March 21, 2011 – Clara Romero v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Taos, and the New Mexico Association of Counties, No. 29,524

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: 	March 21, 2011
NO. 29,524
CLARA ROMERO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF COUNTY OF TAOS, and the
NEW MEXICO ASSOCIATION
OF COUNTIES,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY
Sam B. Sanchez, District Judge
The Herrera Firm, P.C.
Samuel M. Herrera
Taos, NM
for Appellant
Slease & Martinez, P.A.
William D. Slease
Jonlyn M. Martinez
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellees

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} 	We address in this appeal whether the requirements of NMSA 1978, Section
66-5-301(A) (1983), pertaining to uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM)
coverage, apply to a group of counties that pool their financial resources under NMSA
1978, Section 3-62-1(1986) and NMSA 1978, Section 3-62-2 (1986) to satisfy claims
against the individual counties of the group. We hold that Section 66-5-301(A) does
not apply and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Plaintiff Clara Romero, an employee of Defendant Taos County (the County),
was injured in a motor vehicle accident while she was driving a vehicle belonging to
the County in the course of her employment. She was struck by another vehicle and
was not at fault. Plaintiff received a settlement for the policy limits of the insurance
policy of the driver of the other vehicle. She also received workers’ compensation
benefits. Plaintiff made a claim for UM/UIM coverage against the County’s insurance
coverage.
{3} 	The County provided coverage for its losses through a coverage agreement with
Defendant New Mexico Association of Counties (the Association of Counties).
Through the Association of Counties, member counties pool contributions to a fund

(the multi-line fund or pool) to provide coverage for property and liability losses. The
coverage agreement specified the coverage provided by the Association of Counties
through the multi-line pool. 	The coverage agreement did not include UM/UIM
coverage.
{4} 	Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against the County and the
Association of Counties, requesting in part a determination that, based on Section 66-
5-301(A), the County had coverage for, and the Association of Counties was obligated
to pay, UM/UIM benefits to Plaintiff. 	Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the County did not have UM/UIM insurance and that the
Association of Counties was immune from suit. 	Plaintiff filed a counter-motion,
contending 	in 	part 	that 	Section 	66-5-301(A) 	and 	public 	policy 	required 	the
Association of Counties to provide UM/UIM coverage, and the County did not waive
such coverage. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion and granted Defendants’
motion. 	It stated that the County was neither obligated to purchase nor could it
purchase UM/UIM coverage to compensate Plaintiff for her injuries. Plaintiff appeals
from the district court’s order.
APPLICATION OF SECTION 66-5-301(A) TO THE ASSOCIATION OF
COUNTIES
{5} 	Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motion

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for summary judgment and in denying her motion. 	We review the district court’s
grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo to determine whether the district
court was correct that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tafoya v. Rael, 2008-NMSC-057,
¶ 11, 145 N.M. 4, 193 P.3d 551.
{6} 	Plaintiff states that the issue in this case is whether the Association of Counties
is obligated to offer UM/UIM coverage to the County and, if so, whether the County
waived UM/UIM coverage. 	She argues that the law of New Mexico, as stated in
Section 66-5-301(A), requires an insurance provider to offer UM/UIM coverage in all
automobile insurance policies unless the named insured rejects such coverage. Thus,
Plaintiff concludes that because the County did not reject UM/UIM coverage, the
County had such coverage as a result of its coverage agreement with the Association
of Counties.
{7} 	Plaintiff is correct that Section 66-5-301(A) generally requires an insurer to
provide UM/UIM coverage as part of an automobile liability insurance policy unless
rejected by the insured. See Romero v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 111 N.M. 154, 156, 803
P.2d 243, 245 (1990) (stating that public policy embodies making uninsured motorist
overage part of automobile liability insurance policies and that an insured may reject

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such coverage). We therefore agree with Plaintiff that our focus should be on whether
Section 66-5-301 applies to the Association of Counties. Plaintiff made this argument
to the district court, and, although the district court did not expressly rule on this issue,
we can affirm if the district court was correct for any reason that was before it on the
basis of the presentations of the parties. See Meiboom v. Watson, 2000-NMSC-004,
¶ 20, 128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154 (noting that an appellate court may “affirm a
district court ruling on a ground not relied upon by the district court, but will not do
so if reliance on the new ground would be unfair to appellant” (alteration, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted)).
{8} 	We view the matter as one of legislative intent. See Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
2010-NMSC-051, ¶ 15, 149 N.M.162, 245 P.3d 1214 (stating that the “primary goal
when interpreting statutes is to further legislative intent”). To ascertain legislative
intent, we look to the words used by the Legislature in the statutes at issue as “the
primary indicator of legislative intent.” High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of
Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). 	We seek to harmonize our reading of the relevant
statutes to give effect to each of them. See State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 12, 134
N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064 (“All of the provisions of a statute, together with other

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statutes in pari materia, must be read together to ascertain legislative intent.”). We
interpret the UM/UIM statute liberally to implement its remedial purpose. Marckstadt
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 147 N.M. 678, 228 P.3d 462.
{9} 	The statutes relevant to our analysis are Section 66-5-301(A), Section 3-62-1,
Section 3-62-2(A), and NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-207(A) (1998). 	Section 66-5-
301(A) requires automobile liability insurance policies to provide UM/UIM coverage
and reads, in relevant part:
No motor vehicle or automobile liability policy insuring against
loss . . . shall be delivered or issued for delivery in New Mexico with
respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in New
Mexico unless coverage is provided . . . for the protection of persons
insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . . , according to the
rules and regulations promulgated by, and under provisions filed with
and approved by, the superintendent of insurance.
Sections 3-62-1 and 3-62-2(A) address the manner in which public bodies, including
counties, may provide for their insurance needs. Section 3-62-1 permits New Mexico
counties to self-insure through self-insurance reserves as an alternative to, or in
combination with, insurance secured by “any other method provided by law.” Section
3-62-2(A) permits two or more counties to pool their self-insured reserves, claims, or
losses. Section 3-62-2(A) provides that such pooling “shall not be construed to be
transacting insurance or otherwise subject to the provisions of the laws of this state

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regulating insurance or insurance companies.” Section 66-5-207(A) exempts a motor
vehicle owned by a political subdivision of a state, such as the County, from the
Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA), NMSA 1978, Sections 66-5-201
to -239 (1978, as amended through 2003).
{10} 	Sections 3-62-1 and 3-62-2(A) are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s position that
Section 66-5-301(A) requires the Association of Counties to provide the County
UM/UIM coverage. The Association of Counties provides the mechanism by which
its member counties self-insure through their pooled reserves. 	The Legislature
recognized that this type of self-insurance coverage afforded by the Association of
Counties is not the same as other liability insurance by exempting it from state laws
that regulate insurance and insurance companies. Section 3-62-2(A). In the general
sense, Section 66-5-301(A) is such a law because it regulates the terms of a motor
vehicle or automobile liability policy by requiring insurance companies to provide
UM/UIM coverage. 	With this reading of Section 66-5-301(A), the Association of
Counties has no obligation to provide UM/UIM coverage to its self-insuring members.
{11} 	We acknowledge that the Legislature’s use of the word “regulating” with
respect to laws regulating insurance and insurance companies may be ambiguous in
that it might arguably only refer on its face to laws establishing administrative

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regulation. However, when we read Section 66-5-301(A) not only in conjunction with
Sections 3-62-1 and 3-62-2(A) but also with the provisions of the MFRA, the
legislative intent is clear that Section 66-5-301(A) does not apply to the Association
of Counties coverage. 	See Dewitt v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 29, 146
N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341 (stating that to the extent statutory language is ambiguous,
court can consider principles of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent).
{12} 	The purpose of the MFRA “is to require residents of New Mexico who own and
operate motor vehicles upon the highways of the state either to have the ability to
respond in damages to accidents arising out of the use and operation of a motor
vehicle or to obtain a motor vehicle insurance policy.” 	Section 66-5-201.1. 	The
MFRA requires motor vehicle owners to have insurance in specified minimum
amounts or evidence of financial responsibility in specified minimum amounts to
permit anyone to operate a motor vehicle on the streets or highways of the state.
Sections 66-5-205(A), -208, and -215(A). 	It specifically exempts motor vehicles
owned by “any state or any political subdivision of a state.” Section 66-5-207(A).
The County is a political subdivision of the state of New Mexico. El Dorado at Santa
Fe, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty., 89 N.M. 313, 317, 551 P.2d 1360,
1364 (1976) (“A county is but a political subdivision of the [s]tate, and it possesses

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only such powers as are expressly granted to it by the Legislature, together with those
necessarily implied to implement those express powers.”).
{13} 	By virtue of its exemption from the MFRA, the County is not required to
purchase motor vehicle liability insurance or have evidence of financial responsibility
in order to permit its vehicles to operate on New Mexico roads. 	Because the
Legislature exempted the County from any obligation to purchase any motor vehicle
liability insurance, the Legislature certainly did not intend that the County have any
obligation to acquire UM/UIM coverage.
{14} 	This conclusion, however, does not fully address Plaintiff’s argument because
Section 66-5-301(A) places the burden on the insurance provider to include UM/UIM
coverage and, arguably, even though the County as the recipient of the coverage had
no obligation to obtain UM/UIM coverage, the Association of Counties still had the
obligation to provide it. 	To be sure, Section 66-5-301(A) does not contain an
exemption for insurance policies issued to political subdivisions of the state.
Nevertheless, when we construe Section 66-5-301(A) in connection with the MFRA,
the County’s exemption under the MFRA indicates that the Legislature did not intend
the Association of Counties to have any obligation under Section 66-5-301(A) to offer
UM/UIM coverage to the County.

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{15} 	“The rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together has the
greatest probative force in the case of statutes relating to the same subject matter
passed at the same session of the Legislature.” Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 12. Even
though Section 66-5-301(A) is not part of the MFRA, both the MFRA and Section 66-
5-301(A) were originally enacted in 1978 and address required motor vehicle liability
insurance. 	Both are designed to protect persons who are injured in motor vehicle
accidents. The MFRA requires insurance or evidence of financial responsibility for
motor vehicle owners and drivers so that they will be able to respond in damages to
those injured in motor vehicle accidents. Sections 66-5-201.1, -205. Section 66-5-
301(A) further fulfills the MFRA purpose by requiring insurance coverage for
uninsured and underinsured motorists unless the insured rejects such coverage.
{16} 	When we read these statutes together, we believe that the Legislature intended
the requirement of Section 66-5-301(A) to apply to the insurance required under
Section 66-5-205. Indeed, Section 66-5-301(A), in stating the necessary UM/UIM
coverage, specifically references the minimum limits of the MFRA. Thus, Section 66-
5-301(A) does not specifically exempt the County because it need not do so. 	The
Legislature focused on the actions of the insurance provider in Section 66-5-301(A),
not on those of the insured. 	Because the County was exempt from the MFRA

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requirements, even if the Association of Counties was an insurance provider under
Section 66-5-301(A), an issue we do not decide, it was not required to offer the
County UM/UIM coverage.
{17} 	Contrary to our conclusion, Plaintiff makes the additional argument that public
policy requires the Association of Counties to provide UM/UIM coverage. 	As a
general matter, the public policy stated in Section 66-5-301(A) is “to make uninsured
motorist coverage a part of every automobile liability insurance policy issued in this
state, with certain limited exceptions.” Romero, 111 N.M. at 156, 803 P.2d at 245.
Indeed, Section 66-5-301(A) was “intended to expand insurance coverage and to
protect individual members of the public against the hazard of culpable uninsured
motorists.” Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior Servs., 2010-NMSC-050, ¶ 5,
149 N.M. 157, 245 P.3d 1209 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, the Legislature stated in Section 66-5-301(A) that there were limited
exceptions to the required coverage, and it set forth countervailing public policy with
respect to governmental entities in the MFRA and Sections 3-62-1 and 3-62-2(A). In
the context of this case, involving a political subdivision of the state, the Legislature
did not intend the general policy of Section 66-5-301(A) to apply.
CONCLUSION

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{18} 	Section 66-5-301(A) does not require the Association of Counties to provide
UM/UIM coverage to the County. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Defendants.
{19} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
______________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge