September 19, 2012 – State of New Mexico v. Tara Valdez, No. 31,164

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: _____________
Filing Date: 	September 19, 2012
NO. 31,164
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TARA VALDEZ,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Michael E. Vigil, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
Alex Chisholm
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee

1While we acknowledge that alcohol is normally considered to be a drug, for
the purposes of this Opinion we distinguish alcohol from other drugs whether they be
prescription or illegal. Consequently, when we refer to “drugs” we do not include
alcohol.
OPINION
CASTILLO, Chief Judge.
{1} 	The issue in this case is one of first impression: Does the language of NMSA
1978, Section 66-8-102(N) (2010), mandating installation of an ignition interlock on
vehicles driven by persons convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI), violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions as
applied to DWI offenders whose impairment is caused not by alcohol but by drugs?1
We conclude that it does not, and we reverse.
I. 	BACKGROUND
{2} 	Under New Mexico law, it is unlawful for a person to drive a vehicle if that
person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See § 66-8-102(A). Similarly,
it is unlawful for a person to drive a vehicle if that person is under the influence of any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle. See §
66-8-102(B). Section 66-8-102(C) sets out the per se standard for DWI convictions
based on alcohol concentration, and Section 66-8-102(D) deals with aggravated DWI.
The portion of the statute in question in this case, Section 66-8-102(N), applies to any

2
offender convicted of any type of DWI, and requires that offender to
obtain an ignition interlock license and have an ignition interlock device
installed and operating on all motor vehicles driven by the offender,
pursuant to rules adopted by the traffic safety bureau. Unless determined
by the bureau to be indigent, the offender shall pay all costs associated
with having an ignition interlock device installed on the appropriate
motor vehicles. The offender shall operate only those vehicles equipped
with ignition interlock devices for:
(1) 	a period of one year, for a first offender;
(2) 	a period of two years, for a second conviction pursuant to
this section;
(3) 	a period of three years, for a third conviction pursuant to
this section; or
(4) 	the remainder of the offender’s life, for a fourth or
subsequent conviction pursuant to this section.
An ignition interlock device is an electronic analyzer that measures breath-alcohol
concentration and prevents a driver from starting and continuing to operate a vehicle
if the driver’s blood-alcohol content exceeds a specified limit. 	See 18.20.11.11
NMAC (01/01/03).
{3} 	Here, the facts are not in dispute. 	Defendant was charged with a first-time
offense after driving while intoxicated in Santa Fe County pursuant to Section 66-8-
102(B). 	Results of a blood test showed the presence in her system of oxycodone,
diazepam, and nordiazepam, but no alcohol. 	She entered into a conditional plea
agreement wherein she pled guilty to the first-time DWI but reserved the right to
appeal any order requiring her to install an ignition interlock device in her vehicle.
In addition, she filed a motion to set aside any requirement that she install an interlock

3
device. 	The district court accepted the plea agreement and further granted
Defendant’s motion. 	Finding that “alcohol did not contribute to . . . Defendant’s
conviction,” the court ruled that the ignition interlock requirement did not apply to her
case because the interlock devices detect only alcohol, not drugs. The court concluded
that “there is no rational basis” for requiring a person in Defendant’s situation to
comply with the statute, in violation of equal protection guarantees of the state and
federal constitutions. The State appeals.
{4} 	Defendant urges affirmance, claiming that the interlock provision is over-
inclusive in its classifications of drivers and under-inclusive in its remedies. The State
argues for reversal. It contends that the district court wrongly decided that the ignition
interlock law fails the rational basis test and argues that the court improperly
concluded that the law is not rationally related to the goal of preventing driving while
impaired. We look to the statute and subject it to the rational basis test as adopted by
New Mexico courts.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of Review, Scope of Review
{5} 	New Mexico’s Constitution mirrors that of the United States in providing that
“[n]o person shall be . . . denied equal protection of the laws.” N.M. Const. art II,
§ 18; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. We have previously articulated the standard of

4
review in such a constitutional challenge and the approach to the three levels of
scrutiny involved—strict, intermediate, and rational basis:
In analyzing which level of scrutiny should apply in an equal
protection challenge, a court should look at all three levels to determine
which is most appropriate based on the facts of the particular case. The
determination of which level of scrutiny is applicable under the
Constitution is a purely legal question, and is reviewed de novo.
Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 15, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413.
{6} 	The extent of our scrutiny depends “on the nature of the interest and the degree
to which it is infringed.” State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 86, 135 N.M. 223,
86 P.3d 1050 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The highest level of
review, strict scrutiny, is used if the liberty interest being impinged rises to the level
of a fundamental right, most notably in the areas of race or ancestry. 	Id. ¶ 89.
Intermediate 	scrutiny 	is 	appropriate 	for 	analyzing 	“legislative 	classifications
infringing important but not fundamental rights, and involving sensitive but not
suspect 	classes.” 	Id. 	¶ 	97 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted).
Intermediate scrutiny is limited to classes involving gender and illegitimacy. Id. ¶ 99.
{7} 	Both parties agree that, absent an important right or sensitive class, neither of
the two higher forms of scrutiny is applicable in this case and that rational basis is the
appropriate level of scrutiny for assessing the constitutionality of the interlock
requirement. Under rational basis scrutiny, the party challenging the constitutionality

5
of the statute “must overcome a presumption of constitutionality” and “is required to
show that the statute’s classification is not rationally related to the legislative goal.”
Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under this level of scrutiny,
the classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Id. ¶ 102. Thus, we have endorsed the proposition, expressed by the United States
Supreme Court, that the Fourteenth Amendment
permits the [s]tates a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which
affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the [s]tate’s objective. State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the
fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. 	A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it.
Id. ¶ 103 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)).
{8} 	The burden on those challenging the constitutionality of legislative enactments
is therefore great. The United States Supreme Court has long abided by the “strong
presumption of validity” of legislative classifications and has stated that “those
attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have
similarly stated that “the party objecting to the legislative classification has the burden
of demonstrating that the classification bears no rational relationship to a conceivable

6
legislative purpose.” Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 104 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The challenging party “must demonstrate that the challenged
legislation is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, not just that it is possibly so.” 	Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In sum, a defendant “must show that
the classification serves no valid governmental interest, is unreasonable and arbitrary
as to amount to mere caprice.” State v. Edgington, 99 N.M. 715, 719, 663 P.2d 374,
378 (Ct. App. 1983).
B. 	The Purpose of the Statute
{9} 	“The ultimate purpose of the DWI laws is to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public by stopping people from driving under the influence of drugs and
alcohol.” State v. Hernandez, 2001-NMCA-057, ¶ 19, 130 N.M. 698, 30 P.3d 387;
see State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (“The purpose
of our DWI legislation is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of
New Mexico.”). And our courts have long acknowledged that the public interest in
deterring DWI is compelling. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 17.
{10} 	“[A] determination of what is reasonably necessary for the preservation of the
public health, safety and welfare of the general public is a legislative function and
should 	not 	be 	interfered 	with, 	save 	in 	a 	clear 	case 	of 	abuse.” 	Druktenis,
2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 106 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	“[T]he

7
Legislature has broad discretion in determining necessary measures for the protection
of the public.” Id. ¶ 107. And a statute will be upheld “if any state of the facts may
be reasonably conceived to justify it[.]” Edgington, 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377.
In assessing the constitutionality of a statute, we accept that “any redeeming value of
the classification is sufficient.” Española Hous. Auth. v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787, 789,
568 P.2d 1233, 1235 (1977). 	“[E]ven a single persuasive state interest may be
sufficient to defeat a . . . claim that equal protection has been denied.” 	Marrujo v.
N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep’t, 118 N.M. 753, 760, 887 P.2d 747, 754 (1994).
{11} 	In the case before us, we first look to the text of the DWI statute for guidance.
The statute codifying the penalty of installation of an ignition interlock device is titled,
in part, “Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs[.]” Section 66-8-
102. 	That title expresses the Legislature’s intention of having the statute apply to
drivers who are under the influence of either alcohol or drugs or both, making DWI
one crime regardless of the cause. See State v. House, 2001-NMCA-011, ¶ 22, 130
N.M. 418, 25 P.3d 257 (relying on the title of the vehicular homicide statute to note
that “the Legislature’s concern in enacting the statute was death and injury caused by
vehicle”). A conviction for DWI under any section of the statute requires the offender
“to obtain an ignition interlock license and have an ignition interlock device installed
and operating on all motor vehicles driven by the offender, pursuant to rules adopted

8
by the traffic safety bureau.” Section 66-8-102(N).
{12} 	The DWI statute is part of a broad legislative scheme, including the State’s
separate Ignition Interlock Licensing Act, which applies to those whose “privilege or
driver’s license has been revoked or denied.” NMSA 1978, § 66-5-503(A) (2009).
The statute defines “revoked” as applying to a person whose license or driving
privilege has been terminated “for driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs.” 	NMSA 1978, § 66-5-502(D) (2007). 	The statute also defines
“ignition interlock device” as “a device . . . that prevents the operation of a motor
vehicle by an intoxicated or impaired person.” Section 66-5-502(B). This companion
statute does not differentiate between those who were convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. 	When analyzing Section 66-8-102 along with other
statutes, the legislative actions “should be harmonized and construed together when
possible, 	in 	a 	way 	that 	facilitates 	achievement 	of 	their 	goals.” 	Johnson,
2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 6. The goal of the Legislature was to criminalize DWI and to
penalize it with mandatory installation of ignition interlock devices without regard to
the underlying substance that led to the offender’s impairment and conviction.
C. 	Legislative Authority
{13} 	We next analyze the authority of the Legislature and its use of DWI laws to

9
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. Over the years, the New Mexico
Legislature has modified and toughened New Mexico’s DWI laws to combat a serious
problem throughout the state. 	Our Supreme Court has noted that “gradual and
consistent increases in punishment for repeated DWI violations and implementation
of rehabilitation options have been adopted to counter the problem of DWI in New
Mexico.” State v. Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, ¶ 17, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223 (noting
twelve amendments to the DWI laws between 1941 and 1993, each of which “has
adopted a slightly higher degree of penalty, be it a mandatory jail term or
court-ordered treatment for alcohol or drug abuse”). Our Legislature, we have stated,
has “broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local
concern.” Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 71 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
{14} 	Here, that concern revolves around violations of our DWI laws, in particular the
goal of preventing offenders from getting behind the wheel and again driving in an
impaired state. The ignition interlock requirement squarely addresses that concern by
limiting the ability of a previous DWI offender from operating a vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. New Mexico has been a pioneer among states in combating
DWI, and it was the first in the nation to mandate an ignition interlock device for first-
time offenders. 	See Joseph Marutollo, Comment, No Second Chances: Leandra’s

10
Law and Mandatory Alcohol Ignition Interlocks for First-Time Drunk Driving
Offenders, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1090, 1098 (2010). 	In the first few years after
implementing that harsher restriction, recidivism among drunk drivers dropped about
sixty-seven percent. See Ignition Interlocks: Every State, for Every Convicted Drunk
D r i v e r , 	M a d d . o r g , 	h t t p : / / w w w . m a d d . o r g / l a w s / l a w - o v e r v i e w /
Draft-Ignition_Interlocks_Overview.pdf (revised 2012).
{15} 	Defendant complains that the classifications chosen by the Legislature are over-
inclusive because requiring installation of a device that detects only alcohol unfairly
ensnares those convicted of driving under the influence of drugs for no apparent
reason or benefit. But a degree of over-inclusiveness in the name of crime prevention
is not fatal to a statute; a legislature’s “resort to somewhat over[-]inclusive
classifications is legitimate as a prophylactic device to insure the achievement of
statutory ends.” 	Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 71 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
We will not, as long as rational basis is the scrutiny slot through which
we 	review 	statutes, 	look 	behind 	the 	Legislature’s 	over-inclusive
classification unless it rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the [s]tate’s objective, and, as long as any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. ¶ 108 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, “‘[i]n rational
basis scrutiny, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may

11
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’” Id. ¶
112 (quoting Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314-15).
{16} 	The State offered such rational speculation in its response to Defendant’s
motion to set aside the interlock requirement: 	“While the state may not have the
ability or means with an interlock device to prevent a driver under the influence of
only drugs from operating a motor vehicle, it can prevent that same class of people,
who have already demonstrated driving habits that pose a danger to the public, is at
least not under the influence of alcohol.” We also note that it is far from nonsensical
to suggest that the Legislature, in ratcheting up the penalties for the severe and
increasing plague of DWI, concluded that those who have been convicted of driving
under the influence of drugs may also be disposed toward driving under the influence
of alcohol. As noted above, the Legislature imposed the penalty of installation of an
ignition interlock for first-time offenders under the heading of “driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.” 	Furthermore, we do not expect exact
precision when the Legislature imposes penalties to protect the public health, safety,
and welfare. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“The problems
of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). And while the Legislature certainly had the ability to narrow

12
the requirement of ignition interlock devices to only those convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol, “[a]n inquiry into less restrictive alternatives . . . is not
necessary when applying the minimal rational basis test for analyzing legislation.”
Powell v. N.M. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 117 N.M. 415, 420, 872 P.2d 388,
393 (Ct. App. 1994); see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 222 (1976) (“Whether the
same ends might have been better or more precisely served by a different approach is
no part of the judicial inquiry under the traditional minimum rationality approach.”
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). “When employing the minimal scrutiny test, the courts
. . . will uphold the statute if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that will
sustain the challenged classification.” Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 107
N.M. 688, 693, 763 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Trujillo
v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305.
{17} 	We cannot say that requiring ignition interlock devices for all DWI offenders,
regardless of the type of substance that led to the conviction, amounts to an act of the
Legislature that “is unreasonable and arbitrary as to amount to mere caprice.”
Edgington, 99 N.M. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378. 	Nor can we credibly argue that the
penalty “serves no valid governmental interest.” Id. We reaffirm the proposition that
the Legislature is granted “broad discretion in determining necessary measures for the
protection of the public.” Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 107. We detect no element

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of caprice in the historical approach taken by the Legislature in refining our DWI laws
to protect the public from those operating vehicles while impaired irrespective of the
cause of the impairment.
{18} 	Further, we observe that it is not illogical for the Legislature to have imagined
a connection between the use of prescription drugs and the use of alcohol, especially
among young adults. 	See Sean Esteban McCabe, James A. Cranford, & Carol J.
Boyd, The Relationship Between Past-Year Drinking Behaviors and Nonmedical Use
of Prescription Drugs: Prevalence of Co-Occurrence in a National Sample, 84 Drug
and Alcohol Dependence 281, 282 (2006) (stating that “the drug most frequently used
in combination with prescription drugs was alcohol” and noting that about one-third
of emergency department visits connected to oxycodone use also involved alcohol
use). 	It has been reported that “[t]here is growing evidence documenting the
association between alcohol use and [nonmedical use of prescription drugs]”; that
“problem use of prescription drugs was significantly higher among daily alcohol
drinkers”; and that college students who abuse prescription drugs are “over six times
more likely to report frequent binge drinking and over five times more likely to drive
after binge drinking” than college students who did not abuse prescription drugs. Id.
at 285. See also Sean Esteban McCabe, James A. Cranford, Michele Morales, & Amy
Young, Simultaneous and Concurrent Polydrug Use of Alcohol and Prescription

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Drugs: Prevalence, Correlates, and Consequences, J. Stud. Alcohol 529, 529 (July
2006) (finding a 12.1 percent occurrence of simultaneous use of alcohol and
prescription drugs among young adults and urging substance abuse prevention efforts
at the college level that clearly focus on co-ingestion of alcohol and prescription
drugs). We therefore conclude that a rational basis exists for the Legislature to require
the installation of alcohol-detecting ignition interlocks on the vehicles of all first-time
DWI offenders, even those whose offense involved only drugs and not alcohol.
D. 	Defendant’s Additional Issues
{19} 	Defendant raises two side issues that we address briefly. She relies on NMSA
1978, Section 66-8-102.1 (2003), which limits plea agreements, and contends that the
second half of the statute refers only to blood-alcohol content and thus she “could
have negotiated a plea agreement outside the scope of the interlock statute.” 	We
disagree. Section 66-8-102.1 states that “[w]here the complaint or information alleges
a violation of Section 66-8-102 . . . , any plea of guilty thereafter entered in
satisfaction of the charges shall include at least a plea of guilty to the violation of one
of the subsections of Section 66-8-102.” As noted above, all violations of the DWI
statute require installation of the ignition interlock, even for first-time offenders,
regardless of the cause of impairment. See § 66-8-102(N).
{20} 	Next, Defendant asks us to distinguish between offenders who were under the

15
influence of illegal drugs and those who were under the influence of legal prescription
drugs. Defendant asks us to take judicial notice of statistics showing that 48 percent
of all people take prescription drugs, suggesting that it is folly to think that the
Legislature intended to both criminalize the behavior of nearly half the population of
New Mexico and then try to punish them by mandating installation of a pointless
device. We are unpersuaded. The theory of judicial notice is a way for a court to
accept facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” and can be accurately and readily
determined from “sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Rule
11-201(B)(2) NMRA. 	Judicial notice is reserved for obvious facts, universally
accepted as true. See, e.g., City of Aztec v. Gurule, 2010-NMSC-006, ¶ 9, 147 N.M.
693, 228 P.3d 477 (taking judicial notice of a municipal ordinance); State v. Yanez,
89 N.M. 397, 398, 553 P.2d 252, 253 (Ct. App. 1976) (taking judicial notice of the
fact that morphine is an opium derivative). While we decline to take judicial notice
of these statistics, Defendant may make the argument to the extent that it is based on
recognized authority.
{21} 	Regardless, Defendant’s argument is flawed. The DWI statute does not punish
people for merely taking prescription drugs; it outlaws only those who are under the
influence of any drug taken “to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely
driving a vehicle.” Section 66-8-102(B). The level of impairment is what is at issue,

16
and the difference between legal drugs and illegal drugs does not bear on the extent
to which a drug may impair a driver. See Tina Wescott Cafaro, Slipping Through the
Cracks: Why Can’t We Stop Drugged Driving?, 32 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 33, 56
(2010) (noting that “[i]mpairment from licit drugs can parallel the symptoms of illicit
drugs”). In sum, the Legislature is outlawing impaired driving in and of itself, not the
method by which one becomes impaired. 	And here, Defendant was not merely
ingesting prescription drugs under a doctor’s care; she was operating a vehicle while
impaired by those drugs.
III. 	CONCLUSION
{22} 	When we apply rational basis scrutiny to the State’s ignition interlock mandate,
we conclude that the district court erred in finding that the requirement violated equal
protection when applied to a defendant who had only drugs and no alcohol in her
system at the time of the offense. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling of
the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
{23} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________

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CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge
WE CONCUR:
__________________________________
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
__________________________________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge