Board of Education of the Borough of Wood-Ridge, Bergen County v. Board of Education of the Borough of Bogota, Joseph Zarra, Interim Executive County Superintendent and L.B., on behalf of minor child, M.B., 12/21/20, (#290-20)

290-20
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Borough of Wood-Ridge,
Bergen County,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of Bogota,
Bergen County; Joseph Zarra, Interim Executive
County Superintendent; and L.B., on behalf of M.B.,
Respondents.
Synopsis
Petitioner, the Board of Education of the Borough of Wood-Ridge (Wood-Ridge), appealed the determination of
the respondents, the Board of Education of the Borough of Bogota (Bogota) and Joseph Zarra, Interim Executive
County Superintendent (Zarra), that L.B. and her minor child are homeless, and therefore Wood-Ridge is the
district responsible for providing a free public education for M.B. Wood-Ridge contended that M.B. and L.B.
were domiciled in Bogota as of December 2017, making Bogota the district responsible for the cost of M.B.’s
education. Bogota filed a request for reimbursement in the amount of $29,375.95 for cost of M.B.’s education.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: the inquiry here is which district – Wood-Ridge or Bogota – must bear the cost
of M.B.’s education pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.8; 	L.B. established a permanent residence in Bogota when
she moved in with her sister-in-law in December 2017; 	L.B.’s intent to make Bogota her domicile was
evidenced by her actions in withdrawing M.B. from Wood-Ridge and transferring him to Bogota schools,
planning to sign the lease on the property, cleaning and painting the home, and changing her driver’s license to
reflect the Bogota address; however, L.B. was forced to leave the Bogota house in February 2018 because of
mold in the basement, which had sickened her son; 	a subsequent falling out with her sister-in-law made it
impossible to move back to the home; L.B. subsequently lived in hotels or with friends until February 2019,
when she signed a lease in Hackettstown. The ALJ concluded that, while a homeless child may be “deemed”
domiciled after living in a district for one year under N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(d), L.B.’s domicile was established by
her intent at the time she moved into the Bogota house. Accordingly, the ALJ reversed Zarra’s homelessness
determination, denied Bogota’s request for reimbursement of M.B.’s education costs, and determined that
Bogota would remain financially responsible for the cost of M.B.’s education until L.B. established a new
domicile outside the district.
Upon review, the Commissioner found the respondents’ exceptions to be without merit and concurred with the
ALJ that L.B. became domiciled in Bogota when the family moved in with L.B.’s sister-in-law in
December 2017 and was no longer homeless; therefore, Bogota became the district responsible for the cost of
M.B.’s education in December 2017. 	In making her determination, the Commissioner noted, inter alia, that
when a child’s dwelling becomes fixed, regular and adequate, domicile attaches immediately. Further,
homelessness determinations require a fact-specific analysis that includes the intentions of the parents
or guardians. 	M. O’K. v. Board of Education of the Borough of Cresskill, et al, Commissioner Decision
No. 325-14, decided August 12, 2014 at 3, aff’d, A-0828-14T4 (App. Div. Sept. 8, 2016). 	Accordingly, the
Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted as the final decision in this matter.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has
been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
December 21, 2020

1
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 16570-18
Agency Dkt. No. 207-8/18
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Borough of Wood-
Ridge, Bergen County,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of Bogota,
Bergen 	County; 	Joseph 	Zarra, 	Interim
Executive County Superintendent; and L.B., on
behalf of minor child, M.B.,
Respondents.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed by respondent Bogota Board of
Education (Bogota) and respondent Joseph Zarra, Interim Executive County Superintendent
(Zarra), pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the replies thereto filed by petitioner Wood-Ridge
Board of Education (Wood-Ridge).
This matter involves a homelessness determination regarding L.B. and her minor
child, M.B. L.B. was domiciled in Wood-Ridge with her mother until November 2016, when the
home was sold following her mother’s death. Thereafter, L.B. stayed with friends and at hotels
until December 2017, when she moved into her sister-in-law’s Section 8 home in Bogota. L.B.
and M.B. each had their own room in the four-bedroom house, and they shared a private
bathroom upstairs. L.B. cleaned and painted the home’s interior prior to moving in and changed
her driver’s license to reflect her new address. 	L.B. testified that her goal was to provide

2
stability for her son and she hoped that it would be a “permanent, semi-permanent situation” so
that he could finish 8th grade and have four consecutive years of high school. 	(Testimony of
L.B., T37-38, 45).1 L.B.’s sister-in-law advised that she would be added to the lease in
January 2018. 	Accordingly, L.B. signed a Student Transfer Card to remove M.B. from Wood-
Ridge and enrolled him in Bogota schools.2
A few weeks after moving in, L.B. learned that her sister-in-law was not upfront
about the lease, and that the Section 8 landlord would not add L.B. to the lease until March 2018,
when it was up for renewal. 	However, around February 2018, M.B. became sick from mold in
the basement, causing the family to vacate the home so that the problem could be remediated.
Due to disagreements with her sister-in-law, L.B. never returned to the Bogota home except to
retrieve her belongings. 	The family again lived in hotels or with friends until February 2019,
when L.B. signed a lease in Hackettstown.
The issue in this matter is whether the family established a domicile when they
moved into the Bogota home in December 2017, or whether they remained homeless from the
time they moved out of the Wood-Ridge home in November 2016 until they became domiciled
in Hackettstown. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine which district must bear the cost of
M.B.’s education, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.8. 	If the family was homeless the whole time,
Wood-Ridge would be responsible for the cost of M.B.’s education from 2016 until the family
established a domicile in Hackettstown; but, if L.B. had in fact established a domicile in Bogota,
then Bogota would take over responsibility for the cost of M.B.’s education beginning in
December 2017.
1 This citation refers to a transcript of a hearing held before the OAL on February 4, 2020.
2 M.B. attended an out-of-district placement in Ridgefield while enrolled at Wood-Ridge. He continued
to attend that placement while enrolled at Bogota until March 2018, when Bogota transferred him to the
Windsor Learning Academy.

3
Following Bogota’s request for a homelessness determination, Zarra issued a
letter on July 26, 2018 finding that “the family had not established permanent residence in
Bogota” because they had not resided in any town for at least one year. 	(Zarra letter,
July 26, 2018). 	Accordingly, “[a]s the family has not met the one-year threshold, financial
responsibility is still attached to the last district of residence, Wood-Ridge.” 	Id. 	Wood-Ridge
appealed that determination and Bogota filed a counterclaim for $29,375.95 in education costs.
Following a hearing on the merits that included the testimony of L.B., Zarra, and
a representative from each district, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that L.B.
established a permanent residence in Bogota when she moved in with her sister-in-law because
she intended to make the house her permanent home. Specifically, the ALJ explained that L.B.
transferred M.B. to Bogota’s schools, intended to sign the lease, cleaned and painted the home,
and changed her driver’s license to reflect the Bogota address. 	The ALJ further noted that but
for the mold and subsequent falling out with her sister-in-law, L.B. intended to provide a fixed,
permanent home for her son to graduate from high school in four years. While a homeless child
may be “deemed” domiciled after living in a district for one year under N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(d), the
ALJ found that L.B.’s domicile was established by her intent at the time she moved into the
Bogota home. 	Accordingly, the ALJ reversed Zarra’s homelessness determination, denied
Bogota’s request for reimbursement of M.B.’s education costs, and determined that Bogota
would remain financially responsible for the cost of M.B.’s education until a new domicile is
established outside the district.
In its exceptions, Bogota argues that the ALJ erred in considering L.B.’s intent.
According to Bogota, the ALJ quoted an outdated version of the regulation that defines domicile
for student residency – N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a)(1) – when he said that a student’s domicile is the

4
school district where the student’s parent or guardian has a permanent home, such that “the
parent or guardian intends to return to it when absent and has no present intent of moving from
it.” Bogota points out that N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a)(1) now provides that “a student is domiciled in
the school district when he or she is the child of a parent or guardian whose domicile is located
within the district,” without any reference to intent. 	Moreover, Bogota contends that the ALJ
failed to address case law governing homelessness, specifically Board of Education of the
Township of Egg Harbor v. Board of Education of the Mainland Regional High School District,
EDU 6680-09, Initial Decision (October 15, 2010), adopted by Commissioner’s Decision No.
555-10, decided December 30, 2010, which Bogota contends stands for the proposition that
traditional elements of domicile do not apply to homeless families, and they instead become
domiciled after one year residing in a district. 	Citing Egg Harbor, Bogota explains that
homeless families have limited choices in where to live, so their “actual intentions, as opposed to
their viable choices, must be reconciled”; 	as such, determining tuition based solely on intent is
“arbitrary and unworkable.” Id. Finally, Bogota raises a slew of minor errors it contends the ALJ
made, such as typographical mistakes, that demonstrate the ALJ misunderstands the facts and
law at issue. 	Accordingly, Bogota requests that the Commissioner reject the Initial Decision,
reinstate Zarra’s homelessness determination, and order Wood-Ridge to reimburse Bogota for
the cost of M.B.’s education in the amount of $29,375.95.
Similarly, in his exceptions, Zarra argues that the ALJ erred in determining that
M.B. was no longer homeless when the family moved to the Bogota property for a matter of
weeks. 	Zarra also cites Egg Harbor, arguing that the ALJ incorrectly relied on L.B.’s intent to
make the Bogota home her permanent residence because the intent of a homeless family is not
dispositive in determining homelessness. 	Zarra contends that when L.B. moved in with her

5
sister-in-law, M.B. was still homeless in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2(a)(3) because they
were staying with family, and despite L.B.’s intention to remain permanently, she only stayed
there a period of weeks. 	Zarra maintains that as L.B. did not live at the Bogota residence for a
year, she was not deemed domiciled in Bogota. 	As such, Zarra contends that his homelessness
determination was correct and the ALJ erred in finding that financial responsibility for the cost
of M.B.’s education switched to Bogota.
In reply, Wood-Ridge argues that the ALJ correctly found that it does not take a
year to establish a domicile, and the one-year threshold only applies when a permanent residence
has not been established. 	Wood-Ridge further contends that intent is the decisive factor in
establishing domicile and the ALJ properly found that L.B. intended to make the Bogota
residence her permanent home. 	While Bogota and Zarra rely on Egg Harbor, supra, Wood-
Ridge maintains that it was only an Initial Decision rather than a Final Agency Decision, and
nevertheless was superseded by the Commissioner in State-Operated School District of the City
of Camden v. C. Ann Volk, Executive County Superintendent, et al, Commissioner’s Decision
No. 106-16, decided March 18, 2016, in which the Commissioner found that the intentions of the
parents are relevant in homelessness determinations. Accordingly, Wood-Ridge urges the
Commissioner to adopt the Initial Decision in its entirety.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ’s conclusions that L.B.
became domiciled in Bogota when she moved in with her sister-in-law because she intended to
make it her permanent home; her actions in connection with the move further demonstrate those
intentions; and the living arrangement was fixed, regular and adequate. 	Accordingly, Bogota
became financially responsible for the cost of M.B.’s education from December 2017 until the
family establishes a new domicile outside the district.

6
In matters such as this, the threshold inquiry is whether the child is considered
homeless. 	Under the McKinney-Vento Act, homeless children are defined as “individuals who
lack a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence,” which includes “children sharing
housing with other persons due to loss of their own housing, economic hardship, or a similar
reason.” 	42 U.S.C.A. § 11434a. 	Similarly, under state law, homeless children are defined as
“child[ren] 	or 	youth 	who 	lack[] 	a 	fixed, 	regular 	and 	adequate 	residence 	pursuant 	to
N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12 and N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2,” which includes children living in the “residence of
relatives or friends where the homeless child resides out of necessity because his or her family
lacks a regular or permanent residence of its own.” 	N.J.A.C. 6A:17-1.2 and 2.2 (emphasis
added). 	When a child’s dwelling becomes fixed, regular and adequate, domicile attaches
immediately. Egg Harbor, supra, Commissioner’s Decision No. 555-10 at 4.
Thus, conducting a homelessness evaluation to determine whether a child’s home
is considered fixed, regular and adequate requires a fact-specific analysis and “cannot rest upon a
simple calculation of the amount of time that children have spent in a particular location or
municipality.” M. O’K. v. Board of Education of the Borough of Cresskill, et al, Commissioner
Decision 	No. 	325-14, 	decided 	August 	12, 	2014 	at 	3, 	aff’d, 	A-0828-14T4 	(App. 	Div.
Sept. 8, 2016). 	In conducting such a fact-specific inquiry, the Commissioner must consider the
totality of the circumstances, such as “[t]he reasons for the children’s homelessness, their living
conditions, and the resources and intentions of the parents or custodians are relevant.” Ibid.
Once it is determined whether a child is homeless, the question becomes which
district is financially responsible for the child’s education. Ordinarily, a student is eligible for a
free public education in a school district if he or she is domiciled within the school district.
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(a); N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a). A student’s domicile is determined by the domicile

7
of his or her parents. 	N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a)(1). 	When a child becomes homeless, the school
district of residence – i.e., the school district in which the child resided before becoming
homeless – remains responsible for the cost of the child’s education, including when the child is
temporarily living and attending school in another school district. 	N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.3; N.J.S.A.
18A:7B-12. However, when a homeless child lives in a school district for one year or longer –
and a new domicile has not been established – the child is “deemed domiciled” in that district for
the purposes of determining which district is responsible for the cost of the child’s education.
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(d); N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.3(c).
Here, the Commissioner finds that L.B. became domiciled in the Bogota home
upon moving in and was therefore no longer homeless. 	Not only did L.B. testify that she
intended to make the Bogota home a “permanent, semi-permanent situation” so that M.B. could
finish 8 th grade and have four consecutive years of high school, but her actions also confirmed
her intent to make the home her permanent residence. 	She cleaned and painted the home,
switched her son’s school district to Bogota, and changed the address on her driver’s license to
reflect her new address. She also intended to be added to the lease, as her sister-in-law told her
that she would be added in January 2018. 	Additionally, the living arrangements support a
finding that the home was a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence. 	The home
consisted of four bedrooms, so L.B. and M.B. each had their own bedroom and shared a private
bathroom. 	While they were residing in the home of a family member, it was not solely out of
necessity; 	L.B. made the decision to move into that home as a permanent residence to provide
long-term stability for her son. 	Accordingly, as domicile attaches immediately when a child’s
dwelling becomes fixed, regular and adequate, the Bogota home became M.B.’s domicile in
December 2017. 	The unfortunate events that occurred following that time, which ultimately

8
resulted in the family becoming homeless again, do not change the fact that they had already
established a domicile in the Bogota home. As such, Bogota became responsible for the cost of
M.B.’s education beginning in December 2017.
The Commissioner does not find the exceptions filed by Bogota and Zarra to be
persuasive. 	Bogota argues that N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a)(1) removed the reference to intent from
the regulation that defines domicile for student residency matters, which demonstrates that intent
is not a relevant consideration. 	While N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a)(1) previously provided that a
student’s domicile is the school district where the student’s parent or guardian has a permanent
home, such that “the parent or guardian intends to return to it when absent and has no present
intent of moving from it,” it now states that “a student is domiciled in the school district when he
or she is the child of a parent or guardian whose domicile is located within the district.” 	The
Commissioner notes that when the rule was amended in 2013, the Rule Proposal explained why
the word “permanent home” was changed to “domicile” and why the definition of permanent
home (indicating an intent to return and no present intent of moving from) was removed.
45 N.J.R. 1209(a) (May 20, 2013). 	“Domicile is a legal term of art that encompasses the term
‘permanent home’ and is more appropriate[.]” 	Ibid. 	The Rule Adoption further explained that
“[t]he definition of ‘domicile’ does not need to be included in the chapter as it is a term of art and
is well defined in case law.” 45 N.J.R. 2551(a) (December 16, 2013). As the term “domicile” is
widely known to rely on an individual’s intent, it is relevant in the student residency context as
well. 	Moreover, the Commissioner has previously found that the intentions of the parents are
also relevant in conducting a homelessness determination. M. O’K., supra, at 3; see also Volk,
supra, Commissioner’s Decision No. 106-16 (remanding a homelessness matter because a

9
“comprehensive, 	fact-specific 	examination 	of 	the 	family’s 	circumstances” 	is 	required 	to
determine whether the child is homeless).
The Commissioner further disagrees with Bogota and Zarra that a “one-year rule”
replaces the traditional elements of domicile for homeless students. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(d)
provides: “Any person whose parent or guardian, even though not domiciled within the district,
is residing temporarily therein, but any person who has had or shall have his all-year-round
dwelling place within the district for one year or longer shall be deemed to be domiciled within
the district for the purposes of this section.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, while a homeless
child may be deemed domiciled in a district after residing in that school district temporarily for
one year or longer, the family may establish domicile prior to one year. As such, the “one-year
rule” will only deem a homeless child to be domiciled within a school district if he or she has not
already established a domicile.
Finally, 	the 	Commissioner 	disagrees 	with 	Bogota 	and 	Zarra 	that 	the
Initial Decision in Egg Harbor, supra, is controlling. The Initial Decision notes that in analyzing
the circumstances of homeless families, “their actual intentions, as opposed to their viable
choices, must be reconciled,” and, as homeless families may live in places for short times, tuition
cannot be allocated solely on intent. 	Id. 	However, the Commissioner’s Decision makes no
reference to any limitation on intent in a homelessness determination, and instead states that
“domicile attaches immediately if a student’s dwelling is found to be fixed, regular and
adequate.” 	Egg Harbor, supra, Commissioner’s Decision No. 555-10, at 4. 	Furthermore,
subsequent to Egg Harbor, the Commissioner has made clear that homelessness determinations
require a fact-specific analysis that includes the intentions of the parents or guardians. M. O’K.,
supra; Volk, supra, Commissioner’s Decision No. 106-16; State-Operated School District of the

10
City of Camden v. C. Ann Volk, Executive County Superintendent, et al, Commissioner’s
Decision No. 172-17R, decided June 20, 2017; J.G., on behalf of minor children, T.G. and C.G.
v. Board of Education of the Township of Edison, et al, Commissioner’s Decision No. 125-20,
decided June 15, 2020.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted. 	Bogota is directed to
assume the financial responsibility for M.B.’s education from December 2017 until M.B. is
domiciled outside of Bogota. 	Bogota’s counterclaim for reimbursement of M.B.’s education
costs is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	December 21, 2020
Date of Mailing: 	December 24, 2020
3 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008,
c. 36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).

1
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT NO. EDU 16570-18
AGENCY REF. NO. 201-8/18
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
BOROUGH OF WOOD-RIDGE,
Petitioners,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
BOROUGH OF BOGOTA, BERGEN
COUNTY, JOSEPH ZARRA, INTERIM
EXECUTIVE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT
and L.B. o/b/o M.B.,
Respondents.
________________________________
Daniel L. Roberts, Esq., for petitioner (Kenney, Gross, Kovats & Parton,
attorneys)
Alyssa K. Weinstein, Esq., for respondent Borough of Bogota (Scarinci
Hollenbeck, attorneys)
Michael Czarnecki, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent Joseph Zarra,
Executive County Superintendent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General for
New Jersey, attorneys)
L.B., on behalf of M.B., appearing Pro Se.

2
Record Closed: May 27, 2020 	Decided: August 5, 2020
BEFORE ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner the Borough of Wood-Ridge Board of Education (Wood-Ridge or
petitioner) claims that respondent, Borough of Bogota Board of Education (Bogota or
respondent) was responsible for providing a free public education to M.B., the child of
L.B. beginning December 5, 2017. Wood-Ridge claims M.B. and L.B. were domiciled in
Bogota as of that date.
Respondents 	Bogota, 	Joseph 	Zarra, 	the 	Interim 	Executive 	County
Superintendent of Schools, (County Superintendent/Zarra) who made the decision that
Wood-Ridge is responsible for M.B.’s public education, and L.B., the mother of M.B. all
claim that because L.B. and M.B. never lived in Bogota at a permanent address for
more than 12 months before attending public school in Bogota, that Wood-Ridge, where
M.B. was educated since 2009, and where they last had a fixed addressed, remained
responsible for M.B.’s public education, even after they moved to Bogota. 	Accordingly,
they seek reimbursement of $29,275.95 plus interest plus an order compelling petitioner
to assume financial responsibility for a December 2019 out of district School invoice for
retroactive tuition for M.B. and for any additional tuition charged by any entity providing
education to M.B. during M.B.’s and L.B.’s alleged homelessness.
Because of the reasons that follow, I have determined that the Bogota Board of
Education 	is 	the 	financially 	responsible 	district, 	and 	reverse 	the 	Superintendent’s
decision, and order that all of M.B.’s public education costs as of December 5, 2017 is
Bogota’s.

3
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For approximately a year prior to December 5, 2017, L.B. and M.B. had moved
from place to place, including at least twice residing outside Wood-Ridge, after L.B.’s
mother house in Wood-Ridge was sold in November 2016. 	M.B. had been publicly
educated in Wood-Ridge since 2009. 	However, on December 5, 2017, L.B. signed a
student Transfer Card (J-6) stating that M.B.’s last day at Wood-Ridge elementary
school was December 5, 2017. 	On December 12, 2017, Bogota Public Schools
registered M.B. as a student of the Bogota School system. 	Student Registration Form
(J-9). 	L.B. signed the form which contained her new address in Bogota. 	The form
noted that also living at the home in Bogota with M.B.’s aunt. Attached to the form was
L.B.’s driver’s license showing L.B.’s address to be the same as the address as
described on the Student Registration Form.
On June 1, 2018, Jill Connolly, the Supervisor of Pupil Education for Bogota
wrote a letter to Superintendent Zarra “to determine the district of origin” of M.B. (J-12).
The letter noted that although L.B. reported that she resided in Bogota with her sister, at
her sister’s house and that she was cosigning the lease, Ms. Connolly was not satisfied
that 	M.B. 	and 	L.B. 	were 	not 	still 	homeless. 	Ms. 	Connolly’s 	letter 	informed 	the
Superintendent that it was her understanding that the last “permanent address” of L.B.
and M.B. was a house in Wood-Ridge which was sold in November 2016, after L.B.’s
mother died. 	The letter further stated that L.B. and M.B. had to vacate their home
leased by her sister in March 2018 after the discovery of mold. However, L.B. informed
Ms. Connolly that although temporarily displaced from their Bogota home, she intended
to move back once the mold was remediated or move to another home in Bogota.
However, a month later L.B. reported to Ms. Connolly that she had not located another

4
residence in Bogota, that she was not returning to the Bogota home belonging to her
sister because of a family conflict and was temporarily staying at a motel in Whippany.
On July 26, 2018, County Superintendent Zarra wrote a letter (J-18) to the
Bogota Superintendent of Public Schools that he determined M.B. was a “homeless
child”, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A-17-2.2. in that he lacked a “fixed regular and adequate
nighttime residence” pursuant to said regulation and to N.J.S.A. 18A-78.12, because
since November 2016, when they had their last permanent residence in Bogota, M.B.
and L.B. had not lived in any other district for the “required “12 months or more” (citing
N.J.S.A. 	18A-38-1(d).) 	Accordingly, 	in 	his 	determination, 	Wood-Ridge 	remained
financially responsible for M.B.’s public education.
On 	August 9, 2018, Damian Kennedy Superintendent of Schools for Bogota
wrote 	a 	letter 	(J-19) 	to 	his 	counterpart 	Superintendent 	Cipriano 	of Wood-Ridge
informing him 	of Superintendent Zarra’s determination, and attaching Superintendent
Zarra’s 	letter 	and 	further 	advised 	that 	although 	Wood-Ridge 	was 	appealing 	that
decision, Wood- Ridge was responsible for monies expended by Bogota as of that date
for M.B.’s public education, in the amount of $29,375.95. and that Wood-Ridge remains
financially responsible for M.B.’s continued placement and program. 	This appeal
ensued by an Amended Petition of Appeal by Wood-Ridge, filed on or about September
1, 2018.
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
At the hearing, Wood-Ridge offered testimony of Silvia Ragueso, the Director of
Student special Services and L.B., the mother of M.B. 	Bogota offered the testimony of
County Executive Superintendent Zarra, and Jill Connolly, the supervisor of People
Personal Services for the Bogota BOE.

5
Preliminarily, all of the facts as recounted in the Procedural history were either
not contested or are not disputed. 	Further, based upon a review of the testimony and
the 	documentary 	evidence 	presented, 	and 	having 	an 	opportunity 	to 	observe 	the
demeanor of the witnesses and assess their credibility, I find the following additional
FACTS to have been established as set forth below.
M.B. 	and 	his 	mother 	L.B. 	had 	been 	unsettled 	in 	any 	one 	domicile 	for
approximately a year commencing when L.B.’s mother’s home was sold in November
2016, following L.B.’s mother’s death. 	At times, the mother and child stayed in some
places 	outside the district, 	such 	as 	North Arlington 	and 	Hackensack, 	while 	M.B.
continued to attend Wood-Ridge, and while L.B. continued to have contact with Wood-
Ridge schools, including advising them of her whereabouts. 	In early December 2017,
Ms. Ragueso learned of a bus location transfer pending for M.B. 	Ms. Ragueso
contacted L.B. by phone and L.B. advised Ms. Ragueso that she and M.B. were moving
to her sister or sister in law’s4 house in Bogota. 	Although L.B. was questioned if she
had a lease, L.N. advised Ms. Ragueso that she would be living with her sister who had
lived in this four-bedroom home for several years, and that L.B. would be added to the
lease the following month, in January 2019. 	She also provided Ms. Ragueso a copy of
her current driver’s license which used her sister’s address in Bogota as L.B.’s address.
Ms. 	Ragueso 	testified 	that 	L.B. 	was 	excited 	that 	she 	had found 	a 	stable 	home
environment for her and M.B. after a period of effective homelessness. She detailed the
new living conditions where 	she and L.B. 	would 	have 	their 	own 	bedrooms, and
bathroom, that she would pay rent to her sister until she was added to the lease, and
that she also intended to help her sister, who had some disabilities, with needed
transportation at times. 	Following this interaction with Ms. Ragueso, L.B. signed the
aforementioned 	Student 	Transfer 	Card, 	containing 	the 	new 	Bogota 	address. 	As
memorialized in a letter Ms. Ragueso wrote to County Executive Superintendent Zarra,
L.B. told Ms. Ragueso that “she was excited to be back on her feet again and to finally
have a permanent place to live…” 	She felt she had done her due diligence in making
4 As with many relations, it appears L.B. referred to her relative in Bogota, at times as her sister, when in fact she
was her sister in law. She also described her sister in law as M.B.’s “aunt.” For brevity, this relative is referred to
herein as “sister” to L.B. or as M.B.’s aunt.

6
sure the new address with her sister was not a temporary arrangement but intended to
be permanent. 	However, once L.B. signed M.B. out the school district of Wood Ridge,
she never asked L.B. to provide a copy of the lease as it was not required nor their
procedure.
L.B. testified that she had decided to live with her sister when her sister asked
her to move there in November 2017. L.B.’s sister had a four-bedroom home in Bogotá
that was Section 8 qualified and L.B.’s moving there would help her keep her Section 8
status. At the same time, the move to Bogota would provide L.B. with an affordable rent
and, in her words “stability for my son.” In addition to rent, she had also agreed to help
her 	sister 	with 	her 	disabilities, 	by 	example 	providing 	transportation 	for 	doctor’s
appointments. L.B. arranged for her mail to be sent to the house in Bogota. 	Further,
she paid for several improvements to the home before moving in such as some
“updates” cleaning and “painting all of it.” 	In directly responding to the question posed
by Wood-Ridge “So when you moved in Bogota how long did you intend to stay there?”
L.B replied that when she moved, she “hoped” it would be “like a permanent-semi
permanent situation at least to get [her son] into high school.” 5
Additionally, L.B. responded that her sworn to answers to Interrogatories were
“the truth.” 	One interrogatory had asked 	“(F)or how long did you plan to stay at that
[Bogota] address?” L.B. replied “Two years max originally, and then till he [M.B.]
finished and we were stable to have four consecutive years of high school.”
L.B. then recounted a number of reasons why, although her intentions were to
originally to permanently reside with her sister in Bogota, the living arrangements soon
deteriorated. 	For one, her sister wasn’t as forthcoming as she should have been when
she claimed that L.N. could co-sign the lease as early as January. 	L.B. soon learned
that the landlord’s and the Section 8 approval would not come until March. 	Further, in
March, M.B. became ill and it was determined this was owing to mold in the house’s
basement which had to be remediated. 	Nevertheless, and although some of these
5 M.B. was in the 8 th grade when they moved to Bogota.

7
problems began just weeks after moving in, L.S. was asked directly, “But after you had
moved in before you stayed there for weeks and it was your intention to remain there
correct?” 	Her reply was “Yeah Yeah.”
Under cross-examination, L.B. at times appeared to equivocate by modifying the
description of her “intent” by adding or substituting the word “hope” for “intent” saying,
for example it was always her “hope” the move would be permanent. 	Her problem was
that after she moved in “I didn’t have anything in hand saying that it was going to be
what it is [meaning as negotiated with her sister]. So I was always careful of the fact of
saying I’m hopeful form and I was pushing for it , but….”
In any event, although she initially waited for the mold remediation to move back
in with her sister, they began to fight and at some point, the sister locked her and M.B.
out the house, so she and M.B. never returned there except to move out their property.
L.B. kept M.B. in the Bogota school until his June 8 th grade graduation, although
by this time she had moved in temporarily with a friend in Hackensack, as she had a
year before. 	L.B.‘s testimony heaped praise upon Bogota’s BOE. 	She testified they
were “Very gracious, Very professional”. They were honest with me as far as you know,
like what they needed and I was honest with them back saying I have it until a certain
time, but they put the child first and the child’s needs first and they took him in
regardless and they did a reval and re-placed him, So they went far and beyond for my
son”. 	She contrasted this from what can only be called somewhat cold treatment she
received from Wood-Ridge of whom she said: “I was notified by Ridgefield (an out of
district placement Wood-Ridge had previously paid for) through Wood-Ridge early in
December that M. could not attend [XX] school . 	He could not go back to his—
removed…They hadn’t even had it official through me yet and I had that phone just
saying he couldn’t come back and he never got his property back from the [XX] school
either.” 	I find that L.B.’s opinion of the Bogota BOE and the Wood-Ridge BOE may
account for her equivocation in appearing to deflect the use of the word intent by
attempting to distinguish her intent from what she said her “hope” was.

8
On redirect however, L.B. was asked:
Q‘ When you moved into the house in Bogota did you ever
have any knowledge that [your sister] had any issues with
her lease at that time?.
Her answer, in pertinent part was:
A (W)ell no. .Actually when she asked me to in she told me
that she would have to contact the landlord and have me
added to her lease, okay she didn’t give me any inclination
there was a problem”.
To elaborate, L.B. explained that the problem with the lease “came
to light” subsequent to moving in. The questioning continued
Q : And when you had initially moved in, it is fair to say you
had intended to stay there at least two years.
A: Yeah. I was hoping.
Later to the Court’s questioning about L.B.’s intent, she stated:
A: I started the end of November going in there cleaning and
painting and making it ready for us to move in, so I cleaned
the entire house
Q : Because you intended to reside there [?]
A: Because we intended to yes, yes because this was going
to be the home we were going to make…So we intended to
stay there, you know that was the plan.
Bogota called fellow respondent Joseph Zarra to establish the basis for his
determination that M.S. became homeless in November 2016 and had remained
homeless even after relocating with his mother to Bogota. He stated.
A: [C]ommon sense would indicate that a child that has been
moved from home to home with no permanent address and
many times living with someone under the same roof is not –
it is not their home. 	And in this case if I may, the child

9
moved many times in a period…I believe it was nineteen
months.
Q: Do you consider the physical nature of the home?
A: No we don’t have the investigative ability to go in and
determine that
Q: 	Do you consider whether the home is fixed, regular and
adequate?
A: We do not
Superintendent Zarra continued:
Q: How does one establish domicile, in your understanding?
A: In our interpretation domicile is a home where a child
resides that is permanent, and we didn’t see that.
Q: 	So, it is fair to say that if a child moves from town to
town, they wouldn’t be considered domiciled there until they
spent one continuous year there?
A: I think it’s fair to say that, yes.
Q: 	Could a person intentionally move from on town to
another to establish domicile there?
A: We would have no idea.
Q: So today, you don’t know if that person’s is relevant to
establishing domicile?
A: Intention to my knowledge does not come into it.
Mr. Zarra also stated it is not their policy to get statements or information from
the parents when making a determination of homelessness but instead he relies
exclusively on letters provide to him by the districts. While Superintendent Zarra stated
that homeless means a “child or youth who lacks a fixed regular and adequate nighttime
residence,” he also insisted they never consider factors such as the living arrangements
at the house like whether the child has a separate bedroom and other specifics of the
living arrangements. 	Yet somewhat inconsistently, he testified he did consider that L.B.
was supposed to be added to the lease.

10
When questioned about whether this so called one-year time requirement was
uniformly enforced by all school districts, Superintendent Zarra explained.
A: (T) hat really varies from school district to school district.
There are some school districts that are sticklers and until
the family establishes permanent residence, they really won’t
entertain 	registering 	the 	child. 	Other 	school 	districts 	if
evidence is presented that for example they’re going to close
on the house and they have a letter from the realtor, letter
from the seller or the attorney, they’ll allow each child to
register. 	So again, it really is up to each individual school
district how they handle that.
Q Okay, So the fact that the child has not resided in that
district for twelve months or more is not a uniform rule to
give guidance to the district as to whether or not that child is
entitled to a free education in that district?
A: I don’t believe so.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(a) and N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a) sets forth forth the right of a
student to a free public education, which in pertinent parts states:
Public schools shall be free to the following persons over five
and under twenty years of age:
a. Any person who is domiciled within the school district[.]
See V.R. ex rel A.R. v. Hamburg Bd. of Educ., 2 N.J.A.R. 283, 287 (1980), aff’d,
State Bd., 1981 S.L.D. 1533, rev’d on other grounds sub nom.; Rabinowitz v. N.J. State
Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 481 (D.N.J. 1982) (New Jersey requires local domicile, as
opposed to mere residence, in order for a student to receive a free education).
The domicile of an unemancipated child is that of his parent, custodian or
guardian. Somerville Bd. of Educ. v. Manville Bd. of Educ., 332 N.J. Super. 6, 12 (App.

11
Div. 2000), aff’d, 167 N.J. 55 (2001); P.B.K. o/b/o minor child E.Y. v. Board of Ed. of
Tenafly, 343 N.J. Super 419, 427 (App. Div. 2001).
.
A student’s “domicile” is where the student’s parent or guardian has a permanent
home in the school district such that “the parent or guardian intends to return to it when
absent and has no present intent of moving from it, notwithstanding the existence of
homes or residences elsewhere.” N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a)(1); State v. Benny, 20 N.J 238,
250 (1955); In re Unanue, 255 N.J. Super. 362, 374 (Law Div. 1991), aff’d, 311 N.J.
Super. 589 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 541 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051,
119 S. Ct. 1357, 143 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1999). Put another way, the Appellate Division has
long held that a person’s domicile is “the place where [ a person] has his [or her} true
fixed permanent home and principle establishment and to which whenever he [or she] is
absent he [ or she] has an intention of returning,” and from which he {or she] has no
intention of moving. 	D.L., 366 N.J. Super at 273 (quoting T.B.W. ex rel A.W. v Bd. of
Educ. 	Of 	Bellville, 	EDU 	5959-96 	(April 	20, 	1998)
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/). 	Intent is the decisive factor in establishing
domicile. 	A person’s intent converts a residence from a mere place in which a person
lives to a domicile. State v Benny, 20 NJ at 251.
Here, however, it is argued by all the respondents that regardless of their intent,
L.B. and M.B. remained “homeless” throughout December 2017 and the remainder of
the 2018 school year because they failed to spend one continuous year in Bogota (or
anywhere else) during that time. That misreads the wording and intent of the applicable
law.
Petitioner correctly cites the applicable statutes and regulations, where there is a
condition of homelessness the last district of residence shall pay another school district
the tuition costs. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A: 38-19, however such 	payments are made
by the former district of permanent residence when a homeless child is enrolled in a
district other than where the child last resided until the parent establishes a permanent

12
residence or is deemed domiciled in another jurisdiction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:38-
1.d. At that time, the school district of residence shall no longer pay tuition to the school
district of enrollment. N.J.A.C. 6A: 172.8 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, the school district of residence is responsible to pay for the homeless child
until that child either becomes domiciled at a location or are “deemed domiciled at a
location under N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1 (d)” (emphasis supplied) because they spent one
continuous year there. Clearly the statute provides that domiciles may be recognized as
existing well before one year and do not require any specific length of time, but rather
can be established based on the intent of the persons seeking to establish a domicile.
Here, the Bogota BOE and Superintendent Zarra erred in ignoring all the clear
evidence that L.B. intended to make her sister’s house in Bogota her and M.B.’s
domicile and did in fact do so when she moved there in December 2017. 	She had
every intention in making this her permanent home, just as she told the Wood-Ridge
School representative when she signed M.B. out of the school and had him enroll in
Bogota one week after the move. 	Prior to moving in that December L.B cleaned,
painted and fixed up the four-bedroom house to get it ready as a permanent home for
her and her son and to live with her sister in a house she intended to co-lease. 	She
changed her driver’s license to reflect her new address. 	She made an agreement with
her sister how to divide costs and intended to co-sign the lease as soon as the landlord
presented it. 	The fact that L.B. wanted to co-sign the lease as early as January 2018
but the landlord advised that he needed Section 8 approval and would add her to the
lease in March of 2018 did not change L.B.’s intent when she decided to move to that
address in Bogota. 	Further, she did not leave the address on her own volition. 	It is
undisputed that even when she and her son left the house probably in March 2018 while
mold was being remediated, she testified she intended to return there. 	It is only when
she began fighting with her sister and got locked out in April 2018 did she give up on the
house and became homeless again.

13
Respondent would have us completely ignore the intention (or “hope”) of L.B. to
establish, when she moved in to move in with her sister to have a permanent place for
at least until her son could graduate from high school in four years. Despite a few
somewhat modest complaints, L.B. did not abandon the domicile until she was locked
out four months after by her sister. 	Superintendent Zarra testified “intention” has
nothing to do creating a domicile. 	Conversely, he conceded that whether a child stays
one year or more at a certain residence provides “no guidance” to the district in the
determination of whether that district has to provide that child with a free public
education, and that the duration of the stay at a residence provides no uniform guidance
to the districts. I cannot agree on either count. 	Whether the rules are not enforced
uniformly y the districts does not change the “deemed” section of the applicable section,
and The Executive Superintendent’s disregard for the intention to create a domicile was
clearly a misreading of the statute and its intent.
Clearly the preponderance of the evidence shows that when L.B. moved to her
sister’s four bedroom home in Bogota, was the place she found and determined to be,
after a period of about a year of homelessness, a “fixed permanent home and principle
establishment and to which whenever she was absent (e.g. like when she became
absent in about March 2018 because of the mold) she had the intention of returning to
and from which he she had no intention of moving. 	A domicile may be acquired upon
the “concurrence, even for a moment of physical presence at a dwelling place with the
intention of making it a permanent abode.” Lyon v Glaser, 60 N.J. 259,264 (1972).
Further as a matter of law, the “deemed domiciled” provision of N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(d)
was misread or misinterpreted by the Respondents to impose a 12 month minimum as a
sine qua non requirement to establish the domicile of a previously homeless child. 	As
evidenced by the clear wording and intent of the statute, the 12- month requirement
simply deems the domicile to have been created without further proof 	being needed.
Here, petitioners showed by a preponderance of the evidence the further proof of that
intent to create the domicile in Bogota.
CONCLUSION

14
Based on the letter of 	determination by Superintendent Zarra, Bogota has
charged Wood-Ridge with the cost Bogota expended for educational costs of M.B. from
the time he registered with their school district in December 2017 until his graduation in
June 2018, in the amount of $29,375.95, and requests an order that Wood-Ridge
continues to pay the cost of M.B.’s public education until L.B. and M.B. establish a new
domicile. However, as shown, Bogota’s demand must be denied as it was based on an
arbitrary and capricious finding which ignored the fact that L.B. and M.B. clearly
established a new domicile in Bogota commencing in December 2017. Consequently,
the Superintendent’s decision is REVERSED, and Bogota’s demands for payment and
other relief are DENIED. 	Further, Bogota continues to be financially responsible for
M.B.’s public education costs until such time as their new domicile is established
outside the district.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the decision by the County
Executive Superintendent of Schools that M.B. and L.B. did not establish a domicile in
Bogota 	and 	remained 	homeless 	is 	REVERSED, 	and 	the 	claims 	by 	Bogota 	for
reimbursement for the costs of M.B.’s public education between December 2017 and
June 2018, and for the demand for prospective relief ordering Wood-Ridge to pay the
financial costs of M.B.’s public education until such time as they establish another
domicile is DENIED. 	It is further ordered that Bogota continues to be financially
responsible for M.B.’s public education until such time that L.B. an M.B. establish a
domicile outside of Bogota.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	my 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION who by law is authorized

15
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Department of Education does not adopt,
modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit is
otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in
accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4 th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-500, marked "Attention: 	Exceptions." 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
August 5, 2020
______________________ 	_____________________________
DATE 	ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI
Date Received at Agency: 	8/5/20
Date Mailed to Parties:
id
APPENDIX
LIST OF WITNESSES
For Petitioners
Sylvia Ragueso
L.B.

16
For Respondents
Joseph Zarra
Jill Connolly
LIST OF JOINT EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE
J-1 through J-5 NOT IN EVIDENCE
J-6 	Student Transfer Card and Verification Form, dated December 7, 2017
J-7 	Emails between Jill Connolly and Silvia Ragueso, dated December 7, 2017
J-8 	Emails between Jill Connolly and Silvia Ragueso, dated December 8, 2017
J-9 	Bogota Public Schools Student Registration Form, dated December 12, 2017
J-10 	Bogota Public Schools McKinney-Vento Student Residence Form-
J-11 	Email between Jill Connolly and Silvia Ragueso, attaching release of records
form, dated December 12, 2017
J-12 	Letter from Jill Connolly to Joseph Zarra, dated June 1, 2018
J-13 	Letter from Joseph Zarra to Vincent Varcadipane, dated June 22, 2018
J-14 	Letter from Joseph Zarra to Nicholas Cipriano, dated June 22, 2018
J-15 	Letter from Jill Connolly to Joseph Zarra, dated June 28, 2018
J-16 	Email from Victoria Bauman to Irene Ardizzone attaching correspondence from
Nicholas Cipriano and Silvia Ragueso, dated June 28, 2018
J-17 	NOT IN EVIDENCE
J-18 	Letter from Joseph Zarra to Damien Kennedy, dated July 26, 2018
J-19 	Letter from Damien Kennedy to Nicholas Cipriano, dated August 9, 2018
J-20 	Wood-Ridge Board of Education Amended Verified Petition of Appeal, dated
September 4, 2018
J-21 	Bogota Board of Education Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim,
dated September 25, 2018
J-22 	NJDOE (Joseph Zarra) Answer to Amended Verified Petition of Appeal with
Affirmative Defenses, dated October 9, 2018
J-23 	Wood-Ridge Board of Education Answer to Counterclaim, dated October 10,
2018

17
J-24 	L.B. responses to Joint Interrogatories, dated July 8, 2019
J-25 	L.B. responses to Zarra’s Interrogatories and Requests for Admissions, undated
J-26 	NOT IN EVIDENCE
J-27 	L.B. Lease agreement commencing February 15, 2019
J-28 	L.B’ s NJMVC change of address
J-29 	Bogota BOE record of payments to Ridgefield BOE, -March/April 2018
J-30 	Bogota BOE records of payments to D.B. for home instruction- April 2018
J-31 	Bogota BOE records of payment for out of District tuition
J-32 	Correspondence from [X] School to Bogota BOE