January 12, 2015 – State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. Jerry K. and In the Matter of Caludia K. and Madeline K., Children, No. 33,341

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:

Filing Date: January 12, 2015

NO. 33,341
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel.
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES
DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner Appellee,
V.
JERRY K,,
Respondent- Appellant,
and
IN THE MATTER OF CLAUDIA K. and MADELINE K,,
Children.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
Donna J. Mowrer, District Judge

Children, Y outh & Families Department

Charles E. Neelley, Chief Children’s Court Attomey
Rebecca J. Liggett, Children’s Court Attomey

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Jane B. Yohalem
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Exin Van Soelen
Clovis, NM

Guardian Ad Litem

OPINION
SUTIN, Judge.
{1} 	Jerry K. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights as to his two
daughters 	(Children). 	The 	Children, 	Youth 	and 	Families 	Department 	(the
Department) gained legal custody of Children who were held to be “neglected” by
virtue of Father’s incarceration for crimes unrelated to Children. Father’s parental
rights were terminated after he was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.
{2} 	Father argues that his fundamental right to parent Children was violated by the
Department’s refusal to place Children according to his expressed preference of an
adoptive home. 	He also argues that the district court improperly terminated his
parental rights after erroneously excluding evidence of his efforts to effectuate his
desired placement for Children and of the Department’s failure to place Children
according to his wishes. In Father’s view, had the excluded evidence been admitted,
it would have established that Father was able to remedy the causes and conditions of
neglect but that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to assist him in doing
so. Underlying Father’s argument is his desire to have his parental rights restored and
to regain legal custody so that he may consent to Children’s adoption by a couple that
Father considers to be akin to his and Children’s family.

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{3} 	We hold the record does not support Father’s argument that the district court’s
order to terminate his parental rights was affected by the allegedly erroneous
evidentiary ruling. 	We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the
Department’s decision to not place Children according to Father’s recommendation
does not warrant reversal of the district court’s judgment terminating his parental
rights. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
{4} 	Father had sole custody of Children; Children’s mother was, at all times
relevant to this appeal, not involved in Children’s lives (with the exception of having
sent Children one letter), and she is not a party in this appeal. 	On April 8, 2009,
Father was arrested in Clovis, New Mexico, pursuant to a warrant issued by the State
of Missouri for having allegedly perpetrated a number of sex crimes against his ex-
girlfriend’s fourteen-year-old daughter. 	According to a St. Louis, Missouri police
detective with whom Donald Graves, a Department social worker, spoke to on the
phone, Father had fled Missouri, thereby evading investigation. 	Because law
enforcement in Clovis who arrested Father learned from Steven Schultze that Children
had “no family members in the local area” that could care for Children, they placed
Children in the Department’s custody.

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{5} 	At the time of Father’s arrest, Father and Children lived in the home of Mr.
Schultze, who was working in a temporary job as an Administrator/Director for the
Clovis Christian School. Mr. Schultze and his wife, Lois (who did not live in Clovis
while her husband was temporarily employed there), had a long-standing relationship
with Father, and although they were not biologically related, the Schultzes considered
themselves Father’s “family,” and Father described the Schultzes as his former legal
guardians. While Father and Children lived with Mr. Schultze in Clovis, Father’s ex-
girlfriend contacted Mr. Schultze via e-mail regarding Father’s alleged criminal sexual
activity perpetrated against her daughter; however, Mr. Schultze did not believe that
Father had committed the crimes. Despite a criminal investigation and a temporary
suspension from his job in connection with having allowed Father to stay at his house
in Clovis while he was a “fugitive,” Mr. Schultze was not criminally charged, nor was
his employment terminated as a result of having allowed Father to live with him
during that time.
{6} 	On the day of Father’s arrest, Mr. Graves interviewed Father regarding
placement options for Children. 	Father told Mr. Graves that Mr. Schultze, whom
Children knew and called “uncle,” had a letter written by Father that granted Mr.
Schultze guardianship of Children in the event that something happened to Father or
he was unable to care for Children; however, this letter was never found, and later,

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Mr. Schultze claimed to have no knowledge of it. Father also provided Mr. Graves
with information about Father’s brother and sister-in-law in Colorado with whom
Children could stay while Father returned to Missouri to “clear up the situation” of the
then-pending criminal charges. Additionally, Father provided the name of another
couple, Dean and Dezra Turvaville, as possible caretakers for Children.
{7} 	After his interview with Father, Mr. Graves contacted Father’s brother and
sister-in-law who explained that Father’s “plan when he was staying with them” was
that they would “get . . . [C]hildren as long as [Father] gives . . . permission.”
Regarding the other possible caretakers for Children, namely Mr. Schultze and the
Turvavilles, Mr. Graves stated in his affidavit for an ex parte custody order that the
Department could not place Children in their homes without “more information.” Mr.
Graves also stated in his affidavit that he explained to Father that Children “were
placed in custody because there were no family members in the local area and Mr.
Schultze is not a [blood] relative[.]”
{8} 	On November 3, 2009, the district court concluded its adjudicatory hearing.
Father pleaded no contest to neglect pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 32A-4-2(E)(4)
(1999, amended 2009), which defines a “neglected child” as one whose parent “is
unable to discharge that person’s responsibilities to and for the child because of
incarceration[.]” 	At the adjudicatory hearing, the district court adopted the

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Department’s treatment plan that included, in relevant part, the following information.
The Department had located Children’s mother and was awaiting the results of an
assessment to determine whether she could care for Children. Until that assessment
was done, Children would remain with their Department-chosen foster home instead
of with Father’s brother and sister-in-law, who wished to “gain custody” of Children
and who had been approved as “a viable placement option[.]” 	The Department’s
treatment plan also noted that Father had been trying to assist the Department in
finding permanence for Children while he was incarcerated and that Father “seem[ed]
to have a strong concern and care for . . . [C]hildren.”
{9} 	Children’s mother sent one letter to Children, in August 2009, upon the
Department’s request, but beyond that she failed to respond to the Department’s
attempt to assess the viability of placing Children with her; ultimately the Department
was unable to locate her, and her rights were later terminated. In December 2009,
Children were placed with Father’s brother and sister-in-law in Colorado. 	In
September 2010, Father was sentenced to thirty-five years in a Missouri prison. After
Father was sentenced, Father’s brother and sister-in-law advised the Department that
they did not intend to serve as a permanent placement option for Children and that
they would only keep Children until the Department was able to find a new placement.

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{10} 	In October 2010, the district court held a permanency review hearing. Among
other things, the Department permanency worker testified that the Department was
looking into long-term placement options and that once such a placement had been
found, Children would be brought back from Colorado to New Mexico. 	The
Department also requested that Children’s permanency plan be changed from
reunification with Father to termination of Father’s parental rights and adoption
because Father would not be available to parent Children through their adolescence.
{11} 	Father, who testified via telephone at the October 2010 hearing, stated that he
was not aware until the hearing that Children would be removed from his brother and
sister-in-law’s home. Having learned that Children would be moved, Father testified
that he would like the Department to consider placing Children with Steve and Lois
Schultze. At the time of the October 2010 hearing, the Schultzes lived in California.
{12} 	Following the October 2010 hearing, the district court entered an order
changing Children’s permanency from reunification to adoption and reflecting, among
other things, that Father had complied with his treatment plan by writing letters to
Children and by advising the Department of his brother in Colorado as a placement
for Children. On the same day that the court’s permanency review order was entered,
the Department filed a motion for termination of parental rights.

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{13} 	In its motion to terminate Father’s parental rights, the Department stated that
efforts to reunify Father with Children would be futile owing to the length of Father’s
incarceration. The Department also stated that Father’s brother and sister-in-law did
not want to adopt Children and recommended “the Department” as the sole agency or
person that “should be considered by the court to take custody” of Children. 	In
November 2010, the Department moved Children into a non-relative, foster care
placement with a family that wished to adopt Children.
{14} 	On March 8, 2011, the district court, Judge Orlik, held a hearing on the
Department’s motion to terminate Father’s parental rights. In his opening statement,
Father’s counsel represented that Father would be willing to “relinquish his parental
rights” to Children provided that Children would be placed with the Schultzes.
Father’s counsel further argued that since Children’s return from Colorado, the
Department had ruled the Schultzes out as a potential placement for Children without
having investigated the viability of placing Children with them.
{15} 	The district court admonished the Department for having placed Children with
potentially adoptive foster parents without having first investigated placing Children
with the Schultzes, with whom Children had some relationship and who may be

1 According to Department-issued regulations, the term “fictive kin” refers to
“a person not related by birth or marriage who has an emotionally significant
relationship with the child.” 8.26.4.7(P) NMAC (8/15/2011).
2 As a result of various factors, the termination hearing was not held forty-five
days later; rather, it was ultimately conducted in March and June 2013.
3 “ICPC is an acronym for “Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.”
8.26.5.15(A)(8) NMAC (8/15/2011). The ICPC allows states to cooperate with each
other in the interstate placement of children by, among other things, allowing
authorities in the state of a prospective out-of-state placement to “ascertain the
circumstances of the proposed placement[.]” NMSA 1978, § 32A-11-1(B) (1993).
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considered Children’s “fictive kin 1.” Rather than proceed with the March 8, 2011,
termination of parental rights hearing, the district court reset the matter for forty-five
days hence2. The court ordered that during the forty-five-day delay, the Department
would “facilitate and conduct an expedited investigation and background check of”
the 	Schultzes, 	and 	concurrent 	with 	that 	investigation, 	conduct 	an 	“ICPC” 3
investigation into the viability of placing Children with the Schultzes.
{16} 	The Department requested an ICPC home study regarding the Schultzes from
California, and while it awaited the results, it conducted its own investigation into the
propriety of placing Children with the Schultzes. Based on information gathered from
the Clovis Police Department and the Curry County Sheriff’s Office about Mr.
Schultze, the Department submitted a written report to the district court in May 2011
stating, among other things, that it had “grave concerns that Mr. Schultze was
allowing [Father] to reside in his home” despite having been contacted by the mother

4 Judge Orlik, who had previously presided over the case, passed away in May
2011.
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of the victim of Father’s alleged crimes who had detailed “the sex acts that [Father]
forced the teenage victim to endure[,]” and “Mr. Schultze [ignored] the e-mails from
the victim’s mother and failed to confront [Father] about their authenticity.” 	In
September 	2011, 	California’s 	Monterey 	County 	Department 	of 	Social 	and
Employment Services provided the Department with a home study approving
placement of Children with the Schultzes who, among other things, had indicated their
willingness to care for Children and had completed foster parent training in
anticipation of Children’s placement with them. The report, having evaluated many
factors, was highly favorable to and recommended placement with the Schultzes.
Citing confidentiality issues, the Department refused to disclose the results of the
Schultzes’ ICPC home study to Father, forcing Father to file a motion to compel
discovery.
{17} 	On April 3, 2012, the district court, Judge Mowrer, held a permanency hearing.4
Among other things, a Department permanency worker testified that the Department
had determined that the Schultzes were not Children’s “fictive kin.” Also during the
hearing, the district court ordered the Department to disclose the results of the
Schultzes’ ICPC home study to Father and to the district court. By the time of the

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April 3, 2012, hearing, Children had been with their foster parents, who were willing
to adopt them, for nearly two years, and according to the Department, had an
“extremely strong psychological bond” with them; nevertheless, the court stated that
it had not “ruled out” Children’s placement with the Schultzes.
{18} 	In accord with the district court’s order to do so, the Department provided a
copy of the Schultzes’ ICPC home study results to Father, and Father provided a copy
to the district court. 	Approximately seven months had passed between the
Department’s receipt of the ICPC home study and Father’s receipt of a copy. Based
on the results of the ICPC home study, Father filed a motion requesting the district
court place Children with the Schultzes; however, the district court denied the motion
on the ground that it “did not have authority to order a specific placement with Mr.
[and] Mrs. Schultze.”
{19} 	In June 2012, the Department filed a “First Amended and Superseding Motion
for Termination of Parental Rights.” 	In anticipation of a hearing on its motion to
terminate Father’s parental rights, the Department had already filed a motion in limine
to exclude “placement issues” from the hearing on the ground that placement issues,
meaning particularly, the Department’s decision to not place Children with the
Schultzes, were irrelevant and inadmissible on the issue of whether Father’s parental

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rights should be terminated. Father responded to the Department’s motion in limine
by requesting that the court deny it.
{20} 	In July 2012, following a hearing on the Department’s motion in limine, the
district court ordered the exclusion of “issues concerning [the Department’s]
placement decisions[,]” which was defined by the court as evidence pertaining to the
Department’s determination of “where and with whom [C]hildren . . . are to live[,]”
from the termination of parental rights hearing. As a caveat to its order excluding
evidence of placement issues, however, the district court ordered that Father could
“provide evidence that he has given placement alternatives and information to the
Department.” The district court’s ruling in that regard was intended to allow Father
to respond, during the termination hearing, to the Department’s allegation in its
motion to terminate Father’s parental rights that “[Father had] not shown himself to
be able to designate a suitable and appropriate caregiver for . . . [C]hildren.”
{21} 	On March 7, 2013, and June 18, 2013, the district court held a trial on the issue
of terminating Father’s parental rights. 	Following the hearing, the district court
concluded, in relevant part, that clear and convincing evidence established that
Children were neglected because Father was unable to discharge his responsibilities
to and for Children owing to his incarceration, that the conditions and causes of the
neglect were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future despite the Department’s

12
reasonable efforts to facilitate a treatment plan, and that it was in Children’s best
interest to be adopted and not reunified with Father. Accordingly, the district court
terminated Father’s parental rights to Children. Further details of the district court’s
ruling will be discussed as needed in the body of this Opinion.
{22} 	In his appeal from the district court’s termination of parental rights order,
Father primarily argues that the district court erred in excluding evidence of Father’s
efforts to arrange for Children to be adopted by the Schultzes. In Father’s view, his
efforts regarding the Schultzes demonstrated that he was acting to remedy his inability
to parent Children despite his incarceration. Relatedly, Father argues that the district
court erred in excluding evidence of the Department’s failures regarding the Schultzes
as a potential placement for Children because that evidence was relevant to the
question whether the Department made reasonable efforts to assist Father in
remedying the causes and conditions of neglect. Father asserts that the district court’s
erroneous exclusion of relevant evidence led the court to terminate his parental rights
without a valid statutory basis.
{23} 	We conclude that there is no legal basis for reversing the district court’s
judgment terminating Father’s parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm.
DISCUSSION

5 To the extent that Father argues that his right to due process was violated by
the district court’s finding that Children were neglected on grounds other than his
incarceration, Father has failed to demonstrate that in the absence of the alleged error,
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{24} 	Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 32A-4-28(B)(2) (2005), the court shall
terminate parental rights with respect to a neglected child when the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that “the conditions and causes of the neglect . . . are
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future despite reasonable efforts by the
[D]epartment . . . to assist the parent in adjusting the conditions that render the parent
unable to properly care for the child.” See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families
Dep’t v. Lance K., 2009-NMCA-054, ¶ 16, 146 N.M. 286, 209 P.3d 778 (“The
standard of proof for termination of parental rights is clear and convincing
evidence.”). On appeal, this Court does not re-weigh the evidence, rather, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. State ex rel. Children,
Youth & Families Dep’t v. Amanda H., 2007-NMCA-029, ¶ 19, 141 N.M. 299, 154
P.3d 674. 	We review the admission or exclusion of evidence under the abuse of
discretion standard. See In re Esperanza M., 1998-NMCA-039, ¶ 7, 124 N.M. 735,
955 P.2d 204.
{25} 	Father concedes that Children were neglected pursuant to Section 32A-4-
2(E)(4) in that he was “unable to discharge [his] responsibilities to and for [Children]
because of incarceration[.]”5 Father argues, however, that by helping to arrange for

it is reasonably probable that the outcome of this case would have been different. See
In re Pamela A.G., 2006-NMSC-019, ¶ 14, 139 N.M. 459, 134 P.3d 746 (stating the
standard required to procure reversal pursuant to a claimed deprivation of due
process). In light of his concession that Children were neglected pursuant to Section
32A-4-2(E)(4), and he was otherwise unable to discharge his parental duties in light
of his extended incarceration, we do not consider the issue whether Children were
otherwise neglected.
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Children’s placement with his brother and sister-in-law, by identifying the Schultzes
as a potential foster placement, and by offering to consent to the Schultzes’ adoption
of Children, he effectively “remedied his inability to parent Children because of his
incarceration[.]” He argues further that by excluding evidence of his efforts to arrange
Children’s adoption by the Schultzes and of the Department’s failure to comply with
his desire to effect Children’s adoption by the Schultzes, the district court excluded
evidence that was directly relevant on the issue of termination, namely, whether the
conditions and causes of Father’s neglect were likely to change despite reasonable
efforts by the Department. 	See § 32A-4-28(B)(2) (requiring the district court to
terminate parental rights if, despite reasonable efforts by the Department, “the
conditions and causes of the neglect . . . are unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future”).
{26} 	Father’s 	argument 	is 	contradicted 	by 	the 	record 	and 	it 	is, 	therefore,
unpersuasive. 	Father’s argument is founded on a misconstruction of the district
court’s evidentiary order. The district court’s order on the Department’s motion in

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limine to exclude placement issues from the termination of parental rights hearing was
specific and limited in its exclusion of “any evidence or argument concerning
placement of . . . [C]hildren (‘placement’ meaning a determination of where and with
whom [C]hildren in [the Department’s] custody are to live)[.]” 	The order was
intended to prevent Father from raising the Department’s decision to not place
Children with the Schultzes as an issue in the termination of parental rights hearing.
The order expressly permitted Father to provide evidence that he had “given
placement alternatives and information to the Department.” And, contrary to Father’s
argument, the district court’s order did not preclude Father or the Department from
presenting evidence of the time-line of the Department’s activities that, if presented,
would illustrate any delays in the Department’s actions that bore on the question
whether the Department made reasonable efforts to assist Father.
{27} 	Further, testimony from the termination of parental rights hearing and the
district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law demonstrate that the court
permitted and considered evidence of Father’s efforts to have Children placed with
and adopted by the Schultzes. We particularly note that Father testified, in response
to a question by the Department’s counsel, that “the moment” he learned that Children
could not stay with his brother and sister-in-law, he stated his desire for Children to
“go to” the Schultzes. 	Further, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the

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district court recognized Father’s effort regarding the Schultzes when it observed that
Father “directed [the Department] toward persons he felt were fictive kin, Mr. [and]
Mrs. Schultze[,]” and he “attempted to have the [c]ourt force [the Department] to
place [Children] with Mr. [and] Mrs. Schultze.”
{28} 	Additionally, 	in 	regard 	to 	evidence 	of 	the 	Department’s 	“delays” 	in
investigating the Schultzes, we observe that the district court found: (1) that the
Department learned, in August 2010, that Father’s brother and sister-in-law would not
permanently provide placement for Children; and (2) that not until after Judge Orlik’s
March 28, 2011, order to do so did the Department complete an ICPC home study on
Mr. and Mrs. Schultze, after which the Department ultimately determined that it
would not place Children with the Schultzes. Additionally, we observe that during the
termination hearing, a representative of the Department testified that in an October 19,
2010, letter she advised Father that the Department would look for placement
alternatives and asked him to provide input regarding potential placement, but that by
the October 26, 2010, permanency hearing, Father had yet to receive that letter.
{29} 	To the extent that Father wished to present additional evidence of his efforts to
remedy the conditions and causes of neglect or of the Department’s failure to make
reasonable efforts to assist him in doing so, Father does not state, with specificity,
what that evidence was, and we will not attempt to guess what it may have been. See

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Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (stating that
an appellate court will not attempt to “guess at what a party’s arguments might be”
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). Based on the record before us, we conclude that the district
court had before it the evidence that Father complains was excluded and that the
court’s judgment reflects that the court considered the at-issue evidence in making its
determination. 	Therefore, Father has not demonstrated that the district court’s
evidentiary ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. 	See Esperanza M., 1998-
NMCA-039, ¶ 7 (stating that we review evidentiary issues under an abuse of
discretion standard).
{30} 	The subtext of Father’s argument regarding the Department’s efforts and the
apparent crux of his appeal is Father’s view that his fundamental right to parent
Children entitled Father to decide that Children should be placed with, and ultimately
adopted by, the Schultzes and that the district court erred by terminating his parental
rights notwithstanding his efforts to effect Children’s placement with or his offer to
relinquish his parental rights to the Schultzes. Well-intentioned though he may be,
Father’s desire to dictate the Department’s placement of Children at this point in the
proceedings is not supported by the law.

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{31} 	When Father pleaded no contest to the allegation that Children were neglected
as a result of Father’s inability “to discharge [his] responsibilities to and for [them]
because of incarceration[,]” the district court ordered Children into the legal custody
of the Department. 	Absent an abuse of its discretion, the Department’s “legal
custody” of Children permitted it, alone, to determine where and with whom Children
would be placed. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-4(O) (2005, amended 2009) (stating that
“ ‘legal custody’ means a legal status created by order of the court . . . that vests in a
. . . department . . . the right to determine where and with whom a child shall live”);
State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Senaida C., 2008-NMCA-007, ¶ 11,
143 N.M. 335, 176 P.3d 324 (stating that the Department “has the discretion to place
children within the foster system, and the district court [may] only overrule a
[Department] decision if the court determines that [the Department] has . . . abused its
discretion in the placement or proposed placement of the child” (omission in original)
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 	Accordingly, while
Father could and did express his preferences in regard to Children’s placement, once
Children were legal custodians of the Department, Father was not in a position to
decide where or with whom Children would be placed.
{32} 	As we understand Father’s argument, Father wishes to have his parental rights
restored so that he may relinquish his parental rights to Children in favor of the

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Schultzes, who are willing to adopt them. In Father’s view, this arrangement would
serve the best interests of Children and also serve Father’s interest to the extent that,
were Children adopted by the Schultzes, Father could maintain a relationship with
Children, which the Schultzes are willing to facilitate. While Father’s arguments may
be theoretically compelling, as a matter of practicality, they are unacceptable.
{33} 	Father has failed to provide any authority for the proposition that, under the
circumstances of this case, he could lawfully relinquish his rights to Children on the
condition of their adoption by the Schultzes. We assume no such authority exists. See
State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Arthur C., 2011-NMCA-022, ¶ 46,
149 N.M. 472, 251 P.3d 729 (“We assume where arguments in briefs are unsupported
by cited authority, counsel after a diligent search, was unable to find any supporting
authority.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Nor has Father cited any
authority for the proposition that were we to reverse the district court’s judgment
terminating his parental rights, Father could successfully direct the Department to
place Children with the Schultzes. See id.; State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families
Dep’t v. Patricia H., 2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 27, 132 N.M. 299, 47 P.3d 859 (recognizing
that the Department is not required to make “efforts subject to conditions unilaterally
imposed by the parent”).

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{34} 	The district court concluded that Children’s best interests would be served by
being adopted. 	Father refused to relinquish his parental rights to allow Children’s
present foster parents to adopt them, and the Department concluded that it would not
place Children with the Schultzes as a potential adoptive home. Because Children
cannot be adopted unless Father relinquishes his parental rights or consents to their
adoption or, alternatively, unless Father’s parental rights are terminated, reversing the
district court’s judgment would subject Children to a sustained period of legal limbo
in which they would remain legal custodians of the Department, ineligible for
adoption, yet, owing to Father’s lengthy incarceration, would also be ineligible for
reunification. 	See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-17(A)(5) (2005); NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-
19(A) (2001) (stating that consent to adoption or relinquishment of parental rights is
a prerequisite to a child’s adoption except in a circumstance in which the parent’s
parental rights to the child have been terminated). Thus, even were we persuaded that
the Department’s failure to comply with Father’s attempt to dictate Children’s foster
placement with and adoption by the Schultzes was grounds for reversal, reversing the
district court’s judgment in this case would effectively place Father’s impracticable
desire to dictate Children’s placement over Children’s best interests. This we will not
do. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Maurice H., 2014-NMSC-
034, ¶ 47, 335 P.3d 746 (recognizing that, although parental rights are fundamental,

21
they yield to the best interests and welfare of the children at issue); State ex rel.
Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. William M., 2007-NMCA-055, ¶ 66, 141 N.M.
765, 161 P.3d 262 (“When balancing the interests of parents and children, the court
is not required to place the children indefinitely in a legal holding pattern, when doing
so would be detrimental to the children’s interests.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
CONCLUSION
{35} 	We affirm the district court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to
Children.
{36} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_______________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
_______________________________
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge