A-1-CA-35790 | Omnilex

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Court of Appeals of New Mexico
9/26/2018 9:34 AM
Office of the Clerk
Mark Reynolds

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Court of Appeals of New Mexico
9/26/2018 9:34 AM

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW mexicol/.

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Opinion Number:

Filing Date: September 26, 2018

No. A-1-CA-35790

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,

JAMES EDWARD BARELA,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
James Waylon Counts, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

Charles J. Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Will O’Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

pe of the Clerk

—_—

ark Reynolds

OPINION
GALLEGOS, Judge.

4} Defendant James Edward Barela appeals his conviction for felony battery
against a household member, NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-17(A) (2008), asserting
that his sentence was improperly enhanced, pursuant to the habitual offender
enhancement statute, NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-17(A) (2003). Defendant also
argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds and in refusing to admit extrinsic impeachment evidence at trial. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

2} Following a physical altercation between Defendant and Ms. Rebecka Gray
(Victim), the mother of his son, the State indicted Defendant for one count of child
abuse, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of battery against a household
member. Immediately prior to trial, Defendant pleaded no contest to a count of
felony battery against a household member. Following trial, a jury convicted
Defendant of false imprisonment but acquitted him of the child abuse count. The
district court sentenced him to one and a half years incarceration for each count.
Further, based on a prior felony conviction, the district court imposed a one-year
habitual offender enhancement for each count, resulting in a five-year sentence.

Defendant then appealed to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Habitual Offender Enhancement

33 Defendant, a three-time domestic violence offender, pleaded no contest to,
and was convicted of, felony battery against a household member, contrary to
Section 30-3-17(A), which provides, “[w]hoever commits three offenses of battery
against a household member . .. when the household member is a spouse, a former
spouse, a co-parent of a child or a person with whom the offender has had a
continuing personal relationship is guilty of a fourth degree felony.” Based on a prior
felony conviction for false imprisonment, Defendant’s sentence was subsequently
enhanced by one year, pursuant to Section 31-18-17(A), which provides that a
person convicted of a noncapital felony “who has incurred one prior felony
conviction ... is a habitual offender and his basic sentence shall be increased by one
year.” Defendant argues that under the reasoning set forth in State v. Anaya, 1997-
NMSC-010, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223, the district court erred in applying the
habitual offender enhancement to his conviction because the felony battery against
a household member statute is self-enhancing. To resolve this issue, we must engage
in statutory interpretation.

(4, Statutory interpretation is a matter of law that is reviewed de novo. State v.
Rapchack, 2011-NMCA-116, ¥ 8, 150 N.M. 716, 265 P.3d 1289. Our goal when

interpreting statutes is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by applying the

plain meaning of the words in the statute unless doing so would lead to an absurd or
unreasonable result. Id.

5} We thus begin with the plain meaning of the statutes at issue. Section 30-3-
17(A) provides that a defendant who commits three offenses of battery against a
specific subset of household members “is guilty of a fourth degree felony.” Section
31-18-17(A) provides for a one-year enhanced sentence when a person with one
prior felony conviction is subsequently convicted of a noncapital felony. Based on
the language in these statutes, there does not appear to be any basis for concluding
that the district court erred in enhancing Defendant’s fourth-degree felony battery
on a household member conviction by one year based on his prior felony conviction
for false imprisonment.

6} As stated above, however, Defendant argues that the district court’s
imposition of the habitual offender enhancement was improper under Anaya. In
Anaya, our Supreme Court addressed whether a felony driving while intoxicated
(DWI) conviction was subject to the habitual offender enhancement. 1997-NMSC-
010, {ff 26-36. The Court ultimately concluded that it was not, reasoning that the
“insurmountable ambiguity” as to whether the Legislature intended for the habitual
offender enhancement to apply to fourth-time or more DWI offenders required

application of the rule of lenity. Jd. {J 32, 35.

