June 23, 2009 – International Association of Firefighters, Local 1687 AFL-CIO v. City of Carlsbad, a New Mexico Municipal Corporation, No. 28,189

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number:

Filing Date: _June 23, 2009
NO. 28,189

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF FIREFIGHTERS, Local 1687
AFL-CIO,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,
V.

CITY OF CARLSBAD, a New Mexico
Municipal Corporation,

Defendant- Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY
Jane Shuler Gray, District Judge

The Martin Law Fim
W.T. Martin, Jr.
Kenneth D. Dugan
Lane T. Martin
Carlsbad, NM

for Appellee

Miller Stratvert P.A.
Virginia A. Anderman
Charlotte Lamont
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} 	The Public Employee Bargaining Act (PEBA), NMSA 1978, §§ 10-7E-1 to -26
(2003, as amended through 2005), provides for final, binding arbitration as an impasse
procedure in the event a public employer and an exclusive representative of its
employees reach an impasse that cannot be mediated in negotiations under the PEBA.
Section 10-7E-18(B). The PEBA further provides that an impasse resolution between
such parties that requires an expenditure of funds “shall be contingent upon the
specific appropriation of funds by the [L]egislature and the availability of funds.”
Section 10-7E-17(E). We address in this appeal the tension between these provisions.
We hold, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Section 10-7E-17(E) (the
contingency provision) prevails. The district court reached the opposite conclusion.
We therefore reverse its grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff International
Association of Firefighters, Local 1687, AFL-CIO (Union) and its denial of summary
judgment to Defendant City of Carlsbad (City) and, in turn, award judgment to the
City.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	The Union is the collective bargaining agent for the City’s firefighters. It is
their exclusive representative under Section 10-7E-15. The City and the Union have
long engaged in collective bargaining and have had numerous collective bargaining
agreements in place that set terms as to wages and working conditions. 	The last

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collective bargaining agreement expired on April 14, 2006.
{3} 	In negotiating for a new collective bargaining agreement, the Union and the
City reached agreement on all issues except wages, on which issue they reached an
impasse. 	They entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU), stating that
“[t]he impasse procedures as defined under [Section 10-7E-18(B)] will govern the
process for resolution of this impasse.” 	They selected an arbitrator, who, after
conducting an arbitration proceeding, entered an arbitration award, on May 25, 2007,
based on the Union’s last, best offer. 	The award addresses a three-year period,
granting a 3.25% wage increase in the first fiscal year, FY 2006-2007; a 15% one-time
increase in addition to a 3% increase in FY 2007-2008; and a 3% increase in FY 2008-
2009. 	The arbitrator specified that the award “makes no determination as to the
economic capability of the City of Carlsbad as that decision must be left to the
authority and determination of the City Council.” The City did not appropriate funds
in its FY 2007-2008 budget to put into effect the award’s one-time 15% increase.
{4} 	The Union filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the arbitration award and
an injunction, followed by a motion for partial summary judgment. 	The City
responded with a counter-motion for summary judgment. The district court held a
hearing on the motions and ruled from the bench in the Union’s favor. It later entered
numerous orders in conjunction with its ruling. The pertinent orders for the purposes
of this appeal are (1) the order granting summary judgment and confirming the

3
arbitration award, (2) the amended order issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the
City to comply with the arbitration award, and (3) the order granting the Union’s
request for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $46,927. The City appeals from
these orders.
ENACTMENT AND RE-ENACTMENT OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES
{5} 	The Legislature originally enacted the PEBA in 1992 with a sunset provision
to take effect in 1999. NMSA 1978, §§ 10-7D-1 to -26 (1992, as amended through
1998) (repealed 1999). It re-enacted the PEBA in 2003 in mostly the same form as
the original version. 	See §§ 10-7E-1 to -26. 	See generally S. Barry Paisner &
Michelle R. Haubert-Barela, Correcting the Imbalance: 	The New Mexico Public
Employee Bargaining Act and the Statutory Rights Provided to Public Employees, 37
N.M. L. Rev. 357 (2007) (discussing the history surrounding the enactment of New
Mexico’s PEBA). The purpose in both versions was the same, “to guarantee public
employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers, to
promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between public employers and
public employees and to protect the public interest by ensuring, at all times, the
orderly operation and functioning of the state and its political subdivisions.” Section
10-7E-2; § 10-7D-2. In its re-enactment, the Legislature made a significant change
to the impasse resolution procedures. It instituted arbitration as a final procedure in
resolving an impasse in negotiations between a public employer and an exclusive

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representative of public employees. 	See § 10-7E-18(B); § 10-7D-18(B). 	It also
expanded the scope of language limiting the ability of negotiating parties in
circumstances that require the expenditure of funds. 	See §§ 10-7E-17(E), 10-7E-
18(B); § 10-7D-17(E).
{6} 	We begin our analysis with these provisions and their reflection of legislative
intent. We then address the Union’s several arguments that bear on the legislative
intent. We finally consider the Union’s position that genuine issues of material fact
remain so as to defeat summary judgment in favor of the City.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES
{7} 	The impasse resolution procedures that the Legislature adopted in the PEBA in
2003 included two alternatives for resolving an impasse in negotiations. The parties
could (1) engage in mediation, which would lead to arbitration, or (2) enter into a
written agreement to use an alternative procedure. Section 10-7E-18 containing these
procedures provides, as pertinent to this appeal:
(B) 	The following impasse procedures shall be followed by all
public employers and exclusive representatives, except the state and the
state’s exclusive representatives:
(1) 	if an impasse occurs, either party may request from
the board or local board that a mediator be assigned to the negotiations
unless the parties can agree on a mediator. A mediator with the federal
mediation and conciliation service shall be assigned by the board or local
board to assist negotiations unless the parties agree to another mediator;
and

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(2) 	if the impasse continues after a thirty-day mediation
period, either party may request a list of seven arbitrators from the
federal mediation and conciliation service. 	One arbitrator shall be
chosen by the parties by alternately striking names from such list. Who
strikes first shall be determined by coin toss. The arbitrator shall render
a final, binding, written decision resolving unresolved issues pursuant to
[Section 10-7E-17(E)] of the [PEBA] and the Uniform Arbitration Act[,
NMSA 1978, §§ 44-7A-1 to -32 (2001),] no later than thirty days after
the arbitrator has been notified of his or her selection by the parties. The
arbitrator’s decision shall be limited to a selection of one of the two
parties’ complete, last, best offer. 	The costs of an arbitrator and the
arbitrator’s related costs conducted pursuant to this subsection shall be
shared equally by the parties. Each party shall be responsible for bearing
the cost of presenting its case. The decision shall be subject to judicial
review pursuant to the standard set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act.
(C) 	A public employer other than the state may enter into a
written agreement with the exclusive representative setting forth an
alternative impasse resolution procedure.
{8} 	Of the alternative procedures of Section 10-7E-18, the parties elected a hybrid;
they entered into an agreement, the MOU, that would fit the requirements of
Subsection C and agreed to proceed directly to arbitration under Subsection B. Acting
under Subsection B, the parties selected an arbitrator, who, as the statute demands,
entered a written decision within thirty days based on the Union’s last, best offer.
Section 10-7E-18(B)(2). Subsection B calls for the arbitrator’s decision to be a “final,
binding” one. Section 10-7E-18(B)(2).
{9} 	Section 10-7E-18(B) also provides for the arbitrator’s decision to be “pursuant
to” Section 10-7E-17(E). Section 10-7E-17(E) states, in pertinent part:

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An impasse resolution or an agreement provision by a public employer
other than the state or the public schools and an exclusive representative
that requires the expenditure of funds shall be contingent upon the
specific appropriation of funds by the appropriate governing body and
the availability of funds. . . . An arbitration decision shall not require the
reappropriation of funds.
The tension in the language of Section 10-7E-18(B)(2) and Section 10-7E-17(E)
providing for a final, binding arbitration decision that is contingent upon the
appropriation and availability of funds presents the issue in this case and requires
interpretation of the PEBA. The district court interpreted the PEBA to conclude that
the arbitrator’s award was final and binding on the parties. On appeal, we review de
novo a district court’s interpretation of a statute. 	City of Deming v. Deming
Firefighters Local 4521, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 686, 160 P.3d 595. 	In
doing so, we endeavor to fulfill the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute.
Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed’n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 28, 125 N.M.
401, 962 P.2d 1236.
{10} 	The Union urges us to accept the district court’s interpretation by highlighting
the Legislature’s language in Section 10-7E-18(B)(2) that the arbitrator “shall render
a final, binding” decision. It supports its position with policy arguments stressing the
legislative purpose of guaranteeing public employees the right to organize and
collectively bargain with public employers. 	Section 10-7E-2. 	According to the
Union, the Legislature intended mandatory arbitration to be an essential tool of public

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employees in the collective bargaining process because the PEBA forbids striking by
public employees, a right available to private sector employees. Therefore, the Union
continues, unless mandatory arbitration is final and binding, the collective bargaining
right of public employees guaranteed by the PEBA will not be meaningful.
{11} 	When engaging in statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of
the statute and construe it “in its entirety, considering all provisions in relation to each
other.” City of Deming, 2007-NMCA-069, ¶ 21. We seek to give meaning to all parts
of the statute, such that no portion is rendered surplusage or meaningless. Regents of
Univ. of N.M., 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 28. 	With this foundation for our analysis, the
Union argues that an interpretation of the PEBA contrary to that made by the district
court would render the “final, binding” language of Section 10-7E-18(B)(2)
meaningless. We reach the opposite conclusion.
{12} 	Section 10-7E-18(B)(2) states that an arbitrator shall enter a final, binding
decision and also that such decision must be pursuant to Section 10-7E-17(E). Section
10-17E-17(E) makes an impasse resolution that requires the expenditure of funds
contingent upon the appropriation and availability of funds. 	By framing the
arbitrator’s authority in this manner in Section 10-7E-18(B), the Legislature qualified
the arbitrator’s authority with the language of Section 10-7E-17(E). 	See Kahrs v.
Sanchez, 1998-NMCA-037, ¶ 24, 125 N.M. 1, 956 P.2d 132 (filed 1997) (presuming
that the Legislature is aware of existing law when enacting statutes). Indeed, if we

8
were to determine, as we believe the district court did, that the arbitrator could act
under Section 10-7E-18(B)(2) in a final and binding way without reference to the
requirements of Section 10-7E-17(E), we would be ignoring the legislative language
of Section 10-7E-18(B)(2) and considering its reference to Section 10-7E-17(E) to be
meaningless. See Regents of Univ. of N.M., 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 28 (mandating that
no part of a statute is surplusage). Instead, we can give meaning to the two sections
in relation to each other by reading the qualification of Section 10-7E-17(E) to define
the arbitrator’s authority to render a final, binding decision: it is contingent upon the
appropriation and availability of funds when the decision requires the expenditure of
funds.
{13} 	As to the Union’s policy arguments, while we agree with the Union regarding
the importance of finality in the collective bargaining process, the legislative purpose
of the PEBA also includes ensuring “the orderly operation and functioning” of
political subdivisions. 	Section 10-7E-2. 	Section 10-7E-17(E) comports with this
purpose because it subjects an arbitration award to the appropriation and availability
of funds of a political subdivision. From the language of the PEBA, we cannot agree
with the Union that the Legislature, when considering a balance of the public interests,
raised the need for binding arbitration above the stability of public funds. Indeed, the
1992 version of the PEBA did not provide for mandatory arbitration as an impasse
procedure and, for public employers other than the state and their employees’

9
exclusive representatives, provided only factfinding and recommendations by a
factfinder. Section 10-7D-18(B). It also prohibited strikes. Section 10-7D-21(A).
When adopting arbitration in 2003, the Legislature did not mandate arbitration but,
instead, provided it as an option. 	And while the Legislature required that any
arbitration be final and binding, it subjected it to the contingency of the appropriation
and availability of funds that had been part of the 1992 version of the PEBA. Sections
10-7E-17(E), 10-7E-18(B); § 10-7D-17(E). 	It continued to leave to governmental
entities the ability to manage and appropriate their public funds. See § 10-7E-17(E).
The 2003 version of the PEBA simply did not go as far as the Union argues.
THE UNION’S OTHER LEGISLATIVE INTENT ARGUMENTS
Limited Role of Section 10-7E-17(E)
{14} 	The Union makes several arguments differing from our interpretation. It argues
in part that the Legislature did not intend Section 10-7E-17(E) to apply in this case.
According to the Union, Section 10-7E-17(E) only provides that the contingency of
appropriation and availability of funds apply to “[a]n impasse resolution or an
agreement provision by a public employer . . . and an exclusive representative that
requires the expenditure of funds.” 	(Emphasis added.) 	It contends that if the
procedure in this case is an impasse resolution, it was “by” the arbitrator, not the City
and the Union. It concludes that the only part of Section 10-7E-17(E) that applies to
Section 10-7E-18(B) is the last sentence that forbids an arbitration decision from

10
requiring the reappropriation of funds.
{15} 	We cannot agree with the Union’s reading of the statutory provisions. First,
arbitration is an impasse resolution procedure that results in an impasse resolution.
Section 10-7E-18(B) provides the “impasse procedures” to be followed by public
employers other than the state and their employees’ exclusive representatives. 	It
provides arbitration as the ultimate procedure. 	Section 10-7E-18(B)(2). 	The
arbitration procedure requires a decision by an arbitrator “resolving unresolved
issues.” Id. Section 10-7E-18(B)(2) intends that the decision and the procedure used
to reach it constitute an impasse resolution. Second, the 2003 version of the PEBA
modified both Section 10-7D-18(B) and Section 10-7D-17(E). The Legislature made
reference to Section 10-7E-17(E) in Section 10-7E-18(B) in 2003 when it enacted the
new impasse resolution procedures. 	In addition, the 1992 version provided in
pertinent part: “Any agreement provision by a public employer other than the state
or the public schools and an exclusive representative that requires the expenditure of
funds shall be contingent upon the specific appropriation for wages by the appropriate
governing body and the availability of funds.” Section 10-7D-17(E). By changing
the language to pertain to “[a]n impasse resolution or an agreement provision by a
public employer other than the state or the public schools and an exclusive
representative” and by referencing Section 10-7E-17(E) in Section 10-7E-18(B), the
Legislature linked Section 10-7E-17(E) with Section 10-7E-18(B) so that the impasse

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resolution alternatives discussed in Section 10-7E-18(B) applied to both sections. See
Quantum Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-050, ¶ 8, 125 N.M.
49, 956 P.2d 848 (stating that statutes should be construed together with other statutes
on the same subject matter). Third, as drafted, Section 10-7E-18(B)(2) refers to the
entirety of Section 10-7E-17(E), not only the last sentence. If the Legislature intended
to only refer to the last sentence, it could have done so, or even incorporated it into
Section 10-7E-18(B)(2). 	See Kahrs, 1998-NMCA-037, ¶ 24 (presuming that the
Legislature is aware of existing law when enacting statutes).
{16} 	The Union also contends that our interpretation of the PEBA would render the
last sentence of Section 10-7E-17(E) meaningless. The Union states that the sentence
was added when the Legislature added the arbitration provision to Section 10-7E-
18(B). It reasons that “reappropriation” is a form of “appropriation,” and Section 10-
7E-17(E) already provided that an arbitrator could not “appropriate funds.” However,
reappropriation is different from appropriation because it involves a modification of
existing 	appropriations. 	Moreover, 	the 	Union 	contends 	that 	there 	is 	no
reappropriation issue in this case. Additionally, we cannot agree with the Union that
Section 10-7E-18(B)(2) controls over Section 10-7E-17(E) because it is the more
specific statute. The legislative language specifically states its intent that we construe
Section 10-7E-17(E) as part of Section 10-7E-18(B)(2). This argument would require
that we ignore the Legislature’s specific reference to Section 10-7E-17(E) in Section

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10-7E-18(B)(2).
Fairness and Due Process
{17} 	The Union further argues that our interpretation is unfair and violative of due
process. 	It contends that it is unfair because it is one-sided to allow the City the
opportunity to avoid an arbitration decision without giving the Union the same
opportunity. It notes the public policy favoring arbitration and cites Padilla v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2003-NMSC-011, 133 N.M. 661, 68 P.3d
901, in which our Supreme Court considered a provision in an insurance contract that
provided for mandatory arbitration to be binding only if it did not exceed the limits
of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 66-5-201
to -239 (1978, as amended through 2003), and otherwise allowed either party to file
a de novo appeal. 	Padilla, 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 2. 	The Court held the contractual
provision to be void as substantively unconscionable because it was incompatible with
the public policies of encouraging arbitration and protecting persons from uninsured
drivers as expressed in the MFRA. Id. ¶¶ 2, 13-14. However, in this case, we are not
addressing the application of statutory policies to a contractual provision between
private parties, as in Padilla. 	Rather, our issues involve the interpretation of the
Legislature’s policies that it set forth in the PEBA. 	As we have discussed, the
Legislature engaged in a balancing of policies in enacting the PEBA. 	The
contingency language of Section 10-7E-17(E) that protects the public fiscally when

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funds are not available to meet an arbitrator’s decision fulfills one of the stated
purposes in the statute. See § 10-7E-2.
{18} 	With regard to due process, the Union also relies on Board of Education of
Carlsbad Municipal Schools v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 882 P.2d 511 (1994), to
contend that due process restraints apply to arbitration under the PEBA. In Harrell,
our Supreme Court applied due process requirements to the compulsory arbitration
process of NMSA 1978, Section 22-10-17.1 (1993). Harrell, 118 N.M. at 477, 882
P.2d at 518. It stressed the difference between voluntary and compulsory arbitration.
While 	voluntary 	arbitration 	may 	be 	conducted 	using 	any
procedure acceptable to the participants, compulsory arbitration must
comport with due process. 	[V]oluntary arbitration and compulsory
arbitration are fundamentally different if only because one may, under
our system, consent to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of
right, 	but 	similar 	restrictions 	or 	deprivations, 	if 	compelled 	by
government, must accord with procedural and substantive due process.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	It
concluded 	that 	the 	arbitration 	was 	compulsory, 	even 	though 	the 	employee
contractually consented to submit his grievance to arbitration, because the statute
imposed a mandatory arbitration requirement and that the statute violated due process
insofar as it restricted judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision. Id. at 476, 486, 882
P.2d at 517, 527. The PEBA is very different. Section 10-7E-18(C) enables a public
employer other than the state and an exclusive representative to agree in writing to any
impasse resolution procedure, notwithstanding the procedures set forth in Section 10-

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7E-18(B)(2) that call for arbitration. 	Arbitration becomes mandatory only if the
parties elect to proceed under Section 10-7E-18(B), as the Union and the City did by
their MOU. 	Harrell does not apply to this case. 	Moreover, the contingency
provisions of Section 10-7E-17(E) that recognize that a public entity may not have the
funds available to comply with an arbitrator’s decision are reasonably designed to
fulfill the statutory purpose of protecting the public interest “by ensuring, at all times,
the orderly operation and functioning” of the City. Section 10-7E-2; see Rex, Inc. v.
Manufactured Hous. Comm., 2003-NMCA-134, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 533, 80 P.3d 470
(explaining that an argument for due process requires a balancing of the private
interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation against the government’s interest).
Interpretation of the MOU
{19} 	The Union makes the additional argument that the parties agreed to binding
arbitration because they did not refer to Section 10-7E-17(E) in the MOU. The MOU
states: “The impasse procedures as defined under [Section 10-7E-18(B)] will govern
the process for resolution of this impasse.” 	According to the Union, because the
MOU refers only to the impasse procedures of Section 10-7E-18(B) and does not
reference Section 10-7E-17(E), Section 10-7E-17(E) should not be considered to
resolve this impasse. 	We do not agree. 	The parties expressly agreed to use the
“impasse procedures as defined under” Section 10-7E-18(B). 	Those procedures
specifically reference Section 10-7E-17(E). Even though the parties did not mention

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Section 10-7E-17(E), the impasse procedures of Section 10-7E-18(B), as designated
by the parties, incorporate Section 10-7E-17(E).
Appropriation of Funds
{20} 	The Union alternatively argues that even if Section 10-7E-17(E) applies, the
arbitrator’s salary award did not require the appropriation of funds so as to trigger
Section 10-7E-17(E). 	The Union suggests, citing Municipality of Anchorage v.
Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n, 839 P.2d 1080 (Alaska 1992), that
the City could have accommodated the arbitration award by shifting funds or by
cutting other expenditures. However, Municipality of Anchorage is not on point. It
involved an ordinance that mandated binding arbitration, and the pertinent issue was
whether the potential for judicial enforcement of an arbitrator’s award under the
ordinance unconstitutionally delegated the power to appropriate funds. Id. at 1089.
The court observed in that context that the executive and legislative branches of
government must provide the required funding for collective bargaining arbitration
awards because they are part of the contractual negotiations. Id. at 1090-91. The case
before us does not raise that issue. Moreover, as distinguished from the ordinance in
Municipality of Anchorage, the PEBA provides that arbitration decisions requiring the
expenditure of funds are contingent upon the appropriation and availability of funds.
Section 10-7E-17(E).
{21} 	Nor do we agree with the Union that the district court’s judgment, confirmation

16
of the arbitrator’s award, and writ of mandamus require the City’s compliance without
regard to any appropriation. 	The argument simply ignores the question of the
appropriation and availability of funds as set forth in Section 10-7E-17(E).
ABSENCE OF GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
{22} 	The district court granted the Union’s motion for summary judgment and
denied the City’s counter-motion for summary judgment. When the district court acts
on counter-motions for summary judgment based on a common legal issue, this Court
may reverse both the grant of one motion and the denial of the other and award
judgment on the previously denied motion. Cuevas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
2001-NMCA-038, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 539, 28 P.3d 527.
{23} 	The Union asserts that it would not be appropriate for us to award judgment to
the City because genuine issues of material fact remain that must be resolved at trial.
See Rule 1-056(C) NMRA (stating that summary judgment is appropriate if the
summary judgment record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). The Union first
contends that issues of fact remain concerning its claims that (1) the City breached its
obligation under the PEBA “to negotiate in good faith by arbitrarily and without
adequate grounds failing to honor the arbitration award” and (2) the City defrauded
the Union by “pretending that the arbitration award would bind it and luring [the
Union] into executing the arbitration agreement.” However, the Union did not raise

17
these claims in its complaint. 	It mentions such claims in one of its briefs in
conjunction with the counter-motions for summary judgment, referring to Paragraphs
27-29 of its complaint. However, those paragraphs merely recite allegations that the
City budgeted for portions, but not all, of the arbitrator’s award. The complaint does
not contain any claim that the City breached its obligation under the PEBA to
negotiate in good faith or that it defrauded the Union.
{24} 	The Union also contends that there are issues of fact that must be resolved due
to the ambiguity of the MOU. But we do not agree that the MOU is ambiguous. As
we have discussed, it clearly requires the parties to follow the impasse procedures of
Section 10-7E-18(B). That section unambiguously incorporates Section 10-7E-17(E).
There is no remaining factual issue.
CONCLUSION
{25} 	Under the PEBA, an arbitration award requiring a public employer other than
the state to expend funds is contingent upon the appropriation and availability of
funds. We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Union and
denial of summary judgment to the City. We award judgment to the City. Because
we reverse on the merits, we also reverse the district court’s award of attorney fees
and costs to the Union.
{26} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.

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_______________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_______________________________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge
________________________________
ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge