Padilla v. Rios

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: October 31, 2024

No. S-1-SC-39373

DAVID PADILLA,

Petitioner,

v.

HECTOR RIOS, Warden,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Karen L. Townsend, District Judge

Law Offices of the Public Defender
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellant Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Raul Torrez, Attorney General
Teresa Ryan, Assistant Solicitor General
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

DISPOSITIONAL ORDER

PER CURIAM.

{1} This matter came before the Court on certiorari from the district court’s summary
dismissal of Petitioner David Padilla’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Rule 12-
501 NMRA (governing petitions for writs of certiorari seeking review of the denial of
habeas corpus petitions by the district court).
{2} The Court reviewed the parties’ briefing, the record below, and is otherwise fully
informed on the issues and applicable law.

{3} The Court invokes its discretion to dispose of this matter by non-precedential
order. See Rule 12-405(B) NMRA (providing the circumstances for when “[t]he appellate
court may dispose of a case by non-precedential order”).

IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED THAT:

{4} Petitioner filed a habeas petition requesting that the district court resentence him
and only impose a two-year parole term as explicitly set forth in the plea agreement,
which provided for “fifteen (15) years [in custody] . . . followed by two (2) years Parole.”
Petitioner argued below that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
because, after accepting the plea, the district court sentenced Petitioner to an
indeterminate parole term of five-to-twenty years and later amended the parole term sua
sponte to a term of not less than five years and up to Petitioner’s natural life, as required
by statute. See NMSA 1978 § 31-21-10.1(A)(2) (2007).

{5} Petitioner argues the district court erred by summarily dismissing his petition
under Rule 5-802(I)(1) NMRA. Rule 5-802(I)(1) allows summary dismissal of a
successive petition when any claim was “not raised in a prior petition unless
fundamental error has occurred.” (Emphasis added.) We agree with Petitioner.
Summary dismissal was improper under Rule 5-802(I)(1) because Petitioner raised the
same claim in a prior petition filed in 2017. In that petition, he alleged that the district
court illegally enhanced his sentence because the agreed upon two-year parole term in
the plea agreement was subsequently amended to a parole term of five years to twenty
years and, ultimately, to a parole term of five years to natural life. The district court did
not reach the merits of Petitioner’s 2017 claim because it confused the challenge of the
illegal enhancement of the parole term with a challenge against the legality of the parole
term itself, finding that the parole term was not an illegal sentence because a parole
term of five years to natural life “comports with statute.”

{6} While this appeal was pending, we decided State v. Romero, 2023-NMSC-008,
538 P.3d 640. In Romero we concluded the defendant was prejudiced when the district
court accepted a plea agreement with an illegal two-year parole term and like this case,
the district court later imposed a harsher sentence to reflect the mandatory parole term
of “not less than five years and up to natural life.” Id. ¶¶ 50, 52. We held that the district
court erred in not providing the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea and we
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to allow the defendant the
opportunity to withdraw his plea. Id. ¶¶ 4, 50, 52.

{7} Romero supports the same relief in this case. We therefore hold that Petitioner
should be afforded an opportunity to withdraw his plea.

{8} NOW THEREFORE, WE REVERSE the district court’s summary dismissal of
Petitioner’s habeas petition and WE REMAND with instructions to allow Petitioner to
withdraw his plea, and for such further proceedings as the State may wish to pursue.
{9} IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice