September 26, 2012 – State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Department v. Laura J., Nos. 31,324 & 31,374

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: ___________
Filing Date: September 26, 2012
NO. 31,324 (consolidated with No. 31,374)
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel.
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND
FAMILIES DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
LAURA J.,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
In the Matter of ELIJAH J., a child,
and concerning
COLIN D., REBECCA LYNN F., and
DIANA C.,
Intervenors.
consolidated with NO. 31,374
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel.
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND
FAMILIES DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner-Appellee,

v.
LAURA J.,
Respondent,
and
In the Matter of ELIJAH J., a child,
and concerning
COLIN D.,
Intervenor-Appellant,
and
DIANA C. and REBECCA LYNN F.,
Intervenors.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Michael E. Vigil, District Judge
Children, Youth & Families Department
Oneida L’Esperance, Chief Children’s Court Attorney
Rebecca J. Liggett, Children’s Court Attorney
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee

Caren I. Friedman
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant Laura J. (No. 31,324)
Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
Edward Ricco
Melanie B. Stambaugh
Jocelyn Drennan
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant Colin D. (No. 31,374)
Cuddy & McCarthy LLP
Aaron Wolf
Santa Fe, NM
for Intervenors Rebecca Lynn F. and Diana C.
Johnna L. Studebaker
Santa Fe, NM
Guardian ad Litem

OPINION
SUTIN, Judge.
{1} 	Laura J.’s (Mother) and Child’s cousin, Colin D., separately appeal the
termination of Mother’s parental rights to Elijah J. (Child). We have consolidated the
two appeals and consider in this Opinion the issues presented by Mother and by Colin.
In addition to the propriety of the termination of Mother’s parental rights, this appeal
raises questions of Colin’s standing and whether the Children, Youth and Families
Department’s (the Department) failure to consider Colin for placement of Child
requires this Court to remand for further permanency hearings.
{2} 	We hold that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of
Mother’s parental rights and that Mother was afforded due process in regard to the
termination proceedings and determination. 	We affirm the judgment terminating
Mother’s parental rights. In addition, to the extent Mother may have a legal interest
recognized under due process with respect to placement of Child with relatives, we
determine that our remand of the placement issue satisfies any due process concerns.
Last, we also hold that Colin has standing to appeal and that the Department was
obligated but failed to consider Colin as a potential placement for Child requiring the
Department on remand to consider forthwith whether Colin is an appropriate relative

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with whom to place Child. 	Our remand of the placement issue does not require
reversal of the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
BACKGROUND
{3} 	On December 9, 2008, the Department received a referral alleging that Mother
was abusing drugs and physically neglecting Child; the referral included allegations
of inadequate food and lack of supervision. Two days later, on December 11, Delfina
Medina, an investigator with the Department, went to Mother’s home. According to
Ms. Medina, Mother stated that she had a history of domestic violence, dating back
five months, with a former boyfriend. Mother also reportedly admitted using crack
about one month prior to Ms. Medina’s visit and using marijuana about one week
prior to the visit. 	Before concluding the home visit, Ms. Medina requested that
Mother visit the Department’s office “first thing the next morning” for the purposes
of continuing the investigation and submitting to a urinalysis. 	The next day,
December 12, 2008, a snowstorm occurred, and Mother “called in and stated that she
would not make it to the Department that day and would reschedule the appointment
by phoning [Ms.] Medina another day, due to her not having a phone that she could
be reached at.” On January 5, 2009, through Mother’s mother, Ms. Medina requested
that Mother visit the Department on January 7, 2009, but Mother cancelled the
appointment because Child was sick. Mother agreed to allow Ms. Medina to drive her

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to SED Labs for a urinalysis. When Ms. Medina arrived at Mother’s home, Mother
was not there. Later that day, Ms. Medina, along with a detective from the Santa Fe
Police Department, did an unannounced home visit, due to Ms. Medina’s concerns
about Mother’s slurred speech earlier that day. The detective, who arrived before Ms.
Medina, reportedly told Ms. Medina that it seemed that “they” (Mother and her two
guests) were smoking marijuana in the apartment. 	The detective removed drug
paraphernalia from the home and granted the Department a forty-eight-hour hold on
Child, who was taken to the Department’s office by Child Protective Services
supervisor Gabrielle James. Child was approximately nine and one-half months old
at that time.
{4} 	The Department workers noticed that Child’s hands and face were dirty, that
he had scratches and abrasions on his hands and shins, and a rash on his buttocks. He
also had what appeared to be a bump on the back of his head, a mark on his back, and
an older rash on his lower back. He had only one shoe and no socks. He was dressed
in a shirt that was too big. Due to concerns regarding Child’s physical condition and
concerns that he was unable to sit up, unable to hold his head up, and “was not very
responsive[,]” Child was taken to the hospital. At the hospital, a drug screen revealed
that Child tested positive for opiates. 	Child also had impetigo, and he was “very
hungry[.]”

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{5} 	Child was discharged from the hospital the same day he was taken there. Once
discharged from the hospital, Child was placed in foster care. On January 8, a social
worker from the hospital contacted the Department and reportedly stated that, due to
his having tested positive for opiates, Child should not have been discharged from the
hospital and that if Child showed any signs of withdrawal, he needed to be taken back
to the hospital immediately. Also on January 8, 2009, the foster parent reported that
Child was very limp and would not hold his head up. On January 9, 2009, the foster
parent took Child to a follow-up medical appointment, at which the physician
determined that the markings on Child’s body were from bed bugs.
{6} 	Pursuant to the foregoing facts, presented as part of the Department’s affidavit
for ex parte custody order, the district court found probable cause to believe that Child
was abused or neglected as defined in NMSA 1978, Section 32A-4-2 (1999) (amended
2009). Accordingly, the court signed an ex parte custody order on January 9, 2009,
in which it ordered Child to remain in the Department’s custody until further order of
the court.
{7} 	On January 20, 2009, the district court held a temporary custody hearing at
which the court ordered continued departmental custody of Child and adopted the
Department’s initial assessment plan. Among other things, the initial assessment plan
noted that Child had been placed with a foster family in San Miguel County while

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relative placement was being explored, and it called for Mother to provide a list of
relatives to be considered for relative placement. Additionally, it called for Mother
to participate in a psychological evaluation, as well as in a parenting assessment, and
undergo random urinalyses.
{8} 	On January 23, 2009, the case was transferred from the Department’s Santa Fe
office to its Las Vegas, New Mexico office because Child’s alleged father was related
to an employee of the Santa Fe office. 	On January 30, Mother participated in an
intake with Crossroads, a women’s residential recovery center in Carlsbad, New
Mexico. Crossroads accepted Mother into its program and indicated that she could
be admitted in March 2009.
{9} 	On March 3, 2009, the district court held an adjudicatory and dispositional
hearing at which Mother pleaded no contest to allegations of neglect. The court found
that the Department had made and continued to make reasonable efforts to reunify
Child with Mother. The court adopted the Department’s family treatment plan and
added additional requirements of Mother, including that (1) she attend the Crossroads
program 	and 	participate 	in 	services 	and, 	upon 	release, 	follow 	aftercare
recommendations; (2) after attending the Crossroads program, she be assessed for
work skills and be referred to appropriate job training; (3) she get her GED; and
(4) she participate in individual counseling.

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{10} 	On March 16, 2009, Mother was admitted to Crossroads, and Child was placed
there with her. At the time of her admittance to Crossroads, Mother was one month
pregnant with her second child. At Crossroads, Mother underwent a psychological
evaluation 	and 	a 	comprehensive 	clinical 	and 	psychosocial 	assessment. 	She
participated in parenting classes, substance abuse therapy, and individual therapy. She
also interacted with Child to learn to address Child’s developmental delays.
{11} 	Mother was scheduled to graduate from the Crossroads program on July 15,
2009; however, she was unsuccessfully discharged from the program on June 8, 2009,
“due to her manipulative and detrimental behaviors to the group.” In its discharge
summary, Crossroads noted, among other things, that Mother had a very difficult time
focusing on her addiction and the need for changes in her life; that “[s]he focused
most of her time on external factors and manipulated the staff and her group members
constantly”; and that she “did work on her behaviors but would relapse and continue
to repeat the same negative behaviors.” Having been discharged from Crossroads,
Mother returned to Santa Fe, where she resumed working on a treatment plan through
the Department. Child was placed with foster parents, Rebecca Lynn F. and Diana C.
(Foster Parents) in Las Vegas on or about June 10, 2009.
{12} 	On August 11, 2009, the district court held an interim review. 	The court
ordered the implementation of a modified treatment plan. With an overarching goal

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of reunification, the treatment plan included interim goals of Mother obtaining and
maintaining a safe and stable home environment, becoming employed or otherwise
demonstrating 	an 	ability 	to 	provide 	for 	Child, 	attending 	individual 	therapy,
demonstrating and maintaining sobriety, and learning and demonstrating effective
parenting skills. 	Additionally, the treatment plan listed the assessment of relative
placement as an “individual child plan item” and it stated, as a “step” toward this goal,
that the Department would “seek and explore relative placement.”
{13} 	Child’s alleged father having been dismissed from the case, the Department
transferred the case back to its Santa Fe office, and on August 13, 2009, it assigned
the case to senior permanency planning worker, Emily Martin. Among other services,
Ms. Martin referred Mother to the Community Infant Program to provide in-home,
one-on-one, parenting services to Mother. 	According to Ms. Martin and her
supervisor Delphine Trujillo, for the first month or two after the case was transferred
back to Santa Fe, Mother made efforts to comply with her treatment plan. In mid-
September 2009 and continuing through December, Mother’s compliance with the
treatment plan “turned downhill.”
{14} 	Mother’s therapist, Carolyn Burns, testified that, after mid-September, she was
no longer convinced that Mother was sober. 	In mid-September, when Mother’s
boyfriend got out of jail, Mother, who had been attending weekly individual therapy

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sessions and making progress, according to her therapist became “more erratic[.]”
Ms. Burns explained that although Mother would regularly contact her to schedule
therapy, Mother was typically a “no show” for the appointments.
{15} 	In October 2009, because Mother was “very far into her pregnancy[,]” the
Department arranged for Mother to have individual therapy by phone, offered her
transportation when she needed it, and decreased the number of required weekly
Narcotics Anonymous meetings. 	Later in October 2009, Mother’s second child,
Francisco, was born. On October 27, 2009, the district court held a first permanency
hearing. The court adopted, as partial findings of fact, the Department’s permanency
hearing report and additionally found that Mother believed that since the birth of
Francisco she would be able to make increased efforts on her treatment plan. 	The
Department explained that it was not filing for termination of parental rights at the
October hearing, because it chose instead to request “an extension of time to work
with [Mother] on . . . reunification.”
{16} 	Among other facts in the October permanency report, the Department noted that
Mother had made “minimal progress toward[] alleviating the causes of [Child’s]
removal and placement in [the Department’s] custody[.]” The Department noted that
Mother had “just begun to address her substance abuse in outpatient therapy and by
attending [Narcotics Anonymous] meetings”; and that Mother had “made a notable

9
effort in obtaining her sobriety and consistently tested negative for substances during
the month of September” 2009. 	It also noted, however, that Mother’s progress in
addressing her substance abuse had been slow, and she had “only begun to attend the
services designed to help her maintain her recently [attained] sobriety.” 	The
Department further noted that Mother had “not been able to provide a safe and stable
living environment for herself or” for Child. 	The Department also explained that
Mother “seem[ed] to be doing the bare minimum in all recommended services[,]” that
her lack of progress toward the desired outcomes listed on her treatment plan were
“largely due to her lack of commitment to [Child] and her failure to follow through
with treatment recommendations on a consistent basis[,]” as well as to Mother’s
relationship with her boyfriend, which continued to be her priority. The Department
further noted that Mother minimized her boyfriend’s drug use, criminal history, and
domestic violence history.
{17} 	According to Ms. Martin, after the first permanency hearing in October 2009,
“everything turned south.” 	Mother was not making it to all of her visitations, she
would call to schedule urinalyses and then fail to take them, she was missing therapy
appointments, and she was missing her parenting appointments by failing to be at
home when she was scheduled to meet with the Community Infant Program workers.
In early December 2009, during a scheduled home visit with Mother, Ms. Martin

10
became concerned for Francisco’s safety, and she determined that it was necessary to
file a report. The cause of Ms. Martin’s concern was her observation of pills lying
outside of an open bottle on the counter and ashtrays containing either tobacco or
marijuana roaches; also Mother’s urinalysis taken on the day of the home visit
revealed a very high level of THC. Cf. Buffett v. Vargas, 1996-NMSC-012, ¶ 3, 121
N.M. 507, 914 P.2d 1004 (recognizing that THC is the active ingredient in marijuana).
{18} 	On January 8, 2010, the Department held a family centered meeting regarding
Francisco. 	Colin attended the meeting, as did Child’s maternal grandmother.
According to the Department’s notes, following the meeting Colin “said he would
definitely be considered as placement or support to [maternal grandmother] to help
care for Francisco.” 	Later in January 2010, Colin became a kinship guardian to
Francisco, and in April 2010, Colin was licensed as a foster parent with the
Department.
{19} 	On April 19, 2010, the district court held a second permanency hearing related
to Child. The court found, among other things, that Mother had not attended therapy
for several months, that after having stayed sober for a few months prior to the first
permanency hearing, the few drug tests that she had taken in 2010 had reflected very
high levels of THC, and that she had not provided the Department with proof of her
attendance of substance abuse group meetings. The court ordered Child’s permanency

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plan to be changed from reunification to adoption. It also ordered the Department to
continue to provide services to Mother to assist her in adjusting the conditions that
rendered her unable to properly care for Child and ordered Mother to continue to
participate in the treatment plan. Additionally, the court found that
the Department identified the maternal grandmother as a relative and . . .
considered placement with her, but that placement was not feasible . . . .
There was no evidence concerning whether other relatives have been
located or considered for placement. If [Mother] has concerns regarding
other relatives, a hearing should be requested within sixty days.
The court’s order, hereinafter referred to as “the second permanency order,” was not
filed until November 29, 2010.
{20} 	Four months before the second permanency order was filed, on July 27, 2010,
Colin filed a pro se motion to intervene for the purpose of adopting Child. On August
17, 2010, the Department filed a motion to terminate Mother’s parental rights to
Child. In addition to detailing Mother’s history of non-compliance with the treatment
plan and with Department-arranged services, the Department listed as grounds for
termination that Mother had “recently revealed that domestic violence [was] a
problem between her and [her boyfiend].” The Department’s motion also stated that
because Mother’s boyfriend was a household member, the Department requested that
he participate in services but, as of the date of the motion, he had yet to comply with

12
that request. He had, however, submitted to a urinalysis which revealed “an extremely
high level of THC.”
{21} 	On September 10, 2010, the court filed a stipulated order granting Colin status
as an intervenor. 	The details of this order are discussed later in this Opinion.
Beginning on October 25, 2010, and for nine non-consecutive days ending on
February 17, 2011, the court held a hearing on the Department’s motion to terminate
Mother’s parental rights. Among the parties who attended the hearing were Colin and
Mother, both represented by their counsel.
{22} 	Following the termination hearing, in his closing argument, Colin argued that
the Department failed to follow legal mandates to locate, notify, and consider family
members, other than Child’s grandmother, as potential placement for Child. He also
argued that the Department “knew that relative search was an integral part of family
reunification as a matter of law and public policy” and that despite having been
trained on the law, the Department chose not to follow it. 	And he argued that the
Department “failed utterly in making reasonable efforts, or any efforts, to reunify
[Child] with his family[.]” These and other of Colin’s arguments were related to and
made in support of his request that the district court order the Department to arrange
for Child to be placed with a relative, Colin himself being a viable option for such
placement.

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{23} 	Mother’s closing argument focused mainly on her theory that the Department
had failed to make reasonable efforts to assist her in meeting the treatment plan goals.
Specifically, Mother pointed to the difficulties created by the Department’s decision
to place Child in a Las Vegas foster home. Mother also argued that the Department
failed to understand her psychological and cognitive difficulties and, consequently,
it failed to provide her with an adequate treatment plan. Additionally, “as [a] separate
and novel attack on reasonable efforts and placement specifically at both the
permanency stage of the case and [at the termination stage,]” Mother incorporated all
of the argument, theory, and issues that had been raised by Colin.
{24} 	On April 8, 2011, the court filed a decision that reflected its findings of fact and
conclusions of law that provided a basis for termination of Mother’s parental rights.
The court concluded that there existed clear and convincing evidence that the causes
and conditions of the neglect and abuse were unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future despite the Department’s reasonable efforts and that it was in Child’s best
interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Additionally, the court concluded that
“[t]he failure of the Department to investigate and place . . . [C]hild in a relative
placement [was] not relevant on the issue of whether . . . [Mother’s] parental rights .
. . should be terminated.” The court’s decision was followed, on April 21, 2011, by
the issuance of its final judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights.

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{25} 	Colin and Mother separately appeal from the judgment terminating Mother’s
parental rights. 	Mother’s appeal is based on three contentions of error: 	(1) the
Department failed in its duty to make reasonable efforts to place Child with a relative,
(2) the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to assist Mother to adjust the
causes and conditions that led to Child’s custody with the Department, and (3) her
constitutional right to due process was violated.
{26} 	Colin’s appeal is based on his contention that the district court erred in ordering
a change in Child’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption when the
Department had failed to make reasonable efforts to identify and locate relatives who
could potentially have served as placement for Child. Colin maintains that without
the court first having made the requisite finding that the Department had made such
reasonable efforts with respect to placement of Child with him, the case should not
have progressed to the termination stage. As indicated in our discussion that follows,
we agree, in part, with Colin.
DISCUSSION
{27} 	Because our analysis of the issues presented by Mother and Colin requires
interpretation of the Abuse and Neglect Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-4-1 to -34
(1993, as amended through 2009), we begin our discussion with an overview of the
relevant provisions of the Act, as well as relevant provisions of the New Mexico

15
Administrative Code. “The express purpose of the . . . Act is to: (1) make the best
interest[s] of the child paramount; (2) preserve the unity of family, to the maximum
extent possible; and (3) to assure that the parties receive a fair hearing and their
constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced.” 	State ex rel.
Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, ¶ 23, 136 N.M. 53,
94 P.3d 796 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 	The
provisions of the Act should be interpreted in such a manner as to effectuate its stated
purposes, including, when possible, preservation of family unity. 	See State ex rel.
Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Benjamin O., 2007-NMCA-070, ¶ 34, 141 N.M.
692, 160 P.3d 601 (discussing interpretation of the Children’s Code).
{28} 	When a child is taken into custody by the Department and a court has found that
the child was abused or neglected, the Department determines the placement of the
child. 	8.10.8.13(A)(1), (C) NMAC (11/15/05). 	At the outset, and applying to all
subsequent changes in placement, there exists a preference for placement with
qualified relatives of the child. 	8.10.8.13(C)(4) NMAC; 8.10.8.11(C)(5) NMAC
(8/15/07). A “relative,” as defined by Regulation 8.10.8.7(II) NMAC (11/15/05), “is
someone connected to another person by blood or marriage within the fifth degree of
consanguinity.” 	See also 8.10.8.7(Q) NMAC (providing that “‘[f]ifth degree of
consanguinity’ includes brother, sister, grandparents, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, first

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cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law, and brother-in-law, as well as
documented godparents”).
{29} 	If, at the dispositional stage, the court finds that a child is abused or neglected,
the court will order the Department to implement a court-approved treatment plan,
with which the child’s parent is ordered to cooperate. 	Section 32A-4-22(C).
Following an initial review of the disposition, the court will hold a permanency
hearing at which the court shall order one of five permanency plans for the child.
Sections 32A-4-25(A), -25.1(A), (B). The enumerated permanency plan options are:
(1) 	reunification;
(2) 	placement for adoption after the parents’ rights
have been relinquished or terminated or after a motion has
been filed to terminate parental rights;
(3) 	placement with a person who will be the
child’s permanent guardian;
(4) 	placement 	in 	the 	legal 	custody 	of 	the
[D]epartment with the child placed in the home of a fit and
willing relative; or
(5) 	placement 	in 	the 	legal 	custody 	of 	the
[D]epartment 	under 	a 	planned 	permanent 	living
arrangement, provided that there is substantial evidence that
none of the above plans is appropriate for the child.

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Section 32A-4-25.1(B). 	“The court shall hold permanency hearings every twelve
months when a child is in the legal custody of the [D]epartment.” Section 32A-4-25.1(G).
If the court adopts a permanency plan other than reunification, the
court shall determine whether the [D]epartment has made reasonable
efforts to identify and locate all grandparents and other relatives. The
court shall also determine whether the [D]epartment has made reasonable
efforts to conduct home studies on any appropriate relative expressing
an interest in providing permanency for the child. The court must ensure
the consideration has been given to the child’s familial identity and
connections. 	If the court finds that reasonable efforts have not been
made to identify or locate grandparents and other relatives or to conduct
home studies on appropriate and willing relatives, the court shall
schedule a permanency review within sixty days to determine whether
an appropriate relative placement has been made. If a relative placement
is made, the subsequent hearing may be vacated.
Section 32A-4-25.1(D). The required findings provided in Section 32A-4-25.1(D) are
related to certain regulatory provisions that govern the actions of the Department.
Particularly, Subsection (F) of Regulation 8.10.3.16 of the Administrative Code,
which mandates that the Department “shall make every effort to identify, locate[,] and
notify fit and willing relatives for consideration of placement of a child in custody
who requires out of home placement.” 	8.10.3.16(F) NMAC (3/31/10) (amended
4/29/11 and 2/29/12); see also 8.10.3.7(CC) NMAC (3/31/10) (amended 4/29/11 and
2/29/12) (explaining that the term “protective services division” a term that is used in
8.10.3.16(F) 	NMAC, 	“refers 	to 	the 	protective 	services 	division 	of 	the 	. 	. 	.
[D]epartment, and is the state’s designated child welfare agency”). Additionally, we

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note Regulation 8.10.7.17 NMAC (3/31/10), entitled “notifying relatives[,]” reads as
follows:
A. 	[The Department] shall exercise due diligence to identify
and notify adult relatives of a child’s removal within thirty . . . days of
the removal. The notice shall inform relatives of their option to become
a placement resource for the child.
B. 	If 	the 	parent 	is 	unable 	or 	unwilling 	to 	provide 	the
[Department] worker with names and contact information of relatives,
the children’s court attorney shall inform the court and ask the court to
question the parents about relatives. The children’s court attorney shall
include in the court order that the parents will provide names of relatives,
for possible relative placement, to [the Department] and attorneys of
record five . . . days from the date of the hearing.
C. 	At the permanency hearing, when the court adopts a plan
other than reunification, the children’s court attorney shall request that
the court determine whether . . . the [D]epartment has made reasonable
efforts to identify and locate, and conduct home studies of any
appropriate relative expressing an interest in providing permanency for
the child.
{30} 	When abuse and neglect proceedings reach the second permanency hearing
stage, “the presumption is that adoption or other permanent placement is in the child’s
best interest.” Benjamin O., 2007-NMCA-070, ¶ 29 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Once the court has ordered a plan of adoption, “the course is set for
termination[.]” 	Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, ¶ 30. When a termination hearing is
held, a parent’s parental rights will be terminated if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that, despite reasonable efforts by the Department “to assist the

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parent in adjusting the conditions that render the parent unable to properly care for the
child[,]” the conditions and causes of the neglect or abuse are unlikely to change in
the foreseeable future. 	Sections 32A-4-28(B)(2), -29(I). 	“Clear and convincing
evidence is defined as evidence that instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative when
weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an
abiding conviction that the evidence is true.” State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families
Dep’t v. Lance K., 2009-NMCA-054, ¶ 16, 146 N.M. 286, 209 P.3d 778 (alteration,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
{31} 	When a parent appeals from an order terminating her parental rights, we will
affirm the district court if its findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence,
and we will resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the Department. See In re
Termination of Parental Rights of Reuben & Elizabeth O., 104 N.M. 644, 648, 725
P.2d 844, 848 (Ct. App. 1986); see also State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Williams, 108 N.M. 332, 335, 772 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1989) (“Even in a case
involving issues that must be established by clear and convincing evidence, it is for
the finder of fact, and not for reviewing courts, to weigh conflicting evidence and
decide where the truth lies.”).

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I. 	The Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights Was Proper
{32} 	Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the district
court’s conclusions that the Department made reasonable efforts to assist her to adjust
the conditions and causes that led to Child’s custody with the Department. Mother
argues that by placing Child in Las Vegas when Mother lived in Santa Fe, the
Department created a “near-insurmountable obstacle in Mother’s path” because Las
Vegas was not close enough to Mother’s residence to facilitate visitation. Mother also
argues that the Department failed to create a treatment plan that accommodated her
learning disorder and cognitive limitations. According to Mother, “the district court
failed to take into consideration the deleterious results of the Department’s lack of
efforts.”
{33} 	Mother conceded at the termination hearing, and she likewise concedes in her
briefing to this Court, that owing to a lack of financial and other resources, she was
not, and is not, ready to parent Child. Although we agree with Mother that her having
admitted that she was incapable of parenting Child may not, alone, provide a sufficient
basis upon which to affirm the termination, there existed otherwise sufficient evidence
to support the court’s order. 	Having provided an overview of the case in the
background section of this Opinion, we narrow our discussion, in this section, to the

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evidence that bears upon Mother’s two particularized insufficiency of the evidence
claims.
A. 	The Proximity of Child’s Placement in Las Vegas to Mother’s Residence
in Santa Fe Did Not Affect the Outcome in This Case
{34} 	The district court found that:
[] 	[w]hile the case was being managed out of Las Vegas, the
Department transported [Child] to Santa Fe twice a week for supervised
visits . . . . 	[Mother’s] mother provided transportation for additional
visits. . . .
[] 	Upon transfer of the . . . case to the Santa Fe office in August of
2009, [Mother] was set up with two weekly supervised visits for an hour
and a half at either the Department’s Santa Fe or Las Vegas offices.
Transportation was provided by [the Department], [Mother’s] mother[,]
and the foster parents. 	[Mother] was not prejudiced by . . . [C]hild
remaining in Las Vegas after she left Crossroads and moved to Santa Fe.
The results of the case would have been the same.
The court’s finding was supported by the testimony of Nadine Flores, the Las Vegas
permanency plan worker who was assigned to Mother’s case. Ms. Flores explained
at the termination hearing that, although the distance between Child’s placement and
Mother’s residence “wasn’t ideal,” the Department “went out of [its] way to ensure
that [Mother] would have the visits with [Child].” 	Ms. Flores explained that she,
personally, or another Department employee would transport Child twice a week to
Santa Fe because Mother did not have transportation and that other times, Mother
would receive transportation to Las Vegas to visit with Child there.

22
{35} 	Also, Ms. Martin testified that when she was the acting permanency worker on
Mother’s case, hour-and-a-half-long visits were scheduled twice each week and were
held either in Santa Fe or Las Vegas. Mother’s apartment at that time was less than
one mile from the Department’s Santa Fe office, so Mother was able to walk to the
visits held there. Child was transported by the Department or the foster parents for the
Santa Fe visits. And, if Mother needed transportation, the Department provided it;
however, Mother’s mother also provided transportation.
{36} 	Based on the testimony regarding visitation and transportation by both the Las
Vegas and Santa Fe permanency workers, we reject Mother’s argument that the lack
of proximity between her residence and Child’s placement created an insurmountable
obstacle for Mother. The foregoing testimony was sufficient to “instantly tilt[] the
scales” in the court’s mind that the results would have been the same regardless of
Child’s placement in Las Vegas. 	Lance K., 2009-NMCA-054, ¶ 16 (defining clear
and convincing evidence). We will not reweigh the evidence. 	See In re R.W., 108
N.M. at 335, 772 P.2d at 369. We affirm the court’s findings relevant to this issue.
B. 	The Department Made Reasonable Efforts to Assess and Accommodate
Mother’s Cognitive and Emotional Limitations
{37} 	The district court found that:
[Ms.] Burns, M.A., of Integrative Therapies, provided individual therapy
to [Mother]. Ms. Burns used dialectical behavior therapy, the treatment
of choice for personality disorders. They worked on emotional literacy

23
and mindfulness training. . . . She was aware of [Mother’s] history of
ADHD and special education, and that her treatment approach would not
have 	been 	different 	if 	she 	had 	had 	access 	to 	a 	more 	thorough
psychological evaluation.
The court’s finding was directly supported by Ms. Burns’ testimony, which included
statements to the same effect.
{38} 	Additionally, the court found that Mother “entered . . . Crossroads, a residential
treatment center . . . . [where she] completed the first phase of the program[, but] . . .
was discharged unsuccessfully . . . on June 8, 2009.” The record reflects that while
Mother was at Crossroads, she underwent a psychiatric evaluation and a psychosocial
assessment. When Mother was discharged from Crossroads, Ms. Flores contacted its
staff to learn why. 	Ms. Flores specifically raised the issue of whether Mother’s
“mental disabilities” made it difficult for Mother to complete the program. Crossroads
staff reportedly told Ms. Flores the work is modified to accommodate the disabilities
of the residents and that Mother was capable of doing the work, but she was lying and
using her learning disabilities as an excuse to not complete the program.
{39} 	Based on the foregoing evidence, the district court could conclude, by clear and
convincing 	evidence, 	that 	the 	Department 	had 	made 	reasonable 	efforts 	to
accommodate Mother’s cognitive and emotional limitations by providing referrals to
services that were tailored to her particular needs. 	That Mother did not fully
participate in or cooperate with the services does not render the Department’s efforts

24
unreasonable. 	See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Patricia H.,
2002-NMCA-061, ¶ 23, 132 N.M. 299, 47 P.3d 859 (explaining that “[w]hat
constitutes reasonable efforts may vary with a number of factors, such as the level of
cooperation demonstrated by the parent”); see also In re Termination of Parental
Rights of Eventyr J., 120 N.M. 463, 471, 902 P.2d 1066, 1074 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating
that when the Department has made reasonable efforts, further efforts are not
required). 	Mother’s argument that the Department failed to accommodate her
limitations provides no basis for reversal.
II. 	Mother’s Due Process Contentions
{40} 	“Parental rights cannot be terminated without due process of law.” State ex rel.
Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Browind C., 2007-NMCA-023, ¶ 20, 141 N.M.
166, 152 P.3d 153. 	Mother argues that her right to procedural due process was
denied by the Department’s alleged failure to make reasonable efforts to assist her.
Mother also argues that she was deprived of procedural and substantive due process
by the Department’s failure to place Child with relatives. We review Mother’s due
process claims de novo. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Lorena R.,
1999-NMCA-035, ¶ 22, 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164.
{41} 	Mother contends that application of the due process balancing test described in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), supports a holding in her favor. See

25
Browind C., 2007-NMCA-023, ¶ 31 (applying the Mathews test in the context of a
termination of parental rights case). Mathews provides three factors to be employed
in resolving the issue whether constitutional due process dictates were sufficiently
upheld. 424 U.S. at 334-35. The first factor requires identification of “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action[.]” 	Id. at 335. 	Next, we are to
consider “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, 	and 	the 	probable 	value, 	if 	any, 	of 	additional 	or 	substitute 	procedural
safeguards[.]” 	Id. 	Finally, we consider the state’s interest, including, among other
considerations, “the function involved[.]” Id.
{42} 	We first examine Mother’s argument that she was denied due process by the
Department’s failure to make reasonable efforts to assist her. Mother correctly argues
that she has a fundamental right to parent Child. See State ex rel. Children, Youth &
Families Dep’t v. Amanda M., 2006-NMCA-133, ¶ 22, 140 N.M. 578, 144 P.3d 137
(noting that parents have a fundamental right in the care, custody, and management
of their children). “The [Department] has an equally significant interest in protecting
the welfare of children.” State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Brandy S.,
2007-NMCA-135, ¶ 23, 142 N.M. 705, 168 P.3d 1129 (alteration, internal quotation
marks, and citation omitted). Therefore, our decision rests upon our conclusion under
the second Mathews factor. 	Brandy S., 2007-NMCA-135, ¶ 23. 	In terms of the

26
Department’s efforts to assist her to overcome the causes and conditions that rendered
her unable to parent Child, Mother does not make any argument related to the second
Mathews factor. And, as indicated in the previous section, we agree with the district
court’s determination that the Department’s efforts in this regard were reasonable.
The second Mathews factor therefore weighs in favor of affirming the court’s
judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that Mother was not deprived of due process
because the Department’s efforts were reasonable.
{43} 	We turn now to Mother’s argument that she was denied due process by the
Department’s failure to place Child with relatives. Mother contends that by failing to
make reasonable efforts to place Child with a relative, the Department interfered with
her pursuit of a familial relationship with Child. In Mother’s view, had Child been
“placed with a family member, he could have grown up with his brother, and Mother
could have remained connected to both of her sons[,]” and Child could have been
“raised as a member of her extended family.”
{44} 	As discussed later in this Opinion, we remand this case with instructions to the
Department to consider placing Child with Colin. 	Because Mother’s due process
argument as to the Department’s failure to abide by Section 32A-4-25.1 is grounded
in the potential relationship between herself and Child that would arise from his being
placed with Colin, any alleged deprivation of that potential should be remedied by the

1 Although the Department’s argument regarding Colin’s lack of standing is
ambiguous in terms of whether its view is that Colin lacked standing to raise
challenges in the district court or whether he lacks standing to appeal, owing to its
particular stipulation to Colin’s standing in the district court, we interpret its argument
to be that Colin lacks standing to challenge the court’s orders on appeal.
27
proceedings on remand. Accordingly, we decline to address the merits of this aspect
of Mother’s due process claim.
III. 	Colin 	Has 	Standing 	to 	Raise 	the 	Issue 	on 	Appeal 	Whether 	the
Department’s Failure Requires This Matter to be Returned to the
Department to Engage in Consideration of Colin
{45} 	Before we reach the merits of Colin’s argument, we address the Department’s
contention that he does not have standing on appeal 1 to challenge the court’s orders.
We apply de novo review to the legal question of whether a party has standing. Rio
Grande Kennel Club v. City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMCA-093, ¶ 7, 144 N.M. 636,
190 P.3d 1131. We likewise apply de novo review to the interpretation of statutes and
their application to facts. 	Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue, 2005-
NMCA-022, ¶ 16, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273.
{46} 	Colin relies, for standing, on his status as a party to the underlying action. He
cites NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-7 (1966), which provides that “any party aggrieved
may appeal” from “any final order after entry of judgment which affects substantial
rights, in any special statutory proceeding in the district court[.]” 	And he cites St.
Sauver v. New Mexico Peterbilt, Inc., 101 N.M. 84, 85-86, 678 P.2d 712, 713-14 (Ct.

28
App. 1984), for the proposition that “[t]o be aggrieved, a party must have a personal
. . . interest . . . adversely affected by the judgment.” 	Colin contends that he has
standing to appeal as “a party aggrieved by the departmental and judicial disregard of
Section 32A-4-25.1(D) embodied in the district court’s judgment.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)
{47} 	Colin’s status as a party in this case arose from a stipulated order, filed in
September 2010, granting him status as an intervenor. See Rule 1-024(B)(2) NMRA
(governing permissive intervention and stating in pertinent part that “anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action . . . when an applicant’s claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common”); see also § 32A-4-27(A)(4)
(1999) (stating that “[a]t any stage of an abuse or neglect proceeding, a person [who
wishes to become the child’s permanent guardian] may be permitted to intervene as
a party”). 	In pertinent part, the order contained the following stipulations by the
Department, among other parties:
b. 	[Colin] is a person within the fifth degree of consanguinity
. . . with whom . . . [C]hild might arguably have resided if [Colin’s]
existence and interests had been ascertained during the course of the
search requirements of Sec[tion] 32A-4-25.1[;]
. . .
d. 	[Colin] wishe[d] to adopt . . . [C]hild . . . and reserve[d] his
interest in becoming . . . [C]hild’s permanent guardian;

29
. . .
f. 	[Colin] has standing pursuant to Rule 1-024 . . . [because
his] claim or defense and the main action . . . have a question of law or
fact in common[;]
g. 	[Colin] wishe[d] to pursue his rights under the above
described laws in [f]urtherance of preserving family connections[.]
Because the stipulation referred to Colin’s “rights” under the laws cited within the
stipulation, including Section 32A-4-25.1, the stipulation reflected an understanding
and an agreement among all parties that Colin had legal rights pursuant to that section,
among other laws. 	Cf. Snyders v. Hale, 89 N.M. 734, 736, 557 P.2d 583, 585 (Ct.
App. 1976) (stating with regard to stipulations that “[i]n all cases of doubt, that
construction should be adopted which is favorable to the party in whose favor [the
stipulation] is made” (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).
{48} 	We conclude that Colin has standing to appeal. 	As reflected in the order
granting Colin status as an intervenor, the Department in effect stipulated that Colin
had a sufficient legal interest under Section 32A-4-25.1 to seek consideration as a
viable placement for Child so as to preserve family connections. The invasion of this
stipulated, legally protected interest constitutes an injury in fact supportive of his
standing in this matter. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. John R.,
2009-NMCA-025, ¶¶ 16-17, 145 N.M. 636, 203 P.3d 167 (stating that, in the standing
context, the invasion of a legally protected interest constitutes an injury in fact). At

30
the least, given the stipulation, Colin was aggrieved by the departmental disregard of
Section 32A-4-25.1(D).
{49} 	Under the circumstances here, with its having stipulated to Colin’s intervention
in the district court, we reject consideration of the Department’s stated concern that
“[i]f [Section] 32A-4-25.1 confers rights on Colin . . . simply because he is the . . .
cousin of a child in the Department’s custody, the statute would confer the same rights
on grandparents and all ‘other relatives.’ ” We need “not determine abstract questions
of law which do not rest upon existing facts[.]” Henriquez v. Schall, 68 N.M. 86, 89,
358 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1961). 	Colin’s stipulated intervention in this case was
predicated on his timely efforts to identify and seek stipulation to his right to preserve
his family connections and to assert and protect his interest as a relative who should
have been considered and may well have been selected as an appropriate placement
for Child. We leave for another day whether, in other circumstances or showing of
authority, a relative such as Colin may not have standing to raise challenges, either in
the district court or on appeal, pursuant to Section 32A-4-25.1(D).

31
IV. 	The Evidence Shows That the Department Did Not Comply With the
Statute
{50} 	Section 32A-4-25.1(D) indicates that the Department has a duty to make
reasonable efforts to identify, locate, and conduct home studies on willing and
appropriate relatives who could potentially serve as placement for a child. 	What
constitutes “reasonable efforts” varies with the factors and circumstances of each case.
Cf. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Hector C., 2008-NMCA-079, ¶
24, 144 N.M. 222, 185 P.3d 1072 (discussing the reasonable efforts standard in terms
of the Department’s duty to assist parents in adjusting the conditions that rendered
them unable to care for the child). 	Although we do not endeavor to define the
parameters of the efforts that will, in future cases, be considered “reasonable” under
Section 32A-4-25.1(D), it is evident that in this case the Department’s efforts fell far
below any standard of reasonableness in regard to identifying relatives who may have
served as an appropriate placement for Child.
{51} 	The Department was aware of Colin as early as January 2010 when he attended
a meeting at the Department and expressed an interest in providing care for Child’s
half brother. 	Colin testified at the termination hearing that, starting around the
beginning of January, Colin began pursuing information about Child by contacting the
Department, through Ms. Martin, which he did numerous times, and although Ms.
Martin reportedly told Colin that she would “get back” to him, she failed to do so. By

32
April 2010, Colin was a Department-licensed foster parent and was the guardian of
Child’s half brother. Thus, for at least three months before Child’s permanency plan
changed from reunification to adoption (January to April 2010), the Department knew
about Colin, knew that Colin was interested in Child and, sometime in April 2010,
knew that Colin had met Department standards for becoming a foster parent. 	The
Department’s failure to consider placing Child with Colin and to alert the court at the
second permanency review to Colin’s interest in Child, represents a failure by the
Department to comply with the statutory requirement of making reasonable efforts to
place Child with willing and appropriate relatives.
V. 	Notwithstanding the Failures of the Department, We Affirm the Second
Permanency Order, and We Affirm the Termination of Mother’s Parental
Rights
{52} 	We are mindful that the permanency hearing represents a critical stage in abuse
and neglect proceedings. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, ¶ 29. Permanency hearings
determine the direction of the proceedings and, once an adoption plan is ordered, “the
course is set for termination[.]” Id. ¶¶ 30, 32. 	In Colin’s view, the Department’s
failure to locate and identify relatives with whom to place Child requires restoration
of the case to the point at which the process failed, namely, the permanency stage.
{53} 	The permanency stage represented a significant point of the proceedings in
terms of Colin’s interest and Child’s interest because, had Colin been considered as

33
a potential placement, Child may well have been placed with him as the case
progressed toward termination of Mother’s parental rights. In theory, such placement
would have afforded Colin and Child an opportunity to form a bond and, theoretically,
the placement would have increased Colin’s chances of becoming Child’s adoptive
parent. 	See NMSA 1978 § 32A-5-36(F)(7) (2003) (providing that, in adoption
proceedings, the court shall grant a decree of adoption if it finds, among other factors,
that the best interests of the adoptee are served by the adoption). 	Furthermore, as
Mother suggests, had Child been placed with Colin, he could have grown up with his
brother, and Mother could have remained connected to both of her sons.
{54} 	As it was, however, Child remained with Foster Parents, and by the time of the
termination hearing, Child had been with Foster Parents for “twenty plus months[,]”
he appeared to “have developed a psychological parent-child relationship with
[them,]” and he had formed “a strong positive attachment” to them. Because the court
also found that “when possible, infants and toddlers should not be moved from a
placement that can be permanent and . . . which clearly benefit the child’s well-being”
and that Foster Parents were willing to adopt Child, the prospect of the court finding
in future adoptive proceedings that Colin, rather than Foster Parents, would be the best
prospective adoptive parent appears unlikely.

34
{55} 	We agree with Colin that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to
locate and identify relatives for placement. Nevertheless, because the court’s second
permanency order did nothing more than change the permanency plan from
reunification to adoption, we do not see that it is necessary to reverse or set aside the
permanency order, as Colin suggests. Rather, as discussed in the next section of this
Opinion, the Department’s failure in regard to Colin shall be remedied by the
Department doing now what it failed to do at the permanency stage.
{56} 	Moreover, the Department’s failure to consider Colin as a relative placement
does not provide a basis for overturning the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
In its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the district court acknowledged
the Department’s failure to consider relative placement by stating that “[p]rior to the
[p]ermanency [h]earing in April 2010, the Department had not reviewed the case for
relatives or [otherwise] identified any[.]” Nevertheless, the district court concluded
that “[t]he failure of the Department to investigate and place . . . [C]hild in a relative
placement [was] not relevant on the issue of whether . . . [Mother’s] parental rights .
. . should be terminated.”
{57} 	As indicated in our earlier discussion, the termination of Mother’s parental
rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence. We are not persuaded that the
facts that bore upon the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights would

35
have been any different had Child been placed with Colin at the permanency stage.
Neither Mother nor Colin have presented any persuasive argument or authority to
show that the Department’s failures, at the permanency stage, to consider placement
with Colin require reversal of the order terminating Mother’s parental rights. We
agree with the district court’s determination that those failures were not relevant to the
decision 	to 	terminate 	Mother’s 	parental rights. 	Accordingly, 	we 	affirm the
termination of Mother’s parental rights.
VI. 	The Circumstances Require This Matter to be Returned to the Department
to Engage in Consideration of Colin
{58} 	Although we reject Mother’s and Colin’s argument that the Department’s
failure to consider Colin requires reversal of the termination order, nevertheless, we
do not believe that the Department’s lack of regard for the law should go unremedied.
As Colin argues, the Department’s failure to identify relatives with whom to place
Child was not only a violation of Section 32A-4-25.1(D) and related regulations, but
it was also an affront to the policy behind their implementation; namely the promotion
of family unity. 	Colin urges this Court to consider “in more human terms” the
implications of the Department’s failure to make reasonable efforts to place Child
with relatives.
{59} 	As Colin reasons, “[n]ot only the child, but the family as a unit, benefits when
a child is not lost to his or her kin as a result of parental abuse and neglect.”

36
According to Colin, owing to the Department’s lack of reasonable efforts to search for
relatives, he was deprived the opportunity to be considered as a potential placement
for Child such that, had Child been placed with him, Colin would have been placed
in a more advantageous position for adoption, and Child was deprived of the chance
to be raised with his half-brother. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Department’s
failures may have interfered with Mother’s potential to remain connected to both of
her sons as part of her extended family. Such considerations cannot and should not
be minimized. As one commentator explained:
Aside from the parent-child relationship, the sibling relationship is the
most important relationship in a child’s development. 	The emotional
bonds between siblings are irreplaceable. If nurtured and maintained,
these relationships can provide emotional security, affect the intellectual,
social, emotional, and moral development of one another, and offer
lifetime companionship. . . . Siblings with a relationship have a better
chance of forming lasting friendships with each other and with outside
peers. These are just a few of the benefits commentators have ascribed
to sibling relationships. They make no mandate that one be alive prior
to the other’s adoption– a biological bond necessitates at least an attempt
to cultivate a sibling relationship even where none has existed before.
Christopher D. Vanderbeek, Oh, Brother! A California Appeals Court Reaffirms the
Denial of Necessary Access for Separated Children to Build and Maintain Sibling
Relationships, 13 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 349, 378-79 (2009) (alteration,
internal quotation marks, and citation footnotes omitted). 	Thus, the Department’s

37
failures had a range of consequences that defy qualitative assessment and that demand
remedial action.
{60} 	Colin should have had and should now have an opportunity to be considered
as a willing and appropriate relative to provide permanency for Child. Accordingly,
we remand for the Department to complete a home study on Colin and otherwise
consider the viability of placing Child with him. After the Department has met those
obligations, the district court shall hold a hearing to determine the best interests of
Child. See § 32A-4-25.1(D) (requiring the court to hold a “permanency review” if,
when a child’s permanency plan is changed from reunification, the Department has
failed to make reasonable efforts to identify or locate relatives or to conduct home
studies on willing and appropriate relatives with whom to place the child). 	The
Department’s evaluation and the court hearing are to be expedited and meaningful.
If Child’s best interests would be served by being placed with Colin, the court should,
accordingly, oversee a transition plan. 	Cf. Lance K., 2009-NMCA-054, ¶¶ 2, 44
(ordering the court and the Department to oversee a transition plan to return a child
to the father after an erroneous termination of his parental rights).
{61} 	On a final note, we emphasize that Section 32A-4-25.1(D) imposes a duty upon
the district court to make a serious inquiry into whether the Department has complied
with its mandate to locate, identify, and consider relatives with whom to place

38
children in its custody. See Benjamin O., 2007-NMCA-070, ¶ 34 (recognizing that
the preservation of family unity is one of the legislative purposes of the Children’s
Code). In future cases, such inquiry will not be satisfied by a pro forma ratification
of the Department’s assertions that such efforts have been made. Nor will the court’s
or the child’s guardian ad litem’s duty of inquiry be satisfied by leaving the full
burden of locating and identifying relatives to the parents of children in departmental
custody who may, for any number of reasons, be unable or unwilling to provide
information about relatives. 	Rather, in order to comply with the relatives search
requirement of Section 32A-4-25.1(D), the court must conclude that the Department,
through all of its available resources, has met its affirmative duty to “identify and
locate . . . . [and] conduct home studies on any appropriate relative expressing an
interest in providing permanency for the child.” Section 32A-4-25.1(D).
CONCLUSION
{62} 	We affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 	We remand to the
district court with instructions to the Department to complete a home study on Colin
and to look into whether he would serve as an appropriate placement for Child.
Afterward, the district court shall conduct a subsequent hearing on whether placement
with Colin would be in Child’s best interest. 	The proceedings should occur on an
expedited basis.

39
{63} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
WE CONCUR:
___________________________________
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
___________________________________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge