State v. Coleman

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: October 31, 2024

No. S-1-SC-39752

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

MARCUS COLEMAN,

Defendant-Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Robert Aragon, District Judge

Raul Torrez, Attorney General
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General
Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Harrison & Hart, LLC
Nicholas T. Hart
Albuquerque, NM

for Respondent

DISPOSITIONAL ORDER OF REVERSAL

PER CURIAM.

{1} This appeal came before the Court upon the State’s petition for writ of certiorari
to review the Court of Appeals memorandum opinion in the matter of State v. Coleman,
A-1-CA-40166, mem. op. ¶ 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2023) (nonprecedential).
{2} The Court has reviewed the briefs of the parties, and is otherwise fully informed
of the issues and applicable law.

{3} The Court has chosen to exercise its discretion under Rule 12-405(B) NMRA to
dispose of this case by nonprecedential dispositional order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:

{4} The only question before this Court on the State’s appeal is whether Deputy
Salazar had reasonable suspicion under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution to expand his investigation beyond his initial traffic stop of Defendant
Marcus Coleman to inquire whether Defendant was in possession of drugs. This is a
legal question that we review de novo. State v. Vasquez-Salas, 2023-NMSC-023, ¶ 9,
538 P.3d 40.

{5} The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s suppression of the drug
evidence resulting from the stop, concluding that “the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to question Defendant about his travel plans and history.” Coleman, A-1-CA-
40166, mem. op. ¶ 6. The Court of Appeals reasoned “that the officer’s articulated
suspicions for expanding the scope of the traffic stop were formed based in large part
on Defendant’s answers to the officer’s questions about travel,” but “the officer was
required to have reasonable suspicion prior to asking Defendant about the purpose of
his trip” and other travel-related questions. Id. ¶ 9.

{6} “Article II, Section 10 requires that all questions asked during the investigation of
a traffic stop be reasonably related to the initial reason for the stop. Unrelated questions
are permissible when supported by independent reasonable suspicion, for reasons of
officer safety, or if the interaction has developed into a consensual encounter.” State v.
Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 55, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.

{7} The parties agree that Deputy Salazar expanded the scope of the traffic stop
when he began to ask Defendant questions about his travel to and from California. See
Coleman, A-1-CA-40166, mem. op. ¶ 2. Therefore, under Article II, Section 10, Deputy
Salazar’s expansion of the stop must be supported by independent reasonable
suspicion.

{8} “Reasonable suspicion exists when the officer becomes aware of specific
articulable facts that, judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe
criminal activity occurred or was occurring.” Vasquez-Salas, 2023-NMSC-023, ¶ 10
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In analyzing whether an officer has
reasonable suspicion, the trial court must look at the totality of the circumstances, and in
doing so it may consider the officer’s experience and specialized training to make
inferences and deductions from the cumulative information available to the officer.”
State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 410 P.3d 186 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
{9} We conclude that, as a matter of law, reasonable suspicion supported Deputy
Salazar’s expansion of the stop. Articulable facts existed that would lead a reasonable
officer to believe that criminal activity had occurred or was occurring. The specific
articulable facts available to Deputy Salazar at the time that he expanded the stop were
(1) the smell of marijuana emitting from the rental vehicle and then from Defendant’s
person; (2) the rental agreement which indicated that the vehicle had been rented by
the passenger in California the day before and was to be returned to Maryland in two
days; and (3) that the passenger volunteered information about being a veteran and that
they had been visiting veteran friends in California.

{10} In fact, the smell of marijuana alone was likely a sufficient basis for Deputy
Salazar to form a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, contrary to the Court of
Appeals’ analysis, Coleman, A-1-CA-40166, mem. op. ¶ 6. See State v. Candelaria,
2011-NMCA-001, ¶ 21, 149 N.M. 125, 245 P.3d 69 (holding that, following a routine
traffic stop, the officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop
because he smelled marijuana); State v. Randy J., 2011-NMCA-105, ¶ 34, 150 N.M.
683, 265 P.3d 734 (same); State v. Garcia-Ponce, A-1-CA-35369, mem. op. ¶ 10 (N.M.
Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2017) (nonprecedential) (same); cf. State v. Capps, 1982-NMSC-009,
¶ 12, 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484 (“The smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the
probable cause requirement for a warrantless search.”).1 Nevertheless, the smell of
marijuana was not the only fact known to Deputy Salazar at the time that he expanded
the stop. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances and considering the Deputy’s
testimony about his experience and specialized training in interdiction and narcotics
recognition, each of the facts available to Deputy Salazar before he questioned
Defendant about his travel were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.

{11} We agree with the Court of Appeals and Defendant’s contention that, at the
suppression hearing, Deputy Salazar should not have relied on facts discovered after
the expansion of the stop to “justify expanding the scope of the detention to ask the
questions in the first place.” Coleman, A-1-CA-40166, mem. op. ¶¶ 9-11; State v. Jason
L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (“Reasonable suspicion must exist
at the inception of the seizure” and “[t]he officer cannot rely on facts which arise as a
result of the encounter.” (citations omitted)). But our de novo legal determination of
whether reasonable suspicion existed does not turn on the quality of the arresting
officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing. See State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶
40, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836, overruled on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-NMSC-
009, ¶¶ 2-3 (sharing the Court of Appeals’ concern that the officer’s testimony could
have been more specific in its explanation of how the officer’s training and experience
supported his suspicions, but nonetheless concluding that the officer’s flawed testimony

1The stop occurred on April 16, 2021 and the Cannabis Regulation Act, which legalized recreational
marijuana use, went into effect on June 29, 2021. NMSA 1978, §§ 26-2C-1 to -42 (2021, as amended
through 2024). Had the traffic stop occurred after the Act’s effective date, there may have been a
question about whether Deputy Salazar had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop
because the Act specifies that “the odor of cannabis” alone does not constitute “reasonable articulable
suspicion of a crime and is not a basis to stop, detain, or search a person,” unless the officer is
investigating a possible DUI. NMSA 1978, § 26-2C-25(C)(1), (D). The Act does not apply here.
sufficiently articulated the facts that gave him reasonable suspicion to expand the scope
of the stop). Instead, our inquiry is an objective one: we review whether there existed
“objectively reasonable indications of criminal activity,” considering the “specific
articulable facts” that were available to the officer at the time. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009,
¶ 23; see also Vasquez-Salas, 2023-NMSC-023, ¶ 10. We do not consider the facts that
became available to Deputy Salazar after he expanded the scope of the stop. See
Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20. While not perfect, Deputy Salazar’s testimony
sufficiently articulated the facts that gave him reasonable suspicion to expand the scope
of the stop—the smell of marijuana, the passenger’s unsolicited comments, and the
rental agreement.

{12} NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the memorandum opinion of the
Court of Appeals is hereby reversed.

{13} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is remanded to the district court
without prejudice to the remaining arguments in Defendant’s suppression motion.

{14} IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice