Board of Education of the Borough of Bound Brook, Somerset County v. Board of Education of the Borough of Somerville, Somerset County, and K.B., on behalf of minor child, K.B. and Z.B., 4/21/25 (#140-25)

140-25
OAL Dkt. No. 04737-23
Agency Dkt. No. 42-2/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Borough of Bound
Brook, Somerset County,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Borough 	of
Somerville, 	Somerset 	County, 	and 	K.B., 	on
behalf of minor children, K.B. and Z.B.,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by respondents Somerville Board of Education (Somerville) and the Somerset
County Executive County Superintendent (ECS) pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the replies
thereto filed by petitioner Bound Brook Board of Education (Bound Brook), have been reviewed
and considered.
Bound 	Brook 	challenges 	a 	homelessness 	and 	school 	district 	fiscal 	responsibility
determination regarding Z.B. and K.B., the children of respondent, K.B.,1 rendered by the ECS on
December 2, 2022. It is undisputed that, prior to June 2020, Ms. B. resided in Somerville with her
children, who attended school in the Somerville School District. Thereafter, the family lost their
1 Because respondent, K.B., and one of her children share the same initials, respondent, K.B. will be
referred to herein as “Ms. B.,” and her child will be referred to herein as “K.B.”

2
housing due to domestic violence and began living with relatives. On September 28, 2020, Ms.
B. signed a lease for a two-bedroom, one bathroom apartment in Bound Brook, within the Bound
Brook School District. The lease period was from October 1, 2020, to September 30, 2021, and
only Ms. B., Z.B., and K.B. were listed as the occupants. The apartment had a kitchen, a basement,
running water, heat, and electricity. The family occupied the apartment for the full duration of
the lease and Ms. B. signed a second rental agreement to remain at the Bound Brook apartment
from October 1, 2021, to September 30, 2022, and a third renewal in October 2022. On June 1,
2024, Ms. B. moved into an apartment in Branchburg after signing a written lease agreement.
The children continued to attend school in Somerville throughout this entire period.
Somerville assumed financial responsibility for the children’s tuition and transportation
through October 29, 2021. After that, Somerville sought a determination from the ECS regarding
homelessness and school district fiscal responsibility for Z.B. and K.B. 	On December 2, 2022,
upon consideration of information then available about the family, the ECS determined that: (1)
the family lost their Somerville housing in 2020, and continued to be McKinny-Vento eligible; (2)
the family moved in with relatives in Bound Brook in June 2020, and became domiciled in Bound
Brook as of October 29, 2021, when Bound Brook became the district of residence; and (3) thus,
Bound Brook is responsible for the children’s tuition and transportation costs from October 29,
2021, to present, including the costs of attendance to Somerville, until the family establishes a
permanent residence.
Bound Book appealed the ECS’s determination to the Commissioner of Education. After
the matter was transmitted to the OAL, a hearing was held on July 8, 2024, wherein Ms. B.
testified. She stated that she has identified as homeless since 2019. On October 1, 2020, she

3
moved to the Bound Brook apartment with her children after executing a lease. She testified to
entering into two successive lease agreements for her and her children to occupy the Bound
Brook apartment after the first lease expired. 	Ms. B. stated that she intended to leave for
Branchburg while residing at the Bound Brook apartment but did not want to break her lease.
Ms. B. further testified that she relied on a rental assistance program operated by Norwescap to
pay her security deposit and rent until 2021. 	When that support ended, she utilized the
Department of Community Affairs’ (DCA) Homelessness Prevention Program, which paid her rent
until December 2023 or January 2024. On June 1, 2024, Ms. B. and her children moved into an
apartment in Branchburg after executing a lease. As of the hearing on July 8, 2024, the family
still resided in the Branchburg apartment, and the children continued to attend school in
Somerville.
The parties submitted post-hearing briefs. Bound Brook contended that the family had a
fixed, regular, and adequate residence at the Bound Brook apartment from October 1, 2020,
through June 1, 2024, and therefore was not homeless as defined by law at any time relevant to
this matter. 	Bound Brook further contended that when Ms. B. moved to the apartment, the
children should have enrolled in Bound Brook schools; as such, Bound Brook cannot be financially
responsible for the children’s education in Somerville. Somerville and the ECS contended that
the Bound Brook apartment is transitional housing and therefore the family was homeless
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2(a)(1). Somerville and the ECS further asserted that Bound Brook
remains financially responsible for the children’s education in Somerville from October 21, 2021.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Ms. B.’s testimony to be “somewhat credible
and persuasive” but further indicated that she “attempted to ‘sell’ her version of the facts to the

4
undersigned, including the belief of homelessness,” which “detracted from any modicum of
credibility.” Initial Decision at 4. The ALJ further found that a “logical assembly of piecemeal
facts, as testified to by K.B.,” established that she was domiciled in Bound Brook, but sent her
children to school in Somerville. Ibid.
The ALJ concluded that “[a]t no time during the parameters established during this
hearing was K.B. or her children homeless.” Initial Decision at 5. Citing to testimony and evidence
on the record, the ALJ reasoned that there was no basis to conclude that the Bound Brook
apartment was inadequate for the family’s needs. Specifically, the ALJ found that the apartment
had two bedrooms, a bathroom, a living room, and a basement. The apartment was also solely
occupied by Ms. B., Z.B. and K.B., who had full access to “all amenities of a stable and adequate
home” such as heat, water, electricity, and access to cooking facilities. Id. at 4-5. Accordingly,
the ALJ deemed the Bound Brook apartment fixed, regular, and adequate.
Next, the ALJ concluded that since domicile attaches immediately when a residence is
deemed fixed, regular, and adequate, the children had become eligible for free public education
in Bound Brook and should have enrolled in Bound Brook schools; as such, Bound Brook is not
responsible to Somerville for the children’s education and transportation. In doing so, the ALJ
reversed the ECS’s determination, and rejected respondents’ argument that Ms. B. was homeless
because DCA and Norwescap paid her rent.
In its exceptions, Somerville argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that Ms. B. and her
children were not homeless. Somerville contends that it is well-established that families living in
transitional housing are considered homeless under law and that homelessness is best viewed in
a continuum. 	According to Somerville, that continuum shows that Ms. B. and her children

5
temporarily resided in Bound Brook since October 2020, out of necessity due to domestic
violence; that Ms. B. was totally reliant on transitional housing programs to pay her rent from
October 2020 to June 2024; and that Ms. B. never intended to make Bound Brook her permanent
domicile. As such, Somerville argues that the Bound Brook apartment was transitional housing,
meaning the family was homeless in Bound Brook from October 2020 through June 2024.
Accordingly, 	Somerville 	contends 	that 	Bound 	Brook 	is 	responsible 	for 	the 	tuition 	and
transportation of the children to attend school in Somerville.
In response, Bound Brook argues that the ALJ correctly found and concluded that Ms. B.
and her children were not homeless while residing at the Bound Brook apartment. Bound Brook
contends that the family did not reside in transitional housing or a transitional housing facility as
defined by law at any point relevant to the instant matter. Bound Brook further contends that
the record does not support a conclusion that Ms. B. intended to reside in Bound Brook
temporarily, noting that Ms. B. entered into three written annual lease agreements for the Bound
Brook 	apartment, 	and 	that 	the 	family 	lived 	there 	continuously 	for 	nearly 	four 	years.
Furthermore, Bound Brook argues that the undisputed facts establish that the family had a fixed,
regular, and adequate home in Bound Brook from October 1, 2020 through June 1, 2024, and
that rental assistance from a third party does not alter the apartment’s fixed and regular nature.
The ECS takes exception to the ALJ’s conclusion that at no time were Ms. B. and her
children homeless. The ECS argues that the ALJ’s finding — that Ms. B. and her children moved
in with relatives in Bound Brook in June 2020 — qualifies the family as homeless under state and
federal law. The ECS also argues that there is an open question about whether the family relied
on transitional housing that the ALJ never resolved, and that failing to address this issue was in

6
error.2 As such, the ECS requests that the ALJ’s decision be rejected and the matter remanded
for further fact-finding.
In response, Bound Brook argues that the ALJ correctly rejected the claim that the Bound
Brook apartment was transitional housing. 	Bound Brook asserts that respondents failed to
produce competent evidence establishing that Ms. B.’s successive annual leases were through a
transitional housing program that would qualify as homelessness. 	Moreover, Bound Brook
emphasizes that the ALJ addressed the issue of transitional housing when, based on his credibility
finding and the evidence on the record, he concluded that the family was not homeless during
the relevant period. 	Lastly, Bound Brook contends that instant matter concerns Ms. B.’s
residence from October 1, 2020, onward; as such, her homelessness status prior to that period
is not at issue.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ – for the reasons stated in the Initial
Decision – that Ms. B. and her children were not homeless during the time period at issue in this
case.3 The Commissioner further concurs with the ALJ’s determination that Bound Brook is not
financially responsible for Z.B.’s and K.B.’s education or transportation to Somerville.
2 The ECS notes that neither Ms. B. nor Somerville provided evidence that the housing assistance provided
by Norwescap or DCA qualified as transitional housing “rather than a more general homeless prevention
program,” and that Bound Brook did not provide evidence that the residence did not qualify as transitional
housing. The ECS indicates that he “left it to the ALJ to decide” whether the family lived in transitional
housing. ECS Exceptions, at 6. Notwithstanding those statements, the ECS also argues that the Bound
Brook apartment was transitional housing, pointing in part to Exhibit R-5. However, Exhibit R-5 was not
entered into evidence because it was not produced until after the hearing. As such, any reference to it is
improper per N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4(c), and neither the exhibit itself nor arguments related to it in the ECS’
exceptions were considered.
3 The Commissioner finds that Ms. B. may have been homeless from June 2020 through September 2020,
when she lost her home due to domestic violence and was residing with relatives. The Commissioner
notes that students living with relatives are not always determined to be homeless, and a fact-specific
analysis is required. 	However, because the ECS’s decision being appealed only found Bound Brook

7
Under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, homeless children are defined as
“individuals who lack a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime residence,” which includes
“children and youths who are sharing the housing of other persons due to loss of housing,
economic hardship, or a similar reason.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 11434a(2). Similarly, under state law,
homeless children are defined as “child[ren] or youth who lack[] a fixed, regular and adequate
residence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12 and N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2,” which includes children living
in the “residence of relatives or friends where the homeless child resides out of necessity because
the child’s or youth’s family lacks a regular or permanent residence of its own.” N.J.A.C. 6A:17-
1.2; N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2(a)(3). “[D]omicile attaches immediately if a student’s dwelling is found to
be fixed, regular and adequate.” Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Egg Harbor v. Bd. of Educ. of Mainland
Reg’l Sch. Dist., Commissioner Decision No. 555-10 (Dec. 30, 2010), at 4 (citing N.J.S.A. 18A:17B-
12(c)).
responsible for K.B. and Z.B. beginning on October 29, 2021, the period prior to that date is not at issue
in this case and it is unnecessary to make that determination here. For this reason, the Commissioner
concludes that the ALJ was not in error when he found that the family was never homeless, as his decision
was clearly limited to the period of time that is in dispute, not the period that covered June 2020 through
September 2020. The Commissioner also notes that Ms. B.’s living situation from January 2024 to June
2024 is unclear, as she testified that she was sleeping in her car at one point in 2024, but the ALJ also
noted that she testified that she “considers the end of her homelessness to have been in January 2024.”
Initial Decision, at 3. However, as noted herein, Ms. B. was domiciled in Bound Brook well before January
2024 and should have already enrolled Z.B. and K.B. in the Bound Brook School District prior to any point
at which she may have been living in her car in 2024. See Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Bound Brook v. Bd.
of Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway, Commissioner Decision No. 363-24 (Oct. 8, 2024), at 10 (finding that
because “domicile attaches immediately if a student’s dwelling is found to be fixed, regular and
adequate,” the children should have enrolled in the new school district at the time the family moved into
such a dwelling). Accordingly, even if Ms. B. became homeless during the period from January 2024 to
June 2024, Bound Brook should not be held responsible to Somerville for the children’s tuition and
transportation during that period, as the children should not have been attending school in Somerville at
that time.

