State v. Johnson

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: June 2, 2025

No. S-1-SC-39827

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON,

Defendant-Respondent.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY
Daniel A. Bryant, District Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General,
Van Snow, Assistant Solicitor General
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

DECISION

VARGAS, Justice.

{1} This Court granted the State’s Rule 12-502 NMRA petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing Defendant Christopher Johnson’s
conviction for aggravated assault on Sergeant David Warren of the Lincoln County
Sheriff’s Office (LCSO). State v. Johnson, A-1-CA-39266, mem. op. ¶ 17 (N.M. Ct. App.
Feb. 13, 2023) (nonprecedential). The Court of Appeals, acting sua sponte, determined
that there was insufficient evidence of Sergeant Warren’s actual belief that Defendant
was about to batter him, as required for the conviction. Id. ¶ 17.

{2} Contrary to the Court of Appeals, we hold that the State provided sufficient
evidence of Sergeant Warren’s actual belief that Defendant was about to batter him.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals with regard to Defendant’s aggravated
assault on Sergeant Warren and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.1

I. BACKGROUND

{3} On May 9, 2019, a law enforcement officer with the New Mexico Livestock Board
observed Defendant drift onto the right shoulder of the highway, hitting the rumble strip
several times. The officer attempted to perform a traffic stop, but Defendant pulled away
and led police on a chase.

{4} During the police pursuit, Sergeant Warren set up a spike strip to stop
Defendant’s van. Defendant approached the strip at a speed of approximately 85 to 90
miles per hour, then veered out of his lane towards Sergeant Warren. According to
testimony from Sergeant Warren, Defendant missed him by less than one foot, coming
so close that Sergeant Warren felt the air pressure as Defendant’s van sped by him.
LCSO Deputy Evans testified that, as Defendant approached Sergeant Warren, he
yelled over the radio that “[Defendant]’s coming right at ya—[Defendant]’s going to run
you over, everybody get out of the way!” LCSO Sherriff Robert Shepperd similarly
testified that he saw Defendant almost hit Sergeant Warren.

{5} Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault on Sergeant Warren, contrary to
NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-2 (1971).2

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

{6} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts “must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable
inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” State v.
Galindo, 2018-NMSC-021, ¶ 12, 415 P.3d 494. In a sufficiency of the evidence review,
appellate courts determine “whether substantial evidence of either a direct or
circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with
respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶
5, 149 N.M. 185, 246 P.3d 1057. “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Atencio,
2024-NMSC-022, ¶ 59, 557 P.3d 118. This standard of review is “deferential to the

1We exercise our discretion to resolve Defendant’s appeal by non-precedential decision. See Rule 12-
405(B)(1) NMRA (providing that this Court may dispose of a case by order or decision rather than formal
opinion where the “issues presented have been previously decided” by our appellate courts).
2Defendant was also convicted of numerous additional crimes for other conduct during this incident, none
of which are relevant to this decision. We discuss these additional crimes and other conduct no further.
jury’s findings,” as appellate courts do not “enjoy the same exposure to the evidence
and witnesses as the jury at trial.” Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5.

B. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence for a Reasonable Jury To
Conclude Sergeant Warren Actually Believed Defendant Was About To
Batter Him

{7} “Jury instructions become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the
evidence is to be measured.” State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 18, 278 P.3d
517 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Based on UJI 14-2202
NMRA, the jury was instructed that in order to convict Defendant of aggravated assault
on Sergeant Warren, it must find, among other things, “[t]he defendant’s conduct
caused Sergeant Warren to believe the defendant was about to intrude on Sergeant
Warren’s bodily integrity or personal safety by touching or applying force to Sergeant
Warren in a rude, insolent or angry manner.”

{8} Before the Court of Appeals, Defendant did not challenge whether there was
sufficient evidence of Sergeant Warren’s belief, but instead argued that there was
insufficient evidence of a different essential element of the crime. Nevertheless the
Court of Appeals determined, sua sponte, that Defendant’s conviction for aggravated
assault on Sergeant Warren was not supported by sufficient evidence with respect to
Sergeant Warren’s actual belief that Defendant was about to batter him.3 See Johnson,
A-1-CA-39266, ¶ 17; see also Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 15 (stating that
aggravated assault on a peace officer requires “some evidence of the victim’s actual
belief that he was in danger of receiving an immediate battery” (brackets omitted)
(emphasis added)).

{9} The Court of Appeals’ reasoning focused on Sergeant Warren’s testimony that,
as characterized by the Court of Appeals, “he did not think Defendant was trying to hit
him but was only trying to avoid the spikes.” Johnson, A-1-CA-39266, ¶ 17. Based on
this statement, the Court of Appeals concluded that “no rational trier of fact could have
found [the actual belief element] of the crime of aggravated assault on a peace officer
was proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals vacated Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault on Sergeant Warren. Id.

{10} The State argues before this Court that there was more than enough evidence
for a reasonable jury to conclude Sergeant Warren actually believed that Defendant was
about to hit him with the van and that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded

3Appellate courts generally “rely on adversarial briefing to decide legal issues and avoid constructing
legal arguments that the parties, intentionally or otherwise, have not presented.” Pirtle v. Legis. Council
Comm. of N.M. Legislature, 2021-NMSC-026, ¶ 58, 492 P.3d 586. When courts deviate from this formula,
it “creates a strain on judicial resources and a substantial risk of error. It is of no benefit either to the
parties or to future litigants for this Court to promulgate case law based on our own speculation rather
than the parties’ carefully considered arguments,” Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶
70, 309 P.3d 53, and we caution our Court of Appeals to refrain from deciding issues the parties have not
presented.
otherwise. The State relies on testimony from Sergeant Warren and two other law
enforcement officer witnesses that the Court of Appeals failed to consider.

{11} Defendant responds that the testimony from Sergeant Warren offered by the
State indicates Sergeant Warren’s belief at the time of trial, rather than his belief at the
time of the incident. To support its argument that the Court of Appeals’ decision should
be affirmed, Defendant points to Sergeant Warren’s testimony that he did not think
Defendant’s van was directed at him and when he saw the car coming, he moved out of
the way and took cover. But Defendant’s intent is not relevant to the inquiry into
Sergeant Warren’s actual belief of imminent battery by Defendant. See State v.
Morales, 2002-NMCA-052, ¶ 36, 132 N.M. 146, 45 P.3d 406 (“To convict [the
d]efendant of aggravated assault on a peace officer, the State was not required to prove
that [the d]efendant intended to injure or even frighten [the officer].” (emphasis added)),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d
110. Instead, the jury must determine whether “[the d]efendant’s conduct caused [the
officer] to believe [the d]efendant was about to hit him with his vehicle.” Id. ¶ 36
(emphasis added.)

{12} We conclude the State presented ample evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude Sergeant Warren actually believed that Defendant was about to hit him with
the van. In fact, one of the first questions asked during Sergeant Warren’s direct
examination was: “[w]ere you put in any danger when the van drove by?” Sergeant
Warren responded “[a]bsolutely.” Sergeant Warren went on to explain that the “[v]an
swerved . . . towards [him] to veer around the spikes. . . . That’s the only direction
[Defendant] really could have gone to get away from [the spikes].” Sergeant Warren
testified that “[t]his vehicle was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and when
[Defendant] veered to go around the spikes he just nearly ran over me” coming within “a
foot of hitting me.” Moreover, Sergeant Warren testified that in the moment his
“adrenaline was . . . high,” which is a commonly known bodily response to perceived
danger or stress. See Melissa Hamilton, The Reliability of Assault Victims’ Immediate
Accounts: Evidence from Trauma Studies, 26 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 269, 286-288 (2015)
(identifying research finding that adrenaline is released into the bloodstream to engage
the body’s fight-or-flight response during traumatic situations). Finally, Sergeant Warren
testified that, on reflection, this was one of the top ten most dangerous situations in his
entire career.

{13} And, as in Arrendondo, the State also provided testimony from bystander
witnesses from which the jury could infer Sergeant Warren’s actual belief that he was
about to be battered by Defendant. See Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 16 (concluding
that there was sufficient evidence of the victim’s subjective fear based on bystander
testimony where the bystander—who was with the victim—heard gunshots). LCSO
Deputy Evans testified that, as Defendant approached Sergeant Warren, Deputy Evans
yelled over the radio “[Defendant]’s coming right at ya—[Defendant]’s going to run you
over, everybody get out of the way!” LCSO Sherriff Robert Shepperd similarly testified
that he saw Defendant almost hit Sergeant Warren.
{14} Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold
that Sergeant Warren’s testimony, buttressed by that of Deputy Evans and Sheriff
Shepperd, was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude Sergeant Warren
actually believed that Defendant was about to batter him. See e.g., State v. Soto, A-1-
CA-37674, mem. op. ¶¶ 11-13 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2020) (nonprecedential) (holding
there was sufficient evidence for the defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon despite the victim affirmatively stating she was not afraid because she
“felt like [she] was protected by God” when the defendant told victim that he would kill
her, pointed a gun at her, and then fired two shots in the air); see also State v. Montoya,
2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52, 345 P.3d 1056 (stating that appellate courts “do not evaluate
the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which is
consistent with a finding of innocence, and we do not weigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the fact finder so long as there is sufficient evidence to support
the verdict” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{15} We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals with regard to Defendant’s
aggravated assault on Sergeant Warren and remand for proceedings consistent with
this decision.

{16} IT IS SO ORDERED.

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

WE CONCUR:

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice