State Board of Examiners Appeal Archange Antoine v. Board of Education of the Borough of Roselle, Union County, 3/2/2020, (#81-20)

New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Archange Antoine,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of Roselle,
Union County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner contested his removal as a member of the respondent Roselle Board of Education (the
Board) based upon his alleged failure to attend three or more consecutive Board meetings. Petitioner
contended that his removal was improper and in violation of the Board’s own policy, as he had
missed only one regular meeting, and argued that the Board’s decision to remove him was arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable. The parties filed cross motions for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there is no genuine issue as to any material fact here, and the matter
is ripe for summary decision; it is undisputed that petitioner failed to attend four consecutive
meetings of the Board, though petitioner argued that he only missed one regular meeting that
appeared on the Board’s “Regular Public Meeting” schedule; 	N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 explicitly addresses
a board of education’s authority to remove a board member for failure to attend three consecutive
meetings of the board without good cause; 	the statute does not limit missed meetings to “regular”
meetings; and the Board’s Policy 0145 “Board Member Resignation and Removal” cannot override
the authority afforded to it by N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3. The ALJ concluded that the Board 	properly
removed petitioner pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 based on his failure to attend four consecutive
meetings of the Board. Accordingly, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision and
dismissed the petition.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ’s findings and conclusion in this matter.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted as the final decision and the petition was
dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
March 2, 2020
81-20

OAL Dkt. No. 12958-18
Agency Dkt. No. 218-8/18
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Archange Antoine,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of Roselle,
Union County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL) have been reviewed. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon such review, the Commissioner agrees with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
that the Board properly removed petitioner pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 based on his failure to attend
more than three consecutive meetings of the Board. 	The statute does not limit missed meetings to
“regular” meetings, and the Board’s policy cannot override the authority afforded to it by the statute.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in this
matter and the petition is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	March 2, 2020
Date of Mailing: 	March 4, 2020
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008,
c. 36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
AGENCY DKT. NO. 218-8/18
ARCHANGE ANTOINE,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
BOROUGH OF ROSELLE, UNION
COUNTY,
Respondent.
William 	Strazza, 	Esq., 	for 	petitioner 	(The 	Law 	Office 	of 	William 	Strazza,
attorneys)
Allan C. Roth, Esq., for respondent (Ruderman & Roth, attorneys)
Gregory J. Cannon, Esq., for participant Jonathan Spearman (Sobel, Han &
Cannon, attorneys)
Record Closed: December 30, 2019 	Decided: January 27, 2020
BEFORE MARGARET M. MONACO, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Archange Antoine (petitioner) contests his removal from respondent
Roselle Board of Education (the Board) predicated on his alleged failure to attend three
or more consecutive Board meetings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 31, 2018, petitioner filed a Verified Petition with the Commissioner of
Education (the Commissioner), accompanied by a motion for emergent relief. Petitioner
alleges that his “removal from the board was improper, unlawful and in violation of the
[Board’s] own policy, since he only missed one regular meeting,” and that the Board’s
decision to remove him was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.1 Petitioner seeks
an order enjoining the Board from enforcing its resolution removing him as a member of
the Board, requiring his immediate reinstatement, and voiding the Board’s actions to
remove him. 	The Department of Education transmitted the matter to the Office of
Administrative 	Law 	for 	a 	hearing. 	On 	September 	12, 	2018, 	oral 	argument 	was
entertained on petitioner’s emergent-relief motion, which was denied by Order dated
September 	27, 	2018. 	The 	Commissioner 	issued 	a 	Decision 	on 	Application 	for
Emergent Relief on October 12, 2018, adopting the Order denying emergent relief. 	On
May 9, 2019, I issued an Order permitting Jonathan Spearman, who holds the Board
seat formerly held by petitioner, to participate in the within matter. 	The hearing
scheduled for February 26, May 14, and May 17, 2019, was adjourned at the parties’
request, and the parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary decision. 	In this
regard, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts accompanied by various exhibits.
Petitioner filed a brief in support of his motion. The Board submitted a brief in support of
its motion; a brief in opposition to petitioner’s motion; and a certification by counsel
(Roth Cert.), which attached, among other documents, a certification by the District’s
business administrator/board secretary, Anthony Juskiewicz (Juskiewicz Cert.), and
certifications by five Board members, Donna Eleazer (Eleazer Cert.), Patricia Fabrizio
(Fabrizio Cert.), Sherise Pollard (Pollard Cert.), Richard Villeda (Villeda Cert.), and
1 Although the Verified Petition included three counts, petitioner is proceeding only as to count one and
has voluntarily withdrawn count two (which contested the adequacy of the Board’s notice) and count three
(which asserted that petitioner had good cause for missing the meetings).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
3
Courtney Washington (Washington Cert.).2 Mr. Spearman was afforded the opportunity
to respond to the cross-motions. 	No response was received by the required deadline,
on which date the record closed.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties stipulated to the majority of the facts. 	Based upon a review of the
documentary evidence presented, including the Joint Stipulation of Facts (Stip.) and the
certifications submitted by the Board, I FIND the following pertinent undisputed FACTS:
Petitioner was duly elected for a three-year term to the Board commencing on
January 1, 2018. 	(Stip. at ¶ 1.) 	The Board is a public-school board of education
organized under N.J.S.A. 18A:10-1 et seq. 	(Stip. at ¶ 2.) 	Pursuant to Board Policy
0141, the Board consists of nine members who serve a term of three years. 	(Stip. at ¶
3.)
The Board posts its 2017–2018 “Board Agendas and Minutes” on its website.
(Stip. at ¶ 7.) 	Items II(D) and II(E) on the Board’s January 8, 2018, “Reorganization
Meeting Agenda” detailed a proposed resolution announcing the “Legal Notice of
Scheduled Meetings for the Year 2018” in order for the Board to be in compliance with
the Open Public Meetings Act. 	(Stip. at ¶ 8.) 	According to District Policy 0154, “[t]he
Board of Education shall at the organizational meeting . . . [r]eadopt existing bylaws and
policies for the Board’s operation and the operation of the school system.” 	(Stip. at ¶ 9
and Exhibit C.) 	The Board’s “Reorganization Meeting Minutes” for January 8, 2018,
reflect that Items II(D) through (I) were tabled to the next Board meeting scheduled for
Monday, January 29, 2018. 	(Stip. at ¶ 10 and Exhibit D.) 	The Board did not meet on
January 29, 2018, due to inclement weather. (Stip. at ¶ 11.)
The Board held a “Special Meeting” on February 8, 2018. 	(Stip. at ¶ 12.) 	On
the “Special Meeting Agenda” were items that had been tabled at the “Reorganization
Meeting” on January 8, 2018. 	(Ibid.) 	The Board did not address these items on the
2 	The certifications by the business administrator/board secretary and the Board members had been
previously filed in opposition to petitioner’s motion for emergent relief.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
4
February 8, 2018, “Special Meeting Agenda,” as the minutes reflect that the Board took
public comments and posed questions to the superintendent. (Ibid.)
On 	the 	Board’s 	February 	26, 	2018, 	“Regular 	Meeting 	Agenda” 	was
“Reorganization Item[ ] A. 	Designation of Annual Meeting Schedule,” specifically
stating:
LEGAL NOTICE OF SCHEDULED MEETINGS FOR THE YEAR 2018
Pursuant to Chapter 231.P.L. 1975 known as the “Open Public Meetings
Act,” the Roselle Board of Education . . ., at the Regular Meeting held on
January 29, 2018, approve setting the Regular Meetings on the fourth
Monday of each month when applicable, at the Abraham Clark High
School, 122 East Sixth Avenue, Roselle, N.J. commencing at 7:00 p.m.,
February 2018 through December 2018.
Monday March 26, 2018 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday April 30, 2018* 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday May 21, 2018* 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday June 25, 2018 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday July 23, 2018 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday August 27, 2018 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday September 24, 2018 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday October 15, 2018* 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday November 19, 2018* 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
Monday December 17, 2018* 	Regular Public Meeting 	7:00 p.m.
*Identifies meeting not scheduled for the 4th Monday.
Notice of any additions to the above schedule or changes in the time, date
or place of any scheduled meeting will be posted in the locations and
mailed to the newspapers designated by resolution of the Roselle Borough
Board of Education adopted on January 29, 2018 in advance, as required
by law.
[Stip. at ¶ 13.]
The 	Board’s 	“Regular 	Meeting 	Minutes” 	for 	February 	26, 	2018, 	indicate 	that 	the
resolution passed by a vote of 8-0. 	(Ibid.) 	At the time of adopting this resolution, the
Board had a total of ten “Regular Public Meetings” scheduled for 2018. 	(Ibid.) 	These
ten meetings were meetings noticed as voting meetings. 	(Ibid.) 	Any other meeting of
the Board was advertised and public notice was given if a vote of the whole Board was
to be taken. (Ibid.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
5
On May 17, 2018, petitioner failed to attend the Board’s “Workshop Meeting.”
(Stip. at ¶ 14.) 	This meeting was not set forth in the Board’s annual meeting schedule.
(Ibid.) 	The May 17, 2018, “Workshop Meeting Minutes” show that the “Workshop
Meeting” began at 7:06 p.m. and ended 8:46 p.m. and was attended by five of the nine
Board members.
“Workshop Meetings” were instituted for the express purpose of addressing
Board agenda items prior to the scheduled monthly meetings so as to minimize the
length 	of 	the 	scheduled 	monthly 	meetings 	and 	address 	issues 	of 	efficiency 	and
timeliness during the monthly meeting. (Stip. at ¶ 15.) These Workshop Meetings were
regularly held monthly meetings and not usually voting sessions. (Ibid.)
Petitioner attended the Board’s “Regular Meeting” on May 21, 2018. 	(Stip. at
¶ 16.)
On May 24, 2018, petitioner failed to attend the Board’s “Special Meeting.”
(Stip. at ¶ 17.) 	This meeting was not set forth in the Board’s annual meeting schedule.
(Ibid.) 	The only business on the “Special Meeting Agenda” was “District Goal Setting.”
(Ibid.; see Roth Cert. at Exhibit 6.) 	The “Special Meeting” minutes reflect that the
special meeting was attended by six of the nine Board members. 	(Stip. at ¶ 17.) 	The
“Special 	Meeting” 	minutes 	further 	reflect 	that 	neither 	the 	superintendent 	nor 	the
assistant superintendent were in attendance. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Board determined
that it could not achieve the special meeting’s business and “another [meeting] would
need to take place.” (Ibid.)
On June 11, 2018, petitioner failed to attend the Board’s “Special Meeting.”
(Stip. at ¶ 18.) 	This meeting was not set forth in the Board’s annual meeting schedule.
(Ibid.) The only business on the “Special Meeting Agenda” was “District Goal Setting for
2018–19.” 	(Ibid.; see Roth Cert. at Exhibit 6.) 	The “Special Meeting” minutes reflect
that the special meeting was attended by seven of the nine Board members. (Stip. at ¶
18.)
On June 20, 2018, petitioner failed to attend the Board’s “Workshop Meeting.”
(Stip. at ¶ 19.) 	This meeting was not set forth in the Board’s annual meeting schedule.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
6
(Ibid.) 	The June 20, 2018, “Workshop Meeting” Agenda was the June 25, 2018,
“Regular Meeting Agenda.” 	(Ibid. and Exhibit E.) 	According to the “Notice of Roselle
Board of Education Workshop Meeting Change,” the Board “determined that there is a
need to conduct workshop sessions for the purpose of preparing Board business and
the presentation of Board Committee reports prior to the regularly advertised Board
meetings.” 	(Stip. at ¶ 19; see Roth Cert. at 6.) 	Public comments were not taken at the
June 20, 2018, “Workshop Meeting,” as members of the public were not present. (Stip.
at ¶ 20.)
On June 25, 2018, petitioner failed to attend the Board’s “Regular Public
Meeting.” 	(Stip. at ¶ 21.) 	This meeting was set forth in the Board’s annual “Regular
Public Meeting” schedule. (Ibid.)
Petitioner did not notify Business Administrator/Board Secretary Juskiewicz that
he would not be in attendance at any of the above scheduled meetings. 	(Stip. at ¶ 23.)
The Board’s bylaws, policies, and regulations do not place an affirmative duty upon a
Board member to alert the Board of a planned or unplanned absence from a meeting.
(Ibid.) 	Past practice demonstrates 	that Board members 	can notify the 	business
administrator/board secretary if a Board member is unable to attend a meeting. 	(Ibid.)
Board members do appear telephonically at scheduled meetings. 	(Stip. at ¶ 24.) 	The
Board has a practice of permitting Board members who give advance notice to the
business administrator/board secretary to appear at Board meetings telephonically.
(Stip. at ¶ 25.) 	The Board has not formally adopted a bylaw, policy, or regulation that
recognizes the attendance of a meeting by a Board member via telephone, nor has the
Board defined the exact practice and standard for telephonic attendance at meetings.
(Stip. at ¶ 24.) 	Past practice demonstrates that Board members are aware that
telephonic appearances are treated as attendance at the Board meeting. 	(Ibid.)
Petitioner telephonically attended the “Special Meeting” scheduled for May 7, 2018.
(Stip. at ¶ 25.)
The 	duties 	of 	Business 	Administrator/Board 	Secretary 	Juskiewicz 	include
advertising to the public all meetings of a quorum of the Board. (Juskiewicz Cert. at ¶ 2.)
He does not advertise committee meetings, which are not considered regular meetings
of the entire Board. (Ibid.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
7
Business Administrator/Board Secretary Juskiewicz also maintains and updates
the records regarding Board members’ attendance at each meeting. (Juskiewicz Cert. at
¶ 6.) 	Petitioner failed to attend four consecutive Board meetings on May 24, June 11,
June 20, and June 25, 2018, which were advertised meetings of the entire Board, where a
quorum of the Board existed. 	(Juskiewicz Cert. at ¶¶ 2, 8-9; see Roth Cert. at Exhibit 6.)
The meeting on June 25, 2018, was listed as a regular meeting on the Board’s annual
meeting schedule; the meetings on May 24, 2018, and June 11, 2018, were special
meetings; and the meeting on June 20, 2018, was a workshop meeting. 	(See Roth Cert.
at Exhibit 6.)
At the Board’s meeting on August 16, 2018, a motion and a second were made
to give notice to petitioner that the Board would be considering removing him from the
Board for missing more than three consecutive meetings of the Board consistent with
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3. 	(Juskiewicz Cert. at ¶ 13.) 	The audio recording of the “Workshop
Meeting” held on August 16, 2018, reflects a consensus of the Board to have the Board
attorney provide notice to petitioner that his removal as a Board member would be
discussed at the subsequent Board meeting. 	(Stip. at ¶ 22.) 	On or about August 21,
2018, Business Administrator/Board Secretary Juskiewicz sent a chart, via e-mail, to
each Board member, including petitioner, indicating all of the Board members’ attendance
at meetings since January 2018. (Juskiewicz Cert. at ¶¶ 7, 18.)
On or about August 22, 2018, the Board’s attorney, Allan C. Roth, Esq., sent
correspondence to petitioner which states:
Please be advised that pursuant to Board Policy 145, the
Board has requested that you be provided notice that at its
Monday, August 27, 2018 meeting, beginning at 7:00 p.m. in
the Abraham Clark High School auditorium, the Board will
discuss 	your 	removal 	from 	the 	Board 	for 	missing 	three
consecutive meetings, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 and
Berg 	v. 	Blackhorse 	Pike 	Regional 	School 	District, 	1981
S.L.D. March 3.
[Stip. at ¶ 26 and Exhibit F.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
8
The notice did not specify the exact meeting dates missed by petitioner. (Stip. at ¶ 27.)
No Board policy requires specific notice to a Board member of meeting dates missed by
said member. (Ibid.)
Prior to the August 27, 2018, Board meeting, petitioner requested that, if the Board
would be attempting to remove him from the Board, he wanted the discussion to be held in
public session. (Juskiewicz Cert. at ¶ 14.)
On August 27, 2018, at the next meeting of the full Board, a motion and a second
were made to remove petitioner for missing three or more consecutive meetings of the
Board. 	(Juskiewicz Cert. at ¶ 15.) 	Following the motion to remove petitioner, petitioner
was given the floor to present evidence of whether he had good cause to miss the
meetings. 	(Id. at ¶ 16.) 	Petitioner presented evidence and handed out documents to
the Board members. 	(Ibid.) 	Thereafter, a discussion was held by the Board and,
following the Board’s discussion, petitioner was given additional time to respond to the
Board members’ discussion. 	(Ibid.) 	At the conclusion of all discussion regarding the
matter, the vote was taken to remove petitioner from the Board. (Id. at ¶ 17.) A majority
of the Board voted to remove petitioner from the Board. (Ibid.) Petitioner was removed
from his position on the Board by a 5-4 vote. (Stip. at ¶ 28.) The five votes for removal
were cast by Board members Patricia Fabrizio, Donna Eleazer, Richard Villeda, Sherise
Pollard, and Courtney Washington. 	(Ibid.; see also Fabrizio Cert. at ¶¶ 9, 11–13;
Eleazer Cert. at ¶¶ 9–12; Villeda Cert. at ¶¶ 9–12; Pollard Cert. at ¶¶ 9–12; Washington
Cert. at ¶¶ 5–8.)
On or about January 6, 2014, the Board adopted District Policy 0145, entitled
“Board Member Resignation and Removal,” which states in relevant part:
A member who fails to attend three consecutive regular
meetings of the Board without good cause may be removed
from office on the affirmative votes of a majority of the
remaining Board members, provided that
1. 	The member’s removal was proposed at the
immediately previous Board meeting; and
2. 	Notice of the proposed removal was given to the
affected member at least forty-eight hours in

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
9
advance of the meeting at which the vote will be
taken.
[Stip. at ¶ 4 and Exhibit A.]
District Policy 0000.02, entitled “Introduction (M) Bylaws, Policies & Regulations,”
states in pertinent part:
Definitions
The following terms used in these bylaws, policies, and
regulations shall have the meanings set forth below unless
the 	context 	requires 	a 	different 	meaning 	or 	a 	different
definition is supplied:
. . . .
“Meeting” means a gathering that is attended by or open to
all of the members of the Board of Education, held with the
intent on the part of the Board members present to discuss
or act as a unit on the specific public business of the Board
of Education.
[Stip. at ¶ 5 and Exhibit B.]
The policy further defines the rules of construction applicable to the Board’s bylaws,
polices, and regulations as follows:
1. 	Wherever possible, language shall be given its clear
and ordinary interpretation;
2. 	Language shall be construed to have a meaning that
complies with law;
3. 	In the event bylaws, policies and regulations conflict
with 	one 	another, 	the 	later 	adopted 	bylaw, 	policy 	or
regulation shall take precedence over the earlier, and the
more 	specific 	bylaw, 	policy 	or 	regulation 	shall 	take
precedence over the more general;
4. 	Except 	as otherwise 	provided by the 	context, 	the
auxiliary verbs “shall,” “will,” and “must” indicate a mandated
action, and the auxiliary verb “may” indicates an action that
is permitted but is not mandated.
[Stip. at ¶ 6 and Exhibit B.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
10
During their respective tenures on the Board, Board members Fabrizio, Eleazer,
Villeda, Pollard, and Washington have always understood regular Board meetings to
mean a meeting of a quorum of the Board that was advertised and consistent with the
Open Public Meetings Act, as opposed to a committee meeting which does not consist
of a quorum of the Board and is not advertised, and that any advertised meeting of the
entire Board is considered to be a regular meeting of the Board, including, but not
limited 	to, 	scheduled 	monthly 	calendar 	meetings, 	special 	meetings, 	emergency
meetings, workshop meetings, or any other full meeting of the Board. (Fabrizio Cert. at
¶ 4; Eleazer Cert. at ¶ 4; Villeda Cert. at ¶ 4; Pollard Cert. at ¶ 4; Washington Cert. at ¶
4.)
LEGAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b), summary decision “may be rendered if the
papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” 	This rule is substantially similar to the
summary-judgment rule embodied in the New Jersey Court Rules. 	See Judson v.
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954). 	In Brill v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the
appropriate test to be employed in deciding the motion:
[A] determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of
material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the
motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party. 	The “judge’s function is not . . . to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” . . . 	If
there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged
disputed 	issue 	of 	fact, 	that 	issue 	should 	be 	considered
insufficient to constitute a “genuine” issue of material fact for
purposes of Rule 4:46-2.
[Citations omitted.]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
11
In evaluating the merits of the motion, all inferences of doubt are drawn against
the movant and in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed. 	Judson, 17
N.J. at 75. However, “[w]hen a motion for summary decision is made and supported, an
adverse party in order to prevail must by responding affidavit set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary
proceeding.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	The parties agree, and I CONCLUDE, that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the matter is ripe for summary decision.
Against 	this 	backdrop, 	it 	is 	undisputed 	that 	petitioner failed 	to 	attend 	four
consecutive meetings of the Board. 	Petitioner argues, however, that he “only missed
one (1) regular meeting that appeared on the [Board’s] ‘Regular Public Meeting’
schedule—the June 25, 2018 regular meeting.”
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 explicitly addresses a board of education’s authority to remove
a board member for failure to attend meetings. The statute directs in pertinent part:
Cessation of membership.
Whenever 	a 	member 	of 	a 	local 	or 	regional 	board 	of
education shall cease to be a bona fide resident of the
district, or of any constituent district of a consolidated or
regional district which he represents, or shall become mayor
or a member of the governing body of a municipality, his
membership in the board shall immediately cease; and, any
member who fails to attend three consecutive meetings of
the board without good cause may be removed by it.
[Emphasis added.]
The principles governing statutory construction are well settled. 	The “overriding
objective in determining the meaning of a statute is to ‘effectuate the legislative intent in
light of the language used and the objects sought to be achieved.’” McCann v. Clerk of
Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 320 (2001) (citation omitted). 	The general rule of statutory
construction requires an examination of the language of a statute to determine whether
the language is clear or ambiguous and susceptible to more than one interpretation.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
12
The Supreme Court explained in Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592
(2012) (citations omitted):
The objective of all statutory interpretation is to discern and
effectuate the intent of the Legislature. 	To achieve that
objective, 	we 	begin 	by 	looking 	at 	the 	statute’s 	plain
language, 	ascribing 	to 	the 	words 	used 	“their 	ordinary
meaning and significance.” 	We do not view the statutory
words in isolation but “in context with related provisions so
as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.” 	If the
Legislature’s intent is clear on the face of the statute, then
we must apply the law as written. 	It is not our function to
rewrite 	a 	plainly 	written 	statute 	or 	to 	presume 	that 	the
Legislature meant something other than what it conveyed in
its clearly expressed language.
Pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, the Legislature did not
limit the discretionary authority of boards of education to remove a member to situations
where the member has missed only “regular” meetings of the board. 	Rather, N.J.S.A.
18A:12-3 provides that a board of education is authorized to act if a board member fails to
attend three consecutive meetings of the board, without any limitation regarding the
meeting’s designation as a “special,” “regular,” or “workshop” meeting.
In Berg v. Black Horse Pike Regional School District Board of Education, EDU
0875-80 and EDU 1007-80, Initial Decision (January 19, 1981), adopted, Comm’r
(March 3, 1981),3 the petitioner, who had missed two regular meetings, one special
meeting and two work sessions, asserted that the board was barred by the statute from
removing him since he missed only two regularly scheduled monthly meetings. 	In
rejecting this contention, the administrative law judge (ALJ) observed that the precursor of
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 was N.J.S.A. 18:6-11, which provided that “[a] board member who shall
fail to attend three consecutive regular meetings of the board without good cause may be
removed by the board” (emphasis added), and that the new statute eliminated any
reference to the type of meeting held by boards of education. 	The ALJ held that the
“statute refers only to three consecutive meetings and not three consecutive regular
monthly meetings as interpreted by petitioner, [and] [t]he plain meaning of the words
supports the former interpretation.” The Commissioner agreed and found the omission of
3 A copy of this unpublished decision is attached to the Roth certification as Exhibit 4.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
13
the designation “regular” when the Legislature revised the statute to be “significant,” and
that “if the revised version of the statute had intended to mean ‘regular’ the Legislature
would have so stated.”
The same rationale applies with equal force to the within matter. 	It
is well settled that “[t]he Legislature is presumed familiar with prior legislation.”
N.J. Coal. of Health Care Prof’ls v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 323 N.J. Super.
207, 256 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 485 (1999). 	The Legislature’s
deletion of the designation “regular” in the current statute reasonably evidences
an intent on the part of the Legislature to expand the ability of a board of
education to remove a board member for poor attendance.
The crux of petitioner’s argument is that, notwithstanding the statutory language,
District Policy 0145 limits the Board’s authority to remove him unless he “fail[ed] to attend
three consecutive regular meetings of the Board . . . .” 	Petitioner relies on N.J.S.A.
18A:11-1 and Matawan Regional Teachers Association v. Matawan-Aberdeen Regional
School District Board of Education, 223 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 1988), in support of
the binding nature of bylaws adopted by a local board of education.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that “[l]ocal boards of education
are creations of the State and, as such, may exercise only those powers granted to
them by the Legislature—either expressly or by necessary or fair implication.” 	Fair
Lawn Educ. Ass’n v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 79 N.J. 574, 579 (1979). 	A board of
education derives the authority to adopt bylaws and policies from N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c),
which directs:
The board shall . . . [m]ake, amend and repeal rules, not
inconsistent with this title or with the rules of the state board,
for its own government and the transaction of its business
and for 	the 	government 	and 	management 	of 	the 	public
schools and public school property of the district and for the
employment, 	regulation 	of 	conduct 	and 	discharge 	of 	its
employees, subject, where applicable, to the provisions of
Title 11, Civil Service, of the Revised Statutes . . . .
[Emphasis added.]
In Matawan Regional Teachers Association, the Appellate Division addressed
the issue of whether a local school board may lawfully adopt a plan, which included the

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14
closing and sale of a school building by a majority vote of its full membership after
consideration at a single public meeting, even though its bylaws required adoption by a
two-thirds vote of its full membership after consideration at two public meetings.
Although the court concluded that the board was bound by the bylaw that requires two
public meetings for adoption of the plan, it explained that “the bylaw requiring that action
on non-emergent matters of policy be considered at two public meetings does not
conflict directly or indirectly with any statute [and] [i]ts purpose is not to remove the
responsibility and authority to act from those members of a local board who are
authorized by state law to act.” Matawan Reg’l Teachers Ass’n, 223 N.J. Super. at 509.
Accordingly, the court held that, “[i]n the absence of any statute to the contrary, the
board’s bylaw requiring two public meetings to adopt the plan is binding.” 	Id. at 510.
However, the court also held that the board was not bound by the bylaw that limits the
authority of the majority of the board. 	The court reasoned that “N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1 is
silent with respect to the number of votes necessary to adopt rules and to govern and
manage the district,” and “[i]t must be assumed that by its silence the Legislature
intended the common-law rule to apply, i.e., a majority vote of the members of the board
constituting a quorum shall be sufficient.” 	Id. at 507. 	Accordingly, the court held that
“the Legislature has empowered a majority of the majority of a local board to adopt
bylaws 	and 	conduct 	the 	board’s 	business” 	and 	rejected 	“the 	argument 	that 	the
Legislature has merely established a minimum number of affirmative votes necessary
for local board action, which the board may increase in its bylaws to assure a broader
consensus.” 	Ibid. 	In other words, a board of education is not bound by a bylaw that
limits the authority of the board in a manner that is otherwise inconsistent with the law.
Similarly, in the context of a municipal regulation, it is well settled that “[a]
municipality may not contradict a policy the Legislature establishes” and a “local
government may not act contrary to State law.” Summer v. Teaneck Twp., 53 N.J. 548,
554 (1969); see Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Mayor of Woodbridge, 25 N.J. 188 (1957). 	A
pertinent question for consideration in determining whether the State has preempted an
area from municipal regulation is whether “the ordinance conflict[s] with state law, either
because of conflicting policies or operational effect (that is, does the ordinance forbid
what the Legislature has permitted or does the ordinance permit what the Legislature
has forbidden).” Overlook Terrace Mgmt. Corp. v. Rent Control Bd. of W. New York, 71

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15
N.J. 451, 461 (1976). 	And, “an ordinance will fall if it . . . forbids what a statute
expressly authorizes.” Summer, 53 N.J. at 554.
Turning to the within matter, if petitioner’s asserted interpretation and binding
nature of the Board’s policy are accepted, the policy would in effect forbid the Board
from removing a member for missing three consecutive meetings unless they were
“regular” meetings, notwithstanding that N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 unambiguously authorizes
boards of education to take such action. 	Stated differently, petitioner’s position would
limit the discretionary authority of the Board in a manner that is otherwise inconsistent
with N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3.
I CONCLUDE that the Board had the authority to remove, and properly removed,
petitioner pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-3 based on his failure to attend more than three
consecutive meetings of the Board.
ORDER
I ORDER that petitioner’s Verified Petition be and hereby is DISMISSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12958-18
16
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
January 27, 2020
DATE 	MARGARET M. MONACO, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
jb