Rebecca Petersen v. Board of Education of the Hunterdon Central Regional High School District, Hunterdon County, 1/16/26 (#16-26R)

16-26R
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 05919-23
Agency Dkt. No. 159-6/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Rebecca Petersen,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Hunterdon Central
Regional 	High 	School 	District, 	Hunterdon
County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by petitioner and respondent pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the replies
thereto, have been reviewed and considered. Upon review, the Commissioner is constrained to
remand the matter to the OAL for further proceedings.
Petitioner, formerly a member of respondent Board of Education, alleges that the Board
usurped the powers of the School Ethics Commission (SEC) granted pursuant to the School Ethics
Act, N.J.S.A. 18:12-21 to -34, by investigating, prosecuting, and censuring her for anonymous
social media posts that members of the public believed that she made. She seeks a declaration
that the investigation and censure were ultra vires, that she was denied due process, and
requests that the Board’s related resolution be vacated. 	She also seeks indemnification and

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counsel fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 for her defense against the Board’s ultra vires
actions. The indemnification statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20, states in relevant part:
Whenever a civil, administrative, criminal or quasi-criminal
action or other legal proceeding has been or shall be brought
against any person for any act or omission arising out of and in the
course of the performance of his duties as a member of a board of
education . . . the board of education shall defray all costs of
defending such action, including reasonable counsel fees and
expenses, together with costs of appeal, if any, and shall save
harmless and protect such person from any financial loss resulting
therefrom.
Following transmittal of the matter to the OAL and the exchange of discovery, the parties
cross-moved for summary decision. In connection therewith, the parties submitted a signed joint
stipulation of facts. Relevant to petitioner’s indemnification claim, stipulated fact #18 states: “All
such Board action conducted against Mrs. Petersen arose out of and in her role as a member of
the Board.” The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that stipulated fact #18 constituted a legal
conclusion and did not “find it as fact.” Initial Decision at 7.
Ultimately, the ALJ granted petitioner’s motion for summary decision in part, and granted
respondent’s motion for summary decision in part. With respect to the Board resolution, the ALJ
concluded that the Board’s undated resolution which states, in part, that it had “identified
evidence of intentional actions [by petitioner] that eroded trust and risked the integrity and
transparency of the entire Board at a sufficient level to warrant a complaint be filed with the
[School Ethics] Commission” was ultra vires because it resulted in the de facto discipline of
petitioner for violation of the Code of Ethics for School Board Members (Code).
Concerning her due process claims, the ALJ concluded that because the Board illegally
exceeded its authority in taking it upon itself to adjudicate and impose discipline for perceived

3
Code violations, whether it afforded petitioner due process is irrelevant. 	As for petitioner’s
indemnification claim, the ALJ found that the March 29, 2023, Board meeting was a “legal
proceeding” under the indemnification statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20. However, the ALJ concluded
that petitioner is not entitled to indemnification under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 because there is
insufficient evidence that the Board’s legal proceeding concerned petitioner’s performance of
her duties as a Board member.
In particular, the ALJ found no nexus between the social media posts at issue—which
petitioner never admitted to making—and petitioner’s exercise of her duties as a Board member.
Initial Decision at 18. The ALJ also recognized that the parties’ joint stipulation did not address
the social media posts and found that the record lacked evidence connecting petitioner to the
social medial posts. 	As for stipulated fact #18, which provides that Board action against
petitioner “arose out of and in her role as a member of the Board,” the ALJ concluded that she
was not bound by the agreement of counsel as to how a statute should be interpreted or applied.
Id. at 17.
In her exceptions, petitioner argues, among other things, that the ALJ improperly rejected
stipulated fact #18 as a legal conclusion and deprived the parties of a fair opportunity to provide
a factual basis for the stipulation. In response, the Board agrees with the ALJ that stipulated fact
#18 constitutes a legal conclusion that falls within the ALJ’s purview, and that petitioner bears
the burden of establishing that she satisfies the statutory criteria for indemnification set forth in

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N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20. The Board does not agree that petitioner should be given an opportunity to
present additional evidence on this issue because it has already been adjudicated.1
Upon review, the Commissioner finds that a limited remand is required to allow the
parties to present evidence relevant to the issue of indemnification, specifically whether the
Board’s March 29, 2023, meeting pertained to any act or omission arising out of and in the course
of the performance of petitioner’s duties as a Board member. N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20.
“The parties may by stipulation agree upon the facts or any portion thereof involved in
any controversy. Such a stipulation shall be regarded as evidence and shall preclude the parties
from thereafter challenging the facts agreed upon.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.11. In contrast, judges are
“not bound by the concession or agreement of counsel as to how [a] statute is to be interpreted.”
Tibbs v. Boemi, 109 N.J. Super. 200, 204 (App. Div.), aff’d, 55 N.J. 531 (1970). Here, a concession
as to whether the Board’s action against petitioner arose out of and in her role as a member of
the Board “relate[s] to interpretation of a statute, an area as to which a stipulation is
impermissible.” Schere v. Freehold, 150 N.J. Super. 404, 408 (App. Div. 1977).
Although the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that stipulated fact #18 was a legal
conclusion, the Commissioner determines that the parties should be given the opportunity to
present relevant evidence as to whether the Board’s March 29, 2023, meeting pertained to any
act or omission arising out of and in the course of the performance of petitioner’s duties as a
Board member. While the ALJ concluded that the present record contains insufficient evidence
1 The Board submitted its own exceptions to the ALJ’s initial decision wherein it argues that: (1)
the Board did not discipline petitioner via its resolution authorizing the Board President to file
ethics charges with the SEC because the underlying ethics complaint was filed within the statute
of limitations period; and (2) the March 29, 2023, Board meeting was not a legal proceeding
within the meaning of the indemnification statute.

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to establish that the Board’s legal proceeding concerned petitioner’s performance of her duties
as a Board member and denied the indemnification claim on that basis, the Commissioner finds
that it was not unreasonable for the parties to believe that presentation of such evidence was
unnecessary in light of stipulated fact #18. Thus, in the interest of fairness, a remand is warranted
to allow supplementation of the record.
Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the OAL for the limited purpose of allowing the
parties to present evidence relevant to the issue of indemnification as described herein. 	The
Commissioner will adjudicate all other remaining issues following the remand proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	January 16, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	January 20, 2026

New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
AGENCY DKT. NO. 159-6/23
REBECCA PETERSEN,
Petitioner,
v.
HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH
SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF
EDUCATION, HUNTERDON COUNTY,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
Gwyneth K. Murray-Nolan, Esq., for petitioner (Murray-Nolan Berutti LLC,
attorneys)
Joseph L. Roselle, Esq., for respondent (Schenck, Price, Smith & King, LLP,
attorneys)
BEFORE JUDITH LIEBERMAN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Rebecca Petersen was a member of the Hunterdon Central Regional
High School Board of Education (“Board” or “respondent”) during the times relevant to

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
2
this matter. She filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Education
(“Commissioner”) a petition of appeal claiming that the Board usurped the powers of the
School Ethics Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) under the School Ethics Act,
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-21 to -34 by “investigating, prosecuting, and censuring” her for
anonymous social media posts that members of the public believed that she made.
The petition alleges that the Board unilaterally investigated and adjudicated
petitioner’s alleged SEA violations; stripped her of due process protections when it held
a legal proceeding against her; and issued a de facto censure as punishment for her
violations. As relief, she seeks a declaration that the Board’s actions, which culminated
in a Board resolution denouncing the social media comments and directing the Board
President to file an ethics complaint against her with the Commission, were illegal and
ultra vires, an order vacating the Board’s resolution, and indemnification for her legal fees
under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 for her defense against and appeal of the Board’s actions
against her.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 9, 2023, petitioner filed the underlying petition of appeal with the
Department of Education. On June 29, 2023, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the
petition of appeal in lieu of an answer. The Department of Education transmitted the
matter to the Office of Administrative Law, where, on July 3, 2023, it was filed as a
contested case. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
On September 1, 2023, petitioner filed a brief in opposition to respondent’s motion
to dismiss and a cross-motion for summary decision. On November 21, 2023,
respondent’s motion to dismiss and petitioner’s cross-motion for summary decision were
denied.
Between November 12, 2023, and November 6, 2024, several prehearing
conferences were convened to address the parties’ ongoing discovery disputes. On

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
3
November 27, 2024, petitioner filed a motion for sanctions based upon respondent’s
alleged failure to provide discovery and spoliation of evidence. The motion was denied
on January 31, 2025, and the parties were ordered to complete all discovery by March
14, 2025.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary decision, and oral argument was
heard on September 17, 2025. The record closed on September 18, 2025, after petitioner
supplemented the record.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Petitioner explained the genesis of her complaint in her petition, which asserted in
part:
During the public comment portion of the Board meeting of March 20, 2023, two
local activists shared information alleging that a sitting Board member operated an
anonymous Twitter account under the profile name Mammallama and posted
inappropriate comments about transgender issues. Verified Pet., ¶¶ 1, 16. The Twitter
account did not appear to hold itself out to be linked to a Board member in any capacity
and did not contain any information not available to the public. Id. at ¶ 1. On March 21,
2023, petitioner received a request for comment from a local journalist who received a tip
that petitioner was the owner of the Twitter account in question. Id. at ¶ 17. That same
day petitioner met with Superintendent Jeffrey Moore, Board Vice President Dorothea
Kellogg, and Board President Lisa Hughes, who accused petitioner of being the
anonymous tweeter. Id. at ¶ 18−19. After that meeting, Board President Hughes
contacted each Board member and informed them that petitioner was the person behind
the anonymous tweets. Board President Hughes emailed the full Board that evening and
attached a packet of evidence of the situation. Id. at ¶¶ 20−21.
The parties stipulated the following. I therefore FIND it as FACT:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
4
1. Petitioner Rebecca Petersen (“Mrs. Petersen”) has been a member of the
Hunterdon Central Regional High School (“HCRHS”) Board of Education
since January 3, 2023.
2. On or about March 15, 2023, the Board, led by then President Lisa Hughes
(“Hughes”), Vice President Dorothea Kellogg (“Kellogg”) and
Superintendent Jeffrey Moore (“Moore”), initiated an investigation to
demonstrate that Mrs. Petersen violated the Code of Ethics for School
Board Members, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1 (“Code”).
3. On March 24, 2023, Hughes called a special Board meeting to be held on
March 29, 2023, to adjudicate whether Mrs. Petersen violated the Code.
4. Mrs. Petersen retained an attorney to protect her interests, who sent a letter
to the Board informing it that it was engaged in action that was ultra vires
and should immediately cease.
5. Board Counsel Alicia D’Anella (“D’Anella”) did not acknowledge the letter
and never acknowledged that Mrs. Petersen was represented by counsel.
6. During the March 29, 2023 Executive Session, Moore presented “evidence”
in support of his position that Mrs. Petersen violated the Code. See Exh. A.
7. Mrs. Petersen was not permitted to have legal counsel, present evidence or
witnesses, or cross-examine any purported witnesses and was precluded
from challenging the purported evidence against her, though Board counsel
D’Anella was present.
8. Following Moore’s presentation of evidence, a majority of the Board
weighed the evidence and believed that Mrs. Petersen violated the Code.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
5
9. Mrs. Petersen denied all “charges” against her and objected to the legality
and constitutionality of the proceedings under the New Jersey and federal
constitutions and laws.
10. D’Anella provided the Board with three options for penalizing Mrs. Petersen
for her alleged Code violations: (1) adopt a Resolution of Censure; (2) hold
a Vote of No Confidence; or (3) vote to direct the Board President to file
Ethics Complaints against Mrs. Petersen.
11. Kellogg stated that the purpose of a censure was to “publicly humiliate” Mrs.
Petersen.
12. Between the March 29, 2023 Executive Session and the April 24, 2023
regular meeting of the Board, D’Anella, on behalf of the Board, drafted
various options for the Board to consider, including (1) a Resolution of
Censure; (2) a Vote of No Confidence; and (3) a Resolution directing the
Board President to file Ethics Complaints against Mrs. Petersen with the
New Jersey School Ethics Commission.
13. On April 19, 2023, Mrs. Petersen filed a Complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, Civil No. 23-2189 (ZNQ)(JBD)
(“Federal Complaint”), challenging and appealing the legality and
constitutionality of the Board’s March 29, 2023 trial and seeking an
injunction against the Board’s proposed punishment. On or about April 21,
2023, the Hon. Zahid N. Quraishi, U.S.D.J., issued an opinion denying
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.
14. At the regular meeting of the Board on April 24, 2023, the Board passed a
resolution entitled “Motion to Authorize Board President to File Ethics
Charges on the Board’s Behalf,” which directed the Board President to file
ethics charges against Mrs. Petersen with the School Ethics Commission
on the Board’s behalf and with the participation of individual members. Exh.
B.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
6
15. On May 5, 2023, Mrs. Petersen filed an Amended Complaint in Federal
Court, challenging and appealing the legality and constitutionality of the
Board’s actions, seeking only declaratory relief, in the public interest.
16. On or about May 22, 2023, the Board filed a Verified Petition and Request
for Emergent Relief with the Commissioner of Education against Mrs.
Petersen, seeking her removal from the Board due to her then-pending
lawsuit against the Board and Superintendent.
17. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint without prejudice, after
which the Board withdrew its own action to seek petitioner’s removal.
The stipulated facts referenced the following exhibits:
1. March 29, 2023, Executive Session Minutes: “Dr. Moore and Mrs. Hughes
led discussions and presented evidence relating to allegations a Board
member [sic] pertaining to correspondence received by the Board accusing
a member of the Board of inappropriate comments and use of social media.”
J-A.
2. Undated Resolution that was read aloud:
Whereas, The Board, to the best of its ability and within the
limits of its authority, has investigated the allegation brought
by members of the public against Mrs. Petersen, a sitting
member of the Board.
Whereas, That investigation identified evidence of intentional
actions that eroded trust and risked the integrity and
transparency of the entire Board at a sufficient level to warrant
a complaint be filed with the School Ethics Commission
against Mrs. Petersen;
Whereas, The Board recognizes the School Ethics
Commission as the appropriate authority to adjudicate such
complaints;

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
7
Therefore, be it RESOLVED as follows:
The Board directs the Board President to file ethics charges
against Ms. Petersen on behalf of the Board and with the
participation of individual members.
[J-B.1]
Stipulated fact number eighteen provides, “All such Board actions conducted
against Mrs. Petersen arose out of and in her role as a member of the Board.” This is a
legal conclusion that is addressed in the legal analysis below. As such, I do not find it as
fact.
Although not in the stipulated facts, I take official notice of the fact that the Board
filed a complaint with the Commission in September 2023.2 N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.2.
Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner argues that by investigating and “adjudicating” the allegations that were
made by members of the public, the Board conducted an impermissible trial. Further, the
“trial,” which was conducted during executive session, was improperly conducted as
petitioner was denied an opportunity to be represented by counsel, present or challenge
evidence or examine witnesses, while the Superintendent and President presented
“evidence” against her. In addition to seeking an order declaring the Board’s actions
invalid, she seeks indemnification of all of her legal costs from March 24, 2023, through
the conclusion of this matter.
The Board asserts that it properly investigated the allegation that was brought to
its attention by members of the community; it did not censure petitioner; and it did not
usurp the Commission’s authority. It also asserted in its brief that petitioner is not entitled
to indemnification because the allegation against her did not relate to her exercise of her
1 This is an excerpt of the relevant portions of the resolution.
2 Information about the substance of the complaint is not in the record.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
8
duties as a board member and that it did not conduct the type of proceeding that is subject
to the indemnification statute.
Petitioner further argues that, by agreeing to joint stipulation of fact number
eighteen, the Board waived its argument concerning indemnification.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The provisions of N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5, which govern motions for summary decision,
mirror the language of R. 4:46-2 of the New Jersey Court Rules governing motions for
summary judgment. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 permits early disposition of a case before the case
is heard if, based on the papers and discovery which have been filed, it can be decided
“that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). An adverse party
does not bear an obligation to oppose the motion, but to survive summary decision, there
must be “a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding.”
Ibid. The non-existence of one entitles the moving party to summary decision. Brill v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995). Moreover, even if the non-moving
party comes forward with some evidence, this forum must grant summary decision if the
evidence is “so one-sided that [the moving party] must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at
536. Here, the parties do not assert that there are genuine issues as to any of the material
facts, and none have been found. The matter is thus ripe for summary decision.
Did the Board act inappropriately?
The School Ethics Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-21 to -34, was established to ensure that
members of local boards of education and local school administrators “avoid conduct
which is in violation of their public trust or which creates a justifiable impression among
the public that such trust is being violated.” N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(a). To achieve this, the
Legislature declared that there shall be “specific standards to guide their conduct” and a
“disciplinary mechanism to ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards among
them.” N.J.S.A. 18A:12-22(b). It thus established the Code of Ethics for School Board
Members. N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
9
The Commission is the only entity that may adjudicate an allegation of a violation
of the Code, and only the Commissioner of Education may impose discipline after the
Commission recommends the discipline.3 N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29; See also Castriotta v. Bd.
of Educ. of the Twp. of Roxbury, EDU 09217-10, Comm’r (May 18, 2011),
https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/2011/may/185-11.pdf, rev’d in part, 427
N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2012); DeLuna v. Bertram, C31-06, slip op. at 9 (April 27,
2007)4 (“if the Board suspects that the Code of Ethics for School Board Members has
been violated, then a complaint should be filed with the Commission, and the Board
should not make its own determination that a violation has occurred and impose
discipline.”).
Under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29, “any person” may file a complaint alleging a violation
of the Code with the Commission. See also N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.2 ("Complainant" means
the person bringing a complaint of an alleged violation of the Act or the person established
as a lead complainant pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-6.6.) Due to this limitation on who may
file, a board of education may not file a complaint. Rather, it may authorize its
Superintendent to file a complaint, or an individual board member may do so in their
individual capacity. Castriotta, Commissioner Decision 139-7/10 at 6; See also Williams
v. Cianciulli, C64-22, slip op. at 8 (February 18, 2025)5 (the “Commission has consistently
held the belief that whether a Board votes to approve and/or adopts a resolution
authorizing a Board member to file an ethics complaint with the Commission, the fact
remains that the individual, and the individual alone, is the named Complainant, and thus,
it is his or her own complaint, and not the Board’s”).
3 Under the regulations implementing the SEA, N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.1 to -10.1, “censure” is “a formal
expression of disapproval by the Commissioner of Education for a violation(s) of the [SEA], which is
publicized by the adoption of a formal resolution by the School Ethics Commission, and which is provided
to the district board of education or the board of trustees to read and adopt at its next regularly scheduled
public meeting.” N.J.A.C. 6A:28-1.2.
4 Unpublished court decisions and administrative decisions are not precedential. They are referenced here
because they provide relevant guidance.
5 This matter was consolidated with two others, Grober v. Cianciulli, C77-22, and IMO Pamela Stanley,
C99-22

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
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In Castriotta, a school board member alleged that the board acted improperly and
beyond its authority when it passed a resolution censuring her for unethical conduct. The
superintendent sent a letter to the president of the board “to express [his] outrage at the
treatment” that he and the principal received “at the hands of Board member Maureen
Castriotta.” 427 N.J. Super. at 598. The superintendent accused Castriotta of violating
the New Jersey School Administrative Code and “encourage[ed] the Board to take action
against” her. Ibid. In response, the Board's secretary/business administrator sent
petitioner a certified letter captioned “Notice of Potential Censure” that notified petitioner
that he had been directed by the President of the Board of Education to advise her that
the Board would consider a censure resolution against her at an upcoming meeting. The
letter further advised Castriotta:
You may request that the discussion concerning possible
disciplinary action against you take place in private session by
advising the undersigned of your request in writing no later
than noon on May 21, 2010. If the matter is to be discussed
in executive session, that discussion will begin at 6:30 p.m.
In general the charges against you relate to your conduct on
April 27, 2010 which is detailed in the attached draft censure
resolution. The Board has set aside a maximum of forty-five
(45) minutes for the discussion. You are permitted to be
represented by counsel or a representative of your choosing,
to present witnesses on your behalf, and to address the Board
directly should you desire. You should be aware, however,
that it is the position of the District that if you choose to be
represented by counsel, you will do so at your own expense
and that the indemnification statute does not apply in this
instance. If you choose to have discussion in executive
session, witnesses will be called into the meeting one at a time
to address the Board and will be excused after making their
statements. It is anticipated that the Superintendent and High
School principal will also address the Board.
[Id. at 598−599.]
The superintendent and principal testified “before the Board as to [Castriotta’s]
alleged conduct on the day of the student protest that formed the basis for the charges
against her. Petitioner addressed the Board in response, refuting the allegations against

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her.” Id. at 599. After hearing from the parties involved, the Board voted to pass a
resolution that provided, in pertinent part:
WHEREAS, a majority of the Board wish to express in a public
forum their dissatisfaction with Mrs. Castriotta's conduct as
aforesaid;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved that the Members of the
Roxbury Board of Education do hereby censure fellow Board
Member Maureen Castriotta for the aforesaid unbecoming
conduct and caution her to avoid such conduct during the
balance of her term on the Board; and be it further
RESOLVED that a copy of this Resolution shall be sent to the
Commissioner of Education and the Executive County
Superintendent.
[Id. at 600.]
Castriotta challenged the Board’s actions, arguing that it was barred by the SEA.
The Commissioner agreed:
[R]eview and adjudication of allegations of Code of Ethics for
School Board Members violations is solely within the
jurisdictional purview of the School Ethics Commission. As
such, a Board which wishes to have one of its members
disciplined for misconduct falling within the ambit of N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24.1 is required to utilize the statutory mechanisms
set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29. In this matter, it is undeniable
that the impetus for the Board’s action censuring petitioner
was the letter received by its president from Superintendent
of Schools Rossi charging that petitioner had “clearly and
undeniably” violated the statutory Code of Ethics for School
Board members, citing to numerous specific provisions of this
Code which she is alleged to have violated, and requesting
the Board’s quick condemnation of her conduct, which the
Board promptly acted on. Irrespective of the fact that the
resolution censuring petitioner assiduously excluded any
reference to the Code of Ethics in its wording, it is
incontrovertible that the conduct petitioner was censured for
would be violative of the Code and, therefore, adjudicable only
by the School Ethics Commission. Consequently, the
Commissioner is in full accord with the ALJ’s conclusion that
the Board exceeded its authority by censuring petitioner at a

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public meeting for perceived Ethics Code violations and,
therefore, this action was ultra vires and must be vacated.
Next, the Commissioner finds – given that the Board
exceeded its authority in taking it upon itself to adjudicate and
impose discipline against petitioner for perceived Ethics Code
violations – that the extent of the due process it provided her
in this regard, although recognized as wholly deficient in terms
of that which must be accorded an individual charged with
Ethics Code violations, is irrelevant in this case.
[Castriotta v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Roxbury, EDU
09217-10, Comm’r (May 18, 2011) at 5−6.]
In so holding, the Commissioner “rejected as wholly meritless” the Board’s
“contention that its censure of petitioner was not ‘discipline’ but rather merely ‘an
expression of its dissatisfaction with her conduct.’” The Commissioner found “[s]uch a
claim” to be “obviously a distinction without a difference.” Id. at 6, n. 2. Thus, by
adjudicating an allegation that Castriotta violated the Code and imposing discipline, it
exceeded its authority and usurped that of the Commission.
These cases recognize that a Board may have reason to believe that one of its
members violated the Code and may wish to take action by authorizing an individual to
file a complaint with the Commission. This begs the question, how may a board of
education develop a suspicion of a violation? N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1 authorizes boards of
education to:
a. Adopt an official seal;
b. Enforce the rules of the state board;
c. Make, amend and repeal rules, not inconsistent with
this title or with the rules of the state board, for its own
government and the transaction of its business and for
the government and management of the public schools
and public school property of the district and for the
employment, regulation of conduct and discharge of its
employees, subject, where applicable, to the
provisions of Title 11, Civil Service, of the Revised
Statutes; and
d. Perform all acts and do all things, consistent with law

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 05919-23
13
and the rules of the state board, necessary for the
lawful and proper conduct, equipment and
maintenance of the public schools of the district.
This statute confers “broad general authority to the boards of local school districts.”
Edmondson v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Elmer, 424 N.J. Super. 256, 262 (App. Div.
2012). This includes the authority “to discipline one of its members who has violated a
clearly constructed and adopted Board policy governing the conduct of its members.”
Castriotta, Comm’r Decision, 139-7/10, slip op. at 6.
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-30, which authorizes the Commission to impose sanctions on a
board of education member who has violated the Code, also contemplates that N.J.S.A.
18A:11-1(c) and (d) authorize a board to investigate matters of concern about its
members. It provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or regulation
to the contrary, the sanctions authorized by this act may be
imposed on any school official pursuant to the procedures
established in section 9 of this act. However, nothing in this
act shall be construed to limit the authority of any board of
education or any appointing authority to process charges or
complaints pursuant to the procedures contained in Titles 18A
or 11A of the New Jersey Statutes.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:12-30, emphasis added.]
Thus, a school board may address a complaint about one of its members and
evaluate whether further action is required and, if so, what type of action is warranted.
However, the question remains whether the Board acted properly after it
addressed the allegations concerning petitioner. Unlike in Castriotta, the Board did not
expressly discipline petitioner. Rather, it wrote in its resolution that its investigation
“identified evidence of intentional actions that eroded trust and risked the integrity and
transparency of the entire Board at a sufficient level to warrant a complaint be filed with
the Commission.” J-B. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Board did not explicitly
adopt “a resolution censuring Mrs. Petersen for alleged violations of the Code of Ethics[.]”
Pet’r’s Br. at 11. However, it did not file a complaint with the Commission by the time

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petitioner filed her petition with the Commissioner or when the matter was transmitted to
the OAL. Rather, the parties advised that a complaint was not filed with the Commission
until September 2023, approximately five months after the Board issued its resolution
authorizing its President to file ethics charges. Thus, similar to Castriotta, the Board
publicly announced that it found that petitioner engaged in wrongdoing but did not refer
the matter to the Commission, thus creating de facto discipline for a violation of the ethics
code, which is impermissible.
For these reasons, I CONCLUDE that the Board’s resolution was ultra vires in that
it amounted to an unauthorized discipline of petitioner under the Code. And, as the
Commissioner stated in Castriotta, because the Board exceeded its authority, the due
process to which she was entitled need not be addressed here. In so concluding, I do
not reach a determination regarding whether petitioner violated the Code.
Indemnification
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 provides for indemnification of members of boards of
education:
Whenever a civil, administrative, criminal or quasi-criminal
action or other legal proceeding has been or shall be brought
against any person for any act or omission arising out of and
in the course of the performance of his duties as a member of
a board of education, and in the case of a criminal or quasi-
criminal action such action results in final disposition in favor
of such person, the board of education shall defray all costs
of defending such action, including reasonable counsel fees
and expenses, together with costs of appeal, if any, and shall
save harmless and protect such person from any financial loss
resulting therefrom. Indemnification for exemplary or punitive
damages shall not be mandated and shall be governed by the
standards and procedures set forth in N.J.S. 59:10-4. Any
board of education may arrange for and maintain appropriate
insurance to cover all such damages, losses and expenses.
The first question is whether the Board engaged in a proceeding that is covered
by the indemnification statute. The Supreme Court addressed “administrative action” and
observed that “[i]nformal agency action includes investigating, publicizing, planning, and

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15
supervising a regulated industry.” In re Request for Solid Waste Util. Customer Lists, 106
N.J. 508, 519 (1987) (citation omitted); See also In re Atty. Gen. Law Enf’t Directive Nos.
2020-5 and 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462, 490 (2021) (“agencies can also act in a hybrid manner,
with features of rulemaking and adjudication, or in an informal fashion, without a hearing”)
(citation omitted). “The crucial questions are whether the fact finding involves a certain
person or persons whose rights will be directly affected, and whether the subject matter
at issue is susceptible to the receipt of evidence. The nature of the factual inquiries may
be dispositive or assist in the disposition of the issue. A question posed in terms of
general policy may clearly fall in the ‘no hearing’ category. Facts involved in resolution of
a question of that type have sometimes been designated as legislative.” Cunningham v.
Dep’t of Civil Serv., 69 N.J. 13, 22 (1975). If the agency’s inquiry addresses “facts about
the parties and their activities” and the questions to be answered involve “who did what,
where, how, why, with what motive and intent[,]” it is an adjudicative in nature. Ibid.
Conversely, if the agency is “acting in a general capacity, such as rule making, so that
the direct effect of its factual conclusions will be imposed on a class or group, as
distinguished from some specific person or persons, then it may well be that such a
hearing is not required.” Ibid.; See also Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 4 N.J. 99, 105
(1950) (the “quality of the act rather than the character of the agency exercising the
authority is determinative of the nature of the power and the need for procedural due
process”).
Citing Cunningham, the Castriotta court held that “the nature of the proceeding
that led to the Board’s actions against petitioner” constituted a “legal proceeding” that was
covered by the indemnification statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20, because “it is clear to us that
the Board was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity when it found petitioner in violation of
the local code of conduct.” 427 N.J. Super. at 601, 603. It explained:
Before voting to censure petitioner the Board received the
testimony of petitioner’s accusers, heard from petitioner
herself, and ruled on arguments raised by petitioner’s counsel
objecting to its authority to sanction petitioner. These are all
core judicial functions. Thus, when the Board decided that
petitioner had committed an ethical infraction warranting the
sanction of censure, it was performing an adjudicatory act and
functioning in a quasi-judicial capacity. This process

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conformed in all material respects to a due process hearing
and constitutes a “legal proceeding” under N.J.S.A.
18A:12-20.
[Id. at 594−595.]
Here, the record does not suggest that the Board conducted a full legal proceeding
because it did not hear from petitioner or her attorney, and thus it did not weigh the
petitioner’s evidence or arguments against the other evidence that it considered.
However, it weighed the evidence that was presented to it and made a determination
about petitioner’s actions. As noted in Castriotta, the “absence of pre-hearing discovery
or the lack of the oath required under N.J.R.E. 603 may undermine the fairness or integrity
of this ‘legal proceeding’ but do not, in any material way, alter its fundamental character.”
Id. at 603. For these reasons, I CONCLUDE that the March 29, 2023, Board meeting
was a “legal proceeding” to which the indemnification statute applies.
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 also requires that a legal proceeding must have been brought
against a board member for “any act or omission arising out of and in the course of the
performance of his duties as a member of a board of education.” The Supreme Court
addressed this statutory prerequisite in Bower v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of E. Orange,
149 N.J. 416 (1997). It held that the statute requires “mere proof by a preponderance of
the evidence that the act on which the charges are predicated arose out of and in the
course of performance of the duties of employment.” Id. at 434; See also Waters v. Bd.
of Educ. of Toms River, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3083, *12 (December 22, 2011)
(a board member seeking indemnification must show that “the cause of action: (1) arose
out of the performance of his/her duties, and (2) occurred in the course of performing
those duties”) (citing Lonky v. Bd. of Educ. of Bayonne, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 07205-05,
Comm’r, slip op. at 3 (July 7, 2008), http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.shtml).6 In
Lonky, the ALJ observed that, because N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 does not require a disposition
6 These cases addressed the application of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6, a parallel statute that authorizes
indemnification for the defense of a “civil or administrative action or other legal proceeding . . . brought
against any person holding any office, position or employment under the jurisdiction of any board of
education[.]” N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 contains the same prerequisite as N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20: the proceeding
must have been brought against the employee for an “act or omission arising out of and in the course of
the performance of the duties of such office.” Ibid.

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in favor of the employee, “there is an entitlement to indemnification if the sole criteria for
satisfying the statute has been met by showing that the employee was performing the job
she was hired for when the act occurred.” EDU 07205-05 at *3−4.
Here, petitioner seems to argue that she was performing her Board member duties
because she was required to attend the meeting during which the Board conducted its
“trial.” Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 7–8. “Courts have consistently held that board members sued
‘by reason of such membership’ are entitled to indemnification.” Id. at 8. The cases she
cites do not support this position. Rather, they held that the indemnification statute was
intended to “make manifest the implied power or boards of education to provide for the
legal defense of a member of the board who is sued individually for some action taken by
him in furtherance of his prescribed duties.” Errington v. Mansfield Twp. Bd. of Educ., 100
N.J. Super 130, 138 (App. Div. 1968). The other cases cited by petitioner, Jones v.
Kolbeck, 119 N.J. Super 299 (App. Div. 1972) and Sudura v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ.,
167 N.J. Super 331 (Law. Div. 1979), held that members of boards of education may be
indemnified when defending suits challenging their memberships. The courts held that
they were entitled to be indemnified because they were defending their right to perform
as board members. This is distinct from the defense of an action that is unrelated to the
performance of board member duties.
The Board seemingly made two arguments with respect to this prerequisite to
indemnification. In its cross-motion for summary decision, it argued that petitioner is not
entitled to indemnification because its resolution and meeting “stem from petitioner’s
alleged ‘inappropriate comments and use of social media,’” which are “wholly unrelated”
to her role as a Board member, “except for the mere fact that she is a sitting Board
member.” Resp’t’s Br. at 14. During oral argument on the cross-motions, the Board
seemed to reverse its position on this question, apparently in response to joint stipulation
number eighteen, which provided, “All such Board actions conducted against Mrs.
Petersen arose out of and in her role as a member of the Board.” As noted, this is a legal
conclusion. Courts are “not bound by the concession or agreement of counsel as to how
the statute is to be interpreted.” Tibbs v. Boemi, 109 N.J. Super. 200, 204 (App. Div.),
aff'd o.b., 55 N.J. 531, 263 A.2d 785 (1970); See also 73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations § 4
(“Parties to an action may not stipulate to legal conclusions to be reached by the court”).

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The issue is whether the Board’s proceeding concerned petitioner’s exercise of her
duties as a Board member. Cases that have addressed whether a board member’s social
media posts violate the Code are instructive here. If “the speech in question does relate
to the business of the Board and/or its operations, it may then be reasonable for the
reader to perceive the speech as being offered in an official capacity and pursuant to his
or her official duties, provided there is a sufficient nexus between the individual’s social
media page and his or her role/membership on the Board.” Donnerstag v. Koenig, 481
N.J. Super. 291, 307–308 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting Aziz v. Nikitinsky, SEC No. C-56-22,
slip op. at 8 (Oct. 17, 2022)). Here, there is no evidence in the record of a nexus between
the social media posts and petitioner’s exercise of her duties as a Board member. The
Joint Stipulation of Facts does not address this. Moreover, petitioner asserted in her
verified petition that the social media posts at issue were posted anonymously, and she
did not assert that she authored them. Consequently, there is no evidence in the record
connecting petitioner to the social media posts.
Without more, the only rationale for indemnification is petitioner’s status as a Board
member. If this were sufficient, the statutory prerequisite would be meaningless. Clearly,
“legislation should be interpreted so that, if possible, full force and effect is given to every
sentence, clause and word thereof.” Oldfield v. New Jersey Realty Co., 1 N.J. 63, 68
(1948). As noted above, the Supreme Court has underscored that “the act on which the
charges are predicated [must arise] out of and in the course of performance of the duties
of employment,” and petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that she is entitled to indemnification. Bower, 149 N.J. at 434. Accordingly,
because there is insufficient evidence showing that the Board’s proceeding concerned
petitioner’s performance of her duties as a Board member, I CONCLUDE that she has
not demonstrated that she is entitled to indemnification of her legal fees and costs.
ORDER
I ORDER that petitioner’s motion is GRANTED with respect to her claim that the
Board’s resolution was ultra vires in that it amounted to an unauthorized discipline of

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petitioner under the Code. I further ORDER that respondent’s motion is GRANTED with
respect to petitioner’s ineligibility for indemnification. All other aspects of the parties’
motions are DENIED.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days, and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10. Within thirteen days from the date on
which this recommended decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written
exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN:
BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO
Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of
any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
October 31, 2025
DATE JUDITH LIEBERMAN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: October 31, 2025
Date Mailed to Parties: ___________
JL/mg

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APPENDIX
Exhibits
Joint Exhibits:
J-A Executive Session Minutes, March 29, 2023
J-B Undated Resolution
For petitioner:
P-1 District Policy 9130