C.D., on behalf of minor children, A.V. and O.V. v. Board of Education of the Borough of South River, Middlesex County, 5/6/26 (#158-26)

158-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 21086-25
Agency Dkt. No. 416-12/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
C.D., on behalf of minor children, A.V. and O.V.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of South
River, Middlesex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that
petitioner and her minor children were not domiciled in South River during the 2025-2026 school
year. 	The Commissioner further concurs with the ALJ’s conclusion that the children were,
therefore, not entitled to a free public education in South River during that time. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-
1(a).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(b), the Commissioner shall assess tuition against petitioner
for the time period during which A.V. was ineligible to attend school in South River.1 The Board
is entitled to tuition reimbursement in the amount of $3,260.88 for the period of ineligible
1 O.V., age 3, was removed from the preschool program in the district on or about November 13, 2025,
while A.V. continued attending kindergarten in the district during the pendency of these proceedings.

2
attendance from November 13, 2025, through January 15, 2026 ($90.58/day x 36 days). If A.V.
continued to attend school in the district beyond January 15, 2026, then the Board is entitled to
tuition reimbursement at the per diem rate of $90.58 for each additional day of enrollment.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed. 	Petitioner is directed to reimburse the Board in the
amount of $3,260.88 for tuition costs incurred when A.V. was ineligible to attend school in South
River. If A.V. remained enrolled in the district beyond January 15, 2026, petitioner is liable to the
Board for tuition costs at the per diem rate of $90.58 for each additional day until A.V. is
disenrolled.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	May 6, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	May 6, 2026
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 416-12/25
C.D. ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN,
A.V. AND O.V.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOROUGH
OF SOUTH RIVER, MIDDLESEX COUNTY.
Respondent.
______________________________________
C.D., petitioner, pro se
Christopher B. Parton, Esq., for respondent (Kenney, Gross, Kovats &
Parton, attorneys)
Record Closed: January 15, 2026 Decided: February 25, 2026
BEFORE JOAN M. BURKE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner C.D. is the parent of A.V. and O.V. After a residency investigation, it
was determined by respondent Board of Education of the Borough of South River (Board
or district) that the two minor children are not domiciled in South River. O.V. is three

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
2
years old and attended the preschool program in the South River public school district.
O.V. was removed from the program. A.V. is a kindergarten student, and he continues
to attend school in the district. Petitioner challenge the Board of Education’s residency
determination. The District filed a counterclaim seeking payment of tuition for the number
of days that A.V. attended school in the district when he was not eligible to attend the
schools of the district.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 12, 2025, respondent conducted a hearing and found that A.V. and
O.V. were not domiciled in South River. On November 13, 2025, petitioner was notified.
O.V. was removed from the preschool program while A.V. continued in his kindergarten
class. On December 10, 2025, the Department of Education, Office of Controversies and
Disputes, transmitted this case to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for hearing as
to the resolution of petitioner’s motion for emergency relief. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15;
N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23. On December 19, 2025, the hearing for emergent relief was
conducted, and an Order Denying Emergent Relief was subsequently filed on December
22, 2025.
A hearing was held on January 15, 2026, on the merits of the underlying petition,
and the record closed then. Respondent made a motion for partial dismissal of O.V. from
the petition as he is three years old and is not entitled to a free education pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
C.D. is the parent of A.V. She is married to T.V., but the couple is currently
separated. For the 2025–2026 school year, A.V. was enrolled in kindergarten in the
district. The Board completed a residency investigation and conducted a residency
hearing on November 12, 2025. Respondent filed its notice of final determination of
ineligibility on November 13, 2025, determining that A.V. did not reside in the school
district. As a consequence, A.V.’s parents appealed the determination. The tuition rate

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
3
assessed for pre-K and kindergarten students for the 2025–2026 school year was $90.58
per day.
The preceding statements are not in dispute as they are from the records and
testimony of the parties and are hereby FOUND as FACT.
TESTIMONY
For Petitioner
C.D. is the mother of the minor child, A.V., who is in kindergarten at South River
Public School. C.D. testified that she lives at two residences, the Stanton Street home
and the Hillside Avenue home, both located in South River. Her father owns a home that
is located at Cook Avenue in Old Bridge. C.D. testified that she stays at the Old Bridge
home when the children are sick. She argues that the two times the investigator found
them there, they had stayed over because the children were sick.
C.D. submitted a Homeowner Affidavit dated October 18, 2025, which she testified
was emailed to the District. (P-1.) It includes a Wells Fargo bank statement with the
address of Hillside Avenue and a Navy Federal Credit Union American Express Card
statement, also with the address of Hillside Avenue. (See P-1.)
On cross-examination, C.D. was asked if she testified at the internal hearing held
on November 12, 2025, and whether she testified that she lived in Old Bridge. C.D.
testified that at the hearing, she told them she only stayed at the Old Bridge home
“sometime,” and not “all the time.” C.D. was asked what address is on her driver’s license;
it was noted to be the Old Bridge address, and the driver’s license was issued in February
2025. (P-1.) C.D. presented a video from her Ring doorbell, which allegedly showed her
leaving the house at Stanton Street in the mornings. (P-2.) There was no indication or
authentication that this was the Stanton Street home. The dates noted on the Ring video
were December 7, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, and 23 of 2025 and January 7, 8, and 9 of 2026.
No video evidence noted the dates when the District investigated the matter and found

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
4
that the children were not residing in the school district. When asked about the dates of
the investigative period, the petitioner said that the Ring video deletes dates after a certain
time frame.
T.V. is the father of A.V. and O.V. and the husband of C.D. He testified that they
are currently separated. He currently lives at the Stanton Street home. According to T.V.,
he has lived on Stanton Street in South River for over sixteen years, since he was ten.
He argues that he does not know the person who the District received the anonymous tip
from. None of his family members know of the anonymous person. He was concerned
as to who the anonymous tipster was because the record stated he was a neighbor.
On cross-examination, T.V. was asked what address is on his driver’s license. It
was noted that his license was issued in May 2025, and the address was the Cook
Avenue address in Old Bridge (Old Bridge or Cook Avenue).1 When queried why his
driver’s license lists the Old Bridge address, he responded that he is a veteran and wanted
to use a VA loan to purchase the Cook Avenue property as a rental. In order to do this,
he had to list the Cook Avenue address on his driver’s license. (P-1.) T.V. testified that
they stayed over sometimes at the Old Bridge location, but this was only done on
weekends.
For respondent
Joseph Shannon (Shannon) is the director of security and threat assessment;
and the supervisor of the residency program in the district. Shannon was involved to a
certain extent in this matter. He was at the hearing conducted by the District on November
12, 2025, and identified the notice of determination. (R-2.) He testified that the annual
tuition is $16,305, and per diem pupil cost is $90.58. Shannon is familiar with the
investigation that was conducted. He testified that since November they continued to
conduct spot checks at the Hillside Avenue and Stanton Street locations at all times of
the day, and only once they saw the mother’s vehicle at the Hillside Avenue home.
1 On T.V.’s driver’s license the Cook Avenue address is located in South Amboy; on C.D.’s license the
Cook Avenue address is located in Old Bridge. For consistency, the investigative report notes the township
as Old Bridge, therefore the Cook Avenue home address will be referred to as in Old Bridge.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
5
Kasie Rosario (Rosario) is a residency investigator with the district. Rosario
conducts verification of residency in the district on a routine basis. On October 12, 2025,
the District received an email stating that the children (A.V. and O.V.) lived in Old Bridge
and not in South River. Rosario conducted seven surveillances of the three locations
(Hillside Avenue, Stanton Street, and Cook Avenue). On October 14, 17, and 21, 2025,
surveillance was conducted at the Hillside Avenue home at 10:00 a.m., 2:00 p.m., and
8:15 a.m., respectively. (R-1.) Neither the children nor parents were seen there. The
mother drives a blue BMW SUV, and that was also not seen in the driveway. On October
14, 2025, surveillance was conducted at the Stanton Street home at 1:30 p.m., but neither
the children nor parents were there. The children’s uncle was there, but he neither
confirmed nor denied whether the parents were home. (R-1.)
Surveillance was conducted twice at the Cook Avenue home. The surveillance
was done on October 22, 2025, and October 24, 2025, at 8:07 a.m. and 7:15 a.m.,
respectively. (Id. at 2.) On both occasions, the mother was seen with both children
leaving the home. (Ibid.) Rosario testified that she was present at the District hearing on
November 12, 2025. She testified that both parents admitted that they lived at the Old
Bridge address. Based on their testimony and her investigation, the District concluded
that the parents did not live in the school district. On November 13, 2025, the District
notified the parents that the students were not eligible to attend the schools of the district.
(R-3.)
FINDINGS OF FACT
For testimony to be believed, it must not only come from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it also has to be credible in itself. It must elicit evidence that is from such
common experience and observation that it can be approved as proper under the
circumstances. See Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 N.J. 546 (1954); Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J.
Super. 1 (App. Div. 1961). A credibility determination requires an overall assessment of
the witness’s story in light of its rationality, internal consistency, and the manner in which
it “hangs together” with the other evidence. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 749
(9th Cir. 1963). Also, “[t]he interest, motive, bias, or prejudice of a witness may affect his

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
6
credibility and justify the [trier of fact], whose province it is to pass upon the credibility of
an interested witness, in disbelieving his testimony.” State v. Salimone, 19 N.J. Super.
600, 608 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 10 N.J. 316 (1952) (citation omitted).
A trier of fact may reject testimony because it is inherently incredible, or because
it is inconsistent with other testimony or with common experience, or because it is
overborne by other testimony. Congleton v. Pura-Tex Stone Corp., 53 N.J. Super. 282,
287 (App. Div. 1958).
After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, I make the following
findings of fact:
For the 2025–2026 school year, the minor child, A.V., was enrolled in kindergarten
in the school district. After receiving an anonymous complaint, the Board completed a
residency investigation and conducted a residency hearing on November 12, 2025. At
the conclusion of the Board’s hearing, it was determined that the students were not
domiciled in South River and were not entitled to free public education in the district. The
tuition rate of reimbursement as filed with the State for the 2025–2026 school year was
$90.58 per day.
I found the testimony of respondent’s witnesses credible and persuasive.
Investigator Rosario did not embellish her investigative findings and in fact conceded the
point that the mother’s car was seen once at the Hillside location on one of their spot
checks.
Conversely, the petitioner’s testimony was not credible in the manner in which it
was given. Both petitioner and her husband’s testimony assisted the respondent in
proving the facts of the case by a preponderance of the evidence. The father was issued
his driver’s license in May 2025. He testified that he has lived at the Stanton Street home
since he was ten years old. However, his driver’s license had the Old Bridge address on
it. When asked about the Old Bridge address listed on his driver’s license, he stated that
he wanted to use a VA loan to obtain the property as a rental and was informed by the
VA that he had to list the address of the property on his license. I did not find this answer

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
7
to be credible. In addition, the mother testified that the children stay over when they are
sick at the Old Bridge home, while the father testified that they only stayed over on
weekends.
The petitioner presented a Ring doorbell video from December 2025 to January 9,
2026, which only showed the mother leaving each morning, and there was no indication
or verification of the address that she was leaving from; T.V. stated that it was the Stanton
Street home. Neither mother and children nor father was seen on the video entering the
home. I find the video to be self-serving and I give no weight to it.
I therefore FIND that the parents and minor children were domiciled outside the
district in Old Bridge. Accordingly, I FIND that A.V. became ineligible to attend school in
the district for the period he is enrolled in the district for the 2025–2026 school year. The
respondent filed a counterclaim seeking tuition for the days A.V. was ineligible and
attended school in the district in the 2025–2026 school year. At the date of the hearing,
I FOUND that the cost was determined to be $3,260.88 for thirty-six school days from
November 13, 2025, through January 15, 2026, during the school year.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
At issue is whether A.V. was entitled to a free education under N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1,
which provides that public schools shall be free to persons over five and under twenty
years of age who are “domiciled within the school district.” See V.R. ex rel. A.R. v.
Hamburg Bd. of Educ., 2 N.J.A.R. 283, 287 (1980), aff’d, State Bd., 1981 S.L.D. 1533,
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Rabinowitz v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 481
(D.N.J. 1982) (New Jersey requires local domicile, as opposed to mere residence, in
order for a student to receive a free education).
A person who meets age requirements and is domiciled within a school district
may attend its public schools free of charge. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(a). A person may have
many residences but only one domicile. Somerville Bd. of Educ. v. Manville Bd. of Educ.,
332 N.J. Super. 6, 12 (App. Div. 2000), aff’d, 167 N.J. 55 (2001). A child’s domicile is
normally that of his or her parents. Ibid. The domicile of a person is the place where he

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
8
has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever
he is absent, he has the intention of returning, and from which he has no present intention
of moving. In re Unanue, 255 N.J. Super. 362, 374 (Law Div. 1991), aff’d, 311 N.J. Super.
589 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 541 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051 (1999).
The acts, statements, and conduct of the individual, as viewed in the light of all the
circumstances, determine a person’s true intent. Collins v. Yancey, 55 N.J. Super. 514,
521 (Law Div. 1959). The parent has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(b)(2).
The investigation in this matter identified the petitioner with her children leaving the
Old Bridge home. At no time during the investigation prior to the November 12, 2025
hearing was either parent found or seen at either of the homes located in South River.
Since the November 12, 2025 hearing, various spot checks were done, and only once the
petitioner’s vehicle was seen at one of the two homes in South River and that was the
Hillside home. Petitioner’s driver’s license issued in February 2025 lists Old Bridge as
her residence. T.V.’s driver’s license that was issued in May 2025 lists his residence as
the Old Bridge address. I therefore CONCLUDE that the petitioner resides outside of the
district. The record reflects that A.V. resides with his parent outside of the district and
attended school within the district starting November 13, 2025. Accordingly, I
CONCLUDE that A.V. was not entitled to a free public education in the district. The Board
cross-petitioned to be reimbursed for tuition for the period of A.V.’s ineligible enrollment
at the Borough of South River School District. When the evidence does not support the
claims of the resident, the Commissioner of Education is authorized to assess tuition
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:22-6.2(a), which provides as follows:
If an appeal to the Commissioner is filed by the parent,
guardian, adult student, or school district resident keeping an
"affidavit” student and the petitioner does not sustain the
burden of demonstrating the student’s right to attend the
school district, or the petitioner withdraws the appeal, fails to
prosecute, or abandons the appeal by any means other than
settlement agreeing to waive or reduce tuition, the
Commissioner may assess tuition for the period during which
the hearing and decision on appeal were pending, and for up
to one year of a student’s ineligible attendance in a school

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
9
district prior to the appeal’s filing and including the 21-day
period to file an appeal.
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(b) likewise requires that tuition be calculated on the basis of
1/180 of the total annual per-pupil cost to the district multiplied by the number of days of
ineligible attendance.
In accordance with N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.4(d), I have accepted the proofs from the Board
relating to its tuition claim. The Board’s proofs are convincing, and its calculations are
consistent with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(b) and N.J.A.C. 6A:22-6.2(a).
Therefore, I CONCLUDE that the Board has demonstrated entitlement to tuition
reimbursement for thirty-six days of school attendance for A.V. for the period from
November 13, 2025, through January 15, 2026, in the amount of $3,260.88 ($90.58 X
36). I further CONCLUDE that the Board is also entitled to tuition reimbursement for the
amount of school days from January 15, 2026, through the date when A.V. is disenrolled
at $90.58 for each day.
Respondent, in its answer to the petition, files a Motion for Partial Dismissal as to
O.V., who is three years old and was removed from the preschool program. The
respondent argues that “the Petition of Appeal is not valid for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and the express provisions of the New Jersey Constitution, N.J.S.A. 18A:38
and N.J.A.C. 6A:22.” (Respondent Answer to Petition at 4.)
In its Order Denying Emergent Relief in this matter, this tribunal stated:
Each school district is obligated to provide a thorough and
efficient education system to all children residing in its school
district. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1. To carry out this policy,
local boards of education have discretionary authority under
N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c). The boards adopt rules for the
management of the district’s public schools and act in a
manner to ensure the lawful and proper conduct of the
district’s public schools. This Board cites the applicable
policy, which states that “[p]ublic school shall be free to the
following persons over five and under 20 years of age . . . .”
N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1. O.V. is only three years old, and thus is

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
10
not at the age where the district is obligated to provide him
with free public education.
[See Order on Emergent Relief, Docket # EDU 21086-25, at
6.]
I therefore CONCLUDE that respondent’s Motion for Partial Dismissal as it
pertains to O.V. should be granted.
ORDER
It is therefore ORDERED that the District’s determination that A.V. was ineligible
to attend school while domiciled outside the district is hereby AFFIRMED. It is further
ORDERED that petitioner pay respondent, Board of Education of the Borough of South
River, Middlesex County, tuition in the total amount of $3,260.88 for A.V.’s unauthorized
attendance in the district’s schools from November 13, 2025, through January 15, 2026
(thirty-six school days). It is further ORDERED that petitioner shall pay for the amount of
school days from January 15, 2026, through the date when A.V. is disenrolled at $90.58
per day.
Respondent’s Motion for Partial Dismissal as it pertains to O.V., who is three years
old and is not entitled to public education and is not domiciled in the district, is GRANTED.
Petitioner’s appeal is DISMISSED.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
11
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
February 25, 2026
DATE JOAN M. BURKE, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 21086-25
12
APPENDIX
Witnesses
For petitioner
C.D.
T.V.
For respondent
Joseph Shannon, Director of Security
Kasie Rosario, Residency Officer
Exhibits
For petitioner
P-1 C.D. Driver’s License; T.V. Driver’s License; Homeowner Affidavit
P-2 Ring Doorbell Video
For respondent
R-1 Residency Report/Investigation
R-2 Notice of Determination of Ineligibility
R-3 Final Notice of Ineligibility