Margaret Bennett v. Judith Sullivan, Tom Bogdansky, Doreen Mariani, Marianna Emmolo, and Kim Ansh, Bergen County, 12/9/2024, (#445-24)

445-24
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 00881-23
Agency Dkt. No. 12-1/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Margaret Bennett,
Petitioner,
v.
Judith Sullivan, Tom Bogdansky, Doreen
Mariani, Marianna Emmolo, and Kim Ansh,
Respondents.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and respondents’ reply thereto,
have been reviewed and considered.
Petitioner—a parent, taxpayer, and community member—alleges that respondents,
majority members of the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education (Board),
violated various Board policies, regulations, and laws when conducting Board business. 	She
claims that their actions, mainly pertaining to making certain motions and voting on them, have
harmed the school district. The allegations involve the Board’s amendment of its legal services
policy, and a motion to pause the district’s Energy Savings Improvement Program, without first
consulting the Board Superintendent; voting against hiring a substitute teacher; rejecting
purchase orders from a certain appliance store; obstruction of harassment, intimidation, and
bullying (HIB) investigations through Board votes; and obstruction of proper recording of Board

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minutes. 	The most recent amended petition dated March 29, 2023, states that petitioner is
seeking “strong sanctions and injunctive measures” against respondents for their actions.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition for numerous reasons, including that
petitioner lacks standing. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted respondents’ motion upon
determining that petitioner lacks standing. 	The ALJ concluded that petitioner failed to
demonstrate she was harmed or affected by respondents’ actions in a direct and meaningful way.
Additionally, citing N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2, the ALJ concluded that petitioner failed to establish that she
is an “interested person” who would be “substantially, specifically, and directly affected by the
outcome of this matter.” 	The ALJ further concluded that while petitioner claimed that
respondents’ actions could bring about lawsuits involving the district and harm children, she
failed to provide support for those claims.
In her exceptions, petitioner maintains that she has standing as a taxpayer because
taxpayers bear the financial consequences of respondents’ actions. Alternatively, she argues that
even if she lacks standing, the Commissioner should nonetheless make a formal statement, issue
a reprimand, or make recommendations to hold respondents accountable. In reply, respondents
contend that petitioner’s exceptions fail to provide a legal basis to refute the ALJ’s conclusion
that she lacks standing. They argue that petitioner’s status as a taxpayer is insufficient to confer
standing in a matter before the Commissioner because she has not alleged some form of
particularized harm unique to her and distinct from her general concerns as a community
member. They also assert that petitioner’s exceptions are procedurally defective because they
do not conform with N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4.

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Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner lacks standing and
does not qualify as an “interested person” under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2. 	“Restrictions on standing
apply to those who initiate administrative proceedings before the Commissioner.” Cantatore v.
Bd. of Educ. of Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg’l High Sch. Dist., Bergen Cnty., OAL Dkt. No. 05498-
22, Initial Decision at 9, adopted, Commissioner Decision No. 153-23 (May 25, 2023). To pursue
a controversy or dispute arising under the school laws, a person must be an “interested person”
as defined by N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2. Ibid.
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2 defines “interested person” as “a person who will be substantially,
specifically, and directly affected by the outcome of a controversy before the Commissioner.”
The record fails to establish that petitioner has children who are currently attending school in the
Ramapo Indian Hills Regional High School District. Thus, she will “suffer no direct personal harm
or inconvenience from the actions” respondents took. 	Herron v. Bd. of Educ. of Montclair,
Commissioner Decision No. 233-14 at 2 (June 2, 2014). Furthermore, while she is a resident and
taxpayer, she “has alleged no personal financial ramifications” from respondents’ actions. Ibid.
Instead, she alleged that respondents’ actions could bring about lawsuits involving the district
and harm children. 	Accordingly, she does not qualify as an “interested person” under
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2. 	See also Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38, 47-48 (App. Div. 2001)
(explaining that standing to sue requires an adverse position, a personal stake in the outcome,
and the “substantial likelihood” of suffering some harm in the event of an unfavorable decision).
The Commissioner further finds and concludes that, even assuming petitioner had
established standing, the remedies she seeks in her petition—"strong sanctions and injunctive
measures”—are not specifically available to her under the school laws and regulations upon

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which she relies. While the Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under school
laws and regulations, in this instance petitioner has failed to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted by the Commissioner. 	See Cardillo v. Bd. of Educ. of Paterson, Passaic Cnty.,
Commissioner Decision No. 192-24 at 3 (May 15, 2024) (holding that a petition must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim “if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling [petitioner] to relief”).
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter,
respondents’ motion is granted, and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	December 9, 2024
Date of Mailing: 	December 11, 2024
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
AGENCY DKT. NO. 12-1/23
MARGARET BENNETT,
Petitioner,
v.
JUDITH SULLIVAN, TOM BOGDANSKY,
DOREEN 	MARIANI, 	MARIANNA
EMMOLO, AND KIM ANSH,
Respondents.
________________________________
Margaret Bennett, petitioner, pro se
Kerri A. Wright, Esq., for respondents (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, attorneys)
Record Closed: September 1, 2024 	Decided: September 30, 2024
BEFORE JOANN LaSALA CANDIDO, ALAJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents, the majority members of the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional School
District Board of Education (Judith Sullivan, Tom Bogdansky, Doreen Mariani, Marianna

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
2
Emmolo, and Kim Ansh), filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioner’s (Margaret Bennett)
Amended Petition dated January 25, 2023, which sought emergent relief and alleged
various violations/misconduct by the respondents in their positions as members of the
Ramapo Indian Hills Regional Board of Education, although it did not name the Board
itself as a party. 	Chief among the issues discussed here is whether petitioner has
standing to bring this action.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The matter was transmitted to the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law on
January 27, 2023, as an emergent matter, for hearing as a contested case pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23. The emergent relief sought was
solely on the January 5, 2023, hearing vote by respondent Sullivan to not renew the
contract for Fogarty and Hara’s law firm to act as Board counsel. 	Petitioner sought the
injunctive relief in the form of removing respondent Sullivan’s “yes” vote and replacing her
vote with recusal for apparent conflict of interest. 	The petitioner requested that the
remainder of her petition be considered by the Commissioner on a non-emergent basis.
The emergent relief was denied by Administrative Law Judge Jude-Anthony
Tiscornia on February 7, 2023, and upheld by Commissioner of the Department of
Education on March 7, 2023. The Commissioner found the existing petition sufficient to
allow proceedings regarding those issues to proceed.
Petitioner filed the amended petition on April 5, 2023. 	Respondents filed this
motion to dismiss the amended petition on May 11, 2023.
Petitioner 	filed 	her 	opposition 	on 	May 	19, 	2023. 	Respondents 	filed 	their
supplemental submission on June 2, 2023. 	Petitioner filed her response to the
supplemental submission on June 13, 2023. 	Administrative Law Judge Jude-Anthony
Tiscornia was appointed to the Hudson County Superior Court, and the matter was
transferred to the undersigned on or about September 1, 2024.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
3
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
By way of background, petitioner’s amended petition alleges that statutory/code
provisions1 were violated when respondent Ansh motioned to amend Board Policy 0174
regarding legal services without consulting the superintendent beforehand. 	She claims
that changes made to the Board Policy imposed risk to the District and “obstruct[ed] the
operation of the district, impede[d] the Superintendent, Business Administrator, and other
administrators such as the Director of Special Education, from doing what they are
certificated to do which includes the Superintendent’s ability to administer the schools.”
Amended Petition 2. 	She further alleges that the respondents violated Board
Policy 0131, which only allows for first reading policy amendments when there is an
emergency, and Board Policy 1210 regarding board–superintendent relations due to
there not being consultation with the superintendent prior to board policies being revised.
Petitioner avers that a violation of Board Policy 0146 by overstepping their authority as
board members improperly paused an Energy Savings Improvement Plan that had been
approved previously, which imposed a financial burden on the District.
Petitioner further asserts that respondents violated Board Policy 0164, violating
Robert’s Rules, and that the Board’s actions with regard to HIB resolutions contravened
the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act as well as N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.1, sending the District down
the path of litigation.
Petitioner also claims that the respondents obstructed the recording of minutes at
Board meetings and violated Board Policy 4125 by voting against hiring a specific
substitute teacher. 	She alleges obstruction of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1 as well. 	Lastly,
petitioner requests an injunction to avoid the respondents violating Board Policy 6450,
which addresses choice of vendor.2
1 Petitioner references N.J.A.C. 6A:23-5.2, N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1, and N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20. It appears that
N.J.A.C. 6A:23-5.2 is a former version of the code.
2 Petitioner refers to this as Count 9, but it is the second Count 9 listed, and therefore the undersigned will
refer to it as Count 10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
4
Respondents argue that this matter should be dismissed based upon the following.
First, respondents argue that the petitioner has failed to advance a cause of action.
Second, respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed for the petitioner not
having standing. As respondents state:
Petitioner is merely a resident of one of the towns served by
the Board, but she has neither alleged any distinct injury or
harm to herself or her interests, nor can the relief that she
seeks be remedied by the Commissioner. 	Instead, the
amended petition seeks to punish Respondents for their
participation in Board action affecting the District, rather than
Petitioner herself.
[Respondents’ Motion 9.]
Third, respondents argue that petitioner’s application omitted an indispensable
party—specifically, the Board. Fourth, respondents argue that petitioner’s allegations of
violations of board policy are not cognizable claims for the Commissioner to decide. Fifth,
respondents argue that possibly all the issues in this matter are moot. 	And sixth,
respondents argue that the petitioner has failed to allege facts that support petitioner’s
causes of action.
Regarding respondents’ argument stating that petitioner does not have standing in
this matter, petitioner argues in part that:
Petitioner is a citizen of the municipality served by the Board
of Education on which Respondents are Trustees. Petitioner
therefore 	has 	standing 	to 	challenge 	its 	unlawful 	acts.
Sophisticated lawyering by Ms. Wright notwithstanding, these
numerous, well-documented instances of blatant misconduct
by the [Board] require reprimand by the Commissioner of
Education. 	Further, the acts of misconduct which were
reversed by subsequent corrective action of the Board are
clearly capable of repetition; therefore, the Commissioner
should intervene with a written ruling to guard against the
repetition of such misconduct in the future.
[Petitioner’s Opposition 4.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
5
Furthermore, petitioner states that “right now Respondents make up a mission-
driven 	board-within-a-board 	blinded 	by 	ill-conceived 	premises 	that 	has 	absolutely
negatively impacted taxpayers of this regional school district. 	Petitioner is one of those
taxpayers. 	Petitioner has and continues to be harmed by Respondents’ actions.”
Petitioner’s Opposition 4. Petitioner stresses, “More importantly Your Honor, this is about
the children.” Ibid. And the petitioner argues:
Petitioner has standing to object to the detrimental actions of
these Respondents. 	Petitioner is a taxpayer, parent, active
community member. She is a watchdog, a citizen who cares.
District/municipality resources are being squandered. The tab
grows exponentially. There is a direct harm to Petitioner as a
taxpayer who supports the high schools. Petitioner is seeking
a determination that the Respondents’ actions were wrong.
[Petitioner’s Opposition 5.]
In respondents’ supplemental letter brief, respondents argue that “Petitioner
cannot just file a petition because she is a taxpayer, especially when she alleges no
personal ramifications being suffered—above anything imposed on every other taxpayer
in the district—and when the petition is based largely on ideological differences with the
direction taken by the Board.” 	Respondents’ Supplemental 4. 	Respondents state that
“[w]hether an individual has standing is not a function measured against how much
someone ‘cares’ about an issue.” 	Ibid. 	Respondents continue, “Instead, in order to be
an interested party with standing before the Commissioner, Petitioner needs to be
‘substantially, specifically and directly affected by the outcome of a controversy before
the Commissioner.’ N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2. She is not.” Ibid.
Furthermore, respondents state that “[s]he articulates no harm actually being
visited upon her as a result of the Board actions of which she complains. And, as detailed
within Respondents’ motion, and conceded within Petitioner’s opposition, Petitioner's
claims are on behalf of others.” Ibid. Respondents argue that the “[p]etitioner does not
state with any specificity how she actually is harmed. 	She does not explain what the
‘absolute negative impacts’ are.” 	Ibid. 	Regarding her reference about the matter being
about the children, respondents argue that “[p]etitioner must have standing. 	It must be
about her, not about children.” Id. at 5.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
6
Petitioner argues in the third person in response to the respondents’ supplemental
brief, “Petitioner is affected by the outcome. She is a vested community member, parent
and taxpayer. She has standing.” Petitioner’s Response to Supplemental 2.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
While the respondents’ motion uses the term Motion to Dismiss, it should be
addressed using the Motion for Summary Decision standard. 	As has been previously
stated in an Office of Administrative Law decision in another matter, “Respondent’s
motion to dismiss is akin to a motion for summary decision. 	Summary decision is the
administrative counterpart to summary judgment in the judicial arena.” Bacchues v. Bd.
of Trs., Police and Firemen’s Ret. Sys. of N.J., 2021 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 744 (July 19,
2021).
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b) states that a Motion for Summary Decision is granted when
“the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party
is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” 	Furthermore, “When a motion for summary
decision is made and supported, an adverse party in order to prevail must by responding
affidavit set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be
determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	As the Office of
Administrative Law has previously stated in a special education matter, “The standard
governing a motion for summary decision is substantially the same as a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2. Contini v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 286 N.J. Super.
106, 121 (App. Div. 1995) (citing Frank v. Ivy Club, 228 N.J. Super. 40, 62 (App. Div.
1988)).” 	Middletown Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. R.A. and B.A. o/b/o H.A., 2022 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 274 (Apr. 11, 2022). Furthermore:
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must
determine whether the evidence presented, assumed to be
true, and viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party is “sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the
alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Brill

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
7
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
The “judge's function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.” 	Brill, 142 N.J. at 540
(quoting 	Anderson 	v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 	242, 249
(1986)). In other words, the essential question is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require [a
hearing] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 533 (citing Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250).
[Id. at *11–12.]
Standing is an issue of central importance in every case. 	Without standing, an
individual cannot bring a case. 	As the Commissioner of Education wrote in another
matter:
As referenced in the Initial Decision, standing is a threshold
justiciability determination about whether a litigant is entitled
to bring an action before a court or other tribunal. Stubaus v.
Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38, 47 (App. Div., 2001). 	In order
to have standing, a party must be in a position adverse to
other parties, have a palpable stake in the outcome of the
litigation, and be likely to suffer harm in the event of an
unfavorable decision. Ibid.
[Herron v. Montclair Bd. of Educ., 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS
1146, *2 (June 2, 2014).]
Administrative Law Judge Elissa Mizzone Testa wrote in a previous Board of
Education matter, “Restrictions on standing apply to those who initiate administrative
proceedings before the Commissioner.” 	Cantatore v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg’l
High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 221, *9, Initial Decision (Apr. 26,
2023), 	adopted, 	Comm’r 	(May 	25, 	2023),
https://www.nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/2023/153-23.pdf. 	Furthermore, “The
Commissioner has clarified through regulation as well as case law that only an ‘interested
person,’ i.e., one who has standing, may initiate such proceedings. 	Bedminster Educ.
Ass’n v. Bedminster Twp. Bd. of Educ., EDU 6720-05, Comm’r decision (June 16, 2006).”
Ibid. 	N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2 defines an interested person as “a person(s) who will be

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
8
substantially, specifically, and directly affected by the outcome of a controversy before
the Commissioner.” And as explained by Judge Testa:
Consequently, 	petitioners 	must 	show 	that 	they 	will 	“be
affected by the outcome in a direct and meaningful way”
before they may proceed in a contested case. U.K. & G.K. ex
rel D.K. v. Clifton Bd. of Educ., 93 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 71;
Kenwood v. Montclair Bd. of Educ., EDU 8858-81, Initial
Decision, (Apr. 23, 1982), adopted, Comm'r (June 14, 1982)).
Thus, 	to 	have 	standing, 	a 	complaining 	party 	must
demonstrate “some measurable amount of detrimental impact
on the complaining party’s personal rights.” S.J. v. Mountain
Lakes Bd. of Educ., EDU 7081-03, Initial Decision, (Oct. 7,
2003) (citing, Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 491 (1998)).
A deficiency in standing is fatal to a petition such as the one
at issue here. 	“The dismissal of cases brought by litigants
who will not be effected by the outcome in a direct and
meaningful 	way 	is 	required 	by 	this 	regulation.” 	S.J. 	v.
Mountain Lakes Bd. of Educ., EDU 7081-03, Initial Decision,
(Oct. 7, 2003) (citing, S.R. and E.D.R. o/b/o E.D.R., Jr. v.
Montague Bd. of Educ., EDU 5300-03, 201 AGEN LEXIS 583
(Oct. 3, 2001)).
[Cantatore, 2023 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 221, at *10.]
Assuming arguendo that the respondents’ reasons for summary decision other
than for lack of standing fail, the undersigned must grant respondents’ motion for
summary decision on the basis of the petitioner lacking standing first and foremost.
Petitioner’s amended petition can be most appropriately summarized as alleging
that the respondents violated Board policy or New Jersey State statutory/code provisions
when the respondents were acting as members of the Board. Petitioner argues that she
is a taxpayer, parent, active community member, watchdog, and a citizen who cares.
This, however, does not show directly any harm toward her by the respondents’ actions,
nor has she provided any information indicating that she has been affected by the
respondents’ actions in a direct and meaningful way. Petitioner has made claims that the
actions of the respondents could risk lawsuits to the district and harm the children, but
without proof of same.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
9
I must reiterate that standing is central to any matter before the Commissioner, just like it
is in any case in any court. The petitioner does not have standing. Without standing, the
petitioner’s case cannot proceed. 	Petitioner has failed to establish that she is an
interested person who would be “substantially, specifically, and directly affected by the
outcome” of this proceeding. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.2. While concluding that petitioner has no
standing to bring this action and the Commissioner no jurisdiction to hear it, no findings
are made with respect to respondents’ argument that the claims are fatally flawed for
failing to name an indispensable party or any claim of violations of Board policies or
mootness. 	Because of the lack of standing, I CONCLUDE that there are no issues of
material fact and Summary Decision is granted in favor of respondents.
Based upon 	the 	above, 	the 	respondents’ 	motion 	for 	Summary 	Decision 	is
GRANTED.
ORDER
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that respondents’ motion for Summary
Decision is GRANTED and petitioner’s amended petition be and is hereby DISMISSED.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00881-23
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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed 	to 	the 	parties, 	any 	party 	may 	file 	written 	exceptions 	with 	the 	ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed
by email to ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of
Controversies and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton,
New Jersey 08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the
other parties.
September 30, 2024
DATE 	JOANN LASALA CANDIDO, ALAJ
Date Received at Agency: 	September 30, 2024
Date Mailed to Parties: 	September 30, 2024
ljb