Natasha Joly v. Daryl Palmieri, Executive County Superintendent, Union County, 5/8/25 (#256-25)

256-25
OAL Dkt. No. 03000-25
Agency Dkt. No. 32-2/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Natasha Joly,
Petitioner,
v.
Daryl Palmieri, Executive County Superintendent,
Union County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) have
been reviewed. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that petitioner
has failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe
v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6. The Commissioner further concurs with
the ALJ that petitioner fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter. Respondent’s
motion to dismiss is granted, and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	May 8, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	May 9, 2025
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under
N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing
of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03000-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 32-2/35
NATASHA JOLY,
Petitioner,
v.
DARYL 	PALMIERI, 	EXECUTIVE 	COUNTY,
SUPERINTENDENT, UNION COUNTY,
Respondent.
______________________________________
Natasha Joly, petitioner, pro se
Luke D. Hertizel-Lagonikos, Deputy Attorney General for respondent Daryl
Palmieri, Executive County Superintendent, (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
General of New Jersey, attorney)
Record Closed: February 18, 2025 	Decided: February 19, 2025
BEFORE ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner Natasha Joly, (Joly/Petitioner) a member of the Berkeley Heights
Board of Education (BOE), requested Emergent relief on the appeal she took from the
decision of the respondent Daryl Palmieri Executive County Superintendent, for Union

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03000-25
2
County (Palmieri/County) to appoint, on January 27, 2025, a fellow BOE member, Gale
Bradford, as BOE President for 2025. Desiring a “quick resolution,” she sought emergent
relief requesting that the appointment of Bradford be set aside and that in her place,
Palmieri should appoint Joly’s choice for BOE President, in her words, the “more than
qualified” and fellow BOE member, Ms. Dipti Khanna.
Ms. Joly provided no Certified evidence nor authentic documents in support of her
application nor did she file a memorandum of law, outlining how she met all the standards
of Crowe v Degoia for emergent relief.
Respondent provided a Certification of Palmieri in and a brief in opposition to the
request for Emergent Relief. Furter, respondent requested a dismissal in lieu of filing an
answer. 	In addition to the papers filed by the parties, arguments on the motion for
emergent relief and respondent’s motion for dismissal were held before me at the Office
of Administrative Law on February 18, 2025, at which time the record closed. I now deny
petitioner’s request for expedited relief and grant the dismissal sought by respondent.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
All of the following contentions can accurately be described as uncontested or
beyond dispute.
As set forth in Joly’s Statement of Specific Allegations and Essential Supporting
facts, (Allegations) and echoed in the Certification of Palmieri, Gale Bradford was also
appointed President of the BOE by Palmieri in 2024, and for the identical reasons as in
2025. 	In each year the Board was unable to choose among them a BOE President, in
each case being split 4-4 on two candidates. 	In 2025, after the Board’s first regular
meeting for 2025 took place on January 7, 2025, and the Board once again deadlocked
and failed to choose a President, Palmieri, executing one of his required duties, this one
under N.J.S.A. 18A:15-1, on January 27, 2025, appointed from among the BOE members
a President, again being Gale Bradford. 	Palmieri Certification. paragraphs 4 and 5.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03000-25
3
Joly’s complaints were based entirely on her opinion of how Mr. Bradford
performed her duties as BOE President in 2024. She said she reported many examples
of 	Bradford’s 	conduct, 	again 	detailed 	in 	her 	allegations, 	to 	Palmieri 	in 	a 	phone
conversation with him on January 9, 2025. 	They included Bradford allegedly “signing a
contract with the NJSBA without review by the Board,” 	appointing herself (Bradford) to
eight of the nine standing committees of the board, sending incorrect information about
bills to the Press, allowing favored members who attend public hearings to comment more
than the three minute period allotted each person, and creating Ad Hoc Committees that
had the effect of bypassing the Standing Committees. 	Not only that, but Joly alleges
Bradford has “created chaos, lacks knowledge of Robert’s Rules, and is “robotic in her
demeanor.” Finally, Joly contrasted Bradford with her candidate, Ms. Khanna’s alleged
“right demeanor and analytical skills.”
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Regarding the standards of Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), Joly stated her
sought emergent relief on her claims because it was her understanding that the process
included, Palmieri might take up to 20 days just to respond to the petition of Appeal once
it was received (the Petition was filed February 3 and received by respondent on February
6), then the matter would be assigned to the OAL, a Judge assigned and the case would
then have to work its way through the system. 	Rather than enduring such delays, she
sought to address the standard one seeking emergent relief must meet. 	Regarding the
Requirement of showing irreparable harm unless emergent relief is granted, Joly admitted
it was not the case that she “will personally suffer irreparable harm” but rather that “Mrs.
Bradford is the wrong person to be President,” and “the sooner someone else [her
candidate] Mrs. Khanna is appointed the better. 	As to whether the legal rights she
claimed were settled, she candidly admitted not knowing what that means. She thought
she had a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, because all of her allegations could be
proved. 	As to balancing the equities of the parties, she alleged that eventually if Ms.
Bradford remains in office, the BOE is open to “potential liability and financial loss.”

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03000-25
4
As correctly stated in the respondent’s legal brief, irreparable harm, by definition
“must inherently be imminent, concrete non speculative and most occur in the near and
not distant future”. Subcarrier Commc’ns Inc. v Day, 299 N.J. 634, 638 (App Div. 1997).
As a corollary to that, [C]ourts should not intervene, unless the need for equitable relief is
clear, not remote or speculative.” Eccles v Peoples Bank 33 U.S. 426, 431 (1948).
Here, the alleged harm could hardly be more speculative and unclear. 	First Joly
admitted she wouldn’t personally suffer any harm. Her belief was that the residents could
face “potentially liability and financial loss.” 	This is pure speculation, even assuming
petitioner can assert the rights of the entire school district and certainly does not relate to
any definite time in the near future where only emergent relief would be adequate.
Moreover, Joly sought a “fairly quick resolution” as the appointment as Board President
is only a year which might make the regular process moot. 	That is more accurately a
request for an expedited hearing rather than an argument for emergent relief.
As to the whether the claimed legal right is well settled and the related standard of
likelihood to succeed on the merits, 	I must agree with respondent that the only right
involved in this controversy that is well settled is the respondent’s right to appoint a BOE
President because the BOE (for the second consecutive year) failed to agree upon a
President, requiring Palmieri to himself appoint a one from among the existing BOE
members. Joly’s claim amounts to, that because in her opinion Bradford performed poorly
last year in the position, a disgruntled or disappointed member who supported another
candidate should be allowed to substitute and effectively usurp the powers and duties of
the Executive Superintendent are not supported by any law cited by Joly, and it is highly
unlikely there is any legal support for that untenable legal position. 	Thus, Joly’s settled
law to the extent it exists, supports respondent and with what was presented to the Court,
it is far more likely that respondent, not Joly, would succeed on the merits. 	Finally, in
balancing the equities, Board business cannot be properly conducted in the absence of
a Board President. 	Weighing the purely speculative “harm” if emergent relief were not
granted to Joly, against the district’s need to have a President in place to conduct the
regular business of the schools under the BOE’s purview, the equities are with the
respondent.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03000-25
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Thus, although the moving party must meet all the Crowe standards, in this case,
petitioner has met none. Accordingly, her motion for Emergent Relief must be denied.
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of filing an answer to the appeal.
This procedure is permitted per N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10.
I agree with respondent’s description that the petitioner’s challenge was based on
her belief that her candidate, BOE member Khanna, would make a better BOE President
than Bradford, the one the respondent chose. However, her preference and judgement
for choosing the BOE President aside from violating the Board’s right to, ordinarily,
choose their President by a vote of the Board, is not based on solid evidence and certainly
not on any law cited. 	In fact, not only did Joly not cite or allege any violation of law
committed by Palmieri, but in fact she admitted during argument that Palmieri did nothing
illegal but rather stated “I admit he had the legal right to do what he did.” Any notion that
despite the appropriate official following the law by appointing the President when the
BOE failed to do so, it would be better that the public official only chooses someone based
on Joly’s preference, has no basis in the law.
Here the motion to dismiss is based on the “legal sufficiency of the facts alleged
on the face of the complaint.” Dimitrakopoulos v Borrus, Goldin, Foley Vignuolo, Hyman
and Stahl, P.C. 237 N.J. 91 107 (2019). 	The Complaint can be dismissed for failing to
state a claim by failing to “articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief. Sickles v Cabor
Corp, 379 NJ Super 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005)
Petitioner’s disagreements with the Superintendent’s choice for BOE as stated on
the face of her complaint were based entirely on her judgement of the alleged past
performance of that person are not cognizable as lawful claims as respondent clearly and
fulfilled his statutory duties. 	Therefore, the respondent is entitled to dismissal as the
petitioner does not state a claim for which relief may be granted. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10; See
also Rule 4:6-2 (e) Accordingly the said complaint is now dismissed.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03000-25
6
ORDER
Based on all the foregoing, I CONCLUDE that the request for emergent relief fails
to meet any of the prongs of the Crowe v DeGioia test. 	Accordingly, I ORDER that
petitioner's request for emergent relief be and is hereby DENIED.
Also, based on all the foregoing I further CONCLUDE that the petition fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted and I further ORDER that for the aforesaid
reasons, the Complaint be and is dismissed.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 03000-25
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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed 	to 	the 	parties, 	any 	party 	may 	file 	written 	exceptions 	with 	the 	ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed
by email to ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of
Controversies and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton,
New Jersey 08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the
other parties.
February 19, 2025
DATE 	ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	2/19/25
Date Mailed to Parties: 	2/19/25
Emb/id