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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Yumber: Filed 4/6/2020 1-00-PM

SIO Luly

Filing Date: April 6, 2020

NO. A-1-CA-37194 Mark Reynolds

a1 HA MN

CHRISTOPHER J. DOLLENS,
individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of

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James E. Dollens, Deceased, and
SANDRA EVANS,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Vv.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

—
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APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

The Duhigg Law Firm

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Albuquerque, NM

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Albuquerque, NM

Michael B. Browde
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

| Beatrice J. Brickhouse, District Judge

Holland & Hart LLP
Larry J. Montafio

Julia Brogei
J £1

& WN =

Wake 2 i

Santa Fe, NM

5i_Snell & Wilmer L.L.P

Andrew M. Jacobs
Phoenix, AZ

for Appellant

OPINION

3 Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) appeals, on constitutional

grounds, the district court’s order awarding punitive damages to Plaintiffs in the

post-judgment interest to run from the date of the original judgment, entered

February 14, 2014. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

23} This litigation commenced in 2012, when Christopher Dollens (Dollens),

individually and on behalf of the Estate of his father, James Dollens (Decedent), and

Sandra Evans (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought suit against Wells Fargo and

Minnesota Life Insurance Company (Minnesota Life) (collectively, Defendants) in

connection with a mortgage accidental death insurance policy, and Wells Fargo’s

related misapplication of payments and foreclosure on the insured mortgage.

Following a bench trial, the district court found for Plaintiffs, and Wells Fargo

appealed. We affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed and remanded for the

reasons set forth in Dollens v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Dollens I), 2015-NMCA-

096, 9] 2-8, 26-42, 356 P.3d 531. On remand, the district court conducted further

proceedings and entered new judgments on attorney fees and punitive damages.

Wells Fargo now appeals those judgments. Do//ens J contains a detailed factual

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background, but for purposes of explaining the issues in this second appeal, we

provide_an undated si
provide up as

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The Initial Litigation

133 Decedent took out a mortgage to buy a home in 2003. /d. § 2. The mortgage

was serviced by Wells Fargo, which later marketed and sold to Decedent the

mortgage accidental death insurance policy (policy), underwritten by Minnesota

Life. /d. The purpose of the policy was to “reduce or extinguish” the mortgage,

through benefits paid to Wells Fargo, in the event of Decedent’s accidental death.

Id. Decedent died in August 2010. /d. ¥ 3. Dollens, as personal representative of the

Estate, notified Wells Fargo that he would not be able to make the monthly mortgage

payments and would have to sell the home in order to cover the Estate’s debts. /d.

Dollens then learned of the accidental death policy and submitted a claim on behalf

of the Estate. /d. 4 4. Although the Estate, and later Minnesota Life, notified Wells

Fargo that a claim was pending under the policy, and although both parties requested

that Wells Fargo delay or suspend any adverse action on Decedent’s mortgage

account, Wells Fargo commenced foreclosure proceedings in February 2011. /d.

4] 3-5. Minnesota Life initially denied the claim under the policy, but then reversed

its determination, paying Wells Fargo the benefits under the policy on October 5,

2011. 7d. 45.

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{4 Meanwhile, Wells Fargo charged various costs and fees to Decedent’s

for inspecting and preserving the property. /d. 4 6. Upon receiving the policy benefits

from Minnesota Life, Wells Fargo paid some of the principal and interest on the

note, and brought the loan current, but then—rather than paying off the remainder

of the mortgage—paid itself for the above-mentioned fees and costs. /d. Wells Fargo

then reinstated the mortgage with a reduced balance but did not dismiss the

foreclosure action for several months. /d. The Estate made another payment on the

mortgage, but was soon in default again, and made no further payments. /d. ¥ 7.

5} Plaintiffs brought claims against Defendants for breach of the mortgage

contract, wrongful foreclosure, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

violations of the Unfair Practices Act (UPA), violations of the Home Loan

Protection Act (HLPA), and for attorney fees and punitive damages. /d. ¥ 8.

Plaintiffs settled with Minnesota Life but went to trial on the claims against Wells

Fargo.! Jd. Following a bench trial, the district court found in favor of Plaintiffs on

all claims except the HLPA claim. /d. On February 14, 2014, the court awarded

'The case was consolidated and tried together with a related action seeking
fees for the Estate’s attorneys under the common fund doctrine in connection with

the Estate having secured the policy benefits from Minnesota Life (Duhige Law
Firm vy. Wells Fargo, No. CV-2011-10129). /d. The district court found in favor of
the Estate’s attorneys and awarded separate fees of $51,189.08, which this Court

affirmed on appeal. /d. Jj 43-44. That judgment is not at issue in this appeal.

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general damages to Plaintiffs in the amount of $15,633.42, attorney fees of

$390,654.34, costs of $48,397.10, and punitive damages of $2,728,109.16. Jd. With

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respect to punitive damages, the district court reached its figure by adding the

compensatory damages and attorney fees and costs and multiplying the total times

six. Wells Fargo appealed

Dollens I

{6} We first reviewed Plaintiffs’ UPA claim and upheld the district court’s finding

that Wells Fargo had violated NMSA 1978, Section 57-12-3 (1971), of the UPA

through knowingly creating the perception that, in the event of a claim under a

mortgage accidental death insurance policy, Wells Fargo would coordinate in some

manner with Minnesota Life, and would not foreclose on an insured mortgage during

the pendency of such a claim. Dollens I, 2015-NMCA-096, 9 13-18.

{3 | Second, we reversed the award of attorney fees holding that the district court

had not afforded Wells Fargo a meaningful opportunity to litigate that issue. /d.

4] 22-25. We noted that, while the UPA authorizes an award of attorney fees, the

district court also cited (in its initial letter decision) NMSA 1978, Section 48-7-24

(1983) as a basis for its fee award. Dollens I, 2015-NMCA-096, 4 22, 25. That

section was inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ claims, and did not authorize attorney fees. /d.

4 25. Moreover, no fees should have been awarded for the work allocated to

Plaintiffs’ common law breach of contract claims. /d. § 23. We directed that, on

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remand, the district court should give Wells Fargo an opportunity to contest the

reasonableness of the fee affidavit and should ensure, to the extent possible

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fees related to the UPA claim were awarded. /d. 4 24, 45.

{33 | We then turned to the punitive damages award and discussed our concern that

the district court had based its award of nearly $3,000,000 almost entirely on the

uncontested attorney fee affidavit. Jd. § 24. We explained that punitive damages

awards are subject to both procedural and substantive limitations. /d. (citing Aken v.

Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 2002-NMSC-021, 94 11-12,

132 N.M. 401, 49 P.3d 662). Without deciding any substantive issues (including

whether the attorney fees may properly be considered compensatory, for purposes

of considering the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages), we held that, because

Wells Fargo had been given no real opportunity to contest the bulk of the purported

compensatory damages, the procedures used to reach the punitive damages award

were lacking. /d.

(93 |Wealso addressed the parties’ arguments regarding whether all, or only some,

of Plaintiffs’ claims should have formed the basis for the district court’s punitive

damages award. We affirmed the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo breached

the terms of the mortgage by charging unreasonable and unfounded property

inspection and preservation fees. /d. {§ 32-33. We held that punitive damages were

available to deter Wells Fargo’s demonstrated pattern of continued misconduct in

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charging such fees. /d. We also affirmed the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo

breached the terms_of them

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violated the express terms of those contracts by paying its own fees and costs before

paying all interest and principal due as of the date the payments were received. /d.

4934-41. This resulted in a default on the account after the insurance proceeds were

received by Wells Fargo, when the insurance proceeds should instead have

extinguished the mortgage. /d. 4§ 34, 37. Moreover, we held that there was

substantial evidence that Wells Fargo acted in bad faith, such that punitive damages

were available in connection with this claim. /d. 9 37, 41. Wells Fargo not only

inappropriately prioritized its own fees and costs, but it also inexplicably delayed

payments on the principal and interest in the mortgage account, allowing further

interest and fees to accrue. /d. J§[ 38-40. Wells Fargo then maintained the foreclosure

action for several months, even after the account was brought current, and made

unjustified demands for payment from the Estate. /d. § 40. There was testimony that

such handling of a mortgage account was customary and not isolated or accidental,

and thus it was reasonable to conclude that Wells Fargo acted systematically to

increase its profits in reckless disregard of the impact on Plaintiffs. /d.

410} However, we reversed the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo was a third-

party beneficiary under the policy, and its finding that Wells Fargo had breached the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the policy. Jd. J§ 27-31.

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Accordingly, we held that no common law punitive damages could be imposed in

form the basis for the punitive damages award, as the UPA is a separate remedial

scheme with its own treble damages provision. /d. § 26 (stating that “[t]o obtain

punitive damages beyond those permitted by the statutory treble-damages provision

the plaintiff must establish a cause of action other than one under the UPAJ[,]”

quoting McLelland vy. United Wis. Life Ins. Co., 1999-NMCA-055, § 13, 127 N.M.

303, 980 P.2d 86).

(1143. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the punitive damages award and

remanded to the district court for reconsideration of its award without reference to

the UPA claim or the claims for breach of the accidental death insurance policy. /d.

§ 41. We did not reach the substance of the punitive damages award but cautioned

that “the amount of an award of punitive damages must not be so unrelated to the

injury and actual damages proven as to plainly manifest passion and prejudice rather

than reason or justice.” /d. § 42 (quoting Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 9 23). We also

reduced the compensatory damages award to Plaintiffs, based on the parties’

stipulation that Plaintiffs’ actual out-of-pocket damages were $4,221.73, not

$15,633.42 (as originally found by the district court). Dollens I, 2015-NMCA-096,

9 45.

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Proceedings on Remand

litigated the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ attorney fees. The district court issued a

letter decision on August 3, 2016, finding that a 30 percent reduction to the total

hours and fees reflected in the amended fee petition was appropriate to ensure that

only recoverable fees were awarded. The district court entered an award of

$325,380.61 in attorney fees, as well as $13,000 in post-petition attorney fees, and

$54,143.07 in costs.

4133, The parties then briefed the issue of punitive damages. The district court

entered an order on February 5, 2018, awarding Plaintiffs $2,500,000 in punitive

damages. This time, the district court concluded that the attorney fees awarded under

the UPA were not compensatory damages. However, the court was concerned that a

punitive damages award of only six times the compensatory damage award (of

$4,221.73, or approximately $25,330) would be de minimus and would not

accomplish the court’s goal of deterrence. The district court concluded that “[a]

punitive damage award based on any ratio is problematic in this case[,|” and did not

base its punitive damages award on the compensatory damages and/or the attorney

fee award. It further stated that “tying punitive damages to fees detracts from the

message the [cJourt 1s attempting to communicate to Wells Fargo and any parties

that in the future are considering similar conduct.”

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44; The district court explained that the ratio between compensatory and punitive

2 99

prejudice[,]’ ” given the difficulty of knowing why a jury may have decided on any

given award. In a bench trial, by contrast, the court enters findings and conclusions

explaining the basis for its award. The district court set forth some of its reasoning

as follows: (1) Wells Fargo acted willfully and its wrongdoing was customary and

systemic; (2) Wells Fargo showed a lack of understanding as to the significance and

pervasiveness of its misconduct, which went “beyond any issues” related to the

insurance policy; (3) a “per se” rule of smaller punitive awards for economic

damages would merely incentivize parties like Wells Fargo to engage in

economically efficient breaches of duty; (4) Wells Fargo made no argument that a

punitive damages award of a particular magnitude would be a “death penalty,” and

therefore no amount awarded by the district court would threaten the company’s

ability to continue doing business; and (5) the attorney fees and costs, and the “effort

required to get to this point” should not be overlooked. Following additional briefing

by the parties, the district court also entered an amended order awarding Plaintiffs

post-judgment interest of 15% on the $2,500,000 punitive damages award, to run

from February 14, 2014.

415} Wells Fargo now appeals both the award of punitive damages and the order

of post-judgment interest thereon.

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DISCUSSION
I. ___Standards of Review SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSsSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

416} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution “imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding

punitive damages and to amounts forbidden_as grossly excessive.” Phillip Morris

USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, ff 11-12, 19 (discussing the Due Process Clause’s

guarantee against the arbitrary deprivation of property, which requires both fair

procedures for the imposition of punitive damages and “comparatively reasonable”

awards). “Whether an award of punitive damages comports with constitutional due

process is a question of law that we review de novo.” Yedidag v. Roswell Clinic

Corp., 2013-NMCA-096, 4 29, 314 P.3d 243, aff'd, 201S-NMSC-012, 4 29, 346 P.3d

1136; Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 4 19.

73 “We review the award of post-judgment interest for abuse of discretion.”

Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, 4 74, 146

N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791. A district court abuses its discretion if 1t misapprehends or

misapplies the law. Id.

II. Punitive Damages

8} Wells Fargo argues that the district court’s punitive damages award was

unconstitutionally arbitrary and grossly excessive. Although Wells Fargo focuses

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primarily on the substantive excessiveness of the award, we address the arguments

(determining that “in order to afford meaningful review of the substantive aspect of

[a] punitive damages award... , we must ascertain that the procedures used to arrive

at the award were fair”); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443

486 (1993) (“[D]ue process does not simply require that a particular result be

substantively acceptable; it also requires that it be reached on the basis of permissible

considerations.” (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). In light of our conclusion

that there were unconstitutional procedural defects in this case, we remand for

further proceedings. Although we need not decide whether the punitive damages

award was also substantively excessive, we address the issues raised by the parties

to provide guidance on remand. See State vy. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, § 37,

136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699 (addressing an issue likely to recur on remand in order

“to provide guidance to the district court”).

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17

A. The District Court’s Punitive Damages Award Violated Procedural Due
Process Guarantees

419} [he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles litigants to fair

notice of conduct that may be punished by a state’s punitive damages system, and

fair notice of severity of the penalty that a state may impose. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.

15 aa =A 4 fae oak |

I} Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (

lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our

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constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the

that a [s]tate may impose.”’). Furthermore, “[r]equiring the application of law” to a

determination of punitive damages, “rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice . . . helps

to_assure the uniform general treatment_of similarly situated persons that is the

essence of law itself.” /d. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring). “Legal standards need not

be precise” in order to supply litigants with adequate notice and fair treatment, but

“they must offer some kind of constraint upon a jury or court’s discretion, and thus

protection against purely arbitrary behavior.” /d. at 588; see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at

20 (holding that due process is satisfied where discretion is “exercised within

reasonable constraints”’).

20} One such constraint is the requirement of a reasonable relationship between

the punitive damages award and the harm that was or could have been caused to the

plaintiff(s). Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22 (approving of Alabama’s judicial review of jury

awards to ensure that “punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to

the severity of the offense and have some understandable relationship to

compensatory damages”); Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, § 13 (approving of jury

instructions including guidance that “punitive damages must relate to actual

damages and the injury sustained”). Thus, New Mexico’s jury instructions with

respect to punitive damages provide, in part, as follows:

Punitive damages are awarded for the limited purposes of punishment

and to deter others from the commission of like offenses. The amount
of punitive damages must be based_on_reason_and justice takine into

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account all the circumstances, including the nature and enormity of the
wrong and such aggravating and mitigating circumstances as may be

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shown. The property_or wealth of the defendant_1s_a legitimate factor
for your consideration. Zhe amount awarded, if any, must be
reasonably related to the injury and to any damages given as
compensation and not disproportionate to the circumstances

UJI 13-1827 NMRA (emphasis added).

21; Wells Fargo argues that the district court disregarded this constraint by

refusing to examine the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages.

We agree. Other than its statement that “a punitive award of six times the

compensatory award would be de minimus,” the district court did not address the

relationship between Plaintiffs’ actual damages and the punitive damages awarded.

Instead, the district court stated in its order that “a punitive damage award based on

the compensatory damages and/or the fee award would not be in the interest of

justice.” Thus, the district court’s description of its own reasoning indicates that it

rejected not only a consideration of the mathematical ratio between Plaintiffs’ actual

damages and punitive damages, but the necessity of any rational connection

whatsoever between the two figures. We agree with the district court that the unique

circumstances of this case render a “standard” ratio-based inquiry difficult, but—as

we discuss further, below, through a limited examination of the substance of the

punitive damages award—there must be some rational relationship between the

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injury in this case and the punitive damages award. The district court was not free

to-disregard this constrainto

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22} Due process also requires that punitive damages must be “rational in light of

their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition.” BMW, 517

U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

Although “[t]he property or wealth of the defendant is a legitimate factor” for the

jury or judge’s consideration, UJI 13-1827, given that “deterrence 1s directly related

to what people can afford to pay],|” Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 813 (2d Cir.

1996), punitive damages should not exceed the state’s interest in deterrence. Has/ip,

499 US. at 21; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,

419-20 (2003) (holding that “a more modest punishment for this reprehensible

conduct could have satisfied the [s]tate’s legitimate objectives, and the ... courts

should have gone no further”). The state’s interest is limited to punishing for harm

to the plaintiff(s) in the case at bar and deterring the defendant’s conduct within the

state. See UJI 13-1827A NMRA; Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 354-55 (emphasizing

that consideration of “potential harm” must be limited to the harm potentially caused

to the plaintiff, and that a defendant may not be punished for harms it allegedly

caused or may cause others); BMW, 517 U.S. at 572-73 (holding that “judicially

imposed punitive damages” may only further the state’s interest in protecting “its

own consumers and its own economy” and may not impose sanctions for conduct

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unrelated to that interest). Thus, risk of harm to others, or to the public at large, while

sometimes relevant to reprehensibility, is not relevant for any other purpose.

13-1827A comm. cmt.

23} In arriving at its punitive damages figure, the district court in this case appears

to have considered only avoiding an amount _of punitive damages that might

bankrupt Wells Fargo, rather than considering the amount that would accomplish

but not exceed New Mexico’s goals of punishment and deterrence. See Haslip, 499

U.S. at 21. Because Wells Fargo raised no argument about its wealth, the district

court assumed that “any amount it awards will not threaten Wells Fargo’s very

existence.” This, coupled with the district court’s reference to findings that Wells

Fargo services eight to nine million home loans in the United States, and

systemically, remorselessly mishandles mortgage accounts for its own profit,

indicates that the district court’s punitive damages award was aimed at deterring a

national company with virtually unlimited assets from nationwide wrongdoing. This,

again, violated Wells Fargo’s right to a process constrained by fair and permissible

considerations, namely: punishment for harm to these Plaintiffs, and deterring only

conduct in this state.

a4; Accordingly, we reverse and remand the district court’s judgment on punitive

damages, so that the court may reconsider its award within the constraints described

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hereinabove. However, as we have said, we also provide guidance on remand by

addressing the substantive fairness of a punitive damages award

ChE A CALE ¥ a 2

B. Substantive Due Process Requirements

25} Weevaluate whether a punitive damages award meets substantive due process

requirements utilizing three guideposts established by the United States Supreme

Court in BMW: “1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; 2)

the disparity between the harm (or potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the

punitive damages award: and 3) the difference between the punitive damages

awarded by the jury and the civil [and criminal] penalties authorized or imposed in

comparable cases.” Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 4 20 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75);

see Chavarria v. Fleetwood Retail Corp., 2006-NMSC-046, 4 36, 140 N.M. 478,

143 P.3d 717. Our Supreme Court has held that the first two of these guideposts are

akin to New Mexico’s traditional considerations: examining “the size of the

[punitive damages award] in light of the enormity and nature of the wrong

considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the relation between the

amount of [punitive] damages and the actual injury or actual damages sustained.”

Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 4 20. The guideposts are listed in descending order of

importance: the first guidepost 1s the most important indicium of the reasonableness

* We note that, while the BA/W substantive due process guideposts are
typically applied de novo in post-trial review, here, the parties structured their briefs

to the district court (on the issue of punitive damages) around the BMW guideposts.

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of a punitive damages award, and the last is the least important indicium. /d. J 21,

25: Chavatria, 2006-NMSC-046, { 39.

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26} Wells Fargo argues that the district court’s punitive damages award was

excessive under the above guideposts on several grounds. First, as a sort of threshold

argument, it argues that the district court erroneously engaged in additional fact-

finding and/or went beyond the findings of fact available to support the imposition

of punitive damages on remand. Second, it argues that the available findings of fact

show no reprehensible conduct justifying a punitive damages award, or certainly not

so large an award. Third, it argues that the 592:1 ratio between punitive damages

and compensatory damages is grossly excessive. Finally, it argues that comparable

civil or criminal penalties for the same conduct are far less than $2,500,000, showing

that the punitive damages award here was excessive.

7 Before addressing the three BMW guideposts, we reject Wells Fargo’s

contention that the district court impermissibly engaged in additional fact-finding or

went “beyond” the facts found at trial in order to justify its punitive damages award.

The first paragraph of the district court’s order on punitive damages 1s essentially a

statement that its original findings of fact were ultimate findings and that the

evidence supporting those findings was properly reviewed by the court on remand.

We agree. We directed the district court to permit Wells Fargo to challenge the

reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ claimed attorney fees on remand, and the district court

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complied with our directive, and entered new findings relating to attorney fees. We

see no indication

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new findings—which we assume explains the absence of detail in Wells Fargo’s

argument on this point.>

1. Reprehensibility

8} We also reject Wells Fargo’s contention that, under the reprehensibility

guidepost, the factual findings show no reprehensible conduct sufficient to justify

the entry of a punitive damages award. Wells Fargo argues that the district court’s

“initial punitive damages ruling was based largely on Wells [Fargo’s] conduct

related to the [policy] and [Wells Fargo’s] .. . violation of the UPA[,]” and that these

findings were no longer available to support a punitive damages award on remand.

This is incorrect. First, the majority of the district court’s findings in support of its

first punitive damages award did not pertain to the policy or Wells Fargo’s violation

of the UPA—they pertained to the mishandling of the mortgage account through

assessing improper fees and misapplying payments. Furthermore, we made it clear

in our prior opinion that “punitive damages were available—independent of the

UPA—for Wells Fargo’s practices with respect to property inspection and

3Wells Fargo refers only to Plaintiffs’ brief in support of punitive damages,
which cited the portions of the evidentiary record supporting the district court’s

previous findings of fact.

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preservation work orders and for its erroneous application of payments.” Do/llens I,

2015-NMCA-096, 4.41.

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29} With respect to Wells Fargo’s related argument that its conduct was not

sufficiently reprehensible to justify a substantial punitive damages award, we again

disagree. “[P]unitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability

after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the

imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.” Campbell, 538

U.S. at 419. To evaluate whether a defendant’s conduct is sufficiently reprehensible

to warrant the imposition of punitive damages, courts must assess the potential

aggravating factors (or, reprehensibility factors), namely, whether

11 [(1)] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; [(2)] the

12 tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of

13 the health or safety of others; [(3)] the target of the conduct had

14 financial vulnerability; [(4)] the conduct involved repeated actions or

15 was an isolated incident; [(5)] and the harm was the result of intentional

16 malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

17] [d.; see BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-80 (referring to the foregoing considerations as
18] “aggravating factors”). Regarding the first two factors, Wells Fargo argues that mere
19] economic harm, which poses no threat to health or safety, weighs against a finding
20] of significant reprehensibility. Wells Fargo further argues that there was no proof of
21} financial vulnerability on the part of Plaintiffs, nor proof that Wells Fargo engaged
22] in any deceitful conduct.

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517 U.S. at 576 (holding that “infliction of economic injury, especially when done

intentionally through affirmative acts of misconduct or when the target is financially

vulnerable, can warrant a substantial penalty” (citation omitted)); see, e.g.

Chavarria, 2006-NMSC-046, § 37 (holding that a substantial punitive damages

award was appropriate where harm was strictly economic, but the defendant’s

conduct was repeated, deceitful, and demonstrated “a reckless disregard for the

welfare of a financially vulnerable family’’). The district court here appeared to reject

only Wells Fargo’s argument that, where the conduct at issue causes no physical

harm, and poses no threat to health or safety, such cases are as a rule “less worthy

of large punitive damage[s] awards.” We agree. See Chavarria, 2006-NMSC-046,

q 37.

31} The Tenth Circuit cases cited by Wells Fargo for the proposition that courts

are “virtually unanimous” in holding that the first two factors are required for a

substantial punitive damages award are misquoted, or do not stand for the

proposition cited, and are factually distinguishable. See, e.g., Cont’! Trend Res., Inc.

v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 638 (10th Cir. 1996) (observing that the plurality in

BMW “appear to regard torts causing only economic injury as less worthy of large

punitive damages awards than torts inflicting injuries to health or safety’’); id. at 638-

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39, 643 (nevertheless holding that a “substantial penalty” was warranted under the

damages were $2,000,000, a $6,000,000 award was appropriate). The New Mexico

cases cited are largely inapposite. /.g., Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 2011-

NMCA-024, 450, 150 N.M. 283, 258 P.3d 1075 (merely listing the reprehensibility

factors in the context of a wrongful death action); Jolley v. Energen Res. Corp.,

2008-NMCA-164, {| 32-34, 145 N.M. 350, 198 P.3d 376 (finding that three of the

five ageravating factors weighed in favor of a substantial punitive damages award,

again in a wrongful death case, but not addressing the distinction between cases

involving economic versus noneconomic damages); Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc.,

1998-NMCA-021, 9 48, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089 (citing Cont’ Trend Res., 101

F.3d at 639-40, for the proposition that “[i]n economic injury cases, if the damages

are significant .. . the ratio of punitive damages to the harm generally should not

exceed ten to one” (emphasis added)). Indeed, Muncey v. Eyeglass World, LLC, cited

by Wells Fargo, only highlights the absence of a rule that economic harm posing no

risk to health or safety mandates a minimal punitive damages award. 2012-NMCA-

120, 4] 69, 72, 289 P.3d 1255 (upholding a punitive damages award of $2,000,000

in an economic harm case where only one aggravating factor was applicable).

32} Turning to the other three aggravating factors under Campbell, Wells Fargo

argues that the only evidence of Plaintiffs’ financial vulnerability was the Estate’s

INO

claim that it was unable to continue making mortgage payments following

Decedent’s death. But

breaches of the mortgage contract were a cause of the account going into default,

and the Estate repeatedly went into default after Decedent’s death, whereas, before

his death, payments had been timely made for over six years. Dollens I, 2015-

NMCA-096, §§ 2-3, 6-7. Wells Fargo’s misconduct compromised the ability of

Plaintiffs to pay off the mortgage, resulting in continued foreclosure proceedings,

while Wells Fargo profited improperly and in violation of the mortgage contract.

Wells Fargo’s misconduct, by its very nature, affected a financially vulnerable

family, and (because its conduct here was customary) affects similarly vulnerable

families across New Mexico.

333 With respect to the fourth and fifth factors, there was substantial evidence that

Wells Fargo’s conduct was intentional, pervasive, and recidivist. /d. J] 32-40. As

discussed in our prior opinion, expert testimony and case law from other

jurisdictions demonstrated that Wells Fargo had been “previously punished for

similar conduct as early as 2007[,]” and that the improper fees, misapplication of

benefits and other payments on the mortgage were customary. /d. J] 33, 40. We held

that punitive damages were available to deter this pattern of willful, continued

misconduct. /d. § 41. There was also evidence that Wells Fargo’s conduct involved

deceit, because at least some of the fees routinely charged to the mortgage account

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were for services that were not only unnecessary, but not actually performed. /d.

4.32. Accordingly, we agree with Plainti

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support a finding of significant reprehensibility and a substantial punitive damages

award.

2. Ratio

343 Our agreement that a substantial punitive damages award is warranted

requires contextualization through the second guidepost—the relationship between

compensatory damages and punitive damages. The focus of the district court under

this guidepost must be to “ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable

and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages

recovered.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426; see also Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 4 23

(noting that the second BMW guidepost focuses on the injury to the plaintiff and the

necessity of a rational relationship between that injury and the punitive damages

award, and stating that “an award of punitive damages must not be so unrelated to

the injury and actual damages proven as to plainly manifest passion and prejudice

rather than reason or justice” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see

also BMW, 517 U.S. at 580 (noting that “[t]he . .. most commonly cited indicium of

an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm

inflicted on the plaintiff”).

INO

353} Courts have “been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the

award.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424. Generally, “few awards exceeding a single-digit

ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will

satisfy due process.” /d. at 425; see also Chavarria, 2006-NMSC-046, § 38. On the

other hand, though “[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due

process, while still achieving the [s]tate’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than

awards with ratios in a range of 500 to 1 .. . there are no rigid benchmarks that a

punitive damages award may not surpass[.]” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. “[R]atios

greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due process where

a ‘particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic

damages.’ ” /d. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582); Garcia v. Coffman, 1997-NMCA-

092, 9 41, 124 N.M. 12, 946 P.2d 216 (also citing BMW). The lodestar is the

requirement of a reasonable relationship between the actual harm to the plaintiff and

the punitive damages award. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (noting that although there

is no “mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the

constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case[,] .. . a general concern of

reasonableness properly enters into the constitutional calculus” under this guidepost

(omission, alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

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36} Here, Wells Fargo asserts that the district court’s punitive damages award of

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$2 500.000. or approximately 59? times the $4271.73 in compensatory damages
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violates due process because this case does not “fall within a category of exceptional

cases where more than single-digit ratios are constitutionally permissible.” Wells

Fargo argues that awards exceeding this range are only permissible where “(1) the

conduct is particularly egregious; (2) the conduct causes only a small amount of

economic damages; and (3) the damages are hard to detect or measure,” citing

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (citing, in turn, BMW, 517 U.S. at 582). But BMW, in

describing cases that may exceed the single-digit range, posed as examples cases in

which “a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic

damages|,]”’ and noted that “[a] higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which

the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have

been difficult to determine.” 517 U.S. at 582 (emphasis added). Thus, there is no

authority for the proposition that all three of these factors must be present to justify

a substantial award. Indeed, BM/W’s next admonition is to “reiterate [the] rejection

of a categorical approach.” /d.

37; We generally agree with Plaintiffs’ contention that Wells Fargo’s conduct was

both egregious and pervasive, and that the district court followed the logic of BMW

and its progeny, recognizing that too small an award of punitive damages would

create an incentive to engage in an “economically efficient” breach of duty in

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circumstances such as these, where the individual compensatory damages are small,

and there is little incentive fora potential plaintiff to take on the costs of litigation.

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However, we issue some qualification and caution. We reject Plaintiffs’ argument

that the facts of this case “require the highest possible award of punitive damages.”

It must be acknowledged that this case is not comparable to the cases of brutal

physical violence, rape, or racial discrimination. But neither do these extreme cases

involve small economic awards underlying the punitive award, and accordingly, we

do not think they were in the class of cases contemplated by BMW. We must

therefore seek guidance to give content to the “reasonable relationship” requirement

here.

383 We think this case is somewhat comparable to Chavarria, in which a retailer

of mobile homes committed fraud and conversion in the course of selling a mobile

home to the plaintiffs, causing them an increased financial burden, and requiring

them to live in substandard conditions. 2006-NMSC-046, § 37. Although the

damages awarded were only economic, our Supreme Court approved a ratio of

approximately 14:1 in punitive to compensatory damages, or $250,000 to $17,000.

Id. 4§ 35, 39. That case was egregious because it involved a “series of

misrepresentations, forgeries, and fraudulent conduct” in the sale of the mobile home

to the financially vulnerable plaintiffs. /d. § 37.

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393 Though we do not express an opinion on whether Wells Fargo’s conduct here

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the ways we have already discussed. Moreover, although Plaintiffs’ compensatory

damages were lower, the costs of litigation were high, and there was evidence that

Wells Fargo’s treatment of Plaintiffs’ mortgage account was customary

Accordingly, we do not hesitate to label Wells Fargo’s conduct in this case as

egregious. We also note that the Court in Chavarria took into account the

“intangible” nature of some aspects of the harm the plaintiffs suffered. /d. § 38. Here,

similarly, Plaintiffs were subjected to the stress of Wells Fargo’s mishandling of the

mortgage account, immediately following the death of Decedent, and the resulting

potential loss of that property in foreclosure. Accordingly, there 1s an “intangible”

harm over and above the $4,221.73 in compensatory damages which is properly

taken into account under this guidepost.

40} Of course, the 14:1 ratio approved in Chavarria is a great distance from the

592:1 ratio imposed by the district court here, even acknowledging the unique

aspects of this case, discussed above. Plaintiffs, apparently realizing this, argue that

we should also consider the recoverable attorney fees and costs, together with the

compensatory damages when comparing the punitive damages award to Plaintiffs’

actual harm.” Plaintiffs explain that, even though the district court explicitly

refused to base its punitive damages award on the attorney fees in this case, it did

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find that “the amount of fees and costs awarded is a relevant consideration in

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determining a punitive damage[s]| award.

$2,500,000 is 6.3 times the total costs, attorney fees under the UPA, and

compensatory damages totaling $396,745.41,4 which Plaintiffs contend is entirely

within a constitutionally acceptable range. Wells Fargo argues that attorney fees

under the UPA or otherwise, are not compensatory; even if they were, where attorney

fees are included as an element of compensation, courts typically impose only a 1:1

ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.

{4143 We agree with Wells Fargo and the district court that “[f]ees awarded under

the UPA are not compensatory damages.” The UPA 1s a statutory scheme containing

its own remedial provisions, including a treble damages provision, and a separate

attorney fees provision. NMSA 1978, §§ 57-12-10(B), (C) (2005). Plaintiffs were

awarded attorney fees only for their UPA claim. Plaintiffs were separately awarded

punitive damages for two of their common law breach of contract claims. We cannot

see the logic of including the fees awarded pursuant to the UPA (for work relating

to the UPA violation) as an aspect of the injury to Plaintiffs for purposes of

4Even though the district court ostensibly did not base its revised punitive
damages award on compensatory damages or the attorney fee award, the award of

$2,500,000 is effectively “rounding up” from six times the total of damages, fees
and costs ($396,745.41), which is $2,380,472.46—the amount requested by
Plaintiffs in briefing on remand. Six to one was the ratio used by the district court in

its first order.

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comparison with punitive damages awarded for Plaintiffs’ common law claims. In

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{423 However, we also acknowledge that the Tenth Circuit and other federal and

state courts (though none, yet, in New Mexico) have taken into account “the probable

expenses of litigation” for purposes of examining the relationship of punitive

damages to actual damages. See, e.g., Cont’l Trend Res., 101 F.3d at 642 (holding

that “the costs of litigation to vindicate rights is an appropriate element to consider

in justifying a punitive damages award’). Frequently, these courts recognize that a

wealthy defendant may litigate relentlessly and aggressively, in spite of modest

stakes, causing the plaintiff to incur costs and expenses far beyond any

compensatory damages award. See id.; see also Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,

Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that the defendants in such cases

are “investing in developing a reputation intended to deter plaintiffs”). Even setting

aside the attorney fees awarded under the UPA, Plaintiffs’ additional attorney fees

and costs in this case are well in excess of $100,000, or twenty-five times the

compensatory damages of $4,222. However, given the absence of authority for the

proposition that attorney fees should be included as an element of “actual damages”

in this context, we do not include them in the denominator of the ratio between

punitive damages and actual damages. Rather, these fees present a reasonable basis

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to exceed the presumably constitutionally permissible “single digit” ratio. See Cont’/

rend Res., 101 F.3d a

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basis for a substantial attorney fee award, but not figuring the value of those costs

into the second guidepost “ratio” analysis); see also Mathias, 347 F.3d at 676-78

(including the substantial defense costs as one reason that the 37.2:1 ratio of punitive

to compensatory damages was not excessive, but not including the precise costs in

the denominator for ratio purposes). In sum, we agree that the costs of litigation for

Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the mortgage contract might place a reasonable

punitive damages award beyond the single digits, and beyond the ratio approved in

Chavarria, for this reason, and the others set forth above.

443} Another way that the district court in this case may ensure a rational

relationship between punitive damages and compensatory damages is through

comparing this case to other, similar cases. See Lee, 101 F.3d at 811-13 (looking to

punitive damage awards in other cases to “find limits and proportions” in civil rights

case where compensatory damages were nominal). Although we think it important

to observe that this case did not involve only nominal damages—Plaintiffs were

compensated for their financial losses—it did involve minimal economic

compensatory damages, and some degree of intangible harm; significant litigation

costs; and egregious, recidivist wrongdoing on the part of a large business that

directly profited from its misconduct. On remand, the district court may wish to

INO

consider the punitive damages awarded in cases with similar facts, to gain a sense of

3. Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct

{444 “Comparing the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties

that could be imposed for comparable misconduct provides a third indicium_of

excessiveness.” BMW, 517 U.S. at 583; Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, § 25. The United

States Supreme Court has held that “substantial deference” should be accorded “to

legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.”

BMW, 517 U.S at 583 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This relates

to the third guidepost’s purpose of ensuring that a defendant has fair notice of the

penalty that might be imposed for its conduct. See id. at 584. On the other hand, we

have noted criticism that this guidepost is “ineffective and very difficult to employ.”

Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 4 25. Among other things, it is unclear how a court should

proceed where there are no applicable “legislative judgments” regarding the conduct

at issue. /d. Existing civil penalties may also be too low to have a reasonable

deterrent effect on egregious conduct which a defendant should know is punishable

through punitive damages. See id. (noting that “when statutory penalties for the

conduct in question are low or do not exist, a consideration of the statutory penalty

does little to aid in a meaningful review of the excessiveness of the punitive damages

award” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Grassie, 2011-

INO

NMCA-024, §[ 52, 58-61 (noting that “New Mexico and other courts have not

of a patient caused his death, that no comparable sanctions sufficiently deterred the

conduct at issue; thus, this guidepost was unhelpful to the constitutional analysis).

45} Plaintiffs have ignored this guidepost entirely, whereas Wells Fargo points us

only to the UPA, citing Bogle v. Summit Investment Co., 2005-NMCA-024, § 36,

137 N.M. 80, 107 P.3d 520, in which this Court held that “[b]ecause of the similarity

of the conduct prohibited by the [UPA] and the conduct engaged in by [the

defendant], the remedies afforded under the [UPA] serve as a meaningful

comparison in our determination of the reasonableness of the punitive damages

awarded by the district court.” Wells Fargo contends that its conduct here is likewise

similar to conduct proscribed by the UPA, so the UPA’s remedy of treble damages

provides guidance for an appropriate punitive damages award in this case. We reject

this argument. Plaintiffs had a separate UPA claim relating to Wells Fargo’s

misleading representations regarding the policy. But, as the district court succinctly

stated, “Wells Fargo’s misconduct goes beyond any issues that were related to the

insurance policy.” The conduct for which punitive damages were imposed on Wells

Fargo pertained to improper fees assessed against Plaintiffs’ mortgage account and

Wells Fargo’s misapplication of mortgage payments. Thus, the UPA does not

provide a meaningful comparison in this case.

{46} Given the absence of any other sanctions for purportedly comparable

misconduct_cited_by_th

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Grassie, this guidepost is largely unhelpful to the constitutional analysis. However

we note that, under federal law, a bank such as Wells Fargo is subject to criminal

punishment for fraudulent statements in its entries and transactions (such as

presumably, charging fees for services not actually performed). See 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1001(a), 1005 (2018) (providing for penalties including up to a $1,000,000 fine,

and imprisonment); see also Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 4 27 (noting that “/t]he

possibility of a jail sentence justifies a substantial punitive damages award’’). More

broadly, Wells Fargo’s misconduct in this case was customary and recidivist, and

Wells Fargo has cited no law for the proposition that there are some states in which

Wells Fargo’s conduct would have been legal. Accordingly, for purposes of notice,

we conclude that Wells Fargo was on sufficient notice that it may be subject to a

substantial punitive damages award in this state.

III. Post-Judgment Interest

47; Wells Fargo argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing

post-judgment interest on the punitive damages award from February 14, 2014 (the

date of the original judgment) rather than from the date of the district court’s order

on remand, on February 5, 2018. Because we are vacating and remanding the

punitive damages award, we need not necessarily decide this question. However, we

INO

do so hoping that this matter can be finally resolved on remand without further

4483 Wells Fargo contends that, under New Mexico law, if an appellate decision

“leaves open the possibility that the trial court, upon reconsideration, might not enter

anew damages award at all, then post-judgment interest only runs from entry of the

new damages award.” In Dollens I, this Court set aside the original punitive damages

award, allowing the district court to reconsider its punitive damages award entirely,

including whether or not to impose such damages. 2015-NMCA-096, § 41.

Accordingly, Wells Fargo contends, post-judgment interest should run from the date

of the district court’s new order: February 5, 2018. Plaintiffs disagree that this

Court’s opinion left open whether punitive damages should be imposed on remand;

Plaintiffs contend that we affirmed the availability of punitive damages for specific

claims, and that the district court understood that it was only modifying its judgment

accordingly. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend, post-judgment interest should run

from the date of the original judgment.

49} Our Supreme Court has provided as follows, with respect to post-judgment

interest:

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19

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[t]he basic rule is that when this Court reverses and effectively wipes
out all or a portion of a judgment, rendering it a nullity, and remands

20
21
22

for new findings and the award of damages through the exercise of
discretion, then interest accrues from the date of the new judgment; but
with a mere modification, interest accrues from the date of the original

judgment.

Ulibarri v. Gee, 1988-NMSC-093, 4 2, 107 N.M. 768, 764 P.2d 1326. In Gee, the

court distinguished remanding to modify an excessive award of attorney fees, which

only requires the district court to “reconsider]] facts_as originally found|[,]” from

circumstances such as those in Varney v. Taylor, 1969-NMSC-175, 81 N.M. 87, 463

P.2d 511, where the proper damages on remand could not be ascertained “without a

reconsideration of other evidence and new findings on issues not even considered

originally.” Gee, 1988-NMSC-093, 4 4. In Varney, our Supreme Court also observed

the rule that “if the opinion only requires a modification of the former judgment

(such as remittitur or additur), interest accrues at the date of the original judgment;

but if we have reversed the former judgment, insofar as damages are concerned, and

remanded for new findings and computation of the award, . . . then interest accrues

from the date of the new judgment.” 1969-NMSC-175, § 6.

60: In Ulibarri v. Homestake Mining Co., 1991-NMCA-078, 9§ 7-8, 112 N.M.

389, 815 P.2d 1179, this Court addressed these principles in the context of a case

that had initially been remanded for the correct apportionment of liability among the

defendants. On remand, the district court was required to hold a hearing, take

additional evidence concerning the correct apportionment of liability, and then

apportion the previously determined damages. /d. ¥ 7. Following the entry of

judgment on remand, there was a second appeal raising whether interest should run

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from the original judgment or the judgment on remand. We explained:

[ijf it can be said that, on remand, there was nothing for the trial court

to do but comply with the mandate, then the original order was merely
modified_and interest_accrues from the original order. If, however, the

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mandate contemplated further procedures below, . . . including the
consideration of evidence other than that considered at trial, and the
making of new findings, then the interest would accrue from the date

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of the judgment after remand.

Id. 46. Because, in that case, the district court had been required to undertake further

proceedings and to enter appropriate findings in support of its order, we held that

post-judgment interest would run from the second judgment, not the original

judgement. /d. {¥ 8-9.

513 Although this case has some distinguishing characteristics, we think our

precedents require that post-judgment interest should, as a matter of law, run from

the date of the second judgment. In Dollens I, we set aside the district court’s award

of attorney fees. 2015-NMCA-096, § 45. We held that Wells Fargo must be given

the opportunity to contest the reasonableness of the attorney fee affidavit through

further proceedings, noting that Plaintiffs’ uncontested attorney fee affidavit had

largely “formed the basis for the punitive damage[s] award.” /d. J] 24, 45. We did

not address whether attorney fees under the UPA could be treated as compensatory

damages for purposes of applying the BMW ratio in post-trial review. /d. 4 24. We

also held that punitive damages were available for Plaintiffs’ breach of contract

claims concerning improper fees and the misapplication of mortgage payments, but

not for Plaintiffs’ other claims, and remanded for the district court to reconsider

INO

punitive damages “without reference to” the UPA and policy-based claims. /d.

substantive fairness. /d. § 42.

{523 We cannot say that these directives required “mere modification” of the

punitive damages award. See Gee, 1988-NMSC-093, ¢ 2. Rather, the district court

was required to (1) make additional findings (with respect to attorney fees), which it

may or may have considered as relevant to the punitive damages determination; (2)

disregard other factual findings concerning the insurance policy (with respect to

punitive damages); and (3) enter a new punitive damages award “through the

exercise of discretion.” See Dollens I, 2015-NMCA-096, 7 41, 45; see also Gee,

1988-NMSC-093, § 2. Although we anticipated that the district court would enter a

revised award of punitive damages, we left that determination wholly in the hands

of the district court, which is evident from the language of our opinion, Dollens J,

2015-NMCA-096, 9 41, 45 (affirming that punitive damages were “available” for

certain claims, and that the district court should make “any necessary reevaluation

of punitive damages’), and the district court’s order on remand, in which it stated

that its task was to determine “whether the [c]ourt should award punitive damages,

and if so, how much.” Given these additional findings and proceedings, see Ulibarri,

1991-NMCA-078, § 6, and because we gave the district court discretion with respect

—

10
11

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13

to the reevaluation of punitive damages on remand, we hold that post-judgment
interest runs from the district court’s order on remand: February 5, 2018.
CONCLUSION

{53}, We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.

(54 IT ISSO ORDERED.

LINDX-M. VANZI, Judge
WE CONCUR: .
ust;
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

waite H. ZAM@RA, Judge

April 6, 2020- Christopher J. Dollens v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. A-1-CA-37194

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