December 12, 2019- Board of County Commissioners of the County of Rio Arriba v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Santa Fe, No. A-1-CA-36186

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number:__________________	2
Filing Date: DECEMBER 12, 2019	3
No. A-1-CA-36186	4
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS	5
OF THE COUNTY OF RIO ARRIBA and	6
GEORGE MARTINEZ,	7
Petitioners-Appellees,	8
v.	9
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS	10
OF THE COUNTY OF SANTA FE,	11
Respondent-Appellant.	12
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY	13
Sarah M. Singleton, District Judge	14
Adan E. Trujillo	15
Española, NM	16
for Appellees	17
R. Bruce Frederick, Santa Fe County Attorney	18
Rachel A. Brown, Deputy County Attorney	19
Santa Fe, NM	20
for Appellant	21
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 12/12/2019 8:56 AM

OPINION	1
DUFFY, Judge.	2
{1} 	This appeal arises from the district court’s peremptory writ of mandamus	3
compelling the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Santa Fe (Board)	4
to publish notice of Petitioners’ annexation petition pursuant to NMSA 1978,	5
Section 4-33-3 (1947, amended 2019). The Board appeals, arguing that the	6
annexation petition was facially defective and thus it had no duty to publish notice.	7
At the heart of this appeal is what is required to effect a valid annexation petition,	8
an issue of first impression in New Mexico. Because we conclude that the annexation	9
petition was legally defective, we reverse the district court with instructions to quash	10
the writ of mandamus.	11
BACKGROUND	12
{2} 	The City of Española lies within the boundaries of both Santa Fe County and	13
Rio Arriba County. Residents living on the Santa Fe County side of Española must	14
travel to the City of Santa Fe (the county seat of Santa Fe County) to access county	15
services, such as the county clerk or county assessor, whereas residents living on the	16
Rio Arriba County side of Española are able to access these same county services at	17
Rio Arriba County satellite offices located in Española, as well as at the county seat	18
in Tierra Amarilla. Petitioner George Martinez and others who live within the Santa	19
Fe County side of Española wish to access the county services available at the Rio	20

2
Arriba County satellite offices in Española, given their proximity. To accomplish	1
this, Martinez and others began the process to annex the Santa Fe County portion of	2
Española to Rio Arriba County, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 4-33-1 to -3	3
(1947, amended 2019).	4
{3} 	Martinez prepared a “Petition for Annexation” in light of the requirements set	5
forth in Section 4-33-2, which provides:	6
A petition executed by at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the	7
qualified electors residing within the portion of the county proposed to	8
be annexed shall be filed with the county commissioners of the county	9
in which such portion is located. Such petition shall set forth the facts	10
showing the existence of the conditions described in Section [4-33-1]	11
. . . hereof and shall accurately set out the boundaries of the portion of	12
the county proposed to be annexed.	13
The statute required the annexation petition to set forth facts showing that the	14
following two conditions existed:	15
[(1)] Whenever, because of the location and conditions of roads,	16
or the existence or nonexistence of transportation facilities, it will be	17
more convenient for the residents of any portion of a county to travel to	18
the county seat of some other contiguous county, and [(2)] because of	19
such location and condition of roads or the existence or nonexistence	20
of transportation facilities, it will be more convenient and economical	21
for such other county to render governmental services to such portion	22
of such other county, the portion of the county so affected may be	23
annexed to such other county in the following manner.	24
Section 4-33-1; see Youree v. Ellis, 1954-NMSC-002, ¶ 12, 58 N.M. 30, 265 P.2d	25
354 (stating that these conditions are “the decisive grounds upon which alone the	26
court is authorized to order an election on annexation”). The first condition—	27

3
hereinafter referred to as the “county seat condition”—forms the basis of the parties’	1
dispute in this appeal.	2
{4} 	Two maps were attached to the petition. The first map described “[t]he Santa	3
Fe County territory proposed to be annexed into Rio Arriba County.” The second	4
depicted the distances and travel times from Española to the Santa Fe County offices	5
in the City of Santa Fe and to the Rio Arriba County satellite offices in Española,	6
and showed that the Rio Arriba County satellite offices were closer for the	7
petitioning residents.	8
{5} 	Martinez delivered the petition to the Santa Fe County Manager and requested	9
that the Board publish notice of the petition, as required by law. See § 4-33-3 (1947,	10
amended 2019) (“Immediately upon the filing of such petition . . ., it shall be the	11
duty of the county commissioners with whom such petition is filed to cause a notice	12
to be published in some newspaper or newspapers of general circulation in each	13
county affected.”). The Board declined to take any action on the petition after	14
concluding that it was “legally defective on its face” in that “it [did] not set forth	15
facts showing that . . . because of the location and conditions of roads or the existence	16
or nonexistence of transportation facilities[,] . . . it would be more convenient for	17
citizens in the area proposed to be annexed to travel to the county seat of Rio Arriba	18
County (Tierra Amarilla) as opposed to the county seat of Santa Fe County (the City	19
of Santa Fe).” The Board advised in a letter to Martinez that it “was not making a	20

4
judicial determination about whether the conditions that would justify annexation	1
do, in fact, exist” but rather, “was acting within its recognized authority to determine	2
whether a citizen petition requesting it to act is legally valid on its face.”	3
{6} 	Martinez and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Rio Arriba	4
(together, Petitioners) filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court in	5
Santa Fe, asking the court to compel the Board to publish notice pursuant to Section	6
4-33-3. Petitioners stated that although the residents of the area proposed to be	7
annexed “live minutes away from the Rio Arriba [satellite offices] also located in	8
the City of Española, as residents of Santa Fe County they must travel to the Santa	9
Fe County Annex in the City of Santa Fe to receive most county services.” Arguing	10
that “[s]tatutes should be construed in the most beneficial way of which their	11
language is susceptible to prevent absurdity, hardships, or injustice, to favor public	12
convenience, and to oppose all prejudice to public interests[,]” Cox v. City of	13
Albuquerque, 1949-NMSC-041, ¶ 14, 53 N.M. 334, 207 P.2d 1017, Petitioners	14
contended that the annexation petition complied with the county seat condition in	15
Section 4-33-1 because it set forth facts demonstrating that the distance and average	16
travel times to the Rio Arriba County satellite offices in Española were much shorter	17
than the distance and average travel times to the Santa Fe County offices.	18

5
{7} 	After receiving a response from the Board, the district court conducted a non-	1
evidentiary hearing and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus, finding and	2
concluding in relevant part:	3
Although the residents of the area proposed to be annexed “live minutes	4
away from the Rio Arriba [Satellite Offices] also located in the City of	5
Española, as residents of Santa Fe County they must travel to the Santa	6
Fe County Annex in the City of Santa Fe to receive most county	7
services.”	8
Martinez had filed the signature pages of the annexation petition and	9
requested that Santa Fe County “publish notice that the petition had	10
been received as required by law [and] included a proposed form of	11
notice.”	12
The Board approved a motion that the Board “disapprove and take no	13
further action on the petition since it is legally defective on its face	14
because it does not set forth facts showing the existence of the statutory	15
conditions justifying annexation” and so advised Martinez in a letter.	16
“A plain language reading of . . . [Section] 4-33-1 would do a disservice	17
to the purpose of the statute as well as to the people of Santa Fe County,	18
because after all, all we are talking about is giving the people the	19
opportunity to vote on whether or not they want this portion of the	20
county to be allowed to join Rio Arriba County instead of Santa Fe	21
County.”	22
Under the “more nuanced type of statutory construction” that interprets	23
statutes “based on perceived legislative objective and purpose rather	24
than on literal language[,]” Section 4-33-1 is divided into two parts: the	25
first part deals with the convenience of the residents to interact with	26
their county by traveling to the county seat of the new county and the	27
second part looks at the ability of the new county to render government	28
services to the petitioner and the people in the petitioner’s area.	29
The petition “showed that the people in the area proposed to be annexed	30
would be able to interact with their potential new county . . .	31
government on a more convenient basis based on the fact that there are	32

6
county services available in Española” and “[d]espite the fact that the	1
petition could have had more information in it about Tierra Amarilla,	2
the petition was sufficient to comply with the aforementioned intent of	3
the [L]egislature to ensure that facts are set forth that it is more	4
convenient to interact with the potential new county and the potential	5
new county government.”	6
The Board appeals.	7
DISCUSSION	8
{8} 	The Board argues that it had no duty to publish notice of a defective	9
annexation petition and cannot be compelled by mandamus to do so. See Kiddy v.	10
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Eddy Cty., 1953-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 57 N.M. 145, 255 P.2d	11
678 (“The county commissioners are called upon to act upon legal petitions only. If	12
a petition is not legal, no imperative duty exists on their part to call an election. They	13
cannot by mandamus be compelled to perform an illegal task.”); State of N.M. ex rel.	14
San Miguel BCC v. Williams, 2007-NMCA-036, ¶ 9, 141 N.M. 356, 155 P.3d 761	15
(“Mandamus is appropriate to compel the performance of an affirmative act by	16
another where the duty to perform the act is clearly [prescribed] by law and where	17
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”	18
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Whether the annexation petition is	19
defective depends on whether it satisfied the requirements set forth in Sections 4-	20
33-1 and -2, and specifically, whether the petition set forth facts to establish the	21
county seat condition. We must therefore determine what the Legislature intended	22
in Section 4-33-1 by requiring as grounds for annexation that “it will be more	23

7
convenient for the [petitioning] residents of any portion of a county to travel to the	1
county seat of some other contiguous county.” Resolution of this question presents	2
an issue of statutory construction that we review de novo. Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A.,	3
Inc., 2002-NMSC-020, ¶ 16, 132 N.M. 382, 49 P.3d 61 (“The meaning of language	4
used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.”).	5
{9} 	The parties advocate different approaches to statutory construction. The	6
Board argues that the plain language of Section 4-33-1 is clear and unambiguous,	7
and must be given effect without further statutory interpretation. State ex rel. Helman	8
v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 18, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352 (“When a statute	9
contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that	10
language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” (internal quotation marks	11
and citation omitted)). Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that a literal application	12
of the county seat condition is absurd and unjust and ask us to apply a sensible	13
construction instead. See Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d 1047	14
(“[I]f the plain meaning of the statute is doubtful, ambiguous, or if an adherence to	15
the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction, we	16
will construe the statute according to its obvious spirit or reason.” (alteration,	17
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). As our Supreme Court wrote in	18
Gallegos, 	“the 	two 	approaches, 	correctly 	understood, 	can 	be 	viewed 	as	19
complementary, not contradictory.” 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 22. “That is, if the meaning	20

8
of a statute is truly clear—not vague, uncertain, ambiguous, or otherwise doubtful—	1
it is of course the responsibility of the judiciary to apply the statute as written and	2
not to second-guess the [L]egislature’s selection from among competing policies or	3
adoption of one of perhaps several ways of effectuating a particular legislative	4
objective.” Id. “But [our Supreme] Court also cautioned against an overly simplistic	5
application of the plain-meaning rule, stating that it is part of the essence of judicial	6
responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent—the purpose or	7
object—underlying the statute.” Bishop v. Evangelical Good Samaritan Soc., 2009-	8
NMSC-036, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 473, 212 P.3d 361 (internal quotation marks and citation	9
omitted).	10
{10} 	“Therefore, when presented with a question of statutory construction, we	11
begin our analysis by examining the language utilized by the Legislature, as the text	12
of the statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent.” Id. ¶ 11. “We also	13
consider the statutory subsection in reference to the statute as a whole and read the	14
several sections together so that all parts are given effect.” Id. In addition to the	15
statutory language, we examine “the context in which it was promulgated, including	16
the history of the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to	17
accomplish.” Maes v. Audubon Indem. Ins. Grp., 2007-NMSC-046, ¶ 11, 142 N.M.	18
235, 164 P.3d 934; State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 13, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d	19
939 (“In other words, a statutory subsection may not be considered in a vacuum[.]”	20

9
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “The guiding principle of statutory	1
construction is that a statute should be interpreted in a manner consistent with	2
legislative intent.” Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 397,	3
89 P.3d 69.	4
{11} 	Turning now to the statute, a literal reading of the county seat condition would	5
require that annexation petitions include facts showing that it is more convenient for	6
residents to travel to a specific geographical location—the county seat. See § 4-33-	7
1. The parties do not dispute that “county seat” refers to a specific and established	8
location in each county, nor do they claim that the term is ambiguous. As applied in	9
this case, the parties agree that a plain language interpretation would require	10
Petitioners’ annexation petition to contain facts showing that it is more convenient	11
for Española residents to travel to Tierra Amarilla than to Santa Fe. Petitioners also	12
concede that a literal interpretation of the county seat condition would foreclose their	13
petition, as they cannot show this condition is satisfied here.	14
{12} 	Petitioners argue, however, that “the legislative intent was not rooted in a	15
desire to require convenient travel to a geographical location like the county seat for	16
its own sake, but [rather,] a desire to ensure convenient access to the elected officials	17
and the governmental functions and processes they administer.” Petitioners contend	18
that because the county seat is the headquarters of county government, the	19
Legislature’s purpose in adopting the county seat condition was to gauge the	20

10
convenience of accessing and interacting with the governmental services available	1
there. In this case, Petitioners argue that it is “common knowledge” that most Rio	2
Arriba County services are available in Española, and thus, the practical need to	3
travel to Tierra Amarilla is “a seldom occurrence.” Consequently, even though	4
Tierra Amarilla is farther away than Santa Fe, they contend that it is more convenient	5
for them to interact with the Rio Arriba County government in Española than it is	6
for them to interact with the Santa Fe County government in Santa Fe. Petitioners	7
argue that a plain meaning interpretation of the county seat condition leads to an	8
unjust and absurd result because it fails to consider the practical convenience of	9
accessing county governmental services in locations outside of the county seat and	10
ask us to adopt a construction that would consider the convenience of accessing	11
county governmental services in other locations where they are found.	12
{13} 	To determine the Legislature’s intent, we begin by examining the language	13
used by the Legislature as the primary indication of legislative intent. Bishop, 2009-	14
NMSC-036, ¶ 11. We observe that Section 4-33-1 contains two conditions that,	15
pursuant to Section 4-33-2, must exist as grounds for annexation. See generally	16
Stevenson v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 1991-NMSC-051, ¶ 14, 112 N.M. 97, 811 P.2d	17
1308 (stating that conjunctive wording in a statute requires that all listed elements	18
be present). The first condition evaluates convenience from the perspective of	19
residents seeking annexation. For this condition, the Legislature stated that the	20

11
annexation petition must show that it is more convenient for residents to “travel to	1
the county seat” of the new county. See §§ 4-33-1 and -2. In juxtaposition, the second	2
condition evaluates convenience from the perspective of the new county, and for this	3
condition, the Legislature stated that the annexation petition must show that it will	4
be more convenient for the new county to “render governmental services” to those	5
residents. Section 4-33-1 (emphasis added). While Petitioners’ interpretation of the	6
first condition would effectively substitute the term “county services” in place of the	7
Legislature’s use of “county seat,” it is telling that the Legislature chose to use the	8
term “services” only in the second condition. “We have previously said that when	9
the Legislature includes a particular word in one portion of a statute and omits it	10
from another portion of that statute, such omission is presumed to be intentional.”	11
Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep’t, 2013-NMSC-013, ¶ 36, ___	12
P.3d ___ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Had the Legislature	13
intended consider the convenience of accessing “county services” in the first	14
condition, it could have done so expressly. State v. Greenwood, 2012-NMCA-017,	15
¶ 38, 271 P.3d 753 (“The Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if	16
it 	so 	desires.” 	(alteration, 	internal 	quotation 	marks, 	and 	citation 	omitted)).	17
Accordingly, 	a 	purely 	textual 	reading 	weighs 	against 	Petitioners’ 	proposed	18
construction.	19

12
{14} 	Likewise, our review of the history of the statute and the context in which it	1
was 	promulgated 	inform 	our 	understanding 	of 	the 	Legislature’s 	purpose 	in	2
designating “travel to the county seat” as the measure of convenience. State v. Office	3
of Pub. Def. ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 13, 285 P.3d 622 (stating that to	4
give effect to the intent of the Legislature, “we examine the plain language of the	5
statute as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of	6
the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish” (internal	7
quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Legislature enacted Section 4-33-1 and	8
-2 in 1947 against a backdrop of laws requiring that governmental services be	9
provided at the county seat. The county seat is the headquarters of county	10
government, the place where the county government must maintain its offices and	11
where 	county 	services 	must 	be 	provided, 	as 	required 	by 	the 	New 	Mexico	12
Constitution and a constellation of statutes. See, e.g., N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13	13
(amended 2018) (providing that the district court must be at the county seat); NMSA	14
1978, § 4-44-34 (1939) (providing that county officers “shall establish and maintain	15
their offices and headquarters for the transaction of the business of their respective	16
offices at the county seat of their respective counties and shall there keep all the	17
books, papers and official records pertaining to their respective offices”); NMSA	18
1978, § 10-1-13(A) (2011) (defining county officers as the “county commissioner,	19
county assessor, county clerk, county sheriff, county treasurer, probate judge, . . .	20

13
and small claims court clerk”); NMSA 1978, § 34-7-4 (1869-1870) (providing that	1
the probate court must be at the county seat); NMSA 1978, § 4-38-8 (1981)	2
(requiring the board of county commissioners to meet at the county seat at quarterly	3
meetings); NMSA 1978, § 34-6-24 (1988) (providing that the district court must be	4
at the county seat). While counties may choose to provide services in locations	5
outside of the county seat, we agree with the Board that “counties may over time	6
change the number, type and extent of governmental services they provide outside	7
their county seats based on funding or other considerations.” Petitioners, failing to	8
acknowledge the import of these enactments, argue that “[i]f all county officers and	9
corresponding functions they serve were not headquartered in the county seat, then	10
a plain language reading of Section 4-33-1 would require convenience of travel to	11
the county seat because it is a specific geographical location that is symbolic of	12
living in a particular county.” But that is precisely the point—without a substantial	13
change to a number of laws, county services must always be provided in the county	14
seat, whereas the same is not true for satellite offices. Given this, the Legislature’s	15
requirement that annexation petitions state convenience in terms of travel to the	16
county 	seat—the 	only 	location 	where 	county 	services 	are 	required 	to 	be	17
comprehensively provided—is neither unreasonable nor absurd, even if some county	18
services are presently closer for Petitioners in this particular case.	19

14
{15} 	As a further illustration of this point, in this case, some county services are	1
only available at the county seat—the First Judicial District Court and the County	2
Detention Center. Though Petitioners acknowledge that not all county services are	3
available in Española, they have not suggested how convenience should be evaluated	4
in circumstances where access to some county services is rendered less convenient	5
by annexation, or more generally, what kinds and types of services are enough to	6
establish that it is more convenient for residents to interact with another county. The	7
Legislature has provided no guidance for resolving these questions within the Act,	8
nor has it adopted any procedure for evaluating the merits or validity of an	9
annexation petition before notice is published. See Section 4-33-3 (stating that a	10
resident may bring an action within thirty days after notice is published alleging that	11
“the conditions described in Section 4-33-1 . . . do not exist” and “[t]he judge, after	12
hearing, shall make a determination as to whether the allegations of the petition are	13
well taken”); Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 16 (“[W]e look not only to what is	14
explicitly stated by the language of [the statute] but we also take special notice of	15
what has been omitted from the purview of the statute.”). In this case, both issues	16
were addressed in mandamus proceedings, pursuant to NMSA 1878, §§ 44-2-1 to -	17
14 (1884, as amended through 1899). The district court made factual findings on the	18
actual convenience of interacting with Rio Arriba County before concluding that the	19
annexation petition complied with the Legislature’s intent. That factual resolution	20

15
was necessary here, and that it may be necessary every time an annexation petition	1
states convenience in terms of accessing county services rather than travelling to the	2
county seat, suggests that a “county services” interpretation would render unclear	3
what is required to effect a facially valid annexation petition. N.M. State Bd. of Ed.	4
v. Bd. of Ed. of Alamogordo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1981-NMSC-031, ¶ 14, 95 N.M.	5
588, 624 P.2d 530 (“Legislative intent is to be given effect by adopting a	6
construction which will not render the statute’s application absurd or unreasonable	7
and will not lead to injustice or contradiction.”).	8
{16} 	For all of these reasons, we conclude that a plain meaning construction of the	9
county seat condition is consistent with and best effectuates the Legislature’s intent	10
in enacting Section 4-33-1. See Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 3 (indicating that we	11
will not depart from the plain language of a statute unless it is necessary to resolve	12
an ambiguity or absurdity); see also High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of	13
Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (“The court will	14
not read into a statute . . . language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense	15
as written.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 	N.M. Petroleum	16
Marketers Ass’n v. N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., 2007-NMCA-060, ¶ 11, 141 N.M.	17
678, 160 P.3d 587 (adhering to the plain meaning when “[a]ppellants have not	18
convinced us that adherence to the literal meaning of the broad language employed	19
by . . . the Legislature would lead to injustice, absurdity, or internal contradiction”).	20

16
Though we acknowledge that county services have become more accessible and	1
available without the need to physically travel to a county office in the seventy years	2
since Sections 4-33-1 and -2 were enacted, whether travel to the county seat remains	3
the preferred measure of convenience for residents seeking annexation is a matter	4
for the Legislature to determine. Perea v. Baca, 1980-NMSC-079, ¶ 23, 94 N.M.	5
624, 614 P.2d 541 (“If a change in the statute is necessary or proper, that is a task	6
for the Legislature.”); M.D.R. v. State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep’t, 1992-NMCA-	7
082, ¶ 13, 114 N.M. 187, 836 P.2d 106 (“[I]t is not the function of the court of	8
appeals to legislate. Correction of whatever inequity exists in such a situation is best	9
left to the [L]egislature.” (citation omitted)).	10
{17} 	Applying the plain meaning construction of the county seat condition, we	11
conclude that the district court erred in finding that the petition complied with	12
Section 4-33-1. As applied in this case, a plain language reading of Section 4-33-1	13
requires that the petition state facts showing that it will be more convenient for the	14
residents of Española currently residing in Santa Fe County to travel to Tierra	15
Amarilla. Neither the petition nor its attachments made any reference to Tierra	16
Amarilla and thus failed to comply with the statutory requirement that a petition set	17
forth facts showing the existence of both conditions described in Section 4-33-1.	18
Given this, the Board had no duty to publish notice pursuant to Section 4-33-3 and	19
the district court erred by issuing a writ of mandamus directing it to do so. See Kiddy,	20

17
1953-NMSC-023, ¶ 12 (stating that a writ of mandamus should be refused when a	1
petition was invalid, as there is no clear fact that would require performance by the	2
board). We therefore reverse the district court.	3
{18} 	As a result of our holding, it is unnecessary to address the remaining	4
arguments raised by the parties in this appeal.	5
CONCLUSION	6
{19} 	We reverse the district court with instructions to quash the writ of mandamus.	7
{20} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	8
______________________________	9
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	10
WE CONCUR:	11
____________________________	12
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge	13
____________________________	14
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge	15