304-25E•Joseph Muniz v. Board of Education of the Hudson County Schools of Technology, Hudson County, 6/13/25 (#304-25E)
Joseph Muniz v. Board of Education of the Hudson County Schools of Technology, Hudson County, 6/13/25 (#304-25E)
304-25ENjcommned
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304-25E OAL Dkt. No. EDU 09176-25 Agency Dkt. No. 154-5/25 New Jersey Commissioner of Education Order on Emergent Relief Joseph M. Muniz, Petitioner, v. Board of Education of the Hudson County Schools of Technology, Hudson County, Respondent. The record of this emergent matter and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been reviewed and considered. Upon such review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982) and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6. Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is adopted for the reasons stated therein. This matter shall continue at the Office of Administrative Law with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure. IT IS SO ORDERED. COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION Date of Decision: June 13, 2025 Date of Mailing: June 16, 2025
New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer State of New Jersey OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ORDER DENYING EMERGENT RELIEF OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09176-25 AGY REF NO. 154-5/25 JOSEPH M. MUNIZ, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE HUDSON COUNTY SCHOOLS OF TECHNOLOGY, HUDSON COUNTY, Respondent. _________________________________________ Stephen J. Edelstein, Esq., for petitioner (Weiner Law Group, attorneys) Roshan Shah, Esq. and Chris Khatami, Esq., for respondent (Shah Law Group, attorneys) Record Closed: June 2, 2025 Decided: June 2, 2025 BEFORE THOMAS R. BETANCOURT, ALJ:
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09176-25 - 2 - STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Petitioner filed a motion for Emergent Relief with the Office of Controversies and Disputes in the New Jersey Department of Education (DOE). The contested matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1, where it was filed on May 23, 2025, to be heard on an emergent basis. Petitioner seeks, inter alia, reinstatement to his position of employment with the Respondent. Petitioner is currently suspended with pay. Respondent filed a Notice of Motion to dismiss in lieu of an Answer. Oral argument on the motion for emergent relief was heard on June 2, 2025. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Petitioner is employed as the Assistant Business Administrator and Board Secretary for the Respondent District. He has been employed by the District for twenty years. On November 25, 2024, Petitioner was suspended with pay pursuant to a letter issued by then Superintendent Amy Lin-Rodriguez. Thereafter, petitioner received a Rice Notice that his employment would be discussed at a Board meeting on December 12, 2024. Superintendent Lin-Rodriguez was also suspended after she issued her letter of suspension, and prior to the December 12, 2024 Board meeting. That suspension was then approved by the Board at said meeting. Petitioner remains suspended with pay to date. The basis for the suspension, pursuant to Superintendent Lin-Rodriguez’ letter of November 25, 2024, was due to “your conduct today was unprofessional, insubordinate, profane, and threatening.”
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09176-25 - 3 - LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION The threshold question in the instant matter is whether the District can place the petitioner on administrative leave, or otherwise suspend him. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-8.3 states, “Any employee or officer of a board of education in this State who is suspended from his employment, office or position, other than by reason of indictment, pending any investigation, hearing or trial or any appeal therefrom, shall receive his full pay or salary during such period of suspension, except that in the event of charges against such employee or officer brought before the board of education or the Commissioner of Education pursuant to law, such suspension may be with or without pay or salary as provided in chapter 6 of which this section is a supplement.” While there are no tenure charges pending, or even contemplated by the District, the above provides for suspension provided the petitioner receives his full remuneration under his contract. It is not disputed that he is receiving his salary during the suspension. The New Jersey Supreme Court has set forth a four-prong test for determining whether an applicant is entitled to emergent relief. Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132- 34 (1982) (enumerating the factors later codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:14.2-7(s)1. The four factors (“the Factors”), include: 1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted; 2. The legal right underlying petitioner's claim is settled; 3. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim; and 4. When the equities and interests of the parties are balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not granted.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09176-25 - 4 - The moving party bears the burden of proving each of the Crowe elements “clearly and convincingly.” Waste Mgmt of N.J. v. Union County Util. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008). Petitioner asserts that mere fact of the suspension causes irreparable harm. Petitioner does not dispute that he is receiving full pay and benefits. Certainly, there is no financial hardship imposed by his current status. Petitioner submitted no affidavit to set forth facts that support the claim of irreparable harm. Rather, it is simply argued that his status alone causes such irreparable harm. Without more it is not possible for petitioner to meet the first prong of the Crowe test. Petitioner cites Sancez v. Board of Education of the City of Camden, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 23-03; Agency Dkt. No. 403-12/02 (2003). That case is factually distinguishable for the present matter. In Sanchