the p]etitioners’ election cycles and extending—either expressly or . . . by
necessary implication—their term limits, exceeded the Legislature’s authority.” Sugg,
2020-NMSC-002, ¶ 11. Following extensive discussion of case law from other
jurisdictions, see id. ¶¶ 13-22, we concluded that, whether characterized as extending
terms or deferring elections, Sections 1-26-5 and -6 (2019) were unconstitutional:

As to the petitioning judges . . . , the Legislature’s attempts to modify their
election cycles contravened clear and unambiguous constitutional
mandates. Specifically, in requiring district and metropolitan court judges
to face retention or rejection at general elections every sixth and fourth
year, respectively, the framers of our Constitution evinced a clear intent to
establish outer time limits by which retention elections for these classes of
judges must be held.

Sugg, 2020-NMSC-002, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We
nevertheless suggested the Legislature could resolve the problem by proposing a
constitutional amendment that would authorize the invalidated legislation: “Assuming, as
appears to be the case, that the Legislature wishes to pursue the election-related policy
goals sought to be effectuated through the portions of HB 407 that we strike down
today, it is its prerogative to propose, and the voters[’] to adopt, a constitutional
amendment to that end.” Id. ¶ 23.

{10} The Court’s invitation was accepted. In its 2020 session, the Legislature adopted
House Joint Resolution 8, which proposed to amend Article XX, Section 3 of the

5In Sugg, 2020-NMSC-002, we also addressed and upheld related petitions challenging, on the same
grounds, the constitutionality of other provisions of House Bill 407 that provided for staggered elections of
county commissioners, other county officers, and district attorneys by altering the terms of those offices.
Constitution by, among other changes, adding the following language as part of
Subsection C:

The term of a state, county or district officer may be adjusted by law to
align or stagger the election of officers for a particular state, county or
district office throughout the state. Any such adjustment shall require a
legislative finding that the adjustment is to provide for consistency in the
timing of elections for that office or to balance the number of offices
appearing on the ballot.

H.J.R. 8, 54th Leg., 2nd Sess. (N.M. 2020),
https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/20%20Regular/final/HJR08.pdf. Thereafter, at the
November general election, the voters adopted this amending language by a margin of
503,308 in favor to 277,744 against. Canvass of Returns of General Election Held on
November 3, 2020 – State of New Mexico, supra.

{11} Finally, in 2021, the Legislature passed and the Governor approved Senate Bill
266, which amended Sections 1-26-5 and -6 (2019). S.B. 266. The legislation re-
adopted nearly verbatim the language of Sections 1-26-5(B) and -6(B), 6 quoted above.
Section II, paragraph 9, supra. The legislation also included, as a temporary provision
that was not codified, the following legislative finding:

Pursuant to Article 20, Section 3 of the constitution of New Mexico,
the legislature finds that the judicial term adjustments provided for district
court judges in Section 1 of this 2021 act and for metropolitan court judges
in Section 2 of this 2021 act are needed to:

A. balance the number of judicial positions appearing on the
ballot in any one election cycle;

B. enable more effective evaluation of judges by the judicial
performance evaluation commission; and

C. create greater continuity of judges at the trial court level by
not having all judges up for judicial retention in the same election cycle.

S.B. 266, § 3.

III. PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT

{12} Petitioners’ argument is straightforward. Article VI, Section 33 of the New Mexico
Constitution, as construed by Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶ 28, specifically requires
that retention elections of all district judges statewide occur at the same time. Article XX,
Section 3, as amended in 2020, generally authorizes the Legislature to stagger the

6The only differences between the 2019 and 2021 versions of these two sections are that the years of the
expiring terms were updated in the 2021 amendment.
dates of elections of district officers. If district and metropolitan court judges are “district
officers” within the meaning of Article XX, Section 3, then the two provisions are in
conflict. Citing the principle of constitutional construction that, where two constitutional
provisions are in irreconcilable conflict, the general provision must yield to the specific
provision, Petitioners assert that Article VI, Section 33 must control district and
metropolitan court judge retention elections, and as a result Sections 1-26-5 and -6 are
unconstitutional.

IV. PRINCIPLES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS

{13} The primary goal of our interpretation of the Constitution is to identify and give
effect to the intent of its framers and the electorate. State v. Ameer, 2018-NMSC-030, ¶
9, 458 P.3d 390; see also Greene v. Esquibel, 1954-NMSC-039, ¶ 29, 58 N.M. 429, 272
P.2d 330 (“[T]he polestar in the construction of Constitutions is the intention of the
makers and adopters.”). In Asplund v. Alarid, this Court noted the challenge in
discerning intent when constitutional provisions are in conflict:

Acts passed which conflict with the Constitution are invalid. But the
Constitution itself may be amended in the manner provided by it; and
when an amendment has been duly made, it becomes as much a part of
the Constitution as any other part thereof. It can hardly be asserted that
one part of the Constitution is unconstitutional, because it is not in perfect
accord with another part of the same instrument.

1923-NMSC-079, ¶ 11, 29 N.M. 129, 219 P. 786 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Prior decisions of this Court have articulated several principles to address this
situation and construe constitutional provisions which are claimed to be in conflict.

{14} First, if possible we will construe constitutional provisions in a harmonious
manner that will avoid any conflict. Hem v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2015-NMSC-024, ¶ 23,
353 P.3d 1219; accord State ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Advisory Comm.,
2017-NMSC-025, ¶ 19, 401 P.3d 734.

{15} Second, where a constitutional amendment conflicts with a pre-existing provision
of the Constitution, and one provision “is not readily identifiable as the more specific of
the two” provisions, the later provision governs “‘as the latest expression of the
sovereign will of the people, and as an implied modification pro tanto of the original
provision.’” City of Albuquerque v. N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 1979-NMSC-095, ¶ 6, 93
N.M. 719, 605 P.2d 227 (quoting Asplund, 1923-NMSC-079, ¶ 11); see also Denish v.
Johnson, 1996-NMSC-005, ¶ 29, 121 N.M. 280, 910 P.2d 914 (same).

{16} Third, and as a qualification to the second principle of recency, if one provision is
identifiable as the more specific of the two, “‘the specific section governs over the
general regardless of priority of enactment.’” Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, ¶ 29 (emphasis
added) (quoting N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 1979-NMSC-095, ¶ 5). The rationale for the
general/specific rule is that the enacting body “is presumed not to have intended a
conflict between two [provisions] and because [its] attention is more particularly directed
to the relevant subject matter in deliberating upon the special law.” State v. Santillanes,
2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 7, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). 7

{17} In New Mexico, the general/specific rule of constitutional construction can be
traced to statutory construction principles. See N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 1979-NMSC-
095, ¶5 (citing State v. Blevins, 1936-NMSC-052, ¶ 7, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 208; Saiz v.
City of Albuquerque, 1971-NMCA-101, ¶ 9, 82 N.M. 746, 487 P.2d 174, overruled on
other grounds by Galvan v. City of Albuquerque, 1975-NMSC-005, ¶ 14, 87 N.M. 235,
531 P.2d 1208; Santa Fe Downs, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 1973-NMCA-064, ¶ 11, 85
N.M. 115, 509 P.2d 882); see also Fifth Jud. Dist. Nominating Comm’n, 2007-NMSC-
023, ¶ 17 (“[R]ules of statutory construction . . . apply equally to constitutional
construction.”); Postal Fin. Co. v. Sisneros, 1973-NMSC-029, ¶ 8, 84 N.M. 724, 507
P.2d 785 (“The usual principles governing the construction of statutes also apply to the
interpretation of constitutions.”).

{18} The general/specific rule is subject to an exception: “[T]o the extent of any
necessary repugnancy between them, the special statute, or the one dealing with the
common subject matter in a minute way, will prevail over the general statute, unless it
appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling.” Blevins, 1936-
NMSC-052, ¶ 7 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 7 (“[I]f two statutes dealing with the same subject
conflict, [then] the more specific statute will prevail over the more general statute absent
a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary.” (emphasis added)). More
generally, we have noted that

the general/specific statute rule should not be applied in a rigid,
mechanistic fashion. . . . [T]he general/specific statute rule is merely a tool
of statutory interpretation and is not an end to itself. The general/specific
statute rule should not be applied in a manner that ignores . . . the overall
goal of statutory construction to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the Legislature.

Id. ¶ 17 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

{19} The same considerations that underlie adoption of the clear intent exception to
the general/specific rule of statutory construction counsel its adoption in the context of
constitutional construction. See Block v. Vigil-Giron, 2004-NMSC-003, ¶ 4, 135 N.M. 24,
84 P.3d 72 (“[O]ur primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature which

7While three decisions of this Court have articulated the rule that the specific constitutional provision
prevails over the general one, in none of these cases has the rule actually been applied. In New Mexico
State Corp. Commission, neither of the two provisions in question could be characterized as more
specific than the other, and the conflict was resolved instead on the basis of the principle of recency.
1979-NMSC-095, ¶ 6. In Denish, the two provisions at issue were not irreconcilable and could be
construed in a harmonious manner. 1996-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 30-33. And in League of Women Voters, the two
conflicting provisions again were resolved on the basis of the principle of recency. 2017-NMSC-025, ¶ 23.
proposed [the constitutional provision] and the voters of New Mexico who approved it.”).
If evidence indicates that the purpose of a later-adopted constitutional provision,
whether general or specific, was to accomplish an implicit repeal of an earlier provision,
we will give effect to the later-adopted provision. Cf. Galvan, 1975-NMSC-005, ¶ 11
(noting that “repeals by implication,” while not favored, “will be declared where the last
statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show it was
intended to cover the whole subject, and therefore to displace the prior statute” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).

V. THE 2020 AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE XX, SECTION 3 IMPLICITLY
REPEALED ARTICLE VI, SECTION 33’S REQUIREMENT THAT ALL
DISTRICT AND METROPOLITAN COURT JUDGES STAND FOR RETENTION
ELECTION AT THE SAME TIME

{20} How do these principles inform our analysis of the constitutionality of Sections 1-
26-5 and -6? Initially, we consider whether “district officer,” as used in Article XX,
Section 3(C), encompasses district and metropolitan court judges. Judges hold public
offices and thus are public officers as opposed to employees. See N.M. Const. art. VI, §
19 (barring Supreme Court justices and Court of Appeals, district, and metropolitan
court judges from holding any office other than a judicial office); Perea v. Bd. of
Torrance Cnty. Comm’rs, 1967-NMSC-056, ¶ 8, 77 N.M. 543, 425 P.2d 308 (outlining
the characteristics of a public officer and stating that judges are public and judicial
officers); see generally 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees §§ 9, 19 (2018)
(stating that judges are public and judicial officers). In New Mexico, district court judges
hold office within specific judicial districts, N.M. Const. art. VI, § 12. Similarly,
metropolitan court judges hold their offices within a “metropolitan court district.” N.M.
Const. art. VI, § 38; NMSA 1978, § 34-8A-1 (2010). “It is presumed that words
appearing in a constitution have been used according to their plain, natural, and usual
signification and import.” Clark v. Mitchell, 2016-NMSC-005, ¶ 12, 363 P.3d 1213
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We conclude that district court judges
and metropolitan court judges are district officers within the meaning of Article XX,
Section 3. As a result, Article VI, Sections 33, 35, 36, and 37, and Article XX, Section 3
irreconcilably conflict and cannot be harmonized: Article XX, Section 3 authorizes
staggering of terms contrary to this Court’s interpretation of Article VI, Sections 33, 35,
36, and 37 as requiring all district and metropolitan court judges to stand for retention at
the same time. See Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 28, 31; Swope, 1954-NMSC-011,
¶ 22. Because Article VI, Section 33 focuses solely on judicial retention elections, it is
the more specific of the two provisions, and therefore in the absence of clear intent to
the contrary its provisions would control.

{21} The succession of legislative and judicial developments during the recent past as
described above is evidence of an intent that the 2020 amendment to Article XX,
Section 3 controls over the requirement in Article VI, Sections 33, 35. 36, and 37, as
interpreted by this Court, that all district and metropolitan court judges must stand for
retention election at the same time.
In the interpretation of a statute, changes made by the act in the previous
state of the law may be given consideration. Indeed, one of the recognized
rules of construction of statutes is to look to the state of the law when the
statute was enacted in order to see for what it was intended as a
substitute.

Bettini v. City of Las Cruces, 1971-NMSC-054, ¶ 12, 82 N.M. 633, 485 P.2d 967
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see, e.g., Clark, 2016-NMSC-005, ¶ 16
(relying on “the history and context of Article VI, Section 33” of the New Mexico
Constitution to conclude that it did not reflect “any intent by the framers to prohibit
nonretained judges from applying for and being appointed to judicial vacancies”); Vigil-
Giron, 2004-NMSC-003, ¶ 10 (“Finally, any uncertainty as to the legislative intent behind
the constitutional provision is removed by the implementing legislation, enacted . . .
immediately following the adoption of the constitutional provision.”). See generally
Raphaelson, 2015-NMSC-028, ¶ 22 (“The historical purposes of the constitutional
provision are instructive in determining the obvious spirit . . . utilized in [its drafting].”
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{22} In particular, statutory changes—and thus, pursuant to the foregoing authority, a
constitutional amendment—may be interpreted in light of court decisions that prompted
the amendment. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Trujillo, 1986-NMCA-052, ¶ 21, 104 N.M. 379, 721
P.2d 1310 (“The statute [narrowing the scope of tavernkeeper liability regarding alcohol
sales to potentially intoxicated persons] was an obvious response to Lopez [v. Maez,
1982-NMSC-103, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269], . . . [and w]e would contravene
legislative intent were we to interpret the statute as broadening the scope of
tavernkeeper’s liability.”), implicitly overruled on other grounds as recognized in
Mendoza v. Tamaya Enters., Inc., 2010-NMCA-074, ¶ 20, 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d 903;
Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 821 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Wash. 1991) (en
banc) (construing statute regarding insurance proceeds exemptions in light of court
decisions that preceded its amendment); cf. Brown v. Shell Oil Co., 339 N.W.2d 709,
711 (Mich. App. 1983) (“Amending legislation should be liberally construed so as to
correct defects in predecessor statutes.”).

{23} In 2019, the Legislature enacted Sections 1-26-5 and -6 (2019) as part of an
attempt to address concerns about “ballot integrity” and “voter fatigue” by staggering the
terms of district and metropolitan court judges along with other officials. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae Legislative Sponsors at 29-30, Sommer, S-1-SC-37785 (N.M. July 18,
2019). In 2020, in Sugg, 2020-NMSC-002, ¶ 23, we invalidated the 2019 legislation for
lack of constitutional authorization, but invited the Legislature to propose and submit to
the voters an amendment to the Constitution that would authorize such staggered
elections. The following year, the Legislature passed House Joint Resolution 8, and the
voters subsequently approved the amendment to Article XX, Section 3. In 2021, the
Legislature with the Governor’s approval amended Sections 1-26-5 and -6 (2019) to
reinstate the provisions for staggered elections of district and metropolitan court judges.
Granted, the Legislature could have made its intent unmistakable by expressly stating in
the amendatory language of Article XX, Section 3 that it applied to district and
metropolitan court judges. This sequence of events nevertheless reflects with sufficient
and reasonable clarity that the 2020 amendment to Article XX, Section 3 was intended
to implicitly repeal the requirement in Article VI, Sections 33, 35, 36, and 37, that all
district and metropolitan court judges stand for retention at the same time. We therefore
hold that Article XX, Section 3 authorizes the Legislature to stagger the retention terms
of district and metropolitan court judges and there is no other constitutional bar to such
staggering.

VI. CONCLUSION

{24} Article XX, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution, as amended by the voters
in 2020, authorized the Legislature to amend Sections 1-26-5 and -6 (2019) to stagger
retention elections for district and metropolitan court judges. Accordingly, the petition for
writ of mandamus is denied.

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge
Retired, sitting by designation

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice

J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge
Sitting by designation

RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice,
Retired, sitting by designation