April 10, 2017- State of New Mexico v. Bradford James, Nos. 33,312 & 33,701 (consl.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: ___________
Filing Date: April 10, 2017
NOS. 33,312 and 33,701 (consolidated)
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRADFORD JAMES,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MCKINLEY COUNTY
Robert A. Aragon, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Steven H. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
L. Helen Bennett, P.C.
L. Helen Bennett
Albuquerque, NM
Law Office of Brad D. Hall
Levi A. Monagle
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee

OPINION
VIGIL, Judge.
{1} 	This is a driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI) case
that originated in the magistrate court and was then appealed to the district court. The
district court ruled that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle
Defendant was driving, and granted Defendant’s motion to suppress. The district court
also denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a claim that the case was not
adjudicated within the time limits of Rule 6-506(B) NMRA, commonly referred to as
the “six-month rule.” We reverse the district court order granting Defendant’s motion
to suppress and affirm the district court order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
I. 	BACKGROUND
{2} 	A criminal complaint filed in the magistrate court charged Defendant with
aggravated DWI (third offense), driving under a suspended or revoked driver’s
license, failure to carry evidence of financial responsibility, and failure to maintain
lane. Defendant filed a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss, alleging the case
was not heard within the time required by Rule 6-506(B). The motions were denied,
and Defendant entered into a conditional plea and disposition agreement in which
Defendant agreed to plead guilty to non-aggravated DWI (second offense), with all
remaining charges dismissed on the condition that if he succeeded in his appeal on

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either motion, he could withdraw his guilty plea. The magistrate judge approved the
plea and disposition agreement, and filed its judgment and sentence. See State v.
Celusniak, 2004-NMCA-070, ¶¶ 7-8, 135 N.M. 728, 93 P.3d 10 (describing the
procedure to follow for a conditional guilty plea in the magistrate court). Defendant
then appealed to the district court.
{3} 	The appeal to the district court was de novo. Rule 5-826(J) NMRA (“Trials
upon appeals from the magistrate or municipal court to the district court shall be de
novo.”). This means that in the district court there was “[a] new trial on the entire
case—that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law—conducted as if there had
been no trial in the first instance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1737 (10th ed. 2014). In
other words, the district court was not bound in any way by the magistrate court
rulings, and the district court was required to make its own decision on the motion to
suppress and make its own determination of whether the magistrate court complied
with Rule 6-506. See State v. Sharp, 2012-NMCA-042, ¶ 5, 276 P.3d 969 (stating that
in a de novo appeal, the district court must determine itself, independently of the
magistrate court decision, “whether the magistrate court rules were followed”); State
v. Hicks, 1986-NMCA-129, ¶ 6, 105 N.M. 286, 731 P.2d 982 (“In de novo
proceedings, the district court is not in any way bound by the proceedings in the lower
court.”). Defendant again filed a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss for a

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violation of Rule 6-506. Following an evidentiary hearing the district court entered its
order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress. The State appeals from this order. The
district court also denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss for a violation of Rule 6-506,
and Defendant appeals from this order, but only if the State succeeds in its appeal. We
address each appeal in turn.
II. 	Motion to Suppress
{4} 	Defendant’s motion to suppress asserted that Deputy Merlin Benally of the
McKinley County Sheriff’s Department stopped Defendant without reasonable
suspicion, and the stop therefore violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. See State v.
Candelaria, 2011-NMCA-001, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 125, 245 P.3d 69 (“In order to validly
stop an automobile, police officers must possess, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion
that a law has been violated.”). Defendant also contended that the stop by Deputy
Benally was a pretext stop and therefore unconstitutional under Article II, Section 10
of the New Mexico Constitution. See State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 1, 38, 146
N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 143 (holding that “pretextual traffic stops are not constitutionally
reasonable” under the New Mexico Constitution).

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A. 	Facts
{5} 	Deputy Benally was parked on the median of the highway to observe traffic and
to make himself visible to slow down traffic to a safe speed. While so engaged,
Deputy Benally saw Defendant driving, and because of prior encounters with
Defendant, believed that Defendant’s driver’s license was suspended.
{6} 	Approximately three to four months earlier, Deputy Benally had conducted a
traffic stop in which Defendant was the designated driver for the passengers who were
intoxicated. Deputy Benally was informed by dispatch that Defendant’s driver’s
license was suspended with an arrest clause, but because of the intoxicated conditions
of the passengers, Deputy Benally gave Defendant a warning and told him to fix his
driver’s license problem. Later, around the same time period, Deputy Benally stopped
a different vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. Deputy Benally ran
Defendant’s information through dispatch and learned that Defendant’s driver’s
license was still suspended. In addition, and more recently, three to four weeks before
the stop at issue, Deputy Benally was on duty and heard dispatch report that
Defendant’s driver’s license was suspended when another deputy had arrested
Defendant for DWI and driving with a suspended or revoked driver’s license.
{7} 	Deputy Benally therefore turned his vehicle around and began to follow
Defendant with the intent to stop Defendant based solely on his belief that Defendant

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had a suspended driver’s license. See NMSA 1978, § 66-5-39(A) (1993, amended
2013) (“Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state
at a time when [the person’s] privilege to do so is suspended or revoked and who
knows or should have known that his license was suspended or revoked is guilty of
a misdemeanor[.]”). Because the road had “no shoulder” where he could safely stop
Defendant, Deputy Benally waited until they reached a safe place to make the stop.
As Deputy Benally followed Defendant, he believed that he saw Defendant drive over
one of his lanes—a solid white line—and at a stop sign, also believed that he saw that
the passenger in Defendant’s vehicle did not have her seatbelt on. After Defendant
turned onto a street where the stop could be safely made, Deputy Benally turned on
his lights and stopped Defendant.
{8} 	After the stop, Deputy Benally confirmed that Defendant’s driver’s license was
suspended. Deputy Benally also noted that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes,
slurred speech, and an odor of alcohol on his person, and Defendant acknowledged
that he had been drinking. Deputy Benally then conducted field sobriety tests, which
Defendant failed. Defendant was then arrested, and Deputy Benally filed the criminal
complaint in the magistrate court.
{9} 	The district court found that Deputy Benally saw Defendant driving, and based
on the prior encounters with Defendant, believed that his driver’s license was revoked.

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The district court further found that Deputy Benally decided to stop Defendant based
only on his suspicion, and without calling on his radio to confirm that Defendant’s
driver’s license was in fact revoked. The district court concluded that Deputy
Benally’s suspicion was insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion for
the stop. The district court further concluded that the seat belt and failure to maintain
lane violations were pretext for the stop because Deputy Benally had already decided
to stop Defendant before he observed those violations. The State appeals.
B. 	Standard of Review
{10} 	Our review of a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves mixed
questions of fact and law. State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52
P.3d 964. “[W]e look for substantial evidence to support the [district] court’s factual
finding, with deference to the district court’s review of the testimony and other
evidence presented.” State v. Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 376 P.3d 858 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “We then review the application of the law to
those facts, making a de novo determination of the constitutional reasonableness of
the search or seizure.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State
v. Hicks, 2013-NMCA-056, ¶ 5, 300 P.3d 1183 (stating that whether an officer has a
reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle presents a legal question, which
is reviewed on appeal de novo).

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C. 	Analysis
{11} 	We have not heretofore analyzed reasonable suspicion any differently under
Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution than under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 38.
Moreover, Defendant does not argue on appeal that in evaluating the constitutional
reasonableness of the stop, our New Mexico Constitution affords greater protection
than the United States Constitution. We therefore assume that both constitutions
afford the same level of protection. Id. ¶ 39 (applying the same reasonable suspicion
analysis to the stop under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution as
was applied under the Fourth Amendment); see State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶
6, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (stating that because there was no claim that the New
Mexico Constitution affords greater protection than the United States Constitution, the
issue of reasonable suspicion would be evaluated under federal Fourth Amendment
law); State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 12, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922 (stating
that when no claim is made that the New Mexico Constitution affords greater
protection than the United States Constitution, “we assume without deciding” that the
protection under both constitutions is identical (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).

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{12} 	“Both the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution protect
a citizen against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026,
¶ 12. An officer has committed a “seizure” when he stops an automobile and detains
the occupants for an investigatory detention. Id. ¶ 13. An officer “must have a
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity” before the officer makes a traffic stop to
investigate that illegal activity. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 7 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “A reasonable suspicion is a particularized suspicion,
based on all the circumstances that a particular individual, the one detained, is
breaking, or has broken, the law.” State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M.
119, 2 P.3d 856. A reasonable suspicion arises “if the officer is aware of specific
articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that, when judged
objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or
was occurring.” Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
{13} 	The question presented is one of first impression in New Mexico: whether it
was reasonable for Deputy Benally to have a suspicion that Defendant was driving
with a revoked or suspended driver’s license based upon his two prior encounters with
Defendant, and having heard on the police radio three or four weeks earlier that
Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended or revoked driver’s license and

9
DWI. We conclude that Deputy Benally’s stop of Defendant was supported by a
constitutionally sufficient reasonable suspicion.
{14} 	Other jurisdictions have considered whether reasonable suspicion supports a
traffic stop when it is based on an officer’s knowledge that the driver’s license of the
driver was suspended or revoked and have concluded that such knowledge supports
a finding of constitutionally adequate reasonable suspicion to make a stop for that
offense. See United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1034-36 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant for an invalid
driver’s license when the officer learned, approximately over three weeks before, that
the defendant did not have a valid driver’s license and nothing in the record suggested
that the officer should have assumed the on-going violation had ceased); State v.
Leyva, 599 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the officer had,
at a minimum, reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving with a suspended
license when the officer had “four-to-five-week-old” information that the defendant’s
driver’s license was suspended); State v. Harris, 513 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant when the
arresting officer was informed from other officers that, in “the last few weeks” prior
to the stop, the defendant’s driver’s license was suspended (internal quotation marks
omitted)); State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 866-68 (Minn. 1981) (holding that

10
when the officer had learned a month earlier that the defendant owned the vehicle and
had a suspended driver’s license, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the
defendant); State v. Decoteau, 2004 ND 139, ¶ 13, 681 N.W.2d 803 (“When an officer
observes a person driving a vehicle, and the driver’s license was suspended when the
officer stopped him one week earlier, it is far from a ‘mere hunch’ to suspect the
driver’s license is still under suspension.”).
{15} 	New Mexico precedent favors following the reasoning of the foregoing cases.
In Candelaria, 2011-NMCA-001, ¶¶ 1, 9, 16, 19, we concluded that reasonable
suspicion for a stop was satisfied under the United States Constitution when police
officers ran the license plate of a vehicle and learned that the driver’s license of the
registered owner of the vehicle was suspended. We then followed Candelaria in
holding that the New Mexico Constitution was not violated where a stop was based
on information obtained from the Motor Vehicle Department (MVD) that the owner’s
driver’s license was revoked. Hicks, 2013-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4. More recently, our
Supreme Court held in Yazzie that an officer had a reasonable suspicion to conduct a
traffic stop for operating an uninsured vehicle in violation of the law when he relied
on records of the MVD reporting that it was unknown if the vehicle he stopped was
insured as required by the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act. 2016-NMSC-026,
¶¶ 6, 30, 36.

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{16} 	One of the cases we cited in support of our conclusion in Candelaria was State
v. Halvorson, 2000 MT 56, ¶ 15-16, 299 Mont. 1, 997 P.2d 751. Candelaria, 2011-
NMCA-001, ¶ 13. In Halvorson, a city police officer arrested a female driver for DWI
who was driving a vehicle with a personalized license plate, and because the driver
refused to take a breathalizer test, her driver’s license was revoked for six months.
Halvorson, 2000 MT 56, ¶ 3. The city police officer was married to a county deputy
sheriff, who followed the arrest on his radio, and later discussed the circumstances of
the arrest and license suspension with his wife, the city police officer. Id. ¶ 4. Four
months later, the county deputy sheriff saw a vehicle with the same personalized
license plate being driven by a woman, and recognizing the license plate and
remembering the earlier arrest, he made a traffic stop of the vehicle which it turned
out, was being driven by the same woman who was arrested earlier for DWI. Id. ¶ 5.
The Halvorson court concluded that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Id. ¶ 16.
{17} 	Having been guided by the foregoing authorities, and having considered the
basis for Deputy Benally’s suspicion that Defendant was driving under a suspended
or revoked driver’s license, we conclude that Deputy Benally’s suspicion was
constitutionally reasonable. Three or four months earlier, Deputy Benally stopped
Defendant and learned that his driver’s license was suspended with an arrest clause.

12
Deputy Benally let Defendant go with a warning to fix his licensing issue. Shortly
thereafter, in another personal encounter with Defendant, Deputy Benally learned that
Defendant’s driver license was still suspended. Within three to four weeks prior to the
stop, Deputy Benally learned that Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended
or revoked license and DWI. There was no reason for Deputy Benally to believe that
Defendant had fixed his license problem, and Defendant does not contend that the
information forming the basis for his belief that Defendant was driving under a
suspended or revoked driver’s license was stale or otherwise unreliable. Moreover, we
fail to see why Deputy Benally was required to call his dispatch to confirm his
suspicion that Defendant’s license was still suspended under the circumstances.
“[R]easonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical conception, which requires
that officers articulate a reason, beyond a mere hunch, for their belief that an
individual has committed a criminal act.” Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 15
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Deputy Benally’s reason
for stopping Defendant satisfies this standard.
{18} 	We hold that Deputy Benally’s stop was supported by a constitutionally
adequate reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving under a suspended or
revoked driver’s license. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to address whether the
seatbelt and failure to maintain lane violations were pretext for the stop. We reverse

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the district court on the motion to suppress and proceed to the second point raised on
appeal.
II. 	Motion to Dismiss
{19} 	Commonly referred to as the “six-month rule,” Rule 6-506(B) requires a trial
in the magistrate court to commence within one hundred eighty-two days from seven
separate 	triggering 	events, 	whichever 	occurs 	latest. 	Considering 	Defendant’s
arraignment on November 5, 2012 as the applicable triggering event, trial was
required to commence one hundred eighty-two days later—on May 6, 2012. Rule 6-
506(B)(1) (stating in pertinent part that trial shall commence within one hundred
eighty-two days after the date of the arraignment). Trial was scheduled three days
later, on May 9, 2012. Defendant’s motion to dismiss asserted that because trial was
not held by May 6, 2012, and an extension to commence trial was not properly granted
by the magistrate judge, the case should have been dismissed with prejudice under
Rule 6-506(E)(2). “In the event the trial of any person does not commence within the
time limits provided in this rule, including any court-ordered extensions, the case shall
be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. Following a hearing, the district court denied
Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

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A. 	Facts
{20} 	A period of delay resulted from multiple judges being assigned to preside over
the case. The case was first assigned to Judge Henrietta S. Soland, who arraigned
Defendant on November 5, 2012. Judge Soland set a pretrial conference for November
20, 2012, which was then rescheduled to December 5, 2012. Judge Soland retired at
the end of December 2012 when her term expired, and on January 10, 2013, Judge
Timothy F. Hodo was assigned to preside over the case. Judge Hodo promptly set a
hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress and set trial for January 30, 2013.
However, Defendant excused Judge Hodo from the case on January 24, 2013, and on
February 13, 2013, Judge Stanley R. King was assigned. He presided over the case
until its conclusion.
{21} 	On February 13, 2013, Judge King set the case for a hearing on Defendant’s
motion to dismiss and set trial to commence on March 5, 2013. However, Defendant
did not appear for the March 5, 2013 hearing and trial. The stated reason for
Defendant’s non-appearance was that Defendant had rushed to Albuquerque, New
Mexico to be with his niece, who had been placed on life support. No bench warrant
for failure to appear was issued, apparently because Defendant had reported in
advance to counsel and the court that he was going to be absent and why. Judge King
reset the case for trial to commence on May 3, 2013, but Judge King “cancelled” this

15
setting, and the trial was again reset for May 9, 2013. On May 7, 2013, Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss in the magistrate court, alleging a violation of Rule 6-506(B),
and on May 8, 2013, the State responded by filing a motion for an extension of time
to commence the trial under Rule 6-506(C). The next day, on May 9, 2013, the day
set for trial, Judge King ordered that the State be granted a thirty-day extension of
time to commence the trial. In addition, because Defendant failed to appear for the
trial, Judge King issued a bench warrant for Defendant’s arrest. Defendant surrendered
on May 16, 2013, and Judge King approved the conditional plea agreement that same
day.
B. 	Standard of Review
{22} 	We are called upon here to interpret a rule adopted by our Supreme Court and
how it was applied by the district court. These are questions of law that are reviewed
de novo on appeal. State v. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 18, 370 P.3d 771 (“On
appeal, we review the district court’s analysis of the six[-]month rule de novo.”); see
Sharp, 2012-NMCA-042, ¶¶ 4-6 (addressing the construction of the magistrate court
six-month rule and sanctions for its violation); State v. Granado, 2007-NMCA-058,
¶ 11, 141 N.M. 575, 158 P.3d 1018 (addressing the construction of the metropolitan
court six-month rule); State v. Dominguez, 2007-NMCA-132, ¶¶ 7-8, 142 N.M. 631,
168 P.3d 761 (addressing the construction of the now repealed six-month rule for the

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district court).
C. 	Analysis
1. 	A Final, Appealable Order Is Before Us
{23} 	The denial of a motion to dismiss ordinarily contemplates future proceedings
in a case. Because we only decide appeals from final orders, we first address whether
Defendant’s appeal is properly before us. Defendant entered into a conditional guilty
plea in the magistrate court. The condition was that if he succeeded on the motion to
suppress or the motion to dismiss on appeal, he was entitled to withdraw his guilty
plea. If Defendant is not successful in the appeal on both issues, nothing remains but
to remand the case to the magistrate court for execution of the sentence.
{24} 	In the de novo appeal to the district court, Defendant prevailed on his motion
to suppress, but not the motion to dismiss. The State has now succeeded in its appeal
in this Court from the district court order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress.
Defendant may therefore properly appeal from the order denying his motion to
dismiss. Rule 12-201(C) NMRA (“An appellee may . . . raise issues for determination
only if the appellate court should reverse, in whole or in part, the judgment or order
appealed from.”). Moreover, the district court order is a final, appealable order,
because if this Court decides against Defendant on this issue, there is nothing left to
do except remand the case for enforcement of the judgment and sentence imposed by

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the magistrate court. See Celusniak, 2004-NMCA-070, ¶ 14 (recognizing that in a de
novo appeal to the district court after the defendant enters a conditional guilty plea in
the magistrate court following the denial of a motion to suppress, and the district court
finds against the defendant, the district court order is a final appealable order because
“there are no issues remaining in the defendant’s adjudication”).
2. 	There Was No Error in Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
{25} 	Having determined that Defendant’s appeal is properly before us, we now turn
to the merits. The State’s motion for an extension of time was filed on May 8, 2013,
two days after the May 6, 2013 deadline. Rule 6-506(D) provides that a motion to
extend the time to commence trial may be filed within the applicable time limit, “or
upon exceptional circumstances shown within ten (10) days after the expiration of the
time period.” The parties’ briefs dispute whether “exceptional circumstances” were
shown that justified the late filing of the State’s motion. Defendant argues that the
State failed to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” to allow for its late filing and
that it was therefore error for Judge King to even consider the State’s motion. The
State responds that because Judge King had already orally ruled on May 3, 2013,
before the six-month limit expired, and that the trial would be vacated and reset, Judge
King properly considered its motion.

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{26} 	In addition, before an extension of the six-month time to commence trial can
be granted, Rule 6-506(C)(5) requires a determination by the magistrate court “that
exceptional circumstances exist that were beyond the control of the state or the court
that prevented the case from being heard” within the six-month period. Related to this
issue, because the magistrate court proceedings were not on the record, and Judge
King did not testify in the hearing before the district court, the parties also dispute
whether the district court could rely on the prosecutor’s representations about what
Judge King determined were the “exceptional circumstances” to “cancel” the May 3,
2013 trial setting.
{27} 	We decline to address these competing arguments because Rule 6-506 itself
answers whether the district court was correct in denying Defendant’s motion to
dismiss. The latest triggering event here is under Rule 6-506(B)(5), which provides
that “if the defendant is arrested for failure to appear or surrenders in this state for
failure to appear,” trial must commence within one hundred eighty-two days after “the
date of arrest or surrender of the defendant.”
{28} 	Defendant failed to appear for trial on March 5, 2013, but apparently because
he was attending to his niece who was placed on life support and notified the court
and counsel, Judge King did not issue an arrest warrant, nor was a warrant required.
Rule 6-207(A) NMRA (providing that if any person has been ordered by the

19
magistrate judge to appear at a certain time and place, and fails to do so, “the court
may issue a warrant for the person’s arrest”); see Granado, 2007-NMCA-058, ¶ 23
(construing identical language in the metropolitan court rule counterpart to mean that
a judge may, but is not required to, issue a bench warrant for a person who fails to
appear as required, and that the judge has discretion whether to issue a bench warrant).
Because no bench warrant was issued, Rule 6-506(B)(5) does not apply. See Granado,
2007-NMCA-058, ¶¶ 25-26 (concluding that although the metropolitan court judge
stated that a bench warrant was going to be issued when the defendant failed to appear
at trial, and because no bench warrant was actually issued, the automatic extension
provided by the metropolitan court’s counterpart rule did not apply).
{29} 	However, Judge King did issue a bench warrant when Defendant failed to
appear for trial on May 9, 2013, and Defendant surrendered on May 16, 2013. Under
the circumstances, we conclude that our holding in Dorais applies, and is dispositive.
In Dorais, the six-month rule did not expire until December 28, 2006, and trial was
set for November 9, 2006. 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 15. Because the defendant arrived late
for the trial on November 9, 2006, the magistrate judge had him arrested for failure
to appear. Id. Trial was ultimately held on August 13, 2007, and the defendant was
convicted. Id. ¶ 16. As in this case, the defendant in Dorais argued to the magistrate
court and in his de novo appeal to the district court that Rule 6-506 was violated.

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Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶¶ 16-17. We held: “[T]he mere fact of [the d]efendant’s
absence at the appointed place and time permitted the magistrate court to issue the
bench warrant and order [the d]efendant arrested. Because the triggering event
specified in the six[-]month rule—arrest for failure to appear—is also unqualified in
any way, once [the d]efendant was arrested, the six-month clock began anew.” Id.
¶ 18. When a bench warrant is issued, Rule 6-506(B)(5) is self-executing, and under
its terms, an additional six-month period to commence trial begins upon arrest or
surrender. Therefore, the State was not required to file a motion for extension of time
to commence the trial. Moreover, the fact that the arrest warrant here was issued after
the initial six-month period elapsed is of no consequence, because the rule does not
contain such a qualification. Under the terms of the rule, if a defendant fails to appear,
causing a bench warrant to be issued for his arrest, that defendant forfeits the right to
be brought to trial within the initial six-month period. Following Dorais, we hold that
an additional six-month period to bring Defendant to trial commenced on May 16,
2013, when Defendant surrendered on the warrant. There was no violation of Rule 6-
506.

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III. 	CONCLUSION
{30} 	The order of the district court granting Defendant’s motion to suppress is
reversed, the order of the district court denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
affirmed, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
{31} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge
_____________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge