May 18, 2020- State of New Mexico v. James Tyrone Manning, No. A-1-CA-37616

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

fe)
6)

7
8)

id
11
12
13
14
15
16)
17
18)
19)
20
21

22

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication
with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly
in Odyssey.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
STATE OF NEW MEXICO Filed 5/18/2020 9:39 AM
Plaintiff-Appdlee Uh. ~fe4
Mark Reynolds
V. No. A-1-CA-37616
JAMES TYRONE MANNING,
Defendant- Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY

James W. Counts, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attomey General

Eran S. Sharon, Assistant Attomey General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BOGARDUS, J udge.

{1} Defendant James Tyrone Manning appeals from his convictions following a
jury tial of trafficking methamphetamine (by distribution), contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 30-31-20(A)(2)(c) (2006), and conspiracy to commit trfficking

methamphetamine (by distribution), contrary to Section 30-31-20(A)(2)(c) and

2
NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979). Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the	1
evidence supporting his convictions as well as the sentence enhancement for his drug	2
trafficking conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm but remand to the	3
district court to correct typographical errors in the judgment and sentence.	4
BACKGROUND	5
{2} 	Deputy Calib Bruce, an undercover narcotics agent with the Otero County	6
Sheriff’s Office, arranged a meeting with Defendant to buy methamphetamine from	7
him. On December 9, 2015, Deputy Bruce met Defendant at an Alamogordo gas	8
station to purchase methamphetamine. When Defendant arrived at the gas station,	9
he got into Deputy Bruce’s unmarked truck and handed him a plastic baggie with a	10
white crystal-like substance. Deputy Bruce gave Defendant $100 in exchange for the	11
drugs. After the exchange, Defendant got out of Deputy Bruce’s truck, walked over	12
to a black Dodge Charger, and got into the rear passenger seat. During the exchange,	13
Agent Chad Webb, a member of Deputy Bruce’s team, took photographs of	14
Defendant 	and 	the 	vehicle 	he 	entered 	after 	he 	sold 	Deputy 	Bruce 	the	15
methamphetamine.	16
{3} 	After the purchase, Deputy Bruce went back to the police station where he	17
reviewed Agent Webb’s photographs and identified Defendant. The substance that	18
Defendant sold Deputy Bruce tested positive for methamphetamine and had an	19
approximate weight of 1.26 grams.	20

3
{4} 	On December 16, 2015, Deputy Bruce sent a text message to Defendant to	1
purchase more methamphetamine. Deputy Bruce and Defendant exchanged multiple	2
text messages and at least one phone call to arrange the purchase. This time	3
Defendant 	arranged 	for 	his 	“girl” to 	meet 	Deputy Bruce to 	sell 	him more	4
methamphetamine. Deputy Bruce later identified Defendant’s “girl” from previous	5
narcotics investigations as Caresse Stanfill. When he arrived to meet Ms. Stanfill,	6
Deputy Bruce observed the same Dodge Charger in which he had previously seen	7
Defendant, parked at a gas pump. Ms. Stanfill got out of the Dodge Charger, got into	8
Deputy 	Bruce’s 	unmarked 	truck, 	and 	sold 	Deputy 	Bruce 	$50 	worth 	of	9
methamphetamine. The drugs Deputy Bruce purchased from Ms. Stanfill also tested	10
positive for methamphetamine and had an approximate weight of 0.37 grams.	11
Following the drug transaction with Ms. Stanfill, Defendant was arrested and	12
charged with trafficking a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit trafficking	13
a controlled substance.	14
{5} 	Defendant was convicted by a jury of trafficking methamphetamine and	15
conspiracy. The State then filed a supplemental criminal information and brief in	16
support seeking to enhance Defendant’s sentence to a first degree felony for	17
committing a second trafficking offense, pursuant to Section 30-31-20(B)(2). At	18
sentencing, 	based 	on 	Defendant’s 	previous 	conviction 	for 	possession 	of	19
methamphetamine with intent to distribute under NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-	20

4
22(A)(2)(a) (1990, amended 2011), the district court determined that this was	1
Defendant’s second trafficking conviction and enhanced his sentence from a second	2
degree felony to a first degree felony. Defendant was sentenced to nineteen years in	3
prison.	4
DISCUSSION	5
I. 	Substantial Evidence Supports Defendant’s Convictions	6
{6} 	Defendant argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence at trial to	7
prove, 	beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt, 	each 	element 	of 	the 	offenses 	charged.	8
Specifically, with regard to the trafficking by distribution charge, Defendant argues	9
that the evidence was insufficient because there was no physical evidence presented	10
to tie Defendant to the transaction. With regard to the conspiracy charge, Defendant	11
argues that because (1) Deputy Bruce did not observe any communication between	12
Ms. Stanfill and himself; (2) Deputy Bruce did not observe Defendant at the second	13
drug transaction; and (3) there was no physical evidence to tie him to the transaction,	14
his conspiracy conviction should be reversed.	15
A. 	Standard of Review	16
{7} 	“The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of	17
either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a	18
reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v.	19
Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52, 345 P.3d 1056 (internal quotation marks and	20

5
citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind	1
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. ¶ 53 (alteration, internal	2
quotation marks, and citation omitted). When reviewing for substantial evidence,	3
appellate courts “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict,	4
indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in	5
favor of the verdict.” Id. ¶ 52 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We	6
also disregard all evidence and inferences that support a different result. State v.	7
Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. “The question before the	8
reviewing court is not whether [it] would have had a reasonable doubt about guilt	9
but whether it would have been impermissibly unreasonable for a jury to have	10
concluded 	otherwise.” 	Montoya, 	2015-NMSC-010, 	¶ 	52 	(alterations, 	internal	11
quotation marks, and citation omitted). Lastly, we note that “[t]he jury instructions	12
become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be	13
measured.” State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 368 P.3d 409 (alteration, internal	14
quotation marks, and citation omitted).	15
B. 	Substantial Evidence Supported Defendant’s Conviction for Trafficking	16
Methamphetamine	17
{8} 	To 	establish 	Defendant’s 	guilt 	of 	trafficking 	methamphetamine 	by	18
distribution, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1)	19
“[D]efendant transferred or caused the transfer of methamphetamine to another”; (2)	20
“[D]efendant knew it was methamphetamine or believed it to be methamphetamine	21

6
or believed it to be some other drug or other substance the possession of which is	1
regulated or prohibited by law”; and (3) the events transpired in New Mexico on or	2
about December 9, 2015. See UJI 14-3110 NMRA.	3
{9} 	Deputy Bruce testified that he was working as an undercover narcotics agent	4
when 	he 	arranged 	a 	meeting 	with 	Defendant 	at 	a 	gas 	station 	to 	purchase	5
methamphetamine on December 9, 2015. When Defendant arrived at the gas station,	6
he got into Deputy Bruce’s unmarked truck and handed Deputy Bruce a plastic	7
baggie with a white, crystal-like substance. Deputy Bruce paid Defendant $100 for	8
the baggie. During this exchange, Deputy Bruce recorded the conversations with	9
Defendant and the State admitted the audio recording into evidence at trial.	10
Following the transaction, Deputy Bruce returned to the police station where he	11
identified Defendant in a photograph lineup. Agent Webb testified that he worked	12
on Deputy Bruce’s team during the December 9 exchange with Defendant and took	13
photographs of the vehicle and of Defendant. A forensic scientist, Cheryl Serena,	14
analyzed the drugs and testified that the white crystal-like substance that Defendant	15
sold Deputy Bruce tested positive for methamphetamine. Both the photographs and	16
laboratory report were published to the jury. Based on the foregoing, we conclude	17
that 	substantial 	evidence 	supported 	Defendant’s 	conviction 	for 	trafficking	18
methamphetamine.	19

7
C. 	Substantial Evidence Supported Defendant’s Conviction of Conspiracy	1
to Traffic Methamphetamine	2
{10} 	To 	establish 	that 	Defendant 	was 	guilty 	of 	conspiracy 	to 	traffic	3
methamphetamine, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1)	4
“[D]efendant and another person by words or acts agreed together to commit	5
trafficking a controlled substance by distribution”; (2) “[D]efendant and the other	6
person intended to commit trafficking a controlled substance by distribution”; and	7
(3) the events transpired in New Mexico on or about December 16, 2015. See UJI	8
14-2810 NMRA; State v. Hernandez, 1997-NMCA-006, ¶ 41, 122 N.M. 809, 932	9
P.2d 499 (“[T]he [s]tate ha[s] the burden to prove [the d]efendant agreed with	10
someone to commit the underlying offense and intended to commit the underlying	11
offense.”). We note that conspiracy is rarely proven by means of direct evidence;	12
thus, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction. See	13
State v. Johnston, 1982-NMCA-083, ¶ 13, 98 N.M. 92, 645 P.2d 448 (“The gist of	14
conspiracy is the agreement, and such agreements are rarely susceptible of direct	15
proof. Consequently, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conspiracy	16
conviction.”). Accordingly, we must determine “whether the circumstances, taken	17
together, show that [the d]efendant and another party united to accomplish an illegal	18
scheme.” State v. Zamora, 2005-NMCA-039, ¶ 25, 137 N.M. 301, 110 P.3d 517.	19
{11} 	The 	jury 	was 	presented 	evidence 	of 	the 	following 	circumstances:	20
Approximately a week after the first exchange, on December 16, 2015, Deputy	21

8
Bruce sent a text message to Defendant at the same phone number he had used to	1
reach Defendant in the past to purchase more methamphetamine. There were	2
multiple text messages and at least one phone call between Deputy Bruce and	3
Defendant regarding the purchase. 	Defendant told Deputy Bruce that he had	4
arranged for Ms. Stanfill to meet Deputy Bruce to sell him more methamphetamine.	5
When Deputy Bruce arrived at the gas station to meet Ms. Stanfill, he saw the same	6
Dodge Charger that Defendant got into after the drug exchange on December 9. Ms.	7
Stanfill got out of the Dodge Charger and into Deputy Bruce’s truck and sold $50	8
worth of methamphetamine to him. The State’s forensic scientist testified that the	9
drugs from this second transaction tested positive for methamphetamine. The jury	10
also received this laboratory report. The conversations between Deputy Bruce and	11
Defendant arranging the second transaction and the audio recording from the	12
transaction between Deputy Bruce and Ms. Stanfill were both published to the jury.	13
{12} 	Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that	14
Defendant and Ms. Stanfill were working together to sell methamphetamine. See	15
State v. Catt, 2019-NMCA-013, ¶ 45, 435 P.3d 1255 (relying on circumstantial	16
evidence to conclude that sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction	17
for 	conspiracy 	to 	commit 	trafficking 	methamphetamine). 	To 	the 	extent 	that	18
Defendant asserts that more compelling or unequivocal evidence should have been	19
required, we disagree. See State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5, 149 N.M. 185,	20

9
246 P.3d 1057 (“So long as a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable	1
doubt the essential facts required for a conviction, [appellate courts] will not upset a	2
jury's conclusions.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Therefore, we	3
conclude substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to	4
traffic methamphetamine.	5
II. 	Defendant’s Sentence Was Properly Enhanced	6
{13} 	Defendant asserts that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under	7
Section 30-31-20(B)(2). Defendant argues that because he was convicted under an	8
entirely different statute, it was improper for his sentence to be enhanced. Defendant	9
furthers argues that the enhancement of his sentence by the district court from a	10
second degree felony to a first degree felony violates his rights under the Eighth	11
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 13 of the New	12
Mexico Constitution.	13
{14} 	“The application and interpretation of law is subject to a de novo review.”	14
State v. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130. “In New	15
Mexico, the court’s sentencing authority is limited by statute [, and t]he [L]egislature	16
must give express authorization for a sentence to be imposed.” State v. Lacey, 2002-	17
NMCA-032, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 684, 41 P.3d 952 (citation omitted). When interpreting a	18
statute, we seek to give effect to the Legislature’s intent and do so by looking first	19
to the plain meaning of the statute’s language. State v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-012,	20

10
¶ 11, 146 N.M. 14, 206 P.3d 125. “[W]hen a statute contains clear and unambiguous	1
language, 	we 	will 	heed 	that 	language 	and 	refrain 	from 	further 	statutory	2
interpretation.” Id.	3
{15} 	In addressing Defendant’s first argument—that his sentence cannot be	4
enhanced because his prior conviction was under a different statute—the parties	5
focus their arguments on the applicability of State v. Garduno, 1979-NMSC-072, 93	6
N.M. 335, 600 P.2d 281. In Garduno, the defendant “was convicted of two counts	7
of trafficking . . . a controlled substance contrary to [Section] 30-31-20(A).”	8
Garduno, 1979-NMSC-072, ¶ 2. Based on his prior federal conviction for possession	9
with intent to distribute a controlled substance, contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1976),	10
the district court enhanced the defendant’s sentence for his violations of Section 30-	11
31-20(A), pursuant to Section 30-31-20(B)(2). Garduno, 1979-NMSC-072, ¶ 2. On	12
appeal, the defendant contended “that ‘second and subsequent offense’ mean[t] a	13
second or subsequent violation of [Section] 30-31-20, and that a federal offense	14
cannot be used to increase the penalty for the state offense.” Garduno, 1979-NMSC-	15
072, ¶ 5.	16
{16} 	Our Supreme Court was not persuaded, noting that the statute “merely refers	17
to ‘second and subsequent offenses’ ” and “does not specify that the prior offense	18
must have been committed in New Mexico or prosecuted under [the New Mexico	19
Controlled Substances] Act.” Id. Because “[t]he statutes proscribe the same acts and	20

11
require the same knowledge or intent” and “[t]he elements necessary to prove the	1
federal offense were the same as those required to prove the state charges[,]” our	2
Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he federal offense was a prior conviction for	3
purposes of the penalty provisions of . . . [Section] 30-31-20(B)(2).” Garduno, 1979-	4
NMSC-072, ¶¶ 6-7. Accordingly, our Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s	5
enhancement of the defendant’s sentence. Id. ¶ 8.	6
{17} 	Before we address Garduno’s applicability to this case, we take a moment to	7
comment on a discrepancy in the record proper and the parties’ arguments to this	8
Court. It is clear from the record that Defendant in this case was indicted, tried, and	9
convicted for the offense of trafficking by distribution, contrary to Section 30-31-	10
20(A)(2)(c). In its judgment and sentence, the district court correctly refers to	11
Defendant’s conviction as trafficking by distribution. However, the district court	12
cites Section 30-31-20(A)(3), which relates to trafficking by possession with intent	13
to 	distribute, 	when 	identifying 	the 	subsection 	under 	which 	Defendant 	was	14
convicted.1 Because it is clear that Defendant was convicted for trafficking by	15
distribution in this case, the district court on remand shall correct its judgment and	16
1 While not consequential to our review, we identified two other errors in the
judgment and sentence that should also be corrected on remand. First, the conspiracy
count is listed as being charged in Count 1 of the grand jury indictment. This should
be corrected to reflect that it was Count 2 of the grand jury indictment. Second, the
conspiracy count omits citation to the conspiracy statute. This should be corrected
to reflect that the conviction was also contrary to Section 30-28-2.

12
sentence to reflect that Defendant was convicted under Section 30-31-20(A)(2)(c).	1
Like the district court in its judgment and sentence, Defendant and the State also	2
premise their arguments in this appeal on a conviction under Section 30-31-	3
20(A)(3). The crimes of trafficking by distribution and trafficking by possession	4
with intent to distribute, however, require proof of different elements, making the	5
parties’ briefing unhelpful to our analysis. Compare UJI 14-3110 (identifying the	6
elements of trafficking by distribution), with UJI 14-3111 NMRA (identifying the	7
elements of trafficking by possession with intent to distribute).	8
{18} 	Turning back to the applicability of Garduno, we begin by setting forth the	9
elements required to convict Defendant for the crimes of trafficking by distribution,	10
contrary to Section 30-31-20(A)(2)(c), and possession with intent to distribute,	11
contrary to Section 30-31-22(A)(2)(a). To convict Defendant for trafficking by	12
distribution in this case, the State had to prove, in relevant part, the following	13
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) “[D]efendant transferred or caused the	14
transfer of methamphetamine to another”; and (2) “[D]efendant knew it was	15
methamphetamine or believed it to be methamphetamine or believed it to be some	16
drug or other substance the possession of which is regulated or prohibited by law.”	17
UJI 14-3110. In addition to those elements, the State also had to prove, beyond a	18
reasonable doubt, that Defendant acted intentionally when committing the crime.	19
UJI 14-141 NMRA. For Defendant’s prior conviction for possession with intent to	20

13
distribute methamphetamine, the state had to prove, in relevant part, the following	1
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) “[D]efendant had methamphetamine in his	2
possession”; (2) “[D]efendant knew it was methamphetamine or believed it to be	3
methamphetamine or believed it to be some drug or other substance the possession	4
of which is regulated or prohibited by law”; and (3) “[D]efendant intended to transfer	5
it to another.” UJI 14-3104 NMRA. Unlike the elements of the statutes at issue in	6
Garduno, we cannot say that the elements of the statutes involved in this case are	7
the same. However, as we explain next, these statutes proscribe the same acts	8
because they require the same knowledge and intent.	9
{19} 	Both 	Defendant’s 	conviction 	under 	Section 	30-31-20(A)(2)(c) 	and 	his	10
conviction under Section 30-31-22(A)(2)(a) (1990) required the State to prove that	11
Defendant knew or believed the substance that he intended to distribute was	12
methamphetamine or another drug or substance that is regulated or prohibited by	13
law. Both convictions also required the State to prove Defendant, with that	14
knowledge, intended to transfer the substance. The only difference between the	15
crimes was whether Defendant actually completed or caused the transfer of the	16
substance. On this basis, we conclude that Defendant’s prior conviction under	17
Section 30-31-22(A)(2)(a) (1990) was a prior offense for sentence enhancement	18
purposes under Section 30-31-20(B)(2). 	See Garduno, 1979-NMSC-072, ¶ 6.	19
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s enhancement of Defendant’s sentence.	20