(3 Anaya was context-specific and much of our Supreme Court’s analysis with
respect to “insurmountable ambiguity” was based on the language of the DWI statute
at issue in that case, NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(G) (1994). We are not
convinced that the DWI statute’s ambiguity should be automatically imported to the
domestic violence statute at issue here. Instead, we must construe Section 30-3-
17(A) on its own terms. And in so doing, we do not see the same sort of ambiguity
that was present in Anaya that would lead us to apply the rule of lenity.

‘33 Of particular note, in State v. Begay, our Supreme Court clarified that “[its]
holding in Anaya rested not on a concern that the Legislature did not intend to create
two enhancements for the same crime, but rather a concern that the Legislature did
not intend to have a fourth or subsequent DWI offense considered a felony for
purposes of the habitual offender statute.” 2001-NMSC-002, 49, 130 N.M. 61, 17
P.3d 434. Our Supreme Court also stressed its continued belief “that the Legislature
did not intend to punish fourth-time or more DWI offenders in the same manner as
other fourth-degree felons.” Jd. { 10 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). The question for us, then, is whether, given the plain language of
Section 30-3-17(A) and Section 31-18-17(A), there is a countervailing basis for
concluding that the Legislature did not intend to punish someone who repeatedly

(three times) battered an intimate household member in the same manner as other

fourth-degree felons. For the following reasons, we answer the question in the
negative.

9} First, our Supreme Court’s analysis in Anaya largely turned on the fact that
both the DWI statute, which falls within the Motor Vehicle Code and has its own
separate, intricate sentencing scheme, see § 66-8-102(E)-(L), and the habitual
offender statute were silent as to the applicability of the habitual offender
enhancement on felony DWI offenses. See Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, 31 (‘The
[Llegislature’s silence in both Section 31-18-17 and Section 66-8-102(G), is the
strongest evidence that the [Legislature did not intend the habitual offender
sentences in Section 31-18-17 to apply to felony DWI.”). In contrast, the felony
battery against a household member statute at issue in this case falls within the
Criminal Code. And it is clear that the habitual offender statute is specifically
applicable to persons convicted of noncapital felony offenses within the Criminal
Code. See § 31-18-17(A) (indicating that the habitual offender enhancement applies
to “[a] person convicted of a noncapital felony in this state whether within the
Criminal Code... or the Controlled Substances Act... or not[.]”). Therefore, not
only are we not dealing with legislative silence, as the Court was in Anaya, but we
are instead dealing with express statutory language indicating a legislative intent that

the habitual offender enhancement apply to felonies under the Criminal Code.

10} Second, the Court in Anaya concluded that there was ambiguity with respect
to whether the Legislature intended to punish fourth-time or more DWI offenders in
the same manner as other fourth-degree felons, based in part on the fact that (1) the
DWI offenses were non-violent offenses, and (2) Section 66-8-102(G) used the word
“jail” instead of “prison.” Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, {J 29, 33, 34. According to
Anaya, these facts evinced—at least somewhat—that the Legislature intended to
treat a DWI felon differently than a typical felon. Jd. § 33. We have neither of those
concerns here. There is no mention of “jail” within Section 30-3-17, nor are we
dealing with a nonviolent offense.

a1; Thus, given the explicit application of the habitual offender enhancement to
convicted felons under the Criminal Code, as well as the lack of countervailing
indicia within either statute at issue, we do not see any ambiguity with respect to
whether the Legislature intended to treat a serial domestic batterer (of a particular
subset of close, intimate individuals) as a typical fourth-degree felon. In the absence
of ambiguity, applying the rule of lenity is inappropriate. See State v. Edmondson,
1991-NMCA-069, q 12, 112 N.M. 654, 818 P.2d 855 (stating that the rule of lenity
is reserved “for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s
intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history,
and motivating policies of the statute” (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and

citation omitted)). Consequently, based on the plain language of the statutes at issue,

we conclude that the one-year habitual offender enhancement of Defendant’s fourth-
degree felony battery on a household member sentence was proper as a matter of
law.

B. Speedy Trial

123, Defendant was arrested on February 20, 2014, indicted on March 12, 2014,
and scheduled to stand trial on August 21, 2014. On August 20, 2014, Defendant
filed a motion to continue his trial. The motion was granted, and nine days later,
Defendant made a pro forma demand for speedy trial. Defendant’s trial was
scheduled and rescheduled on the court’s trailing docket three times; first in
November 2014 when it came up ninth on the docket, then in February 2015 when
it came up fifth on the trailing docket, and again in May 2015 when it came up fifth
on the docket. Then on August 13, 2015, the day trial was scheduled to begin, the
State filed a motion to continue the trial because it was unable to locate Victim, a
key witness in the case. Defense counsel concurred with the motion, and the district
court granted the continuance. On October 2, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the case for violation of his speedy trial rights. The district court denied
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the case was of intermediate complexity;
that the delay was caused by Defendant’s delay, the State’s delay, and the court’s
schedule; and that the prejudice to Defendant was not so great as to require dismissal.

Defendant’s trial commenced on November 23, 2015. On the second day of trial,

defense counsel renewed her motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, but the
district court declined to revisit its prior ruling on the matter.

43} Both the Federal Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution guarantee an
accused the right to a speedy trial, recognizing “a societal interest in bringing an
accused to trial and... [in] preventing prejudice to the accused.” State v. Brown,
2017-NMCA-046, § 12, 396 P.3d 171 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). When reviewing a district court’s speedy trial decision, we weigh
and balance de novo four factors, derived from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-
30 (1972): “(1) the length of delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and (4) the actual prejudice to the defendant that, on balance,
determines whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated.” State v.
Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, § 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In doing so, “[w]e defer to the district court’s factual
findings.” State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, 4 4, 406 P.3d 505.

1. Length of Delay

a4} We begin by determining whether the length of delay is presumptively
prejudicial—if it is, a speedy trial analysis is warranted. State v. Serros, 2016-
NMSC-008, § 22, 366 P.3d 1121 (noting that the length of delay, the first factor in
speedy trial analysis, “acts as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker

factors if the delay crosses the threshold of being ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ and it

is an independent factor to consider in evaluating whether a speedy trial violation
has occurred”), A delay is presumptively prejudicial if it extends beyond one year
for a simple case, fifteen months for an intermediate case, and eighteen months for
a complex case. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, { 2. “In determining what weight to give
the length of any delay, we consider the extent to which the delay stretched beyond
the presumptively prejudicial period.” State v. Lujan, 2015-NMCA-032, {[ 11, 345
P.3d 1103. Greater delays will potentially weigh more heavily against the state, and
delay amounting to little more than the minimum needed to trigger a speedy trial
analysis will not weigh heavily in a defendant’s favor. Id.

15} We defer to the district court’s finding that the case was of intermediate
complexity and should have been brought to trial within fifteen months. See Ochoa,
2017-NMSC-031, § 15 (deferring to district court’s complexity finding and
parenthetically noting that “the complexity of the case is best determined by the
district court, which must consider both the nature and complexity of the crime”).
We also note that Defendant’s appellate argument that the case should have been
considered simple is undeveloped, and we decline to address it. See State v. Fuentes,
2010-NMCA-027, § 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (noting that this Court does
not review unclear or undeveloped arguments).

16} Defendant was arrested on February 20, 2014, and his trial began on

November 23, 2015, resulting in a delay of twenty one months and three days.

Because the allowable fifteen month period for cases of intermediate complexity
was exceeded by six months, the delay was presumptively prejudicial and weighs
slightly against the State. See State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-074, 4 17, 150 N.M.
415, 259 P.3d 820 (concluding that a six month delay beyond the presumptive
threshold weighed slightly against the state in a case of intermediate complexity).
2. Reason for Delay

7} The next consideration, the reason for the delay, “may either heighten or
temper the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay.” Garza,
2009-NMSC-038, 4] 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There are
three types of delay attributable to the state, each carrying varying weight in a
reviewing court’s analysis. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, {| 29. The first type is “a
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense,” which is
weighed heavily against the state. Jd. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). The amount of weight we assign against the state for the second
type of delay—“negligent or administrative delay”—is “closely related to the length
of delay[.]” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, 26; see id. J 29 (identifying “burdens on the
criminal justice system, such as overcrowded courts, congested dockets or the
unavailability of judges” as negligent or administrative delay (citation omitted)).
Finally, where the delay is due to “a valid reason, such as a missing witness,” it is

often “inevitable and wholly justifiable[,)” and we therefore balance the

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reasonableness of the state’s efforts to move a case toward trial against the perils of
conducting a trial “whose probative accuracy the passage of time has begun by
degrees to throw into question.” Jd. § 27 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

418} There were four discernable periods of delay in this case: the delay between
arrest and the first trial setting, the delay that occurred between Defendant’s
continuance and the next scheduled trial date, the delays that occurred as a result of
the court’s busy docket, and the delay that occurred as a result of the State’s
continuance. The initial delay from February 20, 2014 to August 20, 2014, occurred
as the case was proceeding normally toward trial, and as such, amounts to a neutral
delay that does not weigh against either party. See Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¥ 19
(concluding that the amount of time a case “was proceeding normally toward trial”
does not weigh against either party). Defense counsel’s request for a continuance on
August 20, 2014, pushed the trial setting back to November 3, 2014, and this
seventy-five day delay, being the result of Defendant’s motion, is weighed slightly
against Defendant. See Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, { 29 (acknowledging that delay
caused by the defense is weighed against the defendant). The delay between
November 3, 2014 and August 13, 2015, was caused by the district court’s trailing
docket, and was consequently the result of administrative or negligent delay that

weighs slightly to moderately against the State. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, §] 29

(identifying “congested dockets or the unavailability of judges” and “administrative
burdens on the criminal justice system” as negligent delay weighed against the state).
The delay between August 13, 2015 and November 23, 2015, was due to the State’s
request for a continuance. However, because defense counsel concurred with the
motion and because continuances caused by the unavailability of a witness are
considered valid reasons for delay, the delay is neutral and does not weigh against
either party. See id. 27; see also Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, {| 29.

9} In summary, Defendant was subjected to approximately nine months of
neutral delay, two and a half months of delay attributable to himself, and
approximately nine months of delay weighed against the State. The delay that
occurred outside the fifteen month deadline for cases of intermediate complexity
stemmed from administrative delay in the form of an overburdened court docket and
valid delay in the form of a missing witness. On balance, this factor weighs slightly
against the State.

3. Defendant’s Assertion of His Speedy Trial Rights

20} In assessing whether Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, we look to
the timing of the assertion and the manner in which the right was asserted, according
weight to the “frequency and force of the defendant’s objections to the delay.”
Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, § 32 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

While a failure to assert the right does not amount to waiver, we may consider “the

timeliness and vigor with which the right is asserted.” Jd. “Pro forma assertions are
sufficient to assert the right, but are given little weight in a defendant’s favor[,]” and
a defendant’s assertion of the right can be weakened by acquiescence to the delay.
Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, {[§] 41-42.

21; Defendant submitted two pro forma assertions of his right—each through
different attorneys—at the beginning of his case. Defendant also asserted his right
through a motion to dismiss one month before trial, almost five months after the
presumptively prejudicial period had begun, and again during trial. While these facts
would normally be sufficient to weigh this factor at least slightly in Defendant’s
favor, we also note that his assertions of his right were somewhat mitigated by his
“acquiescence to, and responsibility for,” some periods of delay. State v. Samora,
2016-NMSC-031, §[ 20, 387 P.3d 230. However, because Defendant’s requested
continuance occurred at the beginning of the case, and given the single instance of
Defendant’s concurrence with the State’s continuance request, we conclude that this
prong indeed weighs slightly in Defendant’s favor.

4. Prejudice

2} We analyze prejudice according to three overarching interests: (1) preventing
oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused,
and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Garza, 2009-

NMSC-038, {| 35. “[A] defendant must show particularized prejudice of the kind

against which the speedy trial right is intended to protect.” Id. | 39. “[W]e recognize
that the criminal process inevitably causes anxiety for defendants, but we focus only
on undue prejudice.” State v. Castro, 2017-NMSC-027, { 27, 402 P.3d 688.

23} Defendant argues that because his case was delayed beyond the fifteen month
period allowable for cases of intermediate complexity, prejudice may be presumed
under Garza. We disagree. Though Garza did acknowledge that, “if the length of
delay and the reasons for the delay weigh heavily in [the] defendant’s favor and [the]
defendant has asserted his right and not acquiesced to the delay,” a court may
conclude the defendant’s right have been violated without a showing of prejudice,
Garza’ s holding remains clear—a defendant must make a showing of “particularized
prejudice” to succeed on speedy trial grounds. 2009-NMSC-038, 4 39.

4; The length of, and reasons for, delay do not weigh so heavily in Defendant’s
favor as to allow for the presumption of prejudice that he seeks. Defendant’s trial
took place only six months past the fifteen months allowed, and the majority of the
delay was either valid, due to a missing witness, or negligent, due to administrative
difficulties in scheduling. Defendant’s general assertion that he was prejudiced by
his inability to “work or live his daily life” is insufficient to establish the
“particularized prejudice” required under this factor. Aside from this assertion,
Defendant has put forth no further argument or evidence to demonstrate he suffered

prejudice as a result of the six month delay, and we therefore cannot conclude that

Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. We affirm the district court’s denial
of Defendant’s motion to dismiss for violating his speedy trial rights.

C. Admission of Victim’s Letters

25} Defendant argues that the district court erred in refusing to admit letters
written by Victim as prior inconsistent statements at trial, contending that the letters
were admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 11-613(B) NMRA. “We
examine the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion, and the trial
court’s determination will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.”
State v. Stanley, 2001-NMSC-037, 4 5, 131 N.M. 368, 37 P.3d 85. “An abuse of
discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the [district] court abused its discretion
by its ruling unless we can characterize it as clearly untenable or not justified by
reason.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

26; Rule 11-613(B) governs the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement. “Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent
statement is admissible only if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny
the statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness
about it, or if justice so requires.” Rule 11-613(B). Clarifying the proper application
of this rule, our Supreme Court in State v. Astorga explained the meaning of

inconsistency as used to describe a prior statement: “the question is not whether the

witness denies—or even recalls—having made the prior statement... .The
question, instead, is simply whether the substance of the witness’s trial testimony is
inconsistent with the prior statement.” 2015-NMSC-007, §{ 39-40, 343 P.3d 1245
(citations omitted). Astorga also clarified, however, that the admission of
impeachment evidence under Rule 11-613(B) is “subject to the district court’s broad
discretion under Rule 11-403 [NMRA].” Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, § 40. Rule 11-
403 provides the court with authority to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of. . . unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”

a7 The district court allowed defense counsel to use the content of the letters
Victim wrote to impeach her if she presented inconsistent testimony but not as
substantive evidence, and allowed defense counsel to question her regarding her
motivations for testifying, particularly with regard to any perceived pressure from
the State, reasoning that both were relevant to her credibility. Because it allowed
defense counsel to explore the content of the letters through cross-examination, the
district court ruled that the letters would not be admitted into evidence. During cross-
examination, Victim admitted that she wrote the letters and testified at length about

their content and her reasons for writing them. Defense counsel was able to quote

portions of the letters verbatim and emphasize inconsistencies between her trial
testimony and statements made in the letters.

2s} Though the letters apparently did contain information that contradicted
Victim’s testimony at trial, Defendant's cross-examination of Victim revealed those
contradictions and inconsistencies. As such, admission of the letters themselves
would be cumulative, and it was within the district court’s discretion to refuse to
admit them. See Rule 11-403 (allowing exclusion of evidence that needlessly
presents cumulative evidence); State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, { 26, 141 N.M.
185, 152 P.3d 828 (holding that an appellate court will affirm the district court’s
decision if it is right for any reason and does not prejudice the parties); see also
Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, § 44 (noting, after conducting harmless error analysis,
affirmance based on Rule 11-403 would also be proper under the right for any reason
doctrine).

9} Alternatively, even if the district court erred in refusing to admit the letters,
such error was harmless. In assessing harmless error, “we look to whether there is a
reasonable probability that the error affected the verdict[,]” and the defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating that he or she was prejudiced by the error. Astorga,
2015-NMSC-007, § 43. Because the letters and their contents, including
contradictions with Victim’s testimony, were thoroughly explored by defense

counsel during cross-examination, and Defendant does not point with any

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particularity to information contained in the letters that was not revealed through
cross-examination, Defendant has failed to demonstrate the prejudice necessary for
reversal under a harmless error analysis.

CONCLUSION

30} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

31 IT ISSO ORDERED.

I CONCUR:

se fF wa yy
HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge

JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

VARGAS, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part.

32} I concur in the majority opinion with respect to its decision of the speedy trial
and evidentiary issues raised in Defendant’s appeal. I cannot, however, concur in its
decision that the district court properly enhanced his sentence, pursuant to Section
31-18-17(A).

33} Our Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity in Amaya, when it found an
insurmountable ambiguity as to the intended scope of the habitual offender
sentencing enhancement statute and the felony DWI statute. The Court in Anaya
considered whether Section 66-8-102, which penalized up to three DWI convictions
as misdemeanors and subsequent DWI convictions as felonies, was self-enhancing
so that applying a habitual offender enhancement to a felony DWI conviction would
constitute an impermissible double enhancement. Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, q 27.
The Anaya Court took note of the absence of any reference between the applicable
DWI statute and habitual offender sentencing provision. Jd. {] 27, 29, 31-32.
Applying that rule, the Court concluded that the DWI statute is “a self-enhancing
provision” that “changes the classification of a criminal act which... has been a
misdemeanor into a felony for sentencing purposes only|,|” and reasoned that
because a fourth DWI conviction is not an element of felony DWI, it therefore
“cannot be sentenced as a felony for all purposes, including habitual offender

sentencing.” Id. § 33.

34; I find the Legislature’s intention regarding the application of a sentence
enhancement to Section 30-3-17 to be similarly unclear. When the Legislature’s
intent is not clear from the plain language of a statute, we employ other methods of
statutory construction. Indeed, “[uJnless the [L]egislature’s intention to apply an
enhanced sentence is clear, we presume that the [L]egislature did not intend an
enhancement.” Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, § 30.

35} Given the highly punitive nature of the habitual offender statute, it cannot
apply absent clear evidence that the Legislature intended such a result. See id. § 31.
When the Legislature enacted Section 30-3-17, elevating a third conviction for
battery against a household member to a felony, it did so without including any
reference to the habitual offender sentencing statutes or clarifying its intentions
regarding the application of the enhancement, notwithstanding our Supreme Court’s
reliance on the Legislature’s silence as grounds for its holding in Anaya and its
invitation to the Legislature to clarify its intent. See 1997-NMSC-010, 4 35; id. 4 31
(“The [L]egislature’s silence in both Section 31-18-17 and Section 66-8-102(G), is
the strongest evidence that the [L]egislature did not intend the habitual offender
sentences in Section 31-18-17 to apply to felony DWI.”); see also State v. Begay,
2001-NMSC-002, § 9, 130 N.M. 61, 17 P.3d 434 (emphasizing that the Legislature
did not act to clarify its intentions following issuance of Anaya, concluding

legislative intent therefore “remains uncertain[,]” and applying rule of lenity). As

such, I find no evidence that the Legislature intended the habitual offender
enhancement to apply to a conviction for felony battery of a household member.
Instead, the Legislature’s action of enacting Section 30-3-17 approximately a decade
after our Supreme Court decided Anaya without referencing an intent to enhance the
punishment for felony battery on a household member strongly suggests the
Legislature did not intend the habitual offender enhancement to apply to convictions
under Section 30-3-17(A). See State v. Marquez, 2008-NMSC-055, 4 7, 145 N.M. 1,
193 P.3d 548 (stating that the courts presume the Legislature is aware of existing
law when enacting a statute); Begay, 2001-NMSC-002, 4 6 (opining that if the
Legislature had intended to subject the felony to further enhancement by the
ageravation statute, it would have stated that intention expressly). Given the absence
of any clear intent in the plain language of the statutes, I see similar ambiguity
regarding the scope of the enhancement’s applicability as the Court did in Anaya,
requiring us to apply the rule of lenity.

36} The State argues that because the language of Section 30-3-17(A) requires
more than a predetermined number of prior convictions by also requiring that a third
offense be committed against certain individuals listed in the statutory definition of
a “household member,” it is distinguishable from the self-enhancing provision
recognized in Anaya. The individuals listed in Section 30-3-17(A), however, are all

included in the broad statutory definition of “household member.” Compare NMSA

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1978, Section 30-3-11(A) (2010, amended 2018) (defining household member), with
Section 30-3-17(A) (limiting crime to offenses against a “spouse, former spouse, a
co-parent of a child, or a person with whom the offender has had a continuing
personal relationship”). Section 30-3-17(A) therefore does not require proof of any
additional elements outside those required to obtain a conviction for misdemeanor
battery on a household member, and its limitation of scope only becomes relevant
during sentencing in determining whether the battered household member qualified
to elevate the battery to a felony, much as the number of prior battery convictions
are used to elevate the current conviction to a felony.' The Legislature’s decision to
limit the applicability of Section 30-3-17(A) to household members with an intimate
relationship to the defendant is evidence of a desire to provide those individuals with
greater protection rather than an intent to expand its scope for sentencing purposes.
37 Furthermore, I am not convinced by the majority’s rationale that enhancement
is appropriate under the circumstances of this case because Section 31-18-17
contains “express statutory language indicating a legislative intent that the habitual
offender enhancement apply to felonies under the Criminal Code.” Section 31-18-
17(A) provides that, “[a] person convicted of a noncapital felony in this state whether

within the Criminal Code... or the Controlled Substances Act... or not who has

'The State does not argue or suggest that the number of prior convictions is a
required element of the offense under Section 30-3-17(A).

19
20

incurred one prior felony conviction . . . is a habitual offender and his basic sentence
shall be increased by one year.” In support of its argument that express statutory
language indicating legislative intent is set out, the majority relies on the fact that
Section 31-18-17(A) specifically mentions the Criminal Code. By its plain language,
however, Section 31-18-17 applies to any noncapital felony, regardless of where it
is found in our statutes—whether “within the Criminal Code . . . or not.” Section 31-
18-17(A). I do not see how the broad language of Section 31-18-17(A) resolves the
ambiguity between the two statutes.

38} Finally, I am not persuaded by the majority’s differentiation of Anaya based
on the fact that the battery statute does not mention “jail.” While the Anaya Court
found the mention of “jail” to be additional evidence that the Legislature did not
intend for the habitual offender enhancement to apply to felony DWI, it was the
Legislature’s silence that was “the strongest evidence that the [L]egislature did not
intend the habitual offender sentences in Section 31-18-17 to apply.” Anaya, 1997-
NMSC-010, 4 31.

39} I would apply the reasoning set forth in Anaya, hold that Section 30-3-17(A)
is a self-enhancing statute that cannot be subject to an habitual offender enhancement

under Section 31-18-17 and continue to encourage legislative clarification.

hie Vater

JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge

September 26, 2018- State of New Mexico v. James Edward Barela, No. A-1-CA-35790

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