8
The 	Commissioner 	has 	previously 	held 	that homelessness 	“is 	best 	viewed 	in 	a
continuum.” St.-Op. Sch. Dist. of Camden v. C. Ann Volk, Commissioner Decision No. 172-17R
(June 20, 2017), at 11. Conducting a homelessness evaluation to determine whether a child’s
home is considered fixed, regular, and adequate requires a fact-specific analysis and “cannot rest
upon a simple calculation of the amount of time that children have spent in a particular location
or municipality.” M. O’K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Cresskill, Commissioner Decision No. 325-
14 at 3 (August 12, 2014), aff’d, No. A-0828-14T4 (App. Div. Sept. 8, 2016). In conducting such a
fact-specific inquiry, the Commissioner must consider the totality of the circumstances, as “[t]he
reasons for the children’s homelessness, their living conditions, and the resources and intentions
of the parents or custodians are relevant.” Ibid.
Here, Ms. B. and her children were not homeless while residing in the Bound Brook
apartment – a fixed, regular, and adequate residence. 	The Commissioner does not find
Respondents’ exceptions to be persuasive. The fact that Ms. B. relied on DCA and Norwescap for
her apartment’s security deposit and rent is not dispositive. Petitioner correctly points out that
the Commissioner previously addressed a similar issue in Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Bound Brook
v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway, Commissioner Decision No. 363-24 (Oct. 8, 2024), at 8. The
Commissioner concluded that a parent living in an apartment rental with child and her mother
was not homeless. Specifically, the Commissioner noted that “the fact that [the parent] did not
sign the lease for [the residence] and is not directly financially responsible for rent payments to
the landlord does not require the Commissioner to conclude that [the parent and] children
remain homeless.” Ibid. The Commissioner instead focused on the fact that the mother and child
had resided at in the apartment for an extended period without interruption. Ibid.

9
Ms. B. and her children similarly resided at the Bound Brook apartment for an extended
period. 	The family continued to reside at the Bound Brook apartment after their first annual
lease expired. Ms. B. entered into two separate and consecutive annual lease agreements to
remain at the Bound Brook apartment. The family resided there for over three years. The record
indicates the family’s residence at the Bound Brook apartment was continuous and without
interruption. Furthermore, Ms. B., Z.B., and K.B. were the sole occupants of the apartment that
consisted of two bedrooms, one bathroom, a living room, a kitchen, and a basement. The family
had access to the entire apartment and its amenities, including running water, heat, and
electricity. Ms. B.’s expressed desire to move elsewhere is insufficient to support a finding of
homelessness when considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. See ibid. Moreover,
Ms. B. testified that despite her intent to move, she did not want to break her lease.
The Commissioner is not persuaded by the respondents’ exceptions. The ECS contends
that the ALJ failed to address whether the Bound Brook apartment qualifies as transitional
housing, and Somerville argues that the apartment was transitional housing. While the ALJ did
not use the phrase “transitional housing” in the Initial Decision, he did specifically find that the
“claim that the DCA paid [Ms. B.’s] rent does not qualify as proof of homelessness.” 	Initial
Decision, at 7. The parties’ filings demonstrate that Ms. B.’s receipt of rental assistance was the
basis for their argument that she resided in transitional housing; by rejecting the receipt of rental
assistance as proof of homelessness, the ALJ inherently rejected it as proof that the Bound Brook
apartment was transitional housing.
In reaching his determination, the ALJ relied on evidence on the record and Ms. B.’s
testimony. The ALJ found Ms. B.’s testimony “somewhat credible” but that her attempts to sell

10
her version of the facts, including the belief of homelessness, “detracted from any modicum of
credibility.” Initial Decision at 4. The Commissioner notes that the ALJ had the opportunity to
assess the credibility of Ms. B., who appeared before him and make findings of fact based upon
her testimony. 	Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), an agency "may not reject or modify any
findings of fact as to issues of credibility of lay witnesses unless it is first determined from a review
of the record that those findings are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or are not supported
by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence in the record.” The Commissioner finds no basis
in the record to disturb the ALJ’s credibility assessment regarding Ms. B.’s testimony.
To fully clarify the issue, the Commissioner concludes that the Bound Brook apartment
was not transitional housing. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:17-1.2, a transitional living facility means
“a temporary facility that provides housing to a child due to domestic violence.” Here, while the
record indicates that Ms. B. and her children relocated from Somerville to Bound Brook in June
2020 due to domestic violence, there is no evidence in the record that the Bound Brook
apartment she began to lease in October 2020 fits into the definition of a temporary facility that
provides housing; rather, it was a fixed, regular, and adequate residence in which Ms. B. and her
children lived for more than three years. 	Somerville – and Ms. B. and the ECS – had ample
opportunity during the proceedings at the OAL to produce documentation indicating that the
Bound Brook apartment was part of a transitional housing program that could support a finding
of homelessness under the law, but they did not do so, and the Commissioner concludes that it
is unnecessary to remand this matter for further fact-finding 	when the record as it stands
supports the conclusion that it was not transitional housing and Ms. B. was not homeless when
she resided there.

11
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby granted. Bound Brook is not financially responsible for the Z.B.’s and
K.B.’s transportation to and education in Somerville from October 29, 2021 to June 30, 2024.4
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	April 21, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	April 22, 2025
4 If Ms. B. still resides in Branchburg, she is directed to enroll Z.B. and K.B. in the Branchburg School District
if she has not already done so.
5 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
AGENCY DKT. NO. 42-2/23
BOARD OF EDUCATION, BOROUGH
OF BOUND BROOK, SOMERSET COUNTY,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION, BOROUGH
OF SOMERVILLE, SOMERSET COUNTY,
AND K.B. ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN
K.B. AND Z.B.,
Respondents.
Kyle J. Trent, Esq., for petitioner, Bound Brook Board of Education (Apruzzese,
McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, P.C., attorneys)
Philip E. Stern, Esq., for respondent Somerville Board of Education (DiFrancesco,
Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer and Flaum, P.C., attorneys)
K.B. on behalf of minor children K.B. and Z.B., respondent, pro se
Record Closed: October 21, 2024 Decided: December 5, 2024
BEFORE DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Borough of Bound Brook, challenges the determination made by the
Somerset County executive superintendent of schools that determined: 1. Respondent
K.B. and her minor children K.B. and Z.B. under the law were homeless and became
domiciled in Bound Brook as of October 29, 2021, when Bound Brook became the district
of residence; and 2. Bound Brook is responsible for tuition and transportation costs for
K.B. and Z.B. from October 29, 2021, forward, until the family establishes a permanent
residence.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Department of Education, and an answer was
filed. The matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, where on May 31,
2023, it was filed as a contested case. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
Several prehearing telephone conferences were scheduled, but K.B. failed to appear.
Throughout the proceedings, the parties made several attempts to exchange
discovery. The difficulties in exchanging discovery required multiple conference calls with
the judge to resolve the conflicts. A telephone conference was held on June 4, 2024,
where K.B. again failed to appear. I was informed that K.B. would not be attending the
hearing. I made the determination that the hearing would proceed as scheduled on June
11, 2024. However, a telephone conference was held on June 11, 2024, without the
appearance of K.B., and another hearing date was scheduled for July 8, 2024, where K.B.
did appear. The record remained open for the parties to submit written closing
summations. The record closed on October 21, 2024, after receipt of the parties’
submissions.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
K.B. is the parent of K.B. and Z.B. Until June 2020, K.B. resided in Somerville and
the minor children attended school in the Somerville School District. In June 2020, K.B.
moved to Bound Brook to live with relatives, where she continues to be domiciled with

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
3
her children. During this period, the children continued to attend school in Somerville.
On December 2, 2022, the Somerset County executive superintendent of schools issued
a decision regarding residency status and fiscal responsibility for the children. It was
determined that the family became domiciled in Bound Brook as of October 29, 2021, and
from that day forward Bound Brook was responsible for tuition and transportation for the
children.
The preceding statements are not in dispute, as they are from the records and
testimony of the parties, and are hereby FOUND as FACT.
Testimony
K.B. was the only person to testify, and she stated that as of June 1, 2024, she
currently lives in Bound Brook, New Jersey, and has two children (ages fifteen and
sixteen) enrolled in Somerville High School. On October 1, 2020, she moved to Bound
Brook and executed a lease. (P-4.) The same lease was executed on October 1, 2021,
through September 2022. “There’s a possibility” that the residential lease (P-4) was
provided prior to the issuance of the McKinney-Vento eligibility. (P-1.)
On cross-examination, she stated that she has “identified as homeless since 2019”
due to domestic violence. She contacted an organization that paid her rent and electricity
until 2021. After that, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) (Homelessness
Prevention Program) paid for approximately two and a half years until January 2024. She
considered herself homeless because she “couldn’t pay for rent” or provide for her family.
These places were a “temporary residence.” She considers the end of her homelessness
to have been in January 2024.
Additional Findings of Fact
For testimony to be believed, it must not only come from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it also must be credible in itself. It must elicit evidence that is from such
common experience and observation that it can be approved as proper under the
circumstances. See Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 N.J. 546 (1954); Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
4
Super. 1 (App. Div. 1961). A credibility determination requires an overall assessment of
the witness’s story considering its rationality, internal consistency, and the manner in
which it “hangs together” with the other evidence. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718,
749 (9th Cir. 1963). Also, “‘[t]he interest, motive, bias, or prejudice of a witness may affect
his credibility and justify the [trier of fact], whose province it is to pass upon the credibility
of an interested witness, in disbelieving his testimony.’” State v. Salimone, 19 N.J. Super.
600, 608 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 10 N.J. 316 (1952) (citation omitted).
A trier of fact may reject testimony because it is inherently incredible, or because
it is inconsistent with other testimony or with common experience, or because it is
overborne by other testimony. Congleton v. Pura-Tex Stone Corp., 53 N.J. Super. 282,
287 (App. Div. 1958).
After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, I make the following
additional findings of fact:
The testimony of K.B. was somewhat credible and persuasive. However, her own
testimony assisted the petitioner in proving the facts of the case by a preponderance of
the evidence.
A logical assembly of piecemeal facts, as testified to by K.B., was that she was
domiciled in Bound Brook but sent her children to school in Somerville. The undersigned
believes that the petitioner brought the case together quite well in establishing the real
facts.
It was obvious that K.B. attempted to “sell” her version of the facts to the
undersigned, including the “belief” of homelessness. This detracted from any modicum
of credibility. The facts of the matter are that the Bound Brook apartment leased by K.B.
consisted of two bedrooms and one bathroom and that she resided in it with her two
children. There is no assertion or basis to conclude that it was inadequate for the family’s
needs. The two bedrooms, living room, kitchen, bathroom, and basement were solely
occupied by K.B. and her two children. K.B. had full access to all amenities of a stable

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
5
and adequate home, including but not limited to heat, water, electricity, and cooking
facilities. At no time during the parameters established during this hearing was K.B. or
her children homeless.
Therefore, I FIND that until June 2020 K.B. resided in Somerville and the minor
children attended school in the Somerville School District. I FURTHER FIND that in June
2020 K.B. moved to Bound Brook to live with relatives, where she continued to reside
with her children; however, the children continued to attend school in Somerville. I
FURTHER FIND that at no time were K.B. and her children homeless. I FURTHER FIND
that on December 2, 2022, the Somerset County executive superintendent of schools
issued a decision regarding residency status and fiscal responsibility for the children as
follows: it was determined that the family became domiciled in Bound Brook as of October
29, 2021, and from that day forward Bound Brook was responsible for transportation for
the children. However, I FURTHER FIND that although the December 2, 2022, finding by
the Somerset County executive superintendent may be qualified as a “reasoned exercise
of his discretionary authority under N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.7(a),” it was erroneous.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
At issue is whether K.B. and her minor children K.B. and Z.B. under the law were
homeless and became domiciled in Bound Brook as of October 29, 2021, when Bound
Brook became the district of residence, and whether Bound Brook is responsible for
tuition and transportation costs for minor children K.B. and Z.B. from October 29, 2021.
Also at issue is whether the minor children, K.B. and Z.B., were entitled to a free education
in Somerville to be paid for by Bound Brook under N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1, which provides that
public schools shall be free to persons over five and under twenty years of age who are
“domiciled within the school district.” See V.R. ex rel. A.R. v. Hamburg Bd. of Educ., 2
N.J.A.R. 283, 287 (1980), aff’d, State Bd., 1981 S.L.D. 1533, rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. Rabinowitz v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 481 (D.N.J. 1982) (New Jersey
requires local domicile, as opposed to mere residence, for a student to receive a free
education).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
6
A person who meets age requirements and is domiciled within a school district
may attend its public schools free of charge. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(a). A person may have
many residences but only one domicile. Somerville Bd. of Educ. v. Manville Bd. of Educ.,
332 N.J. Super. 6, 12 (App. Div. 2000), aff’d, 167 N.J. 55 (2001). A child’s domicile is
normally that of his or her parents. Ibid. The domicile of a person is the place where he
has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever
he is absent he has the intention of returning, and from which he has no present intention
of moving. In re Unanue, 255 N.J. Super. 362, 374 (Law Div. 1991), aff’d, 311 N.J. Super.
589 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 541 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051 (1999).
The acts, statements, and conduct of the individual, as viewed in the light of all the
circumstances, determine a person’s true intent. Collins v. Yancey, 55 N.J. Super. 514,
521 (Law Div. 1959). The parent has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(b)(2). K.B. was not homeless at any time relevant to this
proceeding, and the Bound Brook Board of Education is not financially responsible for
K.B.’s children’s education in Somerville at any time, including the period beginning
October 29, 2021. The Bound Brook apartment leased by K.B. consisted of two
bedrooms and one bathroom, and she resided in it with her two children. There is no
assertion or basis to conclude that it was inadequate for the family’s needs. The two
bedrooms, living room, kitchen, bathroom, and basement were solely occupied by K.B.
and her two children. K.B. had full access to all amenities of a stable and adequate home,
including but not limited to heat, water, electricity, and access to cooking facilities.
Furthermore, Bound Brook is correct that when a family claims to be homeless but
is living in “a fixed, regular, and adequate residence” they do not qualify as homeless.
Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 2024 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 880, Final
Decision at *12 (October 9, 2024). Since “domicile attaches immediately if a student’s
dwelling is found to be fixed, regular and adequate,” the family becomes “eligible for a
free public education in the . . . school district [they moved to] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:38-
1(a) and N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a) and should have enrolled in [that district’s] schools at that
time.” Ibid. (citation omitted). In such circumstance, that new district “cannot be held
financially responsible for payment of the children’s out-of-district tuition and
transportation expenses” where the family claimed to be homeless and continued

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
7
attending school in their old school district pending the appeal. Ibid. The claim that the
DCA paid K.B.’s rent does not qualify as proof of homelessness.
The record reflects that K.B. and her minor children were never homeless and that
the children attended school within the district of Somerville while domiciled outside of the
district in Bound Brook. Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that until June 2020 K.B. was
domiciled in Somerville with the minor children, who attended school in the Somerville
School District. I FURTHER CONCLUDE that in June 2020 K.B. moved to Bound Brook
and was domiciled with relatives, and she continues to live there with her children.
However, the children continued to attend school in Somerville. I FURTHER CONCLUDE
that the decision of December 2, 2022, by the Somerset County executive superintendent
of schools regarding residency status and fiscal responsibility for the children was
erroneous. I FURTHER CONCLUDE that petitioner’s appeal should be GRANTED.
ORDER
It is, therefore, ORDERED that the petitioner’s appeal is GRANTED and Bound
Brook is not financially responsible for any aspect of the minor children’s education or
transportation in Somerville.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
8
by email to ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of
Controversies and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton,
New Jersey 08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the
other parties.
December 5 , 2024
DATE DEAN J. BUONO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
DJB/onl

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04737-23
9
APPENDIX
Witnesses
For petitioner:
K.B.
For respondent:
None
Exhibits
For petitioner:
P-1 McKinney-Vento Law
P-2 Interrogatories
P-3 Answers to Interrogatories
P-4 Lease Agreement with 34 West Second St., Bound Brook
For respondent:
R-1 Lease Agreements
R-2 Norwescap and emails
R-3 Ledger of payments
R-4 May Invoice