K.S., on behalf of minor child, Z.S. v. Perth Amboy Board of Education, Middlesex County, 10/13/26 (#406-26E)

406-26E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 00449-25
Agency Dkt. No. 006-01-26
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
K.S., on behalf of minor child, Z.S.,
Petitioner,
v.
Perth 	Amboy 	Board 	of 	Education, 	Middlesex
County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to demonstrate
entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-34 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem
necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	October 13, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	October 13, 2026

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 00449-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 006-01-26
K.S., ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD, Z.S.,
Petitioner,
v.
PERTH AMBOY BOARD OF
EDUCATION, MIDDLESEX COUNTY,
Respondent.
___________________________________
George Christopoulos, Esq., for petitioner (Law Offices of George Christopolous,
P.C.)
Danielle A. Panizzi, Esq., for respondent (Machado Law Group, attorneys)
BEFORE JOAN M. BURKE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND
Petitioner K.S., on behalf of minor child Z.S., challenges the suspension imposed
on her minor child by respondent Perth Amboy Board of Education (Board). On
September 1, 2026, the petitioner filed an Emergent Relief Request. In the request for
relief, petitioner seeks the following:

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1. Directing Respondent to immediately place Z.S. in an
out-of-district public school placement, at Respondent’s sole
cost and expense, including transportation;
2. Staying the December 19, 2025, removal and any
continuation thereof pending final decision in this matter, and
directing that no reference to the December 19, 2025, removal
be relied upon in connection with Z.S.’s enrollment,
placement, or participation in school activities pending final
decision;
3. Directing Respondent to update Z.S.’s disciplinary,
attendance and academic record with accurate information;
4. Directing Respondent to delete the fraudulent records
regarding Z.S.’ s attendance, academics and disciplinary files;
5. Directing Respondent to serve responses to
Petitioner’s First Request for Admissions, First Request for
Production of Documents, and First Request for Answers to
Interrogatories, served August 4, 2026, within five (5) days;
6. Directing Respondent to preserve all documents,
communications, recordings, and video surveillance identified
in Petitioner’s document demands;
7. Directing Respondent to cease taking any further
retaliatory action against Z.S.; and
8. Granting such other and further relief as the Court
deems just and equitable.
[Petitioner’s Submission for Emergent Relief.]
Respondent argues that there is no threat to Z.S.’s continued education.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 19, 2025, the Board issued a code of conduct violation for “repeated
disruptions to the educational process” and a ten-day suspension. The suspension began
on December 19, 2025. (Petitioner’s Emergent Brief at Exhibit D.) In December 2025,
K.S. disenrolled Z.S. from the District School.

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By way of background, this is the second emergent relief sought by the petitioner.
On January 9, 2026, the Department of Education, Office of Controversies and Disputes,
transmitted the first emergent matter along with the due process petition to the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL) for a hearing of petitioner’s motion for emergency relief. The
merits of the underlying petition were to be addressed once the motion for emergent relief
was heard and decided.
A pre-hearing status conference was held on February 10, 2026, with the parties
after which the petitioner withdrew the request for emergent relief. A plenary hearing on
the merits of the underlying petition was scheduled for a hearing on April 13, 2026. This
hearing date was adjourned to allow petitioner to retain new counsel. On September 1,
2026, the petitioner filed an emergent relief request. The emergent relief request was
scheduled and heard on September 4, 2026.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
Z.S. is twelve years old and is a student in the Perth Amboy District. On December
19, 2025, Z.S. was suspended for repeated disruptions at school. Petitioner argues that
Z.S. has not been in a classroom since December 19, 2025. No formal hearing was held
within thirty calendar days of the suspension. Petitioner argues that Z.S. does not want
to return to the same school and request to be transferred out of district.
Respondent argues that there was no immediate threat or harm to petitioner. In
December 2025, K.S. disenrolled Z.S. from the Perth Amboy School District. Petitioner
reenrolled Z.S. sometime in February 2026. (Respondent Brief in Opposition to Emergent
Relief.) Petitioner requested the Board provide home instructions to Z.S. Ibid. The Board
offered ten (10) hours per week of home instruction pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.2. Ibid.
Petitioner declined and has opted to homeschool Z.S. Respondent further argues that
petitioner failed to allege facts sufficient to warrant the requested relief.

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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, the Commissioner’s jurisdiction is defined and is limited
to “controversies and disputes arising under the school laws.” In Dunellen Board of
Education v. Dunellen Education Association, 64 N.J. 17, 23 (1973), the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that “the Legislature enacted provisions entrusting school
supervision and management to local school boards . . . subject to the supervisory control
[of] . . . the State Commissioner of Education.”
The regulations governing such disputes before the Commissioner of Education
provide that “[w]here the subject matter of the controversy is a particular course of action
by a district board of education or any other party subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner, the petitioner may include with the petition of appeal, a separate motion
for emergent relief or a stay of that action pending the Commissioner’s final decision in
the contested case.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a). The regulations further provide that the
Commissioner may “[t]ransmit the motion to the OAL for immediate hearing on the
motion.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(c)(3).
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b) sets forth the standards governing motions for emergent relief
and instructs that:
A motion for a stay or emergent relief shall be accompanied
by a letter memorandum or brief which shall address the
following standards to be met for granting such relief pursuant
to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. at 126 (1982):
1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the
requested relief is not granted;
2. The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is
settled;
3. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on
the merits of the underlying claim; and
4. When the equities and interests of the parties
are balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm

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than the respondent will suffer if the requested relief is
not granted.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b).]
Indeed, the moving party must demonstrate each element “clearly and
convincingly.” Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union County Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508,
520 (App. Div. 2008). Emergent relief is designed “to ‘prevent some threatening,
irreparable mischief, which should be averted until an opportunity is afforded for a full and
deliberate investigation of the case.’” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132 (citation omitted).
Irreparable Harm
Harm is generally considered irreparable if monetary damages cannot adequately
redress it. Id. at 132−33. In other words, irreparable harm is described as “‘substantial
injury to a material degree coupled with the inadequacy of money damages.’” Judice’s
Sunshine Pontiac, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (D.N.J. 1976)
(citation omitted). A claimant must demonstrate more than a risk of irreparable harm.
Continental Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F. 2d 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1980). The
requisite for injunctive relief requires a “‘clear showing of immediate irreparable injury’” or
a “‘presently existing actual threat; (an injunction) may not be used simply to eliminate a
possibility of a remote future injury, or a future invasion of rights, be those rights protected
by statute or by common law.’” Ibid. (citation omitted).
In the petitioner’s submission, she argues:
The harm here is neither speculative nor prospective. It has
been occurring continuously more than eight (8) months and will
continue into the 2026–2027 school year unless this court
intervenes. Z.S. receives no instruction from any District teacher
between December 19, 2025, and the present. N.J.A.C. 6A:16-
10.2(b) required the District to provide services no later than five
(5) school days after he left the general education program.”
[Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Emergent Relief.]

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In response, the Board argues that petitioner has not satisfied her burden of proof
regarding irreparable harm by clear and convincing evidence. The Board argues there is
no immediate or irreparable harm. Petitioner seeks “that the District place Z.S. at an out-
of-district school, and immediately revise his discipline records.” (Respondent’s Brief in
opposition to Emergent Relief.) Furthermore, petitioner unilaterally opted to keep Z.S.
out of school, refuse to accept the “District’s lawful home-instruction offer, which affords
home instruction to Z.S. virtually after-school for two (2) hours per week pending a
discipline hearing, K.S. has elected to keep Z.S. out of school and provide homeschooling
herself . . . a parent should not be permitted to manufacture an emergency by declining
an educational program lawfully offered by the District.”
Emergent relief “should not be entered except when necessary to prevent
substantial, immediate and irreparable harm.” Subcarrier Commc’n Inc. v. Day, 299 N.J.
Super. 634, 638 (App. Div. 1997). I therefore CONCLUDE that petitioner has not satisfied
her burden as to irreparable harm.
Settled Legal Right
Emergent relief “should be withheld when the legal right underlying plaintiff's claim
is unsettled.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (citing Citizens Coach Co. v. Camden H.R. Co., 29
N.J. Eq. 299, 304−05 (E. & A. 1878)).
Each school district is obligated to provide a thorough and efficient education
system to all children residing in its school district. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1; N.J.S.A.
18A:33-1. To carry out this policy, local boards of education have discretionary authority
under N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c). The boards adopt rules for the management of the district's
public schools and act in a manner to ensure the lawful and proper conduct of the district’s
public schools. Petitioner argues that Z.S. was entitled to notice of the charges and have
an opportunity to respond before removal. Respondent argues that it is within the
District’s discretion to discipline Z.S. pursuant to the District’s code of conduct.
Here, petitioner unilaterally removed Z.S. from the District after the suspension in
December. Petitioner then reenrolled him but opted to keep him at home and home

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school him while rejecting the District’s offer of home instruction. I therefore CONCLUDE
that petitioner has not met her burden of establishing that her underlying claim was
settled.
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Under the third emergent relief standard, “a plaintiff must make a preliminary
showing of a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits.” Crowe, 90 N.J.
at 133 (citing Ideal Laundry Co. v. Gugliemone, 107 N.J. Eq. 108, 115−16 (E. & A. 1930)).
This requirement is often implicitly tied to whether the right to the underlying claim is
settled.
A presumption of lawfulness and good faith applies to a board of education's
actions. In challenges to board actions, the challenger bears the burden of proving that
such acts were unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Schuster v. Bd. of Educ.
of Montgomery Twp., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 670, 676 (citing Schnick v. Westwood Bd. of
Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 1960), Quinlan v. Bd. of Educ. of North Bergen Twp.,
73 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 1962)).
The “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard of review imposes a heavy
burden on challengers of board actions, and “means having no rational basis.” Piccoli v.
Ed. of Educ. of Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l Sch. Dist., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 1839-98 (January
22, 1999) (citing Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184,
199−200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974)).
In order for petitioner to demonstrate that she is likely to prevail on her underlying
claim, I must find that the suspension was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable”. This
required a full hearing, which cannot be replicated in the context of an emergent hearing.
Petitioner has not cited any regulations to support her position or that the District’s action
was “arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” Under the circumstances and prior to a full
hearing, petitioner has not demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of her
claim.

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Therefore, I CONCLUDE that petitioner does not meet the third prong of the
emergent relief standard.
Balancing of the Equities
The fourth emergent relief standard, involves “the relative hardship to the parties
in granting or denying relief.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 134 (citing Isolantite Inc. v. United Elect.
Radio & Mach. Workers, 130 N.J. Eq. 506, 515 (Ch. 1941), mod. on other grounds, 132
N.J. Eq. 613 (E. & A. 1942)). To satisfy this standard, petitioner must demonstrate that
she will suffer more significant harm than the Board if this tribunal does not grant the
requested relief. Petitioner, in her submission, states that Z.S. is “[a] twelve-year-old who
has lost two-thirds of a school year and stands to lose more . . . . The District bears no
cognizable burden from an order directing in-person enrollment. (Petitioner’s Brief for
Emergent Relief.)
The Board argues that petitioner has no right to the out-of-district placement she
seeks and the Board has a strong and valid interest in its orderly operation of its school
and disciplining its student pursuant to the Code of Conduct.
Under the circumstances prior to a full hearing to grant an out-of-district transfer
would visit a flood of litigation on the District. I therefore CONCLUDE that the respondent
would suffer greater harm if the requested relief was granted.
Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has not
demonstrated entitlement to the emergent relief requested, since she has not satisfied
any of the four prongs of the test.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that the petitioner’s application for emergent relief is DENIED. This
matter will be scheduled for a status conference and continue to a plenary hearing to
address the merits of the underlying petition.

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This Order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified, or
rejected by the Commissioner of Education, who by law is authorized to make a final
decision in this matter. The final decision on the application for emergent relief shall be
issued without undue delay, but no later than forty-five (45) days following the entry of
this Order. If the Commissioner of Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this Order
within forty-five days, this recommended order shall become a final decision on the issue
of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
September 8, 2026
DATE JOAN M. BURKE, ALJ
Date Mailed to Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
JMB/nn

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APPENDIX
Exhibits
For petitioner:
P-1 Petitioner’s Brief for Emergent Relief with attachment, September 1, 2026
For respondent:
R-1 Respondent’s Letter Brief in Opposition to Emergent Relief, September 4,
2026