Board of Education of the City of Newark, Essex County v. Dawn Haynes, 1/21/25 (#22-25E)

22-25E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 17242-24
Agency Dkt. No. 385-12/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
Board of Education of the City of Newark, Essex
County,
Petitioner,
v.
Dawn Haynes,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office
of Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
have been reviewed and considered.
Petitioner, the Newark Board of Education (Board), filed this motion for emergent relief
against respondent, Board member Dawn Haynes, and seeks her removal from the Board due to
a disqualifying conflict of interest. N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2, “Inconsistent interests or office prohibited,”
provides in relevant part: “No member of any board of education shall be interested directly or
indirectly in any contract with or claim against the board . . .”.
On or about October 24, 2024, respondent’s eighteen-year-old daughter filed a Notice of
Tort Claim against the Newark Public Schools, Superintendent Roger Leon, and Principal Nelson
Ruiz regarding alleged mistreatment and bullying which took place when she was a high school

2
student. Respondent’s daughter indicated on the Notice of Tort Claim that her address was the
same as respondent’s address.
The Board asserts that respondent and her daughter are members of the same household
and that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2, respondent must be immediately removed from her
position as a Board member because she is directly or indirectly interested in her daughter’s
claim. However, both respondent and her daughter deny that they are members of the same
household.
According to certifications submitted by respondent, her daughter is a full-time college
student at Clark Atlanta University in Georgia, where she lives on campus. She intends to live
with her cousin in Marietta, Georgia during the summer months while she attends summer
classes. She also intends to obtain a driver’s license and to register to vote in Georgia. She listed
respondent’s address on the Notice of Tort Claim for purposes of convenience, but she maintains
that she no longer lives with respondent in Newark. 	She will continue to visit her parents on
holiday breaks, and she has not yet arranged to have her mail forwarded to Georgia.1
To obtain emergent relief, the Board must establish that: (1) it will suffer irreparable harm
if the requested relief is not granted; (2) the legal right underlying its claim is settled; (3) it has a
reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim; and (4) it will suffer
greater harm than respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not granted. Crowe v. DeGioia,
90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982); N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
1 On December 16, 2024, after the Board initiated this action via petition and motion for emergent relief,
respondent’s daughter sent the Board correspondence providing her current address in Marietta, Georgia.

3
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that the Board has failed to
demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe and
codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6. However, as explained herein, the Commissioner so concludes for
different reasons than those cited by the ALJ. In particular, the Commissioner rejects the ALJ’s
finding that a Notice of Tort Claim “is not the type of claim that would justify [respondent’s]
removal” from the Board. Order, at 4.
At the outset, the Commissioner has previously held that a Notice of Tort Claim is a type
of claim that could potentially result in disqualification under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2. See, e.g., Bd. of
Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne v. Taliaferro, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 197 (1993) (board member
disqualified under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 when wife filed Notice of Tort Claim against board and he
had indirect interest due to potential for significant monetary benefit as family unit member if
she recovered damages); Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Berlin v. Lee, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 6050-01,
Initial Decision (April 29, 2002), Commissioner Decision No. 238-02 (June 14, 2002) (board
member disqualified under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 after filing Notice of Tort Claim against board on
behalf of minor children); Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Palmyra v. Marinnie, Commissioner Decision
No. 208-05 (June 8, 2005) (board member disqualified under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 for indirect
interest in adult son’s Notice of Tort Claim against board as son was a member of his household,
had educational and/or living expenses subsidized by mother who also lived in household, and
board member would benefit in substantial and material way if son was awarded over $1,000,000
in damages). But see Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Brick v. Mercer, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 5 (1995) (board
member not disqualified under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 when adult son filed Notice of Tort Claim against
board because no showing made to establish board member would benefit from son’s claim).

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Moreover, the ALJ’s reliance on W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506 (2023), is misplaced. There,
in a matter that did not involve the interpretation or application of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2, the
Supreme Court held that a Notice of Tort Claim neither constitutes a complaint nor the
commencement of civil litigation. W.S., 252 N.J. at 520. Applying W.S., the ALJ reasoned that
because a complaint was not yet filed by respondent’s daughter and civil litigation had not yet
commenced, the Notice of Tort Claim could not disqualify respondent from her Board member
position under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 when it had not been established that she helped her daughter
prepare or serve the Notice of Tort Claim.
However, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 clearly and unambiguously prohibits an
inconsistent interest in a “claim.” 	It does not require that a complaint be filed or that civil
litigation begin for a prohibited inconsistent interest to arise. Berlin, Initial Decision at 15. “The
notice of a tort claim is not merely an inchoate claim that may be pursued at some future date,
but represents an actual claim against a public entity which may be subject to settlement and,
failing that, may be the subject of a future court action against the public entity. Thus, the claim
. . . has been made and is in existence by virtue of the notice of claim.” Id. at 14-15. For these
reasons, the Commissioner rejects the ALJ’s finding that a Notice of Tort Claim “is not the type of
claim” that could lead to respondent’s removal from the Board. Order, at 4.
Nevertheless, the Commissioner holds that the Board is not entitled to emergent relief
because the legal right underlying its claim is not settled. Disqualification pursuant to N.J.S.A.
18A:12-2 is not automatic once a board member’s immediate family member files a Notice of
Tort Claim against the board. See generally Bd. of Educ. of Sea Isle City v. Kennedy, 196 N.J. 1, 15
(2008). “Indeed, the Commissioner has stated his willingness to engage in fact-sensitive, case-

5
specific analyses in respect of a member’s direct or indirect interest in alleged ‘inconsistent’
claims and contracts.” Ibid.
“[N]ot all claims in which a board member has an interest constitute a ‘substantial
conflict’ requiring removal from office as the sole remedy.” Id. at 16. “Substantial, disqualifying
conflicts of interest should be identified either by type of claim, i.e. specific monetary claims by
the member or a family member as in a tort claim, or by type of proceeding.” Id. at 18. Accord
Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Kinnelon v. D’Amico, 477 N.J. Super. 184, 190 (App. Div. 2023). Removal
may be warranted when there are “concrete, pecuniary aspects to the dispute.” Kennedy, 196
N.J. at 7. It is important to consider whether the alleged inconsistent interest “would call into
question a board member’s ability to perform public duties and the public’s confidence in that
ability of the member to perform his or her office.” Id. at 17. “[T]he line between acceptable
and prohibited activities . . . may be resolved through the prism of a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. at
18.
In summary, because disqualification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 is not automatic once
a board member’s immediate family member files a Notice of Tort Claim against the board, the
Commissioner finds that the Board’s legal right underlying its claim is not settled. The current
record does not permit the Commissioner to conduct the requisite thorough, fact-sensitive, case-
specific analysis mandated by the Court in Kennedy to determine whether respondent has a
direct or indirect interest in her daughter’s claim against the Board that would warrant her
disqualification under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2. While respondent’s daughter’s domicile is a factor to
consider, it is not necessarily dispositive. Furthermore, the extent to which respondent continues

6
to support her daughter financially while she continues her education on a full-time basis is
unknown.
Accordingly, the Board’s application for emergent relief is denied.2 	This matter shall
continue at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it
to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	January 21, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	January 21, 2025
2 Because all Crowe factors must be satisfied to obtain emergent relief, the Commissioner need not analyze the
remaining three factors.

New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER
DENYING EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 385-12/24
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CITY OF NEWARK,
ESSEX COUNTY,
Petitioner,
v.
DAWN HAYNES,
Respondent.
______________________________________
Brenda C. Liss, Esq., for petitioner
Bryant Lawrence Horsley, Jr., Esq., for respondent (Souder Law Group, LLP,
attorneys)
Record Closed: December 17, 2024 	Decided: December 19, 2024
BEFORE WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 6, 2024, the Board of Education of the City of Newark (“Board”) filed
a Motion for Emergent Relief to exclude Respondent Dawn Haynes from participation in
all business and activity of the Board pending the outcome of Petition for 	Declaratory
Relief filed that same day. The parties provided notice that oral argument on the Board’s
Motion for Emergent Relief would take place on December 13, 2024 at the Office of
Administrative Law. Counsel for the Board appeared for oral argument and respondent
failed to appear. 	When contacted by telephone respondent indicated that she did not
receive notice of the oral argument. 	However, respondent later confirmed that she had
received an email from transmittals oal.nj.gov (which contained notice that oral argument
would take place on December 13, 2024) she did not open it because she did not
recognize the sender. Respondent was granted permission to submit written opposition
to the motion by Monday, December 16 th. 	A further extension was granted until
December 17th at 4:00 pm after a request for same was received from newly retained
counsel for the respondent. The record on the motion was closed on December 17, 2024
after receiving written opposition from respondent.
ISSUE
Does the filing of a Notice of Tort Claim by respondent’s adult daughter require the
immediate removal of respondent from her position as an elected member of the Board
of Education of the City of Newark.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue at bar arose upon the Board’s receipt of a Notice of Tort Claim (“NTC”)
dated October 24, 2024, addressed to the Newark Public Schools c/o Superintendent
Rodger Leon. 	The document identifies itself as “Notice of Tort Claim for [respondent’s
adult daughter]” and gives the respondent’s address as the address of the claimant. The
Notice of Tort Claim also lists the “Names of the Public Entity or Employee Causing Loss
“ as Newark Public Schools, Superintendent Roger Leon, and Principal Nelson Ruiz.”

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
3
The NTC states that the claimant “was subjected to and suffered pervasive and
consistent’ mistreatment of 15 specified types as well as “other inappropriate and unlawful
verbal and physical torts.” It further states that ”Newark Public Schools, Superintendent
Roger Leon and Principle Nelson Ruiz are liable for violating my rights…” and “acted
illegally, 	unethically, 	maliciously, 	intentionally, 	recklessly, 	negligently, 	fraudulently,
wrongfully, and/or immorally, and aided and abetted the conduct.”
The Board argues that because respondent and her daughter reside at the same
address and are members of the same household, respondent has a disqualifying interest
in her daughter’s claim against the Board. The Board maintains that during the pendency
of the Petition for Declaratory Ruling the business of the board will continue resulting in
potential conflicts of interest. The Board also emphasizes that its members have access
to confidential information including information concerning pending and threatened
litigation. 	For these reasons, the Board goes on to assert that its request for emergent
relief be granted because it satisfies all the standards for such relief pursuant to Crowe v.
DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982). 	For the reasons set forth below, I disagree.
A litigant seeking emergent relief must comply with the requirement of N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.6 which provides, in relevant part:
(B) 	a 	motion 	for 	a 	stay 	or 	emergent 	relief 	shall 	be
accompanied by a letter memorandum or brief which shall
address the following standards to be met for granting such
relief pursuant to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982):
1. 	The 	petitioner 	will 	suffer 	irreparable 	harm 	if 	the
requested relief is not granted;
2. 	The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. 	The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
the underlying claim;
4. 	When 	the 	equities 	and 	interests 	of 	the 	parties 	are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the
respondent 	will 	suffer 	if 	the 	requested 	relief 	is 	not
granted.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
4
It is the petitioner's burden to demonstrate a clear right to emergent relief by
addressing these components of emergent relief (See, e.g., Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Educ.
V. L.E. and A.E. o/b/o J.E., OAL Dkt. No. EDS 14744-18 (N.J. Adm. Oct.22, 2-18). I FIND
that petitioner has failed to do so.
1. 	Irreparable Harm
The gravamen of petitioner’s contention concerning this standard is that the
Board will be forced to include among its members the respondent, who has an
“irreconcilable conflict of interest” due to the substantial monetary claim made by
her daughter against the Board. The first weakness I find in the logic of petitioner’s
assertion of irreparable harm is that there has been no proceeding filed against the
Board by petitioner’s daughter. 	I FIND that the NTC served on the Board by
petitioner’s daughter is not the type of claim that would justify removal as from her
elected Board position.
Pursuant to Rule 4:2-2, "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with
the court." 	A NTC does not constitute a complaint or a pleading. 	Rule 4:5-1(a)
provides an exclusive list of all permissible "pleadings" that can be filed in a civil
action: a complaint, an answer, an answer to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross
- claim, a third-party complaint and third-party answer, and a reply to an affirmative
defense. Neither a TCA notice of claim nor a motion for leave to file a late notice
of claim appears on the list, and the rule concludes: "No other pleading is allowed."
R. 4:5-1(a).
As indicated in W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506 (2023):
The Appellate Division has thus held that filing a notice of
claim under the TCA does not commence civil litigation. See
J.R.S., 398 N.J. Super. at 5-6, 939 A.2d 226. Instead, a notice
of claim informs public entities of "[p]otential future litigation or
notice of intent to commence a civil suit at some future time ."
Id., 398 N.J. Super. at 6, 939 A.2d 226. "Although the filing of
a tort claims notice under N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 is an indispensable
jurisdictional prerequisite to the prosecution of common law
tort claims against a public entity, the mere serving of this

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
5
notice 	upon 	the 	public 	entity 	does 	not 	amount 	to 	the
commencement of 'civil litigation.' " Id. 398 N.J. Super. at 5-6,
939 A.2d 226 (citing Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284,
290, 850 A.2d 1238 (2004)). As we have noted, one of the
purposes of the notice of claim is "to allow the public entity at
least six months for administrative review with the opportunity
to settle meritorious claims prior to the bringing of suit." Velez,
180 N.J. at 290, 850 A.2d 1238 (emphasis added) (quoting
Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 121, 751 A.2d 1047
(2000)). That would be impossible if a notice of claim itself
began civil litigation.
[Id. at 520]
In Board of Educ. of City of Sea Isle City v. Kennedy, 196 N.J. 1 (2007), the Court
concluded that a Board member should not be removed from office merely because he
or she advanced a claim “in a proceeding” against a school district involving that individual
of an immediate family member’s interests. Id at 17-18. Here, no proceeding has been
initiated and it has not been established that respondent had any involvement in her
daughter preparing or serving the NTC.
My reasoning for finding is also supported by the caselaw that has developed
which interprets the section of New Jersey School law described as “Qualifications” for
office for members of local boards of education. That statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 states:
No 	board 	member 	of 	any 	Board 	of 	Education 	shall 	be
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with or claim
against the board, nor, in the case of local and regional school
districts, shall he hold office as mayor or as member of the
governing body of a municipality, nor, in the case of county
special services school districts and county vocational school
districts, shall he hold office as a member of the governing
body of a county.
No evidence has been presented that would indicate that the NTC constitutes an
actual claim filed against the Board. A notice of a potential claim is not a complaint filed
against or a “proceeding” initiated against the board. 	I Find no harm to the Board as a
result 	of 	receiving 	notice 	of 	a 	potential 	tort 	claim 	from 	respondent’s 	daughter.
Accordingly, I find no evidence of irreparable harm to the Board.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
6
In Board of Educ. of City of Sea Isle City v. Kennedy, 196 N.J. 1 (2007) conducted
an analysis of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2, its application to sitting member board members, and
its interplay with N.J.S.A. 18A: 12-21-23 (a/k/a the School Ethics Act, “SEA”). The Court
observed that while N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2 sets out clear prohibitions against board members
qualifying for a board position if they have inconsistent claims against the board, it did not
require automatic removal when an inconsistent claim arises during a member’s term.
While the Court had “no doubt” that an inconstant claim can be a cause for removal it did
not find that removal was the only potential remedy. 	The Court recognized that the
Commissioner of Education, who historically has heard petitions to remove a sitting board
of education member for alleged conflicts of interest, has stated his willingness to engage
in a fact-sensitive, case by case analysis concerning the member’s direct or indirect
interest in the alleged “inconsistent “ claims. Id. at 15. The Court ultimately found that the
Commissioner’s past applications of N.J.S.A. 18A:12.2 “demonstrate a willingness to
engage in a careful examination of a board member’s asserted conflicting interest in a
claim against the board, and further, to find that not all claims in which the board member
has an interest constitute a “substantial conflict” requiring removal from office as the sole
remedy.” Id at 16.
The 	Court 	in 	Kennedy 	also 	recognized 	that 	many 	administrative 	decisions
concerning substantial conflicts of interest of 	sitting board members took place prior to
the enactment of the SEA and therefor the guidance provided by those decisions needed
to be enlightened further by the later action of the legislature that addressed conflict of
interest issues. The Court stated:
With the enactment of SEA, the legislature declared its
intention " to ensure and preserve public confidence” in local
school board members, by providing board members with
advanced 	guidance 	on 	ethical 	conduct 	so 	that 	such
members might conduct their personal affairs appropriately
and 	within 	the 	bounds 	ethically 	expected. 	The 	SEA
considered the advocacy interests of board members and
recognized a limited need to except board members from an
absolute prohibition from pursuing their family members
interests in “negotiations and proceedings” involving the
board. 	Read 	broadly, 	the 	latter 	enacted 	SEA 	could
contradict 	N.J.S.A.18A: 	2-2’s 	interest 	in 	prohibiting
substantial conflicting claims that pit a board members

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
7
interest in a claim against the interest of the board. Implied
repealers are not favored, however, and would require that
we find the latter enacted statute to be utterly inconsistent or
repugnant to the earlier.
We need not do so here for the two statutes are readily
capable of being harmonized the legislatures authorization
of a board members ability to pursue resolution of some
personal issues, interests, or disagreements with a school
district through negotiations and even “proceedings” is not
repugnant to the earlier recognition by the Commissioner
that 	not 	all 	“claims” 	against 	the 	board 	will 	require
disqualification and removal from office under N.J.S.A.18A:
2-2. 	We 	view 	the 	SEA's 	exemption 	as 	a 	legislative
expansion of that previously recognized, limited case-law
exception to the rule against inconsistent claims. Certainly,
we perceive no direct statutory conflict between the two
statutes. 	The reconciliation of the two statutes will unfold
based on fact-sensitive analysis for substantial and deeply
antagonistic interests that would call into question a board
member's ability to perform public duties and the public's
confidence in that ability of the member to perform his or her
office, 	notwithstanding 	the 	advancement 	of 	a 	personal
interest through negotiations or a “proceeding”.
The legislature is exemption allowing participation in certain
quote 	proceedings 	must 	be 	taken 	into 	account 	by 	the
commissioner in removal actions based on N.J.S.A.18A: 2-
2’s prohibition against inconsistent claims. We recognize
that that shall require careful case development. As a matter
of fairness, the court should provide the public with advice
and guidance. The legislature has recognized the value of
such advanced notice about the parameters of acceptable
behavior, specifically noting that the more guidance that
school board members receive, the better for them and for
the public that they serve.
[Id at 28-31]
Based on the court’s analysis in Kennedy, I FIND that removal of a sitting board
member when an inconsistent claim arises is not mandatory and that there needs to be
a fact sensitive analysis of the alleged direct , or in this case indirect interest in the alleged
inconsistent claim.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
8
Based upon my review of the Petition for Declaratory relief and the papers filed in
support of the Motion for Emergent relief, I FIND the petitioner has failed to establish that
Irreparable harm would result if emergent relief is not granted. 	The NTC was filed on
October 28, 2024 and the Petition for Declaratory Relief was filed on December 6, 2024.
Nowhere in the Petition or the papers filed in support of the Motion is there any indication
that any action has been taken by the board on the NTC or that any action on the NTC is
pending and would require emergent relief. 	While the Board does argue that there is a
meeting scheduled for December19, 2024 and respondent’s attendance and participation
in that meeting would cause irreparable harm, there is no indication as to why irreparable
harm would occur simply because of respondent’s participation. 	Even if the Board had
indicated that it was going to take action on the NTC, there is no reason why respondent’s
abstention from participation in any such discussion or board action would not protect the
validity of any action taken.
2. 	The Legal Right Underlying the Boards Claim
The Board argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy is the controlling
law. 	I agree. 	I do not agree however that the Kennedy decision support petitioner’s
position. 	Petitioner relies on the following quote from Kennedy to support its argument
that the NTC in and of itself disqualified respondent from board membership:
Substantial, 	disqualifying 	conflicts 	of 	interest 	should 	be
identified by type of claim, i.e. specific monetary claims by the
member or a family member as in a tort claim …
[ Petitioner’s Brief at p.4]
A review of the sentence preceding the above quote and the words following the
ellipsis at the end, make it clear the Court was referring to an actual proceeding where
claim sounding in tort was alleged and not a Notice 	of a potential tort claim. 	A clearer
quote of the Court’s position is as follows:
We Conclude that a board member should not be removed
from office merely because he or she has advanced any claim
“in a proceeding” against a school district involving that
individual 	or 	an 	immediate 	family 	member’s 	interest.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
9
Substantial, 	disqualifying 	conflict’s 	of 	interest 	should 	be
identified either by type of claim, i.e. specific monetary claims
by the member or a family member as 	in a tort claim, or by
type of proceeding.
I do agree with petitioner’s contention that claims of family members resulting in a
potential benefit to the board member’s household constitute an indirect conflict of
interest. I do however FIND that those indirect claims also need to be made in a complaint
or petition filed in an appropriate proceeding and not in a notice of a potential claim in a
future proceeding. Petitioner has not provided support for a contrary finding.
3. 	The Likelihood 	of Prevailing on the Merits of the
Underlying Claim
In support of its argument that it would ultimately prevail on the merits of their
Petition, they simply state that “a declaratory ruling that Respondent is disqualified from
membership on the Board is inescapable, given the statutory prohibition and authorities
cited above. I disagree that the statutes and authority cited by petitioner makes a finding
in petitioner’s favor inescapable. For the reasons stated above. I Find that the relevant
caselaw and statutes make it more likely that petitioner will not ultimately prevail on the
merits of the underlying claim.
4. 	Balancing of the Interests
Petitioner maintains that when equities and respective interests of the Board and
respondents are balanced, the Board will suffer greater harm if the requested relief is
denied than respondent would suffer if it is granted. The Board maintains that its interest
is that of the public and citizens of the City of Newark: the interest in having a full
complement of members whose sole interest is in the students of the Newark Public
Schools, and in not having one of its members hampered in her work by a conflict of
interest. As with petitioner’s other arguments, I disagree with them.
Respondent is an elected member of the Board who petitioner is seeking to
disqualify for an allege conflict of interest which has not yet arisen. If petitioner’s daughter

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
10
never files a proceeding against the board, there will never be an actual conflict.
Moreover, because of the holdings in Kennedy, it is clear that any potential impact of the
filing of the NTC on Petitioner can be addressed in a fact-sensitive analysis at the time of
the hearing on the Petition. The fact that there has been advanced notice of a potential
claim by respondents’ daughter, and there is no indication that an action will be filed prior
to a full hearing on the Board’s Petition, there appears to be sufficient time for the parties
to agree upon a process whereby respondent’s involvement in her daughter’s claim would
be restricted.
Also, as indicated in the analysis of irreparable harm above, the Court in Kennedy
recognized “the Legislature’s authorization of a school board member’s ability to pursue
personal issues, interests, or disagreements with a school district through negotiation and
even “proceedings” is not repugnant to the earlier recognition by the Commissioner that
not all “claims“ against the board will require disqualification and removal from office
under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2”. Id. at 17. Accordingly, at the time of the hearing on the Petition,
a 	fact-sensitive 	analysis 	of 	the 	alleged 	conflict 	of 	interest 	may 	even 	result 	in 	a
determination that respondent interest is such that her abstention would not be required.
I FIND, after balancing the equities and interests of the parties, that respondent
will suffer greater harm than the Board if the emergent relief requested by the board is
granted.
In conclusion, while I have determined that standards for emergent relief have not
been met, I have reached no determination as to whether a disqualifying conflict of
interest will exist at the time of the hearing on Petition. 	Given that there will be time
between my decision on this motion and the hearing on the Petition for Declaratory Ruling,
I 	urge 	the 	parties 	to 	meet 	and 	determine 	if 	agreement 	can be 	reached 	on 	the
implementation of procedures that would take place in the event petitioner’s daughter files
a complaint or initiates procedures against the Board.
For the reasons indicated above,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
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IT IS on this 19th day of December, 2024, ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for
emergent relief is DEINIED.
This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who
by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	The final decision shall be
issued without undue delay, but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this
order. If the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, does
not adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall
become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10.
December 19, 2024
DATE 	WILLIAM COURTNEY, ALJ

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 17242-24
12
LIST OF MOVING PAPERS
For Petitioners:
Petitioner for Declaratory Relief;
December 6, 2024 Letter Brief;
Certification of Service;
Certification of Valarie Willson;
Notice of Motion for Declaratory Relief
For Respondent:
Respondent’s Answer to Petition;
Brief in Opposition to Motion for Emergent Relief;
Certification of Akela Haynes;
Certification of Dawn Haynes