S.M., on behalf of minor child, E.V. v. Board of Education of the Borough of Sayreville, Middlesex County, 5/23/25 (#272-25E)

272-25E
OAL Dkt. No. 06953-25
Agency Dkt. No. 119-4/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
S.M., on behalf of minor child, E.V.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of Sayreville,
Middlesex County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed. 	Upon such review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to
demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia,
90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
The Commissioner reminds the Board that it must review E.V.’s case at each subsequent district
board of education meeting, to determine whether E.V. should return to the general education program.
N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.3(c)1.i.-iv; N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.3(d).
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted for the reasons stated therein. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as
the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	May 23, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	May 27, 2025

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 06953-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 119-4/25
S.M. ON BEHALF OF E.V.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE,
Respondent.
S.M., petitioner, pro se
Danielle N. Pantaleo, Esq., for respondent (The Busch Law Group, L.L.C.,
attorneys)
BEFORE TRICIA M. CALIGUIRE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner S.M., on behalf of E.V., filed a petition for due process to challenge, on
factual and procedural grounds, the decision of respondent, the Board of Education of the
Borough of Sayreville (Board), to issue a long-term suspension of E.V. from school, and
to challenge the Board’s failure to find that E.V. was a victim of harassment, intimidation
and bullying (HIB), as defined in the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A.

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2
18A:37-13 et seq. (Anti-Bullying Law). In this emergent proceeding, petitioner seeks an
order returning E.V. to in-person instruction at Sayreville Middle School (SMS).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 22, 2025, petitioner filed a petition of appeal and a request for emergent
relief with the New Jersey Department of Education, Office of Controversies and Disputes.
On April 24, 2025, the motion for emergent relief and the due-process petition were
transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and
N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23.
On April 28, 2025, the parties appeared for oral argument on the motion for
emergent relief, and the motion is now ripe for review.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
Based on the arguments of petitioner and of counsel and on the documents filed
by the parties, the following statements are undisputed, and therefore, I FIND as FACTS:
E.V. is a thirteen-year-old female who is enrolled in the eighth grade at SMS.
S.M. alleges that during the 2024–2025 school year, E.V. was repeatedly targeted
by L., a female enrolled in the seventh grade at SMS, and that on at least two occasions,
S.M. and E.V. reported these incidents to the SMS administration and asked that they be
investigated as HIB.
On or about February 7, 2025, E.V. and L. were called to participate in peer
mediation before Principal Scott Nurnberger. As no resolution to their dispute was
reached, the students were issued a “no contact” order, meaning that they were prohibited
from having verbal and/or physical contact with each other on school grounds.
On February 24, 2025, E.V. was involved in a physical altercation with L. on school
grounds. As a result of this altercation, E.V. was charged with assault, the attempt to

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3
cause bodily injury to another, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1). See Ltr. Br. of Resp’t
Opposing Emergent Relief (April 27, 2025) (Resp’t’s Br.) at 2 (citing Middlesex County
Juvenile Complaint No. 1219-JC-2025-7 (February 24, 2025)).
By letter dated February 25, 2025, Megan Romero, SMS vice principal, notified
petitioner that E.V. was suspended from school for ten days pending a disciplinary
hearing before the Board. Resp’t’s Br., Ex. 2. E.V. was asked to appear before the Board
on February 27, 2025, to answer charges of alleged violations of Board policy: assault,
failure to follow administrative direction (the “no contact” order), and severe violation of
the technology agreement.1 Ibid.
Romero also sent to petitioner E.V.’s “student comprehensive report,” which would
be reviewed by the Board for E.V.’s disciplinary hearing. This report includes summaries
of four occasions, between October 2022 and February 25, 2025, on which E.V. was
disciplined for some form of physical altercation in school. Resp’t’s Br., Ex. 3.
By letter dated February 28, 2025, Romero notified petitioner that at petitioner's
request, E.V.’s disciplinary hearing was rescheduled to March 3, 2025, and that
respondent would provide E.V. with home instruction. Id., Ex. 4. Home instruction has
been provided to E.V. since March 3, 2025. Id., Ex. 7.
On March 20, 2025, S.M. and E.V. appeared before the Board Committee on
Student Discipline (Committee). By letter dated March 21, 2025, Romero notified S.M. of
the decision of the Committee to recommend that the Board suspend E.V. for more than
ten days and place her in the Monmouth Ocean Educational Services Commission
(MOESC) interim alternative education program for the remainder of the 2024–2025
school year. Id., Ex. 6.
On April 1, 2025, S.M. appeared at a regular meeting of the Board to advocate on
her daughter’s behalf. In executive session, the Board voted to adopt the Committee’s
1 There is conflicting testimony on this topic, but it is undisputed that the altercation between E.V. and L.
was videotaped by another person or persons using a cellphone camera and the resulting video was
distributed.

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recommendation that E.V. be suspended from SMS and be enrolled in the MOESC
program for the duration of the 2024–2025 school year.
The April 1, 2025, meeting of the Board included the involvement of fifth-grade
students from the Somerville School District in the “Let Children Lead” program. S.M.
alleges that the decision on E.V.’s suspension was made by these students, not the Board
members, and that as a result, E.V. was deprived of due process. Respondent counters
that the students merely voiced the decisions of Board members to approve or disapprove
the entire agenda and had no involvement with, and were not present for, executive
session when the Board discussed and voted on E.V.’s suspension.
S.M. has refused to enroll E.V. in the MOESC program, and she remains on home
instruction.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
When the subject matter of a controversy is an action by a board of education, the
petitioner may file “a separate motion for emergent relief . . . pending the Commissioner’s
final decision in the contested case.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a). Here, S.M. has initiated due-
process proceedings challenging E.V.’s long-term suspension on factual and procedural
grounds and challenging the Board’s action in failing to find that E.V. was a victim of HIB,
pursuant to the Anti-Bullying Law. She requests emergent relief in the form of an order
returning E.V. to school pending the due process hearing.
The standards for granting emergent relief are outlined in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90
N.J. 126 (1982), and are codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b). The petitioner bears the burden
of proving that:
1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the
requested relief is not granted;
2. The legal right underlying the petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
of the underlying claim; and

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4. When the equities and the interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the
respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not
granted.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b).]
Irreparable harm
To obtain emergent relief, S.M. must demonstrate more than a risk of irreparable
harm should E.V. remain on long-term suspension and/or placement in the MOESC
program. In an educational setting, “irreparable harm may be shown . . . when there is
a significant interruption or termination of educational services.” Ocean Twp. Bd. of Educ.
v. J.E. and T.B. ex rel. J.E., 2004 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 115, at *8 (February 23, 2004).
“Irreparable harm is shown when money damages cannot adequately compensate
plaintiff’s injuries.” Hornstine v. Twp. of Moorestown, 263 F. Supp. 2d 887, 911 (D.N.J.
2003) (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)). “More than a risk of irreparable
harm must be demonstrated.” Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351,
359 (3d Cir. 1980). “The requisite for injunctive relief has been characterized as a ‘clear
showing of immediate irreparable injury’ . . . or a ‘presently existing actual threat; (an
injunction) may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury, or
a future invasion of rights, be those rights protected by statute or by the common law.’”
Ibid. (citations omitted).
Here, petitioner argues that E.V. “has already missed significant instructional time”
and the “[c]ontinued exclusion [of E.V.] from her regular school environment is causing
emotional distress and academic regression.” Pet’r’s Motion at 1. E.V. is subject to social
and emotional harm as a result from “missing her final months of 8th grade, including
significant milestones such as formal ceremonies, graduation preparation, and peer
relationships[.]” Pet’r’s Post-Hearing Br. (April 28, 2025) (Pet’r’s Br.).
E.V. has missed, and continues to miss, instructional time in the SMS building, but
respondent has provided home instruction and an alternate educational placement
through the end of the school year or pending a decision of the Commissioner to return

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6
E.V. to school, whichever comes first. S.M. claims that the alternate placement is not
“comparable to E.V.’s current academic program,” Pet’r’s Br. at 2, but no evidence has
been submitted by which such a comparison may be made. While it is arguable that E.V.
could miss out on end-of-year events that cannot be recovered (e.g., ceremonies,
graduation) if this matter does not conclude before those events take place, that
possibility does not warrant the remedy requested. As counsel argued, failure of a student
to comply with the disciplinary requirements of the school can result in the loss of the
privilege -- not the right -- to participate in various non-academic events. Finally, petitioner
has yet to introduce evidence (or a certification from a treating professional) of the
emotional distress and academic regression that E.V. has allegedly experienced.
Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has not met the burden of proving
irreparable harm will result if E.V. is not immediately returned to SMS.
Settled Legal Right and the Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The second consideration is whether the legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is
settled, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b)(2), and then third, petitioner must make a preliminary
showing of a reasonable probability of success on the merits. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133.
Petitioner contends first that E.V. was denied her right to due process when the
decision on her long-term suspension was made by a panel of fifth-grade students rather
than the members of the Board and because the Board failed to properly investigate the
incident prior to making a decision on discipline. Second, petitioner argues that the
punishment given to E.V. is inconsistent with the SMS Discipline Policy; respondent
issued E.V. a ten-day suspension, which was increased to a long-term suspension after
consideration by the Board. But, under the discipline matrix from the SMS 2024–2025
Handbook, that punishment is consistent with a third incident of assault, Pro Se Petition
of Appeal (April 23, 2025), Attachment, and petitioner contendsthat E.V. had not
previously been accused or found guilty of physical violence. According to S.M., all prior
incidents resulting in discipline for E.V. were related to cell-phone usage.

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In response, respondent states that the decision on E.V.’s long-term suspension
was made by the Board after consideration of the Committee’s recommendation and
S.M.’s testimony in support of her daughter. It would be incredible for Board members to
permit anyone, much less fifth-grade students, to stand in for them on such a critical
decision. There is, however, no proof that they did so.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that E.V. had no prior incidents of physical violence
meriting discipline, E.V.’s disciplinary record shows that from the time she entered SMS,
E.V. has been disciplined following four separate incidents involving physical violence.
Respondent contends that the incident of February 24, 2025, was “so egregious” that the
Board was compelled to issue the long-term suspension.
While I agree that E.V. has the right to due process, including a full and fair
investigation of the February 24, 2025 incident, and E.V. has the right to be disciplined in
a manner consistent with the SMS Handbook, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has not
demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits of those claims. Under this
emergent relief prong, “a plaintiff must make a preliminary showing of a reasonable
probability of ultimate success on the merits.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (citing Ideal Laundry
Co. v. Gugliemone, 107 N.J. Eq. 108, 115–16 (E. & A. 1930)). This typically “‘involves a
prediction of the probable outcome of the case’ based on each party’s initial proofs,
usually limited to documents.” Brown v. City of Paterson, 424 N.J. Super. 176, 182–83
(App. Div. 2012) (quoting Rinaldo v. RLR Inv., LLC, 387 N.J. Super. 387, 397 (App. Div.
2006)). At best, the evidence so far presented is inconclusive, and the parties must be
afforded the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence, including surveillance
videos, to support their positions in this matter.
It is well settled that the decisions of local boards of education are to stand
undisturbed unless shown to be patently “arbitrary, without rational basis or induced by
improper motives.” J.M. By His Guardian, D.M. v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Dist.,
Hunterdon Cnty., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 415, 419; R.A.M. and C.A.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Bd. of
Educ. of Tabernacle, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 573, 576 (citing Kopera v. West Orange Bd. of
Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 1960)). Our courts have held that "[w]here there is
room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and

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upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion
has been reached." Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184,
199-200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App Div. 1974). To satisfy the arbitrary
and capricious standard, petitioner must prove that respondent acted in either bad faith
or in disregard to the circumstances. I CONCLUDE that petitioner has not shown the
likelihood of prevailing on the claims in her due process petition.
Balancing the Equities
The fourth and final emergent relief standard involves “the relative hardship to the
parties in granting or denying relief.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 134 (citing Isolantite Inc. v. United
Elect. Radio & Mach. Workers, 130 N.J. Eq. 506, 515 (Ch. 1941), mod. on other grounds,
132 N.J. Eq. 613 (E. & A. 1942)).
Here, S.M. argues that E.V. will be harmed if she cannot return to school,
academically, reputationally, and most significantly, emotionally. Pet’r’s Motion at 2. In
making this claim, S.M. states that E.V. has been bullied and the bully has not been
disciplined, two issues that are in dispute. The Board argues that granting emergent relief
here would “render meaningless the Board’s legal right to fully present the facts and
arguments supporting the decision to impose a long-term suspension of E.V.” Resp’t’s
Br. at 13. I CONCLUDE that the Board has the stronger claim; the Board would suffer
the greater harm if I were to reverse its decision without the benefit of a hearing at which
both parties will present witnesses and additional evidence to support their positions.
Based upon the above, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has not met the
requirements outlined in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b), and therefore, an order for emergent relief
is not appropriate.
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, I hereby ORDER that the petitioner’s application for
emergent relief is hereby DENIED and this matter shall proceed to hearing on all issues
raised in the due process petitioner.

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This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
who by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision shall
be issued without undue delay, but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this
order. If the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does
not adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall
become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10.
April 29, 2025
DATE TRICIA M. CALIGUIRE, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
TMC/kl/sg