February 9, 2026- State of New Mexico v. Kristopher Haagenson, No. A-1-CA-41576

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: __________	2
Filing Date: February 9, 2026	3
No. A-1-CA-41576	4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,	5
Plaintiff-Appellee,	6
v.	7
KRISTOPHER HAAGENSON,	8
Defendant-Appellant.	9
APPEAL 	FROM 	THE 	METROPOLITAN 	COURT 	OF 	BERNALILLO	10
COUNTY	11
Nina A. Safier, Metropolitan Court Judge	12
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General	13
Santa Fe, NM	14
Meryl Swanson, Assistant Solicitor General	15
Albuquerque, NM	16
for Appellee	17
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	18
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender	19
Santa Fe, NM	20
for Appellant	21
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 2/9/2026 8:00 AM

OPINION	1
HANISEE, Judge.	2
{1} 	Defendant Kristopher Haagenson was convicted of violating a protective	3
order after a jury trial in metropolitan court. See NMSA 1978, § 40-13-6 (2013).	4
Defendant appeals, arguing reversible error in the jury instructions, insufficient	5
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, and violation of the Confrontation Clause and	6
of the prohibition against hearsay. We affirm.	7
BACKGROUND	8
{2} 	Defendant was arrested for violating a protective order against him held by	9
Christina Haagenson (Victim), Defendant’s ex-wife, contrary to Section 40-13-6(E).	10
At trial, Victim testified that she and Defendant had attended a telephonic hearing	11
on December 8, 2021, pursuant to her petition to the metropolitan court for an order	12
of protection against Defendant. The State admitted the order of protection, which	13
had been signed by the district court judge the day after the hearing and included	14
various recommendations accepted by the judge, including that Defendant stay 100	15
yards away from Victim. Victim testified that a few months after her request for a	16
protective order was granted, Defendant called her, entered her garage when she	17
opened it to park upon her arrival home, and said he wanted to talk to his “fucking	18
wife.” Victim backed her vehicle out of her garage and left her property, calling	19
police to report Defendant’s violation of the protective order. Victim testified that	20

2
her sister and niece were in the vehicle with her. Victim’s sister also testified at trial,	1
corroborating Victim’s version of events. Victim testified that Defendant left her	2
property as she exited her garage.	3
{3} 	Later that morning, officers responded to a separate, “suspicious subject and	4
vehicle” call in Victim’s neighborhood. Officer Luna testified that upon his arrival	5
in the neighborhood, Defendant fled upon seeing his approaching police vehicle.	6
Officer Luna and other officers tracked down Defendant in the backyard of a	7
residence (not Victim’s) in the neighborhood and arrested him. Bodycam footage	8
admitted at trial showed that before the arrest, police yelled commands for	9
Defendant to come out of the backyard. Defendant did not comply, requiring police	10
to eventually enter the backyard in order to detain him. During the arrest, Defendant	11
volunteered that he was never served with any “paperwork for a restraining order,”	12
that he did not do anything wrong, and that Victim was “abusing [him] with the law”	13
because she thought he had an affair.	14
{4} 	The jury was given UJI 14-334 NMRA, which required them to find the	15
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict Defendant of	16
violating an order of protection:	17
1. 	An order of protection was filed in cause number D-202-DV-	18
2020-001325;	19
2. 	[t]he order of protection was valid on the 11th day of March,	20
2023;	21

3
3. 	[D]efendant knew about the order of protection;	1
4. 	[D]efendant knowingly violated the order of protection by	2
coming within 100 yards of [Victim], and/or [Victim’s] home;	3
[and]	4
5. 	[t]his happened in New Mexico on or about the 11th day of	5
March, 2023.	6
{5} 	To explain “knowledge” as it appears in the third and fourth elements of UJI	7
14-334, the metropolitan court accepted the State’s proffered jury instruction, UJI	8
14-5032 NMRA, a proof of knowledge instruction that explained how knowledge	9
“may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances.” The metropolitan court	10
reasoned that this “general criminal intent instruction . . . has always gone along with	11
an order of protection violation.” The metropolitan court denied Defendant’s request	12
for a jury instruction that required the jury to find that Defendant had received notice	13
of the protective order, agreeing with the State that while personal service or	14
presence at issuance may be ways to prove knowledge, they were not the only ways	15
to do so.	16
{6} 	Defendant appeals, arguing primarily that he never received the requisite	17
notice of the protective order and therefore insufficient evidence of knowledge	18
existed. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the jury instructions constituted	19
reversible error because they did not include or require elements of notice. Finally,	20
Defendant argues that the protective order was testimonial hearsay and that the check	21
mark indicating the protective order was mailed to Defendant was therefore hearsay	22

4
within hearsay; Defendant contends that the admission of the portion of the order	1
with the checked box without testimony from the declarant who made the check	2
mark violated his Confrontation Clause rights. We address each argument in turn.	3
DISCUSSION	4
I. 	Sufficiency of Evidence	5
{7} 	“[A]ppellate 	courts 	review 	sufficiency 	of 	the 	evidence 	from 	a 	highly	6
deferential standpoint.” State v. Slade, 2014-NMCA-088, ¶ 13, 331 P.3d 930	7
(omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “We examine each	8
essential element of the crimes charged and the evidence at trial to ensure that a	9
rational jury could have found the facts required for each element of the conviction	10
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see	11
also State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 368 P.3d 409 (“The jury instructions	12
become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be	13
measured.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).	14
{8} 	The third and fourth elements of the jury instruction required the jury to find	15
beyond a reasonable doubt that “[D]efendant knew about the order of protection”	16
and that “[D]efendant knowingly violated the order of protection.” See UJI 14-334.	17
Victim testified at trial that a telephonic hearing regarding her petition for a	18
protective order occurred and that Defendant was present. Victim testified that she	19

5
received the protective order in the mail and that the order indicated that a copy had	1
been mailed to Defendant.	2
{9} 	In addition to Victim’s testimony about the protective order and hearing, the	3
State argued at trial and on appeal that Defendant’s knowledge could be gathered	4
from circumstantial evidence. The evidence before the jury included the following:	5
Defendant’s fleeing the vicinity of Victim’s home upon seeing an officer’s car;	6
Defendant remaining hidden in a backyard despite police yelling commands for him	7
to come out; Defendant’s unsolicited comment to the arresting officers that he had	8
not received the protection order (suggesting independent awareness thereof);	9
Defendant’s contention that Victim was merely trying to use the courts against him;	10
and the check mark on the protection order indicating that it had been mailed to	11
Defendant.	12
{10} 	In our view, sufficient evidence existed that Defendant both knew of and	13
knowingly violated the protective order. Defendant attended the telephonic hearing	14
and knew that Victim sought a protective order against him. With or without later	15
receiving personal service of the protective order, Defendant’s words and behavior	16
once police arrived indicated his awareness that he was engaged in prohibited	17
conduct by showing up to Victim’s home—let alone entering it—and angrily	18
seeking to talk with her. We therefore agree with the State that sufficient evidence	19
supported a finding that Defendant knew of the order of protection, i.e., that one	20

6
existed, as well as that Defendant knowingly violated such an order of protection by	1
entering Victim’s property.	2
II. 	Jury Instruction	3
{11} 	We turn next to Defendant’s assertion, as an alternative to his sufficiency	4
contentions, of error based on the purported contradiction among the jury instruction	5
for violation of a protective order, the language of the statute, and State v. Ramos,	6
2013-NMSC-031, 305 P.3d 921. A defendant is “fairly entitled to a jury instruction	7
that accurately describe[s] the essential elements of the crime and what the [s]tate	8
would have to prove for a conviction.” Id. ¶ 31. When, as here, a defendant objects	9
to the jury instruction tendered at trial, “we review [their] conviction for reversible	10
error.” Id. ¶ 32. “To determine if a defect in a jury instruction amounts to reversible	11
error, we must determine whether a reasonable jury could have been confused or	12
misdirected by the jury instruction.” Id. Otherwise, “[a] jury instruction is proper,	13
and nothing more is required, if it fairly and accurately presents the law.” State v.	14
Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 38, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591.	15
{12} 	Because Defendant relies heavily on Ramos, we briefly summarize the case	16
before addressing the parties’ arguments. In 	Ramos, the defendant had been	17
personally served with a protective order but chose not to read it. 2013-NMSC-031,	18
¶¶ 4, 25. When the defendant arrived and remained at a bar where the victim	19
protected by the order was already present, the defendant was arrested for coming	20

7
within the distance proscribed by the order. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. At his trial for violating the	1
protective order, the jury instruction included two elements bearing upon the	2
defendant’s knowledge that he was restrained, requiring the state to prove that “[t]he	3
[d]efendant knew about the temporary order of protection” and that “[t]he defendant	4
violated the temporary order of protection.” Id. ¶ 13. On appeal, our Supreme Court	5
agreed with the defendant that the jury instruction was erroneous because it omitted	6
“knowingly” before “violated”; however, the Court held that knowledge was	7
imputed to the defendant as a matter of law when he was personally served. Id.	8
¶¶ 25-28. Referring, in dicta, to the notice provisions listed in Section 40-13-6(A),	9
our Supreme Court explained, “Mandatory service of the order of protection	10
provides the restrained party with knowledge that certain actions will be considered	11
criminal. . . . Thus notice, and the knowledge that comes with it, would seem to be	12
an integral part of the crime and the legislative intent behind it.” Ramos, 2013-	13
NMSC-031, ¶ 21.	14
{13} 	In Defendant’s view, a contradiction exists between Ramos’s interpretation of	15
Section 40-13-6 and the jury instruction here at issue, rendering it potentially	16
confusing and misleading for the jury. Specifically, Section 40-13-6(A) reads, “The	17
order shall be personally served upon the restrained party, unless the restrained party	18
or the restrained party’s attorney was present at the time the order was issued.”	19
Defendant reads Ramos as making the two forms of service mentioned in Subsection	20

8
A of Section 40-13-6—presence at the time the order was issued or personal	1
service—“mandatory preconditions” to establishing a knowing violation of a	2
protective order. Put another way, Defendant claims that a defendant must receive	3
notice 	in 	one 	of 	these 	two 	forms 	of 	service 	for 	notice—and 	by 	extension	4
knowledge—to be proven. The jury instruction’s omission of these two notice	5
provisions, in Defendant’s view, is “akin to a missing elements instruction,”	6
meaning that the jury instruction did not accurately convey the law and that	7
reversible error occurred. See State v. Mascareñas, 2000-NMSC-017, ¶ 20, 129	8
N.M. 230, 4 P.3d 1221.	9
{14} 	The State responds that even though Subsection A of Section 40-13-6 includes	10
two forms of notice, notice is not thereby automatically rendered an element of the	11
corresponding criminal offense of violating a protective order found in Subsection	12
E; Subsection A does not state the elements of the offense of violation of a protective	13
order and the prosecution is not required to prove compliance with Subsection A in	14
order to establish that Defendant violated “an order of protection,” as proscribed by	15
Subsection E. See § 40-13-6; see also State v. Montoya, 1977-NMCA-134, ¶ 6, 91	16
N.M. 262, 572 P.2d 1270 (stating prosecution is not required to prove compliance	17
with administrative provisions found in one part of a statute when proving the	18
elements of a violation found in another). As to Ramos’s interpretation of Section	19
40-13-6, the State argues that while Ramos does emphasize the importance of	20

9
knowledge, as evidenced by its addition of “knowingly,” it does not require the State	1
to show either of the two notice provisions identified in Subsection A when proving	2
knowledge. See Ramos, 2013-NMSC-031, ¶ 26. Ramos never expressly held nor	3
implied that any showing beyond the fact of knowledge itself is required, but instead	4
acknowledged that personal service is merely one way that the State can prove	5
knowledge. See id. ¶ 30.1
6
{15} 	We agree with the State. We view knowledge—not notice—to be an element	7
of the crime of violating a protective order. Our Supreme Court’s explanation in	8
Ramos that “notice, and the knowledge that comes with it, would seem to be an	9
integral part of the crime and the legislative intent behind it” did not elevate the	10
notice provision found in Subsection A of Section 40-13-6 to an element of the crime	11
of violating a protective order. Ramos, 2013-NMSC-031, ¶ 21. Rather, Ramos	12
indicates that when at least one notice provision is satisfied, knowledge is imputed	13
1 The parties skirmish over the meaning of the second notice provision—a
defendant’s presence when an order is issued—and whether this provision was
satisfied as an alternative to personal service in this case. Rather than address this
issue directly, however, we flag it for our Supreme Court and Legislature. We
acknowledge that Section 40-13-6 was enacted in 1987 and note that such a
provision seems out of step with now-common practice: hearing officers, rather than
judges, regularly oversee protective order hearings, compile recommendations, and
seek a judge’s approval and signature after such a hearing. See Rule 1-053.2 NMRA
(1998) (establishing domestic relations hearing officers, their duties and authority,
since 1998). Assuming without deciding that an order is “issued” upon a judge’s
acceptance, approval, and signing of a hearing officer’s recommendations, a
defendant 	is 	frequently 	not 	present 	when 	a 	protective 	order 	is 	issued.
See § 40-13-6(A).

10
as a matter of law—not that the two notice provisions are the only ways to prove	1
knowledge. Id. In light of our reading of Section 40-13-6 and Ramos, the jury	2
instruction could not have confused or misdirected a reasonable jury. See Ramos,	3
2013-NMSC-031, ¶ 21. Ramos made clear the State’s burden and what the jury must	4
find to convict—that beyond a reasonable doubt, Defendant knew of and knowingly	5
violated a protective order. We see no reversible error.	6
III. 	Hearsay and Confrontation Clause	7
{16} 	Defendant’s final contention is that the protective order as well as the check	8
mark on its final page indicating the order had been mailed to Defendant are	9
inadmissible hearsay and hearsay within hearsay, respectively. Defendant also	10
argues that the check mark indicating the order had been mailed to Defendant was	11
testimonial and violated Defendant’s right of confrontation.	12
A. 	Hearsay	13
{17} 	As for hearsay, this Court “review[s] the admission of evidence under an	14
abuse of discretion standard and will not reverse in the absence of a clear abuse.”	15
State v. Sarracino, 1998-NMSC-022, ¶ 20, 125 N.M. 511, 964 P.2d 72. “An abuse	16
of discretion occurs when a ruling is against logic and is clearly untenable or not	17
justified by reason.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	18
{18} 	Here, the metropolitan court found that both the protective order and its	19
contents were business records and thus exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Rule 11-	20

11
803(6) NMRA. The court explained that previous cases in New Mexico discuss how	1
business records are “essentially the recording of what did or didn’t happen.” In	2
applying that legal finding to the protective order and its contents, the court stated	3
that “whether or not [the check mark] is proof that it was mailed is not necessarily	4
what this business record is showing, but simply what the procedure of a court tasked	5
with a certain job” is and that such procedure is “noted in a business record of	6
regularly conducted activity and took place.”	7
{19} 	In the particular facts of this case, we do not view such a finding to be against	8
logic or clearly untenable. As the State points out, the order of protection form is a	9
standardized document for hearing officers to fill out and include recommendations	10
for a judge’s approval. See Rule 4-965 NMRA. Preexisting boxes allow a hearing	11
officer to, in the regular course of their activities, select from a myriad of potential	12
options, such as whether the petitioner and respondent were present at the hearing,	13
whether they were mailed copies of the order once signed, whether weapons were	14
involved, whether certain conduct occurred, and what conduct was prohibited. Id.	15
Considering the standardization of this form and the frequency with which it is	16
used—presumably 	every 	time 	a 	hearing 	for 	a 	protective 	order 	is 	held—the	17
metropolitan court’s finding that such qualified as a business record is justified by	18
reason and we find no abuse of discretion.	19

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B. 	Confrontation Clause	1
{20} 	The Confrontation Clause “applies only to testimonial hearsay.” Smith v.	2
Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 784 (2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	3
The 	phrase 	“testimonial 	hearsay” 	imposes 	two 	limits 	on 	the 	reach 	of 	the	4
Confrontation Clause: (1) only hearsay—“meaning, out-of-court statements offered	5
to prove the truth of the matter asserted”—is barred; and (2) only “testimonial	6
statements” are prohibited. Id. at 784-85 (internal quotation marks and citations	7
omitted). Admissibility under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law, which	8
an appellate court reviews de novo. See State v. Zamarripa, 2009-NMSC-001, ¶ 22,	9
145 N.M. 402, 199 P.3d 846.	10
{21} 	Although we determined the metropolitan court did not abuse its discretion by	11
admitting the protective order and the check mark therein under the business records	12
exception to the prohibition against hearsay, we still must ask whether such was	13
testimonial. See State v. Martinez, 1982-NMCA-137, ¶ 16, 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d	14
879 (“The fact that evidence may have qualified for admission under an exception	15
to the hearsay rule does not necessarily mean that a defendant’s constitutional right	16
of confrontation was not violated.”). We hold that it was not.	17
{22} 	“Statements are testimonial when there is no ongoing emergency and the	18
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially	19
relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Zamarripa, 2009-NMSC-001, ¶ 24 (internal	20

13
quotation marks and citation omitted). Business and public records typically do not	1
invoke Confrontation Clause protections “not because they qualify under an	2
exception 	to 	the 	hearsay 	rules, 	but 	because—having 	been 	created 	for 	the	3
administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving	4
some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557	5
U.S. 305, 324 (2009).	6
{23} 	Defendant argues that while “[m]ailing copies and checking boxes may well	7
be part of [a hearing officer]’s ordinary course of business,” the check mark went to	8
whether Defendant received notice of the protective order—a fact that would	9
become relevant if he violated the order and was subjected to prosecution. See	10
Ramos, 2013-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 20-21. The State responds that the order fails the	11
primary purpose test and that statements made to someone, such as a hearing officer,	12
who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior	13
are 	significantly 	less 	likely 	to 	be 	testimonial 	than 	statements 	given 	to 	law	14
enforcement officers. See State v. Tsosie, 2022-NMSC-017, ¶ 42, 516 P.3d 1116.	15
{24} 	We agree with the State. Here, the protective order was compiled solely for	16
Victim’s protection and not to establish or prove facts relevant to future litigation.	17
Taken a step further, the order was drafted arguably with the intent to avoid future	18
litigation. We view the hearing officer’s purpose in filling out the protective order	19
form to be distinct from “primarily intending to establish some fact with the	20

14
understanding that the statement may be used in a criminal prosecution.” See State	1
v. Navarette, 2013-NMSC-003, ¶ 8, 294 P.3d 435. Determining the protective order	2
and its contents not to be testimonial, we hold that Defendant’s right of confrontation	3
was intact.	4
CONCLUSION	5
{25} 	We affirm Defendant’s conviction.	6
{26} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	7
_____________________________	8
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge	9
WE CONCUR:	10
___________________________________	11
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	12
___________________________________	13
KRISTOPHER N. HOUGHTON, Judge	14