August 24, 2021- State of New Mexico v. Matthew Robert Stevens, No. A-1-CA-38179

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: ________________	2
Filing Date: AUGUST 24, 2021	3
No. A-1-CA-38179	4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	5
Plaintiff-Appellant,	6
v.	7
MATTHEW ROBERT STEVENS,	8
Defendant-Appellee.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	10
Stanley Whitaker, District Judge	11
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General	12
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General	13
Santa Fe, NM	14
for Appellant	15
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	16
William O’Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender	17
Santa Fe, NM	18
for Appellee	19
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 8/24/2021 12:25 PM

OPINION	1
YOHALEM, Judge.	2
{1} 	The memorandum opinion filed on August 10, 2021, is hereby withdrawn and	3
replaced with this opinion. Defendant Matthew Robert Stevens was charged in the	4
Second Judicial District Court with aggravated assault against a household member	5
(deadly weapon), pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-13(A)(1) (1995); false	6
imprisonment, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-4-3 (1963); and aggravated	7
assault (deadly weapon), pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-2(A) (1963). All	8
but the last charge, aggravated assault (deadly weapon), were dismissed by the State	9
prior to the scheduled trial date following the exclusion of State witnesses as a	10
sanction for failing to make them available for interviews. The State appeals from	11
the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Defendant’s last remaining charge on	12
the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the State failed to bring	13
the case to trial within the deadline set by LR2-308 NMRA.	14
{2} 	Relying on the provisions of LR2-308, the State contends that the district court	15
erred in dismissing this criminal case with prejudice for four reasons: (1) the district	16
court erred in concluding that the rule was jurisdictional and that dismissal with	17
prejudice was required if a case was not timely tried; (2) the district court erred in	18
concluding dismissal with prejudice was required by the terms of LR2-308; (3) the	19
State was not responsible for the failure to comply with the deadline to commence	20

2
trial; and (4) dismissal was precluded by the exception set forth in LR2-308(H)(6).	1
We agree with the State both that the district court erred in dismissing for lack of	2
jurisdiction and that the rule, by its terms, did not require dismissal. We reverse and	3
remand on these bases, without reaching the two additional issues raised by the State.	4
BACKGROUND	5
{3} 	Defendant was charged on May 2, 2018, in the metropolitan court with	6
aggravated 	assault 	against 	a 	household 	member 	(deadly 	weapon); 	false	7
imprisonment; and aggravated assault (deadly weapon). The metropolitan court	8
found probable cause on May 3, 2018. The State requested pretrial preventive	9
detention, based on interviews with the victim and witnesses and Defendant’s	10
criminal history. The metropolitan court granted the motion, finding that reliable	11
evidence showed that Defendant posed a danger to the community, and that no	12
release conditions would reasonably protect the safety of the community from future	13
criminal activity.	14
{4} 	Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on May 16, 2018, and the case	15
proceeded in the Second Judicial District Court. Shortly thereafter, Defendant asked	16
the district court to reconsider the order requiring pretrial detention. The motion to	17
reconsider was denied and Defendant remained in pretrial detention throughout the	18
proceedings.	19

3
{5} 	Defendant was arraigned on May 25, 2018. The timelines set by the rules for	1
criminal proceedings in the Second Judicial District Court run either from the date	2
of arraignment or from some other triggering event. LR2-308(F)(5)(a) (stating that	3
deadlines for commencement of trial and other events run from arraignment or other	4
applicable triggering event identified in LR2-308(G)). In this case, the parties agree	5
that the timelines ran from May 25, 2018, the date of Defendant’s arraignment.	6
{6} 	At the time of arraignment, the State is required by LR2-308(B)(2) to file a	7
certification. This certification requires the State to acknowledge that it has done	8
sufficient investigation to be “reasonably certain that . . . the case will reach a timely	9
disposition by plea or trial within the case processing time limits set forth in this	10
rule[.]” LR2-308(B)(2)(a). The certification also requires the State to acknowledge	11
that it understands that, “absent extraordinary circumstances,” its “failure to comply	12
with the case processing time lines set forth in [LR2-308] will result in sanctions as	13
set 	forth 	in 	[LR2-308(H)].” 	LR2-308(B)(2)(d). 	The 	State 	timely 	filed 	this	14
certification.	15
{7} 	LR2-308(F)(3) requires the district court to assign a case to one of three tracks.	16
The deadlines for a case to progress depend on the track selected by the district court.	17
LR2-308(F)(5). At a status hearing on July 12, 2018, the district court assigned the	18
case to Track 1, the track with the shortest time limits, intended for the least complex	19
criminal cases. LR2-308(F)(3). Both parties agree that, as a Track 1 case, the rule	20

4
required the district court’s scheduling order to provide a date for commencement	1
of 	trial 	within 	“within 	two 	hundred 	ten 	(210) 	days 	of 	arraignment.” 	LR2-	2
308(F)(5)(a). The district court adopted a scheduling order setting a November 26,	3
2018, deadline for pretrial motions, and a trial date on a trailing docket for January	4
28, 2019. Although the scheduling order provided that the trial date was within the	5
210-day period for commencing trial set by LR2-308(F)(5)(a), the date set was	6
actually more than a month past the deadline to commence trial under the rule. The	7
210 days expired on December 21, 2018. The State did not alert the district court to	8
its error during the scheduling conference or after receipt of the scheduling order.	9
{8} 	On November 26, 2018, the deadline set by the district court for filing pretrial	10
motions, Defendant filed a pretrial motion to exclude four of the State’s witnesses,	11
based on the State’s failure to timely make them available for interview by defense	12
counsel. Defendant noted in his motion that his trial was scheduled to commence	13
after the deadline set by the rule, without requesting any relief on this basis. The	14
State did not respond to Defendant’s motion.	15
{9} 	At a December 17, 2018 hearing, on Defendant’s motion to exclude witnesses,	16
the district court reprimanded the State for failing to file a response, and granted	17
Defendant’s motion, excluding four prosecution witnesses. Once again, the fact that	18
the scheduled trial date violated LR2-308’s deadline for commencing trial was not	19
brought to the district court’s attention.	20

5
{10} 	December 21, 2018, was the last day under the rule to timely commence trial.	1
Three days after the deadline passed, Defendant filed an addendum to his November	2
26, 2018, motion to exclude witness testimony. In the addendum to his motion,	3
Defendant informed the district court that the deadline set by LR2-308(F)(5) for	4
commencing trial had expired, and asked the court to dismiss the case as a sanction.	5
{11} 	The State responded by claiming that Defendant’s addendum was a pretrial	6
motion, that the deadline for pretrial motions was November 26, 2018, and,	7
therefore, Defendant’s December 24, 2018, motion to dismiss should be denied as	8
untimely. The district court agreed with the State, ruling orally at a January 8, 2019	9
hearing, that Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failing to comply with the rule’s time	10
for commencement of trial was an untimely-filed pretrial motion, and, therefore,	11
holding that it could not be filed without the prior permission of the court. The	12
district court orally denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this basis and set trial	13
for January 30, 2019. Only one count remained to be tried—aggravated assault	14
(deadly weapon)—the others 	having 	been 	dismissed 	by the State 	after four	15
prosecution witnesses were excluded.	16
{12} 	On January 28, 2019, the case was assigned to another judge for trial. On the	17
day of trial, Defendant moved for reconsideration of the district court’s oral ruling	18
denying his motion to dismiss. The district court granted Defendant’s motion,	19

6
announcing on January 30, 2019, the morning of trial, that the case was dismissed	1
with prejudice.	2
{13} 	The State filed a motion to reconsider. Following a hearing on the State’s	3
motion to reconsider, the district court entered a written order granting, in a single	4
document, Defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying the State’s motion to	5
reconsider. The district court concluded, in relevant part, that because the time limits	6
set by LR2-308 for commencing trial had expired more than a month earlier without	7
an extension having been sought, the court had no jurisdiction, and was required as	8
well by the terms of the rule to dismiss with prejudice.	9
{14} 	The State appealed to this Court.	10
DISCUSSION	11
{15} 	The State contends, in relevant part, that the district court erred in concluding	12
that the time limits for trial set forth in LR2-308 are jurisdictional and that, because	13
the time for commencing trial set by the rule had already expired, the district court	14
was required to dismiss with prejudice. We agree with the State’s claims of error,	15
both because the rule is not jurisdictional and it does not require dismissal with	16
prejudice when the deadline for trial has passed.	17
I. 	Standard of Review	18
{16} 	“The determination of whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law which	19
[we] review[] de novo.” Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 6, 132	20

7
N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668. We review de novo as well the district court’s construction	1
of the provisions of LR2-308, “because the interpretation of rules is a question of	2
law.” H-B-S P’ship v. Aircoa Hosp. Servs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-013, ¶ 5, 143 N.M.	3
404, 176 P.3d 1136.	4
II. 	The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction	5
{17} 	Although the district court did not specify in its order, we assume that the	6
court was referring to its subject matter jurisdiction when it held that “the time limits	7
imposed by . . . LR2-308 are jurisdictional.” “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power	8
to adjudicate the general questions involved in the claim[.]” Williams v. Rio Rancho	9
Pub. Schs., 2008-NMCA-150, ¶ 10, 145 N.M. 214, 195 P.3d 879.	10
{18} 	The source of the district court’s jurisdiction is Article VI, Section 13 of the	11
New Mexico Constitution, which provides: “The district court shall have original	12
jurisdiction in all matters and causes not excepted in this constitution, and such	13
jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as provided by law[.]” As our Supreme	14
Court has held, jurisdiction cannot be created through the Court’s rulemaking	15
authority; rules regulate the procedure in our district courts. Jurisdiction is controlled	16
by the constitution and our Legislature. See State v. Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005,	17
¶ 6, 141 N.M. 178, 152 P.3d 821; State v. Guzman, 2004-NMCA-097, ¶ 9, 136 N.M.	18
253, 96 P.3d 1173 (holding that the former Rule 5-604(B) NMRA (2004), which set	19
a six-month deadline for trial of a simple criminal case “is not jurisdictional”).	20

8
{19} 	The only question relevant to determine whether the district court has subject	1
matter jurisdiction is “whether this kind of claim . . . falls within the general scope	2
of authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or statute.” Gonzales v.	3
Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-036, ¶ 12, 120 N.M. 133, 899 P.2d 576. Criminal cases	4
plainly fall within the general scope of authority conferred upon our district courts,	5
see State ex rel. Foy v. Austin Cap. Mgmt., Ltd., 2015-NMSC-025, ¶ 7, 355 P.3d 1,	6
and, therefore, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction.	7
III. 	The District Court Erred in Construing LR2-308 to Require Dismissal	8
With Prejudice When the Deadline for Commencing Trial Has Passed	9
{20} 	Having concluded that the provisions of LR2-308 are not jurisdictional, the	10
remaining question before us is whether the district court correctly concluded that	11
the provisions of the rule removed all discretion from the court, making dismissal	12
with prejudice mandatory.	13
{21} 	The State contends that the failure to timely commence trial is no different	14
than any other violation of the rule; it is a “failure to comply” addressed in LR2-	15
308(H) by the imposition of a sanction chosen by the district court, in the exercise	16
of its discretion, on the responsible party. LR2-308(H)(1) provides:	17
If a party fails to comply with any provision of this rule or the time	18
limits imposed by a scheduling order entered under this rule, the court	19
shall impose sanctions as the court may deem appropriate in the	20
circumstances and taking into consideration the reasons for the failure	21
to comply.	22

9
{22} 	Instead of focusing on LR2-308(H), Defendant turns to LR2-308(J), the rule’s	1
provision addressing extensions of time for trial. Defendant contends that the State’s	2
failure to timely request an extension of time to commence trial should be treated	3
identically to the pretrial denial of an extension request, pursuant to LR2-308(J)(4).	4
LR2-308(J)(4) provides that if a timely request for an extension of time is denied	5
before the date for trial to commence by the chief judge, and the state then fails to	6
commence trial on the date set, dismissal with prejudice is required. Defendant	7
contends that dismissal with prejudice is therefore mandatory in this case as well.	8
{23} 	We are not persuaded by Defendant’s analogy to LR2-308(J)(4). LR2-	9
308(J)(4) applies solely when a timely request for a second extension of time,	10
requiring a showing of extraordinary circumstances, is sought, and is denied upon	11
review by the chief judge before the date set for trial. Contrary to Defendant’s	12
construction of this provision, LR2-308(J)(4) does not impose mandatory dismissal;	13
Subparagraph (J)(4) gives the State the option of proceeding to trial on the date set.	14
The case is dismissed only if the State opts not to proceed to trial.	15
{24} 	In this case, there was no request for an extension of time and no pretrial denial	16
of that request. The predicate for application of LR2-308(J)(4), therefore, was not	17
satisfied. Most importantly, the State was not given the option of avoiding dismissal	18
by proceeding to trial because the deadline for trial had already expired. This was	19
arguably a violation of the rule requiring the State to commence trial within 210 days	20

10
of arraignment. As the State contends, a failure to comply with any provision of the	1
rule is specifically addressed by LR2-308(H)(1), which states that “[i]f a party fails	2
to comply with any provision of this rule[,]” the district court “shall impose sanctions	3
as 	the 	court 	may 	deem 	appropriate 	in 	the 	circumstances 	and 	taking 	into	4
consideration the reasons for the failure to comply.” (Emphases added.)	5
{25} 	This Court, most recently in State v. Lewis, 2018-NMCA-019, 413 P.3d 484,	6
construed LR2-308(H)(1) to mandate that the district court apply some sanction if a	7
party has failed to comply with a provision of the rule, but to leave the type of	8
sanction to the discretion of the district court. See Lewis, 2018-NMCA-019, ¶ 8	9
(construing the identical language of LR2-400.1(A) (2015) NMRA, the predecessor	10
of LR2-308).	11
{26} 	We note that LR2-308(H)(1) requires the district court to exercise its	12
discretion in light of the circumstances and, in particular, in light of the reasons for	13
the failure to comply in deciding what sanction is appropriate. Here the State	14
contends that the failure to timely bring Defendant to trial was attributable to the	15
error made by the district court in its scheduling order, or to the Defendant relieving	16
the State of all responsibility for the violation, and making any sanction, let alone	17
dismissal with prejudice, inappropriate. We leave both the appropriateness of a	18
sanction and the type of sanction to be imposed, if one is appropriate, to the district	19
court’s discretion on remand.	20

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CONCLUSION	1
{27} 	We reverse and remand to allow the district court to determine, in the exercise	2
of its discretion, whether the State is the party responsible for the delay, and if so,	3
what sanction is appropriate under LR2-308(H)(1).	4
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	5
______________________________	6
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge	7
WE CONCUR:	8
_____________________________	9
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	10
_____________________________	11
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	12