Mercer County Special Services Educational and Therapeutic Association v. Board of Education of the Mercer County Special Services School District and Board of Education of the City of Trenton, Mercer County, 4/23/2021, (#93-21)

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

93-21
New J ersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision

Mercer County Special Services Educational and
Therapeutic Association,

Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the Mercer County Special
Services School District, Mercer County, and

Board of Education of the City of Trenton,
Mercer County,

Respondent.

Synopsis

The petitioner— the Mercer County Special Services Education and Therapeutic Association (Association) —

the interests of its member paraprofessionals who are employed by the respondent Board of
Education of the Mercer County Special Services School District (MCSSSD) as individual aides for special
education students sent to MCSSSD by the respondent Board of Education of the City of Trenton (Trenton).
The petitioner alleged that layoffs of Association members by MCSSSD and Trenton during and as a result of
the COVID-19 pandemic violated the New Jersey School Law, NJ.SA 18A:1-1 et seg, and its
accompanying regulations, NJ.A.C. GA:1-1 et. seg. The Association filed its appeal with the Commissioner,
arguing that the layoffs violated respondents’ obligations to provide a free, appropriate public education

(FAPE) to all students. The respondents filed motions to dismiss for lack of standing and jurisdiction.

The ALJ found, inter alia, that: the Association does not have standing to bring a claim seeking to
enforce the rights of special education students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA); further, neither the school laws nor the contract between MCSSSD and Trenton provide a basis
for standing in this case; the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction here; the Association’s members
have no statutory or regulatory claim to their jobs, and though they may have a claim under their
employment contracts with MCSSSD, the Commissioner has no jurisdiction over contractual disputes.
Accordingly, the ALJ granted the respondents’ motions to dismiss.

Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ, for the reasons thoroughly expressed in the
Initial Decision, that the Association lacks standing in this case and the Commissioner does not have
junsdiction over special education matters, which are under the sole purview of the Office of Special
Education. Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted as the final decision in this matter,
and the petition was dismissed.

This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It

has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10956-20
Agency Dkt. No. 212-10/20
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Mercer County Special Services Educational
and Therapeutic Association,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Mercer County
Special Services School District, Mercer
County, and Board of Education of the City
of Trenton, Mercer County,
Respondents.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL), the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and respondents’ replies
thereto have been reviewed and considered.
The Mercer County Special Services Educational and Therapeutic Association
(Association) represents the interests of its member paraprofessionals, who are employed by the
Mercer County Special Services School District (MCSSSD) as individual aides for special education
students sent to MCSSSD by the Trenton Board of Education (Trenton), at Trenton’s expense. In
October 2020, Trenton notified MCSSSD that it would no longer pay for the cost of individual aides
who were working with students remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Approximately twenty-
seven individual aides were laid off between October 11, 2020 and November 9, 2020, when they
were reinstated. The Association appealed to the Commissioner, arguing that the layoffs violated
respondents’ obligations to provide a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) to all students. The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted respondents’ motions to dismiss, finding that the
93-21

2
Association does not have standing to bring a claim seeking to enforce the rights of special education
students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), nor did the school laws or the
contract between MCSSSD and Trenton provide a basis for standing. For similar reasons, the ALJ
concluded that the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction in this matter. The ALJ further found
that the Association’s members have no statutory or regulatory claim to their jobs, and while they
may have a claim under their employment contracts with MCSSSD, the Commissioner has no
jurisdiction over contractual disputes.1
In its exceptions, the Association argues that by failing to follow students’
Individualized Education Programs (IEPs), respondents violated the school laws, independent of
whether they also violated the IDEA. According to the Association, the fact that the individual aides
were laid off and lost pay makes this matter a controversy that is properly before the Commissioner.
The Association contends that this matter does not require the Commissioner to make a substantive
determination regarding whether individual students were provided with a FAPE or whether their
educational needs were being met, but rather only requires a comparison of the student IEPs to the
services that were actually provided, with the issue being whether the IEPs were followed.
In their replies, Trenton and MCSSSD reiterate arguments regarding standing and
jurisdiction previously made in their motions to dismiss, and urge the Commissioner to affirm the
Initial Decision.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ, for the reasons thoroughly
detailed in the Initial Decision, that the Association does not have standing and that the
Commissioner does not have jurisdiction over this matter.2 As the Association itself acknowledges
in its exceptions, this matter requires a comparison of student IEPs to the services that were actually
1 The ALJ did not reach the issue of whether the Association’s claims were moot in light of new agreements entered
into by MCSSSD and Trenton.
2 The Commissioner does not reach respondents’ arguments that the matter is moot.

3
provided, and the issue is whether the IEPs have been followed. Resolving matters involving the
provision of special education services is one of the functions of the dispute resolution process of
the Department of Education’s Office of Special Education (OSE). N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7;
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-9.2. Moreover, while the Association characterizes its claim as one made pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-30 of the school laws, which provides remedies for employees who are “illegally
dismissed,” it is clear that this, too, is actually a special education issue, because the only provisions
cited by the Association for the alleged illegality of the layoff are special education regulations. In
the absence of any claim arising under the school laws, the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate a claim that respondents failed to follow student IEPs, because such review falls
exclusively within the purview of the OSE. See Long Beach Island Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the
Long Beach Island Consolidated Sch. Dist., Commissioner Decision No. 330-09 (decided
October 13, 2009); Trenton Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Trenton, Mercer Cty.,
Commissioner Decision No. 283-20 (decided December 14, 2020).
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
3 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
April 23, 2021
April 27, 2021

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS
OAL DOCKET NO. EDU 10956-20
MERCER COUNTY SPECIAL AGENCY REF. NO. 212-10/20
SERVICES EDUCATIONAL
AND THERAPEUTIC ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
MERCER COUNTY SPECIAL SERVICES
SCHOOL DISTRICT, MERCER COUNTY,
AND BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE CITY OF TRENTON, MERCER COUNTY,
Respondents.
________________________________________
Edward A. Cridge, Esq., for petitioner (Mellk O’Neil, attorneys)
Walter R. Bliss, Jr., Esq., for respondent, Board of Education of the Mercer County
Special Services School District, Mercer County (Law Offices of Walter R. Bliss,
Jr., attorneys)
Elesia L. James, Assistant General Counsel, for respondent, Board of Education of
the City of Trenton, Mercer County (James Rolle, Jr., General Counsel)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
2
Record Closed: February 18, 2021 Decided: March 9, 2021
BEFORE TRICIA M. CALIGUIRE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF CASE
Petitioner Mercer County Special Services Education and Therapeutic Association
(Association) alleges that the layoffs of Association members during and as a result of the
COVID-19 emergency by respondents, Board of Education of the Mercer County Special
Services School District, Mercer County (MCSSSD), and Board of Education of the City of
Trenton, Mercer County (Trenton), violated the New Jersey School Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:1-1
et. seq., and its accompanying regulations, N.J.A.C. 6A:1-1 et. seq.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 1, 2020, the Association filed a petition with the Commissioner of the New
Jersey Department of Education pursuant to N.J.S.A 18A:6-9. On November 20, 2020,
respondents filed motions to dismiss in lieu of answers. These motions were not decided by
the Commissioner and were transmitted with the petition on November 24, 2020, to the Office
of Administrative Law (OAL) for hearing as a contested case pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to
-15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
By letter dated January 19, 2021, a briefing schedule was issued and on February 8,
2021, the Association responded to the motions to dismiss. On February 18, 2021, MCSSD
and Trenton submitted reply briefs and the motions are now ripe for review.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Respondents’ motions were filed in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g), which
permits the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer. The New Jersey Supreme Court
explained that the analysis required when considering a motion to dismiss is “whether a cause

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
3
of action is suggested by the facts.” Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192
(1988) (citations omitted). Further:
Because the matter arises on defendants’ motion to dismiss, [the
court must] accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint. . . .
Plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference in their favor.
A reviewing court must ‘search the complaint in depth and with
liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action
may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim. . . .’
[Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 140 N.J. 623, 625-26
(1995) (citations omitted); see also, Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J.
565, 569 (2014).]
A motion to dismiss should only be granted in the rarest of instances. Printing Mart-
Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 772 (1989).1 In reviewing the complaint, the
question is not whether the petitioner can prove the allegations, but whether the facts alleged
are sufficient to state a cause of action. Id. at 746. Accordingly, for the purposes of the
motion, all facts alleged by the petition will be deemed admitted, and I FIND as follows:
1. The City of Trenton School District is a public school district with administrative
offices at 108 North Clinton Avenue, Trenton, New Jersey.
2. MCSSSD is a receiving school district as provided at N.J.A.C. 6A:14-7.1, which
provides special education (SE) and related services to students from local
school districts, including Trenton.
3. The Association is a labor organization serving as the majority representative
for employees of MCSSSD, including individual aides (or paraprofessionals).
4. Consistent with state and federal law, a local educational district must develop
an individual education program (IEP) for each student in the district classified
as eligible for SE and related services. For each SE student sent by Trenton to
1 See also, F. G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997) (“If a generous reading of the allegations merely
suggests a cause of action, the complaint will withstand the motion.”).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
4
MCSSSD, Trenton is responsible for developing his or her IEP and paying the
cost of that student’s education (i.e., tuition to MCSSSD).
5. The IEPs of some of the SE students sent by Trenton to MCSSSD provide for
individual aides to support such students on a one-to-one basis. This service is
considered an “extraordinary service” and is billed by MCSSSD to Trenton
separately and paid to MCSSSD by Trenton directly.
6. During the 2019-2020 and the 2020-2021 school years, due to the COVID-19
pandemic, MCSSSD provided educational services remotely to SE students,
including students from Trenton.
7. Prior to October 9, 2020, Trenton notified MCSSSD that it would no longer pay
for the cost of individual aides who were working with SE students remotely.
MCSSSD notified the Association that it would lay off approximately twenty-
seven individual aides, all of whom are represented by the Association.
8. The layoffs of individual aides became effective October 11, 2020, continuing
while all instruction was provided on a remote basis. The individual aides were
reinstated effective November 9, 2020.
9. Prior to November 9, 2020, MCSSSD and Trenton reached agreement on the
retention of and payment for individual aides as specified in the IEPs of SE
students, whether school is conducted remotely or in-person.
10. MCSSSD and Trenton reached agreement on payment of invoices for
individual aides for the period of all-remote instruction from mid-March 2020,
through October 11, 2020.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
5
11. The Association claims that the above-described action by Trenton violates
Trenton’s obligation to provide all SE students with a free appropriate public
education (FAPE).
12. The Association claims that the above-described action by MCSSSD violates
the obligation of MCSSSD to provide all SE students with a FAPE.
13. In this matter, the Association asks the Commissioner:
(a) for a declaration that Trenton and MCSSSD are required to follow the IEPs
of SE students from Trenton;
(b) to direct Trenton to pay the cost of individual aides who are assigned by
MCSSSD to work remotely with SE students from Trenton;
(c) to enjoin MCSSSD from laying off individual aides who are assigned by
MCSSSD to SE students from Trenton in compliance with the IEPs of such
students; and
(d) to direct MCSSSD to reinstate with back pay, benefits and emoluments, all
individual aides who were laid off as a result of Trenton’s refusal to pay the
cost of individual aides who were working with SE students remotely, and to
direct Trenton to reimburse MCSSSD for the resulting costs.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
6
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Respondents contend that the petition must be dismissed for lack of standing, as the
Association lacks standing to bring claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (IDEA), on behalf of any SE students, and the Association lacks
standing to challenge or enforce the contract between MCSSSD and Trenton.
Respondents further argue that the petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the
Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim based on the IDEA and/or to enforce the
contract between MCSSSD and Trenton. Finally, respondents claim that the controversies
raised by the petition are now moot:2
The Association responds that the motions for dismissal for lack of standing and
jurisdiction must be denied as the Association does not bring this action under the IDEA but
under the New Jersey School Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:1-1 et seq. (School Law), and the regulations
promulgated thereto. The failure of respondents to provide individual aides to SE students as
required under the IEPs of such students was a violation of the School Law, as a result of
which Association members suffered compensable injury. Further, Association argues that the
prospective relief requested by the Association is still available and the underlying issue is of
substantial importance, capable of repetition yet evading review and therefore, not moot.
STANDING
Standing is a “threshold justiciability determination whether the litigant is entitled to
initiate and maintain an action before a court or other tribunal.” In re Six-Month Extension of
N.J.A.C. 5:91-1, 372 N.J. Super. 61, 85 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 630 (2005);
Stubus v. Williams, 339 N.J. Super. 38, 47 (App. Div. 2001). A lack of standing precludes a
court from entertaining any of the substantive issues presented for determination. Watkins v.
2 In addition, respondents contend that any claims alleged by the Association to arise under the New Jersey
School Law (cited below) prior to July 3, 2020, are time-barred. Ltr. Br. of Respondent Board of Education
of the City of Trenton (November 20, 2020), at 3. Petitioner did not respond to this defense, presumably
because the acts complained of occurred after July 3, 2020.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
7
Resorts Int’l Hotel and Casino, 124 N.J. 398, 418 (1991) (“A dismissal for lack of standing . . .
amounts to a refusal by the court to resolve the matter.”)
To have standing to bring an administrative action, a party must have suffered a
distinct injury or harm that was caused by the adverse party and that can be remedied by the
administrative forum. Herron v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tsp. of Montclair, OAL Docket No. EDU
14067-13, Initial Decision, *5 (April 16, 2014), Comm. Ed. Dec. (June 2, 2014), https://njlaw.
rutgers.edu/collections/oal/html/initial/edu14067-13_1.html. While New Jersey courts often
take a liberal approach on this issue, standing “is not automatic and a litigant usually has no
standing to assert the rights of a third party.” In re N.J.A.C. 5:91-1, 372 N.J. Super. at 85
(citations omitted); see also, Kathleen Donohue v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Patterson,
OAL Docket Nos. EDU 08806-16 and 09476-16, Initial Decision, *17 (April 6, 2017), Comm.
Ed. Dec. (May 8, 2017) (adopting decision that former teacher had no standing to assert the
rights of schoolchildren to FAPE despite claims that the “administration squander[ed]
resources and [failed] to adequately supervise the performance of those responsible to
instruct the children”), https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/final/edu08806-16_1_1.pdf.
Respondents argue that petitioner attempts to raise claims on behalf of SE students
under the IDEA and such claims can only be brought by the students or their parents (or legal
guardians). Even a generous reading of the petition cannot avoid the conclusion that the
Association is alleging violations of the IDEA, specifically that by failing to adhere to the
requirements of individual aides in IEPs, respondents did not provide FAPE to the respective SE
students. Among the purposes of IDEA is “to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities
and parents of such children are protected.” 20 U.S.C. 1400 (d)(1)(B). New Jersey regulations
make clear, however, that “a petition on behalf of a minor shall be filed by the parent or legal
guardian of the minor” not by the teachers or other service providers. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3 (a)(2). I
CONCLUDE that the Association has no standing to bring a claim for an order enforcing the
rights of SE students under the IDEA.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in its response brief, the Association clarifies that it
does not bring this action under the IDEA, but under the School Law. Ltr. Br. of Petitioner in

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
8
Response to Motions to Dismiss (February 3, 2021), at 4-5. Petitioner argues that the
failure of respondents to follow the IEPs of SE students from Trenton was not permissible
and resulted in the layoffs of Association members, triggering petitioner’s right to bring suit
under the following statute:
Any person holding office, position or employment in the public
school system of the state, who shall be illegally dismissed or
suspended therefrom, shall be entitled to compensation for the
period covered by the illegal dismissal or suspension, if such
dismissal or suspension shall be finally determined to have been
without good cause, upon making written application therefor
with the board or body by whom he was employed, within 30
days after such determination.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:6-30 (emphasis added).]
The Association argues that its members were laid off as a direct result of respondents’
failure to follow the requirements of certain IEPs and “neither respondent argues. . . that the
paraprofessional layoffs were permissible[.]” Ltr. Br. of Pet’r, at 4. These improper layoffs were
a violation of the School Law and led to cognizable injury to Association members, giving the
Association standing to bring the claims here. For support, the Association cites a case involving
the decision of a school board to lay off child study team (CST) members and replace them with
a private entity, which was a clear violation of the statute and regulations calling for CST
members to be employees of the district. Ltr. Br. of Pet’r, at 5, citing Bloomfield Ed. Assn. o/b/o
Child Study Team v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. of Bloomfield, OAL Docket No. EDU 18705-13, Comm.
Ed. Dec. 410-15, https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/html/initial/edu18705-13_1.html.
The Bloomfield case does not support the Association’s position on standing. The
petitioners in Bloomfield were tenured employees of the school district, laid off by the district in
an effort to save money by outsourcing their jobs. Id. at *4, *9. Besides the protections
afforded them by tenure, applicable law3 prohibited the school district from replacing
petitioners with an unrelated outside entity. Id. at *10-11. The “improper layoffs” in Bloomfield
were found to violate two provisions of the School Law, specifically, N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5, and
3 N.J.S.A. 18A:46-5.1; N.J.A.C. 6A:14-3.1(b).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
9
28-9. Further, the labor organization in Bloomfield brought claims on behalf of its members
that the members could have brought on their own. See, Crescent Park Tenants Assoc. v.
Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 109 (1971) (association of tenants had standing where
there was no question as to “the stake and adverseness” of any individual tenant). In this
matter, to find the layoffs improper would require an evaluation of whether the IDEA permitted
Trenton to make changes to the respective IEPs; in other words, the layoffs would only be
improper if the students’ right to FAPE was impaired as a result. As explained above, the
Association has no standing to assert those rights. Even assuming that the actions of
respondents vis-à-vis the SE students were not permissible under the IDEA, petitioner points
to no provision in the School Law which protects its members from layoffs when a sending
district changes the services provided under IEPs. To find otherwise would impair the ability of
any CST to modify an IEP mid-way through a school year. I CONCLUDE that the School Law
does not provide petitioner withstanding to challenge the actions of respondents in modifying
services to SE students as required by the students’ respective IEPs.
Respondents also argue that petitioner has no standing to brings claims based on the
contracts entered by and between MCSSSD and Trenton because the Association is not a party
to these contracts. “The obligation of contracts is, in general, limited to the parties making them.”
Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 101, 484 A.2d 675 (1984) (citation omitted); see also, Borrello
v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., No. A-3151-14T4, 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1915, at *13 (App.
Div. Aug. 16, 2016) (court dismissed claims brought under collective bargaining agreement
against individuals who were not parties to the contract). Here, the Association represents
independent aides who are hired as needed by MCSSSD. Their right to employment would be
found in the contracts they may have signed with MCSSD, not in the contracts Trenton signed
with MCSSSD.4 I CONCLUDE that the Association has no standing to bring a claim under the
School Law to enforce the contract entered by and between respondents MCSSSD and
Trenton.
4 Respondent MCSSSD states that “to the extent the Association is alleging a contracting claim against
MCSSSD challenging the notice of layoff,” such is outside the Commissioner’s jurisdiction. Ltr. Br. of Resp’t
Board, at 3. Petitioner did not respond to this argument.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
10
JURISDICTION
Respondents contend that whether the petition is grounded in the IDEA or the School
Law, the Commissioner of Education has no jurisdiction to hear this matter. Petitioner,
however, contends that the Commissioner has jurisdiction over its claims under the following
provision of the School Law:
Commissioner shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine,
without cost to the parties, all controversies and disputes
arising under the school laws, excepting those governing higher
education, or under the rules of the State board or of the
commissioners.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.]
As stated above, petitioner contends that respondents’ failure to comply with the IEPs of
certain Trenton SE students was a violation of the IDEA and therefore, led to the illegal dismissal
without good cause of Association members, which is compensable in an action brought under
the School Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-30. Therefore, petitioner argues, the Commissioner has proper
jurisdiction to hear this action. Ltr. Br. of Pet’r, at 4-5.
Despite petitioner’s assertion that it is undisputed that the layoffs of Association members
by MCSSSD were impermissible, neither respondent conceded that position.5 Further, to reach
the conclusion that layoffs were impermissible would require an inquiry into whether a school
district is obligated to provide one-on-one assistance to SE students outside the classroom
during a pandemic, when the aides may or may not be able to work in close physical proximity to
those SE students. This is a question that can only be resolved by application of the IDEA and
then only on a case-by-case basis. Federal and state law, as stated above, permits only
students and/or parents to challenge the denial of FAPE and/or to enforce IEPs. Further, as
both respondents note, actions under the IDEA must be filed with the Director of the Office of
Special Programs, not with the Commissioner. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(e)(2); N.J.A.C. 6A:14-9.2.
5 See, Ltr. Br. of Pet’r, at 4; cf. Ltr. Br. of Respondent MCSSSD in Reply to Petitioner’s Response to Motion to
Dismiss (February 18, 2021), at 3, and Ltr. Br. of Respondent Trenton in Reply to Petitioner’s Response to
Motion to Dismiss (February 18, 2021), at 3.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
11
The Commissioner’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited by statute to “controversies
and disputes arising under the school laws.” N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9; Balsley v. N. Hunterdon Reg’l
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 117 N.J. 434, 438 (1990). It is well settled that the Commissioner
does not have jurisdiction over contractual disputes, even if those disputes “pertain to school
personnel,” Picogna v. Bd. of Educ., Twp. of Cherry Hill, 249 N.J. Super. 332, 335 (App. Div.
1991), or involve school boards. Archway Programs, Inc. v. Pemberton Tp. Bd. of Educ., 352
N.J. Super. 420, 424-25 (App. Div. 2002) (contract claims against school boards do not arise
under the school laws and are “typically and appropriately adjudicated in the courts”).
Contractual disputes are generally considered to be outside the Commissioner’s
jurisdiction because no special expertise in school law is necessary for the interpretation of
contractual language. See, Picogna, 249 N.J. Super. at 335 (no jurisdiction over contract
claim of non-tenured school employee because no interpretation of school laws was
required); S. Orange-Maplewood Ed. Ass'n v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch. Dist. of S. Orange &
Maplewood, 146 N.J. Super. 457, 462 (App. Div. 1977) (though Board “exercised its authority
under the school laws” to reach agreement with teachers’ union, the dispute over “the
interpretation of that agreement” should be brought in Superior Court).
In this matter, the members of the Association have no statutory or regulatory claim to
their jobs under the School Law. The Association may have claims against MCSSSD as a
result of the employment contracts signed with the individual members, and the relief sought
by the Association – preventing MCSSSD from conducting further layoffs, and restitution of
back pay, benefits and emoluments lost as a result of the alleged improper layoffs – would be
based on the terms of those employment contracts. As stated above, however, such contract
claims fall outside the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. I CONCLUDE that petitioner has
failed to demonstrate that this venue has the proper jurisdiction to hear this case.
While concluding that petitioner has no standing to bring this action and the
Commissioner no jurisdiction to hear it, no findings are made with respect to respondents’
argument that the claims herein are moot as a result of agreements reached by

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20
12
respondents after this petition was filed. Similarly, no findings are made with respect to the
ability of petitioner to raise its claims in another forum.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the motions to dismiss of BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE MERCER COUNTY SPECIAL SERVICES SCHOOL DISTRICT, MERCER COUNTY,
and of the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF TRENTON, MERCER COUNTY, are
GRANTED and the claims brought by the petition of MERCER COUNTY EDUCATIONAL
AND THERAPEUTIC ASSOCIATION are hereby DISMISSED.
I hereby FILE this Initial Decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION for consideration. This recommended decision may be adopted, modified
or rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law
is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such
time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in
accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this initial decision was mailed to the
parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, P.O. Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge
and to the other parties.
March 9, 2021
DATE TRICIA M. CALIGUIRE, ALJ

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10956-20

Date Received at Agency:

Date Mailed to Parties:

TMC/nd

13