14
{20} 	Nevertheless, even if Garduno was not applicable here, we would still	1
conclude that Defendant’s sentence enhancement was proper for the following	2
reasons. Section 30-31-20(B) makes it “unlawful for a person to intentionally	3
traffic.” Trafficking can be accomplished by manufacture, distribution, or possession	4
with intent to distribute. Section 30-31-20(A)(1)-(3). Under Section 30-31-20(B)(2),	5
a person’s second and subsequent offense for unlawfully trafficking results in a	6
sentence enhancement. Section 30-31-20(B)(2) does not require that the person’s	7
subsequent offense be of the same type of trafficking as their previous offense to	8
enhance that person’s sentence.	9
{21} 	As we explained in our memorandum opinion addressing Defendant’s appeal	10
in 	a 	different 	case, 	Defendant’s 	previous 	conviction 	under 	Section 	30-31-	11
22(A)(2)(a) (1990) required proof of the same elements as his conviction in that case	12
under Section 30-31-20(A)(3)(c). State v. Manning, No. A-1-CA-37615, memo. op.	13
¶ 28 	(N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020) (non-precedential). Therefore, applying	14
Garduno, we concluded that Defendant’s conviction under 30-31-22(A)(2)(a)	15
(1990) was a prior offense for the purposes of Section 30-31-20(B)(2). Manning,	16
No. A-1-CA-37615, memo. op. ¶ 28. Accordingly, we affirmed the district court’s	17
enhancement of Defendant’s sentence. Id.	18
{22} 	Because Section 30-31-20(B)(2) does not require the subsequent trafficking	19
offense to be of the same type of trafficking as the prior offense, we reach the same	20

15
conclusion here—Defendant’s conviction under Section 30-31-22(A)(2)(a) (1990)	1
is a prior offense for the purposes of Section 30-31-20(B)(2). Thus, we also affirm	2
the district court’s sentence enhancement in this case on this basis.2
3
{23} 	Next, we address Defendant’s argument that the internal enhancement of his	4
conviction from a second degree felony to a first degree felony violates his rights	5
under the Eight Amendment and Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico	6
Constitution to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. In New Mexico, our	7
Supreme Court has “(1) recognized that the length of a sentence is a legislative	8
prerogative, and (2) absent a compelling reason, the judiciary shall not impose its	9
own views concerning the appropriate punishment for crimes.” State v. Harris,	10
1984-NMCA-003, ¶ 50, 101 N.M. 12, 677 P.2d 625. Additionally, New Mexico case	11
law demonstrates that “it is an exceedingly rare case where a term of incarceration,	12
which has been authorized by the Legislature, will be found to be excessively long	13
or inherently cruel.” State v. Augustus, 1981-NMCA-118, ¶ 8, 97 N.M. 100, 637	14
2 In his briefing, Defendant notes that trial counsel attempted to distinguish
Garduno on notice grounds, specifically that he “was never put on notice that a
future trafficking conviction would result in a first-degree felony conviction.” It is
not clear whether Defendant is also arguing that we should distinguish Garduno on
those grounds in this appeal. To the extent that Defendant is making that argument,
we decline to address it because his argument is undeveloped and is not supported
by citation to authority. See State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031
(stating 	that 	appellate 	courts 	are 	under 	no 	obligation 	to 	review 	unclear 	or
undeveloped arguments); State v. Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60, 327 P.3d
1129 (“[A]ppellate courts will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support
of the issue and that, given no cited authority, we assume no such authority exists.”).

16
P.2d 50. Defendant was convicted of trafficking methamphetamine in the first	1
degree for a second offense. The sentence he received was twice as long as that of a	2
first offense because the judge imposed the lawful and statutorily mandated	3
sentence. A review of the legislative intent of New Mexico’s Controlled Substance	4
Act reveals the intent for repeat offenders to serve longer sentences than first time	5
offenders. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Defendant’s sentence enhancement	6
and resulting period of incarceration was cruel or unusual or a violation of his state	7
or federal constitutional rights.	8
CONCLUSION	9
{24} 	For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that substantial evidence	10
supported Defendant’s trafficking and conspiracy to traffic convictions and the	11
district court did not err in enhancing Defendant’s sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.	12
However, we remand to the district court to correct the errors in the judgment and	13
sentence that we have identified in this opinion.	14
{25} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	15
_____________________________	16
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	17

1
WE CONCUR:
2
Joue 4.Vargar
3
JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge
4 5
SHAMMARA M. MENDERSON, Judge
17