February 16, 2009 – State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Department v. Johnny S., Sr., No. 28,852

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:
Filing Date: 	FEBRUARY 16, 2009
NO. 28,852
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel.
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES
DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
JOHNNY S., SR.,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
In the Matter of JEREMIAH S.,
JONATHAN S., and JAYDEN S.,
Children.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY
Donald Schutte, District Judge
Children, Youth & Families Department
Simon Romo, Chief Children’s Court Attorney
Rebecca J. Liggett, Children’s Court Attorney
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee

Alex Chisholm
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
Albert J. Mitchell
Tucumcari, NM
Guardian Ad Litem

OPINION
BUSTAMANTE, Judge.
{1} 	Johnny S. (Father) appeals from the judgment of the district court terminating
his parental rights to his three children, Jonathan S., Jeremiah S., and Jayden S.
(collectively “Children”). Father’s rights were terminated based on findings of both
abuse/neglect and presumptive abandonment pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 32A-
4-28(B)(2) and 32A-4-28(B)(3) (2005), respectively. Father does not challenge any
of the district court’s findings of abuse and neglect or presumptive abandonment. In
fact, Father concedes that the record supports a finding of presumptive abandonment
under Section 32A-4-28(B)(3) by clear and convincing evidence.
{2} 	Father argues instead that his parental rights were improperly terminated
because the New Mexico Children, Youth & Families Department (CYFD) failed to
adequately accommodate his mental impairments, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 12132
(1990) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The difficulty for Father is that
he failed to preserve the issue in the district court. We affirm on the basis of lack of
preservation. See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 106 N.M. 492, 496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.
App. 1987). We sense, however, some lingering misapprehension as to the proper
method of preserving ADA issues. As a consequence, we opt to clarify preservation
requirements in these cases.
{3} 	Father asserts that he falls within the protection of the ADA which provides that

1Appellate counsel did not represent Father in the district court.
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“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Father argues that he is a “qualified
individual with a disability” based on two psychological evaluations performed by Dr.
Christopher J. Alexander.
{4} 	Dr. Alexander’s evaluations reveal serious deficits in Father’s mental health,
including chronic depression, anxiety, and cognitive disorders. In February 2007, Dr.
Alexander opined that “it is doubtful” that Father would be able to care for the
children “in the near-term, even if he were to go back on psychiatric medication and
comply with the full parameters of his Treatment Plan.” 	Dr. Alexander’s January
2006 evaluation reflected a quite guarded view of Father’s ability to take care of
himself much less the Children.
{5} 	Despite these reports, the record reveals no request by Father’s counsel 1 for an
evaluation of the applicability of the ADA to Father. 	While Father did request
findings of fact regarding his psychological problems, he failed to ask for any specific
finding or conclusion of law that Father was a qualified individual with a disability
within the meaning and protection of the ADA.
{6} 	Acknowledging that he did not adequately develop the potential applicability

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of the ADA below, Father asserts that the district court had an independent obligation
to ensure that the issue was properly explored by Father’s counsel and CYFD. Father
asserts that this obligation is a natural extension of our language in State ex rel.
Children, Youth & Families Department v. John D., 1997-NMCA-019, ¶ 21, 123
N.M. 114, 934 P.2d 308, noting that “a lower court must determine whether the
eligibility requirements are necessary and, if so, must conduct an individualized
inquiry into whether reasonable modifications can be made in the case.” Father also
asserted at oral argument that placing the onus on the district court to at least raise the
issue is reasonable given the fundamental nature of the familial interests at stake.
{7} 	We decline to place on district judges the obligation to initiate inquiry into the
applicability of the ADA in particular cases. District judges are simply not in a good
position to recognize the potential application of the ADA, in particular in the early
stages of termination proceedings when the inquiry would be best raised. Counsel,
who should be most aware of their clients’ situation, are best equipped to determine
whether the ADA might apply and whether it would be of value to pursue it.
{8} 	To preserve issues concerning violations of the ADA, the parent bears the initial
burden of asserting that the parent is a qualified individual with a disability under 42
U.S.C. Section 12131(2). Thereafter, the parent must create a factual and legal record
sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review of the district court decision on the

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issue. What constitutes a sufficient record is, of course, different for each case. At
a minimum, however, there must be a request for relief citing the ADA backed by
facts developed in the record.
{9} 	Determining what accommodation may be reasonable once the ADA is found
to apply will call for a more collaborative effort between the parents, CYFD, and the
district court. But the initial burden to raise and argue the issues—as early in the case
as possible—lies with the parents and their counsel.
{10} 	Given the shortcomings of the record before us, we cannot undertake any
analysis of the factual showing which might be required to demonstrate eligibility for
ADA protection. Neither can we provide any further insight as to whether the ADA
applies to termination of parental rights under Section 32A-4-28(B)(3) (presumptive
abandonment). See John D., 1997-NMCA-019, ¶ 19. We write solely to emphasize
that respondents in termination of parental rights cases have the burden of raising and
proving application of the ADA to them.
{11} 	We affirm the district court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to Children.

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{12} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
WE CONCUR:
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge