August 22, 2019- Martin Sanchez v. Jose Lujan, No. A-1-CA-35721

Corrections to this opinion not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM
Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
1 	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
I
2 MARTIN SANCHEZ, Individually and as
· 3 Personal Representative for the ESTATE
4 	OF CLIFFORD SANCHEZ; PHIL SANCHEZ;
5 and STEVEN SANCHEZ, Individually,
6 	Plaintiffs-Appellants,
7 v. 	No. A-1-CA-35721
8 JOSE LUJAN,
9 	Defendant-Appellee,
10 and
11 	GILBERT SANCHEZ; ESSENTIA
12 INSURANCE COMPANY; and HAGERTY
13 	INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC,
14 	Defendants,
15 	and
16 CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE
17 COMPANY,
18 	Plaintiff-In-Intervention,
19 v.
20 JOSE LUJAN; GILBERT SANCHEZ;
21 	MARTIN SANCHEZ, Individually and as
22 	the Personal Representative for the ESTATE
23 	OF CLIFrORD SANCHEZ; PHIL
24 	SANCHEZ; and STEVEN SANCHEZ,
25 	Defendants.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 8/22/2019 11:04 AM

1 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY
2 Francis J. Mathew, District Judge
3 Atler Law Firm, P.C.
4 Timothy J. Atler
5 Albuquerque, NM
6 Cruz Law Office, LLC
7 Ernestina R. Cruz
8 Taos, NM
9 	Sanchez Law Firm
10 Dennis T. Sanchez
11 	Taos, NM
12 for Appellants
13 	Allen, Shepherd, Lewis and Syra, P.A.
14 E.W. Shepherd
15 	Courtney A. Schumacher
16 Tiffany A. Owens
17 Albuquerque, NM
18 for Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
19 IVES, Judge.
20 	{l} 	Plaintiffs Martin Sanchez, Phil Sanchez, and Steven Sanchez sued Defendant
21 	Jose Lujan for the wrongful death of Clifford Sanchez (Decedent) on a negligence
22 theory. The' district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. On
23 	appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erroneously entered summary judgment
24 as a sanction. We reject this argument, concluding that the district court granted
2

1 summary judgment on the merits. In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that if the
2 district court entered summary judgment on the merits, it erred in various ways,
3 including by not giving Plaintiffs more time to respond to the summary judgment
4 motion with the benefit of discovery. 1 We agree and reverse.
5 BACKGROUND
6 	{2} 	Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant and others arose from a tragic hunting
7 accident. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Defendant and Gilbert Sanchez
8 (Gilbert) were using Defendant's pick-up truck to hunt for elk together. According
9 to Plaintiffs' complaint, with Defendant behind the wheel, Gilbert spotted an elk,
10 directed Defendant to stop, and either fired his gun from inside Defendant's truck or
11 	took a few steps from the truck before firing. Instead of shooting an elk, Gilbert shot
12 Decedent, killing him.
13 	{3} 	Less than four months after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, Defendant moved
14 for summary judgment, relying exclusively on his own affidavit to establish the
15 	following facts, which he contended were undisputed. At the time of the incident
16 that caused Decedent's death, Defendant did not possess a hunting permit, was not
17 hunting, and did not intend to hunt. Defendant accompanied Gilbert solely to spend
1 Plaintiffs also argue that the district court failed to 	follow the proper
procedure for entering summary judgment in the absence of a response by the
nonmoving party, and that Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
based on the undisputed material facts. We do not reach these issues.
3

·1 time with him because they were friends. Gilbert chose the route of travel throughout
2 the excursion. While spotting elk, Gilbert would direct Defendant to stop the vehicle.
3 At the time of the incident, Gilbert indicated to Defendant that he thought he had
4 spotted an elk and directed Defendant to stop the vehicle. Gilbert left the vehicle and
5 "disappeared from Defendant['s] sight into brush." When Gilbert shot Decedent,
6 Defendant was inside his vehicle, unable to see or communicate with Gilbert. These
7 facts, Defendant argued, entitled him to summary judgment as a matter of law
8 because: 	(1) 	Defendant neither participated in nor 	facilitated 	the 	shooting 	of
9 Decedent; (2) Defendant had no duty to control Gilbert; and (3) Defendant was not
10 jointly and severally liable for Gilbert's actions because the two men did not share a
11 	common purpose. Based on these facts, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs' negligence
12 claim failed because he owed no duty to the Decedent or Plaintiffs, and that
13 	Plaintiffs' vicarious liability theory failed as a matter of law.
14 {4} 	Rather than responding to Defendant's motion on its merits, Plaintiffs filed a
15 	separate motion pursuant to Rule 1-056(F) NMRA within the time prescribed for
16 responding to a summary judgment motion. In their motion, Plaintiffs requested
17 leave to conduct discovery regarding the factual assertions in Defendant's affidavit.
18 Plaintiffs informed the district court that they needed to "tender written discovery"
19 and "take depositions to more fully flesh out the facts at issue." They therefore asked
20 the district court to "stay a ruling" on the summary judgment motion "until such time
4

1 as the requested discovery is complete" and asked for "sufficient time" to file a
2 response brief. In response to Plaintiffs' Rule 1-056(F) motion, Defendant explained
3 that he did not oppose the motion "in principle" and indicated that he would not have
4 opposed a request to depose Defendant and "allow limited written discovery" within
5 a reasonable period of time, such as sixty days. Defendant stated, however, that an
6 unlimited amount of time for discovery on the motion was neither appropriate nor
7 warranted. The parties completed briefing on the Rule 1-056(F) motion on July 29,
8 2014.
9 {5} 	On October 21, 2014, Defendant filed a notice of completion of briefing on
10 his summary judgment motion, indicating that Plaintiffs had not responded. On
11 	November 4, 2014, Plaintiffs served interrogatories and requests for production on
12 Defendant through his counsel. Plaintiffs served additional requests for production
13 	on Defendant on December 18, 2014. Although Defendant did not respond to any of
14 these discovery requests, Plaintiffs did not move to compel responses before t~e
15 	summary judgment hearing four months later.
16 {6} 	On April 16, 2015, the district court held a hearing on Defendant's motion for
17 summary judgment. During the hearing, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs had not
18 	disputed the material facts in Defendant's summary judgment motion and that
19 Plaintiffs had not cited any law to justify denying the motion. Defendant argued that
20 Plaintiffs had had a reasonable time to complete discovery and that the court should
5

1 grant the motion because there were no issues of material fact. For their part,
2 Plaintiffs argued that they had responded to the motion for summary judgment· by
3 moving for discovery and additional time to file a response under Rule 1-056(F).
4 Plaintiffs informed the court that they had served written discovery on Defendant,
5 who had failed to respond, and that they wished to depose Defendant and Sanchez.
6 {7} 	The district court noted that Plaintiffs had not disputed the material facts in
7 Defendant's motion by responding to the motion for summary judgment, and that
8 nine months should have been enough time to complete the needed discovery. After
9 further argument, the district court granted the motion, stating that Defendant "made
10 a prima facie showing for purposes of summary judgment."
11 	{8} 	Plaintiffs moved to reconsider, reiterating that the summary judgment motion
12 was premature because discovery was necessary to properly respond to the motion
13 	on the merits and that Defendant had failed to respond to Plaintiffs' 	discovery
14 requests. Plaintiffs argued that the court had granted the motion as a sanction for
15 	their failure to respond and suggested that a lesser sanction might be appropriate
16 because they had responded to the motion by requesting discovery, rather than
17 "outright ignor[ing]" it. They accordingly asked the court to reinstate the matter,
18 	enter a scheduling order setting a discovery deadline, and stay ruling on the summary
19 judgment motion until the conclusion of all discovery, or at least until the completion
20 	of discovery pertinent to the summary judgment motion.
6

1 {9} 	At the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion, Defendant argued, among other things,
2 that he had "made a prima facie showing of summary judgment." The court agreed:
3 "Defendant made a prima facie case. The Plaintiffls] failed to file a response[ or]
4 take appropriate action for the purpose of pursuing discovery for purposes of the
5 motion." The court denied the motion to reconsider. Plaintiffs appealed.
6 DISCUSSION
7 I. 	The District Court Did Not Enter Summary Judgment as a Sanction
8 {to} 	Plaintiffs argue that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment
9 for Defendant as a sanction for abusive litigation tactics. We disagree with Plaintiffs'
10 	interpretation of the district court's ruling. Viewing the district court's remarks about
11 	its rulings in light of our summary judgment jurisprudence and parlance, we
12 conclude that the court granted Defendant's motion on the merits. Accordingly, we ·
13 	reject Plaintiffs' arguments that (1) the district court failed to consider the requisite
14 factors for sanctions; (2) the court did not make findings of fact and conclusions of
15 	law sufficient to warrant dismissal without prejudice as a sanction; and (3) the facts
16 did not warrant the severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice.
17 	{11} 	Rule 1-056 governs summary judgment. Rule 1-056(B) provides: "A party
18 	against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
19 judgment is sought may move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
7

1 judgment as to all or any part thereof." Rule 1-056(C) sets the standard for granting
2 summary judgment on the merits:
3
4
5
6
7
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving. party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
8 "To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must meet an initial burden of
9 establishing a prima facie case." Freeman v. Fairchild, 2018-NMSC-023, ,-r 16, 416
10 P.3d 264 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The moving party makes a
11 	"prima facie case" or "prima facie showing" by establishing that "there is no dispute
12 about the facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]"
13 	Gordon v. Sandoval Cty. Assessor, 2001-NMCA-044, ,-r 12, 130 N.M. 573, 28 P.3d
14 	1114. In other words, the phrases "prim.a facie case" and "prima facie showing" are
15 	shorthand for the summary judgment standard in Rule 1-056(C). "If the moving
16 party establishes 	a prima facie 	case, the burden shifts to 	the non-movant to
17 demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on
18 	the merits." Freeman, 2018-NMSC-023, ,-r 16; see Rule 1-056(E) (explaining that
19 when the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, that party "may not rest upon the
20 mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
21 	otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
22 genuine issue for trial").
8

1 {12} 	The phrases "prima facie 	case" 	and "prima facie 	showing" 	are 	firmly
2 embedded in our summary judgment jurisprudence. For over four decades, our
3 courts have used these interchangeable phrases to describe the showing that shifts
4 the burden to the party resisting summary judgment-the showing that warrants
5 entry of summary judgment if the resisting party fails to carry its burden. See Romero
6 v. 	Philip Morris Inc., 	2010-NMSC-035, 	if 	10, 	148 	N.M. 	713, 242 P.3d 280
7 ("[S]ummary judgment may be proper when the moving party has met its initial
8 burden of establishing a prima facie ca~e for summary judgment."); Goodman v.
9 Brock, 1972-NMSC-043, ,r 8, 83 N.M. 789, 498 P.2d 676 ("[O]nce [the] defendants
10 had made a prima facie showing that they were entitled to summary judgment, the
11 	burden was on [the] plaintiff to show that there was a genuine factual issue and that
12 	defendants were not entitled as a matter of law to summary judgment."); Rekart v.
13 	Safeway Stores, Inc., 1970-NMCA-020, ,r 26, 81 N.M. 491,468 P.2d 892 (same).
14 	{13} 	In this case, the district court echoed the language of longstanding New
15 	Mexico precedent three times. See Jeantete v. Jeantete, 1990-NMCA-13 8, ,r 11, 111
16 N.M. 417, 806 P.2d 66 (recognizing that we "may consider the trial court's verbal
17 comments in order to clarify or discern the basis for the order or action of the court
18 	below"). As discussed, the district court's words have but one meaning in the
19 	summary judgment context in New Mexico. The court was terse but clear: it granted
9

1 Defendant's motion because it concluded he had carried his burden under Rule 1-
2 056(C), entitling him to summary judgment because Plaintiffs failed to carry theirs.
3 	{14} 	Nothing in the record gives us reason to conclude that the district court entered
4 judgment against Plaintiffs as a sanction. Plaintiffs do not identify any reference to
5 sanctions in the district court's written orders or oral statements. Nor do Plaintiffs
6 identify any defense request for a sanction. Instead, Plaintiffs point to a number of
7 comments the district court made about what it believed was Plaintiffs' lack of
8 diligence in pursuing their Rule 1-056(F) motion, obtaining the discovery to respond
9 to Defendant's summary judgment motion on the merits, and filing such a response.
10 For example, the district court stated that Plaintiffs had "some obligation other than
11 	to say [they] need[ ed] more time ... [and could not] just sit there and do nothing for
12 a year." Similarly, the district court noted that Plaintiffs had not responded to the
13 	merits of the summary judgment motion and opined that"[ n ]ine months should have
14 been ample time" for Plaintiffs to obtain the discovery they were asking for. The
15 	district court made other similar remarks. We do not interpret any of the district
16 court's statements as justifications for sanctioning Plaintiffs. The district court was
17 explaining its reasons for proceeding to a decision on the merits of the suminary
18 judgment motion and for rejecting Plaintiffs' request for additional time to conduct
19 discovery and respond to the motion on the merits.
10

1 {15} 	Accordingly, the requirements for imposing sanctions do not apply. The
2 district court was not obligated to consider the factors that pertain to sanctions. See
3 Freeman, 2018-NMSC-023, , 	18 (concluding that district court is only required to
4 consider sanction factors when it "is considering whether to grant a motion for
5 summary judgment as a sanction for abusive litigation conduct"). Nor was it
6 obligated to make findings of fact and conclusions of law or provide any other
7 detailed explanation for its ruling. Compare id. , 21 (requiring specific findings of
8 fact and conclusions oflaw "[i]f the district court determines that summary judgment
9 should be granted as a sanction"), with Skarda v. Skarda, 1975-NMSC-028,, 12, 87
10 N.M. 497, 536 P.2d 257 (recognizing "that the trial court is not required to adopt a
11 	separate opinion or enter a recital in the record as to the exact grounds" for summary
12 judgment). Finally, the district court was not obligated to determine whether any
13 	litigation conduct was so "extreme" that it warranted the "severe" sanction of
14 dismissal with prejudice. Freeman, 2018-NMSC-023,, 20.
15 	II. 	The District Court Granted Summary Judgment Prematurely
16 	{16} 	Plaintiffs argue that the district court erroneously denied them additional time
17 to complete the discovery they assert that they needed to respond to Defendant's
18 	summary judgment motion on the merits. We review claims that a district court
19 granted summary judgment prematurely for abuse of discretion. Flagstar Bank, FSB
20 	v. Licha, 2015-NMCA-086, ,, 23-24, 356 P.3d 1102, abrogated on other grounds
11

1 as recognized by PNC Mortg. v. Romero, 2016-NMCA-064, 377 P.3d 461. A ruling
-
2 is an abuse of discretion when it "is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions
3 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case[,]" Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-
4 078, 165, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153, or is "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable[,]"
5 Mayeux v. Winder, 2006-NMCA-028, 134, 139 N.M. 235, 131 P.3d 85.
6 {17} 	In New Mexico, we have a "strong bent in favor of deciding matters on their
7 merits" after all interested parties have had a reasonable opportunity to present the
8 legal arguments and the evidence they believe supports their positions. Atherton v.
9 	Gopin, 2015-NMCA-003, 11 18, 27, 340 P.3d 630 (reversing district court's ruling
10 prohibiting 	party 	opposing 	summary 	judgment 	motion 	from 	responding 	to
11 	undisputed facts in moving party's motion). This overarching view of summary
12 judgment is consistent with our case law regarding the timing of summary judgment
13 	rulings. "[A]s a general rule, a court should not grant summary judgment before a
14 party has completed discovery, particularly when further factual resolution is
15 	essential to determine the central legal issues involved or [when] the facts before the
16 court are insufficiently developed." Sun Country Sav. Bank of N.M, 	F.S.B. 	v.
17 McDowell, 1989-NMSC-043, 127, 108 N.M. 528, 775 P.2d 730 (citations omitted).
18 	{18} 	But this general rule "is not absolute." Carillo v. My Way Holdings, LLC,
19 	2017-NMCA-024, 17 n.7, 389 P.3d 1087; see Romero v. Giant Stop-N-Go of N.M,
20 Inc., 2009-NMCA-059, 1 17, 146 N.M. 520, 212 P.3d 408 (recognizing that the
12

1 general rule is not universal). When determining whether a district court granted
2 summary judgment without·affording the nonmoving party an adequate opportunity
3 to complete discovery, we consider "several critical factors": 	(1) "whether the
4 [nonmoving] party sought a continuance at the summaryjudgment motion hearing
5 to complete its discovery"; (2) "whether, after the filing of the summary judgment
6 motion until the grant 	of summary judgment, 	sufficient time existed for the
7 nonmoving party to use discovery procedures and obtain necessary discovery"; (3)
8 "whether an affidavit opposing summary judgment contained a statement of the time
9 required to complete the discovery, the particular evidence needed, where the
10 particular evidence was located and the methods used to obtain the evidence"; and
11 	(4) "whether the party moving for summary judgment gave an appropriate response
12 to a discovery request from the nonmoving party." Sun Country Sav. Bank, 1989-
13 	NMSC-043, 127.
14 	{19} 	Applying these factors, we conclude the district court granted summary
15 judgment 	prematurely. 	The 	first 	factor 	favors 	Plaintiffs. 	They 	asked 	for 	a
16 continuance 	at 	the 	summary judgment hearing 	so 	that 	they 	could 	complete
17 discovery.
18 	{20} 	The second and fourth factors relate closely to each other in this case because
19 both Plaintiffs and Defendant bear some responsibility for the Rule 	1-056(F)
20 discovery not being complete at the time of the summary judgment hearing. The
13

1 second factor favors Defendant, but the fourth factor favors Plaintiffs. Over ten
2 months passed between the filing of Defendant's summary judgment motion and the
3 district court's order granting summary judgment. This would have been more than
4 enough time to complete the discovery at issue had both Plaintiffs and Defendant
5 been diligent. See Bierner v. 	City of Truth or Consequences, 2004-NMCA-093,
6 ,, 23-27, 136 N.M. 197, 96 P.3d 322 (holding that the trial court did not err in
7 granting. summary judgment because, among other factors, the plaintiffs had over
8 four months to complete discovery); see also Sun Country Sav. Bank, 1989-NMSC-
9 	043,, 27 (holding that trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because,
10 among other factors, the plaintiffs had two and a half months to complete discovery).
11 	After Defendant moved for summary judgment, Plaintiffs waited approximately five
12 months 	to 	propound interrogatories 	and requests 	for production. 	Defendant's
13 	responses to Plaintiffs' discovery requests were due months before the court granted
14 the summary judgment motion, but Defendant never responded. Had Defendant
15 	responded, the fourth factor would have.weighed in his favor. See Sun Country Sav.
16 Bank, 	1989-NMSC-043, , 	27 (holding that trial court did not err in granting
17 summary judgment because, among other factors, the nonmoving party had received
18 responses to their discovery requests); Bierner, 2004-NMCA-093, ,, 27 (holding
19 that trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because, among other
20 factors, nonmoving party received responses to interrogatories and requests for
14

1 production and did not contend that moving party did not respond to any discovery
2 requests). Despite Defendant's failure to respond, Plaintiffs did not move to compel.
3 Nor did they notice any depositions. In sum, Plaintiffs did not act with urgency, but
4 Defendant contributed to the delay by failing to respond to discovery requests that it
5 acknowledged Plaintiffs had a right to pursue under Rule 1-056(F).
6 	{21} 	The third factor favors Plaintiffs. In their Rule 1-056(F) motion, Plaintiffs
·'·'
7 specified 	that 	they 	needed 	written 	discovery 	and 	depositions, 	including 	of
8 Defendant, whose testimony formed the entire factual foundation for his summary
9 judgment motion. Plaintiffs stated in their briefing that they would confer with
10 Defendant about how much time was reasonable for Plaintiffs to complete the
11 	proposed discovery, and Plaintiffs -requested that the Court grant Plaintiffs ninety
12 	days from the entry of its order setting a deadline if the parties could not agree. These
13 	facts distinguish Plaintiffs' case from those in which the nonmoving party failed to ·
14 provide such specific information. See Sun Country Sav. Bank, 1989-NMSC-043,
15 ,r 29 (affirming summary judgment because, among other things, nonmoving party
16 did not describe time needed for discovery or the methods to be used to obtain the
17 evidence needed); Bierner, 2004-NMCA-093, ,r 27 (affirming summary judgment
18 because, among other things, the parties opposing summary judgment did not give
19 the district court information about the particular evidence they needed to respond
20 to the summary judgment motion).
15

1 {22} 	Defendant argues on appeal that Plaintiffs. did not fully comply with Rule 1-
2 056(F) because they did not submit an affidavit supporting the assertions they made
3 in support of their request for more timeto seek discovery. We agree. See Romero,
4 2009-NMCA-059, , 	18 (recognizing that Rule 	1-056(F) requires a supporting
5 affidavit). However, at no time during the district court proceedings did Defendant
6 contend that the lack of an affidavit was problematic. Nor did Defendant or the
7 district court identify any other defect in the content or form of Plaintiffs' Rule 1-
8 056(F) request. Considering all of the circumstances, the third Sun Country Savings
9 Bank factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs despite their failure to submit a supporting
10 affidavit.
11 	{23} 	Viewing all of the factors together, we see no reasonable justification for
12 	deviating from the general rule that summary judgment is premature when the
13 	nonmoving party has not completed discovery. As the district court's remarks
14 	indicate, it focused on just one of the four factors-the one that favored Defendant.
15 	However, all of the factors are "critical[,]" Sun Country Savings Bank, 1989-NMSC-
l 6 043, , 	27, and the remaining three factors favor Plaintiffs. Under our "more
17 exacting" review of orders granting "final relief without consideration of the merits
18 	of a claim or defense[,]" Skeen v. Boyles, 2009-NMCA-080,, 43, 146 N.M. 627,
19 	213 P.3d 531, we conclude that the district court should have afforded Plaintiffs
20 more time to complete the pertinent discovery and respond on the merits.
16

1 CONCLUSION
2 	{24} 	We 	reverse 	the 	entry 	of 	summary 	judgment 	and 	remand 	for 	further
3 proceedings consistent with this opinion.
4 	{25} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
5
6
7 WE CONCUR:
s~cf~9 MEG P. DUFF\',Jd~
17