March 28, 2019- State of New Mexico v. George Trujillo, No. A-1-CA-36135

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“NO: GOUT? APPEA* 5 OF TE™ Siz N Wt

Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 3/28/2019 11:07 AM

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Md. ~L4
Plaintiff-Appellee, Mark Reynolds
V. No. A-1-CA-36135
GEORGE TRUJILLO,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
Drew D. Tatum, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

Lauren J. Wolongevicz, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION
IVES, Judge.
43 Defendant George Trujillo was convicted after a jury trial of possessing
methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. On appeal, Defendant

challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, arguing that the

1 search of his home and car pursuant to a no-knock search warrant was contrary to
2 New Mexico law. Defendant principally argues that all no-knock warrants are
3 invalid under Article II, Section 	10 of the New Mexico Constitution, broadly
4 asserting 	that 	any 	evidence 	seized 	pursuant 	to 	a 	no-knock 	warrant 	must 	be
5 suppressed, even 	in cases where exigent circumstances would otherwise allow
6 unannounced entry by law enforcement. In the alternative, Defendant argues that
7 even if New Mexico law allows for no-knock warrants: (1) a no-knock warrant is
8 not dispositive at a suppression hearing, where the question should be whether there
9 were exigent circumstances at the time of the search, and no such circumstances
10 	existed 	here; 	and 	(2) 	the 	search 	warrant 	affidavit 	did 	not 	establish 	exigent
11 	circumstances and omitted material facts that weighed against a finding of exigency.
12 	We decline to address Defendant's categorical challenge to the validity of no-knock
13 	warrants because he did not cite any legal authority or develop any argument to
14 	support the holding he seeks. We conclude that the district court did not err in
15 	denying the motion to suppress because the court could have reasonably concluded
16 that the police announced their presence and their authority to search before entering
17 	Defendant's home. Because the officers complied with the knock-and-announce
18 	rule, we do not address Defendant' s arguments regarding the exigency exception.
19 	We affirm.
2

1 BACKGROUND
2 	{2} 	A judge issued a no-knock warrant to search the property where Defendant
3 	resided for evidence of drug trafficking. The warrant was based on the affidavit of
4 	Officer James Lara Jr. Officer Lara stated in his affidavit that a no-knock warrant
5 was 	necessary 	for 	officer 	safet y. 	According 	to 	Officer 	Lara, 	Defendant 	had
6 	surveillance cameras on his front door that would allow him to monitor people
7 approaching his house, and police found five loaded firearms during a previous
8 	search of his home. Officer Lara also stated that in his own "personal contact with
9 	[Defendant] in the past[,]" Defendant had been "defiant and uncooperative towards
10 	law enforcement."
11 	{3} 	Before Officer Lara and other officers executed the search warrant, they
12 	watched Defendant's residence from the street and concluded he was not home. The
13 	officers waited for Defendant, who eventually drove up and backed his vehicle into
14 his driveway. 	The officers pulled their vehicles into the driveway and ordered
15 	Defendant out of his vehicle, instructing him to sit on the ground and informing him
16 that they had a warrant to search his house. They then took Defendant' s keys from
17 him , used them to unlock the door to the house, and entered the residence. The police
18 	seized marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia from the residence and
19 vehicle.
3

1 {4} 	The 	State 	charged 	Defendant 	with 	two 	felonies: 	possession 	of
2 methamphetamine with intent to distribute, NMSA 1978, § 30-31-20 (2006), and
3 possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, NMSA 1978, § 30-31-22(A)(l)
4 (2011 ). 	The 	State 	also 	charged 	him 	with 	misdemeanor 	possession 	of 	drug
5 paraphernalia, NMSA 1978, § 30-31-25.l(A) (2001).
6 	{5} 	Defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the no-knock
7 warrant. He claimed, among other things, that the warrant was invalid at the time it
8 was issued because Rule 5-211 NMRA does not authorize no-knock warrants and
9 because Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution forbids such warrants.
10 Defendant urged the district court to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to what
11 	he contended was an "invalid search warrant." At the hearing on the motion, Officer
12 	Lara testified to the facts described above about the execution of the search warrant.
13 	{6} 	The district court denied the motion without making findings of fact. It also
14 denied Defendant's motion to reconsider.
15 	{7} 	Although Defendant was not convicted of the two drug trafficking felonies
16 originally 	charged, 	a 	jury 	found 	him 	guilty 	of 	felony 	possession 	of
17 	methamphetamine, as well as two misdemeanors, possession of marijuana and
18 	possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant appeals.
4

1 DISCUSSION
2 	Standard of Review
3 	{8} 	This Court "review[ s] the constitutional question of the reasonableness of a
4 	search and seizure de novo." State v. Hand, 2008-NMSC-014, ~ 6, 143 N.M. 530,
5 	178 P.3d 165 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our task is to decide
6 " whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most
7 	favorable to the prevailing party." State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ~ 9, 138 N.M.
8 9, 116 P.3d 80 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here, the
9 	district court does not make specific findings of fact, "we must draw from the record
10 to derive findings based on reasonable facts and inferences and determine whether
11 	those facts and inferences support the conclusion reached by the [district] court." Id.
12 ~ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We "indulge in all reasonable
13 	presumptions in support of the district court' s ruling." Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018,
14 ~ 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
15 	Categorical Challenge to Validity of No-Knock Warrants
16 	{9} 	Citing Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, Defendant
17 	claims that every search pursuant to a no-knock warrant is invalid as a matter oflaw ,
18 	and 	that 	all 	evidence 	seized pursuant to 	such a 	warrant 	must 	be 	suppressed,
19 	regardless of whether exigent circumstances exist at the time of police entry. 1 In
1 Defendant 	does 	not 	contend 	on 	appeal 	that 	the 	warrant 	at 	issue 	was
5

l 	State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062, ilil 9-13 , 116 N.M . 431,863 P.2d 1052, our
2 	Supreme Court discussed but declined to decide whether no-knock search warrants
3 	are valid under Article II, Section 10. The Court noted:
4
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[T]he unsettled issue of the legality of their use under the laws of this
state 	require 	that 	we 	one 	day 	address 	the 	validity 	of a 	judicial
predetermination 	of necessity for 	unannounced entry. 	It would 	be
inappropriate, however, to set forth here a position on a point not
discussed by the parties in their briefs.
9 Id. ,I 10 (footnote omitted).
10 	{ to} 	For similar reasons, we do not decide the issue in this case. Defendant has not
11 	cited any authority that supports the constitutional holding he seeks- 	that whenever
12 	a judge issues a warrant that authorizes police to enter a residence without complying
13 	with the knock-and-announce rule, the warrant itself is invalid, requiring suppression
14 	of all fruits of the search. We therefore assume no such authority exists. See In re
15 	Adoption of Do e, 1984-NMSC-024, il 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329. Nor, beyond
16 reciting that Article II, Section 	10 provides greater protection than its 	federal
17 counterpart, 	has 	Defendant 	developed 	any 	argument 	to 	support 	his 	requested
18 	holding. Appellate courts are under no obligation to review unclear or undeveloped
19 arguments. 	See 	State 	v. 	Guerra, 	2012-NMSC-014, 	il 	21 , 	278 	P.3d 	1031.
unsupported by probable cause sufficient to authorize a search.
6

1 Accordingly, we will not consider the merits of Defendant's categorical challenge
2 to the use of no-knock warrants. 2
3 	{11} 	In support of his argument that all no-knock warrants are invalid, Defendant
4 relies on three out-of-jurisdiction cases: Parsley v. Superior Court, 513 P.2d 611
5 (Cal. 1973); State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fl. 1994), and Davis v. State, 859
6 A.2d 1112 (Md. 2004). However, none of these cases supports the broad, categorical
7 holding Defendant seeks. In Parsley, Bamber, and Davis, the courts recognized that
8 no-knock warrants based on judicial predictions regarding the presence of exigent
9 circumstances do not justify unannounced residential entry by police. See Parsley,
10 	513 P.2d at 613 (holding that advance judicial approval does not excuse compliance
11 	with state law knock-and-announce requirements); Bamber, 630 So. 2d at 1051
12 	(holding that no-knock warrants "are without legal effect in Florida"); Davis, 859
13 	A.2d at 1132 (holding that judicial officers in Maryland may not issue no-knock
14 	warrants). But all three courts indicated that the presence of exigent circumstances
15 	at the time of entry could justify a no-knock search regardless of the presence of a
2 It is also unclear whether Defendant intends to assert that Article II, Section
10 required the police to announce their presence and authority before they ordered
him from his vehicle and searched it. Whatever his intent, his briefs do not cite
authority or develop argument to support extending the announcement requirement
from searches of residences to searches of vehicles. We assume no such authority
exists and, as with his categorical challenge to no-knock warrants, decline to address
the merits of the issue. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, 1 2; State v.
Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ,-r 34, 387 P.3d 885 (declining to do work necessary to
reach inadequately briefed constitutional issue).
7

1 no-knock provision. 3 See Parsley, 513 P.2d at 615-17 (addressing prosecution's
2 argument that district court's reliance on no-knock warrant was harmless error
3 because police were reacting to perceived "demonstrable emergency"); Bamber, 630
4 So. 2d at 1053 (noting that no-knock searches "are lawful when circumstances at the
5 scene constitute an emergency that meets certain narrowly prescribed conditions");
6 Davis, 	859 A.2d at 	1132-36 (analyzing facts at time law enforcement entered
7 residence and concluding that "the entry in this case was not justified by existing
8 and articulated exigency"). None of the courts held that the inclusion of a no-knock
9 provision renders a search warrant invalid as a matter of law, categorically requiring
10 	suppression. Instead, all three cases support the narrower proposition that whether a
11 	particular search is lawful depends on the circumstances at the time the police enter
12 	a residence. In other words, under Parsley, Bamber, and Davis, an unannounced
13 	search conducted pursuant to a no-knock warrant is valid and does not require
14 	suppression if the search itself was consistent with applicable knock-and-announce
15 	doctrine.
16 	{12} 	Even ifwe were to find Parsley, Bamber, and Davis persuasive and hold that
17 no-knock warrants do not justify unannounced entry in New Mexico, Defendant has
3While Bamber, 630 So. 2d at 1049, 1055, involved a standard, rather than a
no-knock, warrant, the court treated this as a distinction without a difference in
holding that the 	no-knock 	search 	at 	issue 	had 	not been justified by 	exigent
circumstances.
8

1 offered no reason for us to make the significant logical leap from the holdings of
2 those cases to the holding he requests. To reach Defendant's proposed holding, we
3 would have to accept one aspect of Parsley, Bamber, and Davis (that a no-knock
4 warrant 	does 	not justify 	unannounced 	entry) 	and 	reject 	another 	(that exigent
5 circumstances at the time of entry justify failure to announce, even when the search
6 is pursuant to a no-knock warrant). Defendant does not explain why we should carve
7 Parsley, Bamber, and Davis in this fashion. He makes only a conclusory assertion
8 that searches conducted pursuant to no-knock warrants are per se unconstitutional.
9 Defendant has not adequately briefed the constitutional issue he raises, and we will
10 	not do the independent research and analysis necessary to consider and decide the
11 	merits of that issue in his appeal. See State v. Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ,-r 34, 387
12 P .3 d 885 ("For this Court to rule on an inadequately briefed constitutional issue
13 	would essentially require us to do the work on behalf of Defendant, which we will
14 not do."); see also State v. Clifford, 1994-NMSC-048, ,-r 19, 117 N.M. 508,873 P.2d
15 	254 (noting that appellate courts need not do counsel's research).
16 Constitutionality of the Search Under Article II, Section 10
17 	{13} 	As an alternative to his categorical challenge to no-knock warrants, Defendant
18 	claims the search at issue violated Article II, Section 10 because it was inconsistent
19 with our knock-and-announce doctrine in various respects. We disagree. Viewing
20 the evidence 	in the 	light most favorable to the State, the record supports the
9

1 conclusion that the officers announced their presence and authority to Defendant
2 before entering his residence.
3 	{14} 	"The requirement that officers executing a search warrant announce their
4 	identity and purpose and be denied admission is a critical component of a reasonable
5 search under Article II, Section 10." State v. Attaway, 1994-NMSC-Ol l, ,-r 22, 117
6 N.M. 	141, 870 P.2d 103. "[T]he knock-and-announce rule requires that officers
7 make known not only their presence, but also their authority under the warrant that
8 they are serving." State v. Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, ,-r 18, 143 N.M. 692, 181 P.3d
9 684. The announcement requirement "protects both the occupant and police from
10 the possible violent response of a startled occupant suddenly confronted with an
11 	unannounced entry by an unknown person." Attaway, 1994-NMSC-Ol l, ,-r 13. It also
12 "protects the sanctity of the home and individual privacy." Id. Finally, it "prevent[s]
13 	the needless destruction of the homeowner's property[.]" Id. The failure to announce
14 generally renders the search of a residence unreasonable under our state constitution,
15 	requiring suppression of seized evidence, with certain exceptions. See id. ,-r 22 n.6
16 (noting that remedy is suppression under Article II, Section 1O); State v. Jean-Paul,
17 	2013-NMCA-032, ,-r,-r 10-11, 295 P.3d 1072 (summarizing exceptions for futility and
18 	exigency).
19 	{15} 	Viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
20 	indulging all reasonable inferences in support of the district court's ruling, we
10

1 identify 	no 	error 	in 	the 	denial 	of suppression. 	The 	district 	court 	could 	have
2 reasonably found, based on the testimony at the suppression hearing, that before the
3 police 	entered 	Defendant's 	residence, 	they 	informed 	him 	that 	they 	were 	law
4 	enforcement officers who had a warrant to search his property. See Vargas, 2008-
5 NMSC-019, , 	18 (requiring police officers to announce presence and authority
6 	before entering). Officer Lara testified that the police officers approached Defendant
7 	when he was sitting in his vehicle, which he had parked in the driveway of his
8 residence. In addition, Officer Lara testified that the officers ordered him out of his
9 	vehicle, detained him, informed him that they had come to his home to search it
10 pursuant to a warrant, and then entered his residence. This testimony supports the
11 	conclusion that the officers complied with our state constitutional announcement
12 requirement.
13 	CONCLUSION
14 	{16} 	We affirm.
15 	{17} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
16
17 	Z,~,,~.~
11

—

WE CONCU

K\yy 0 D>

~O-—_____—

M. MONICA LAMURA) Chief Judge

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2. Uli r—

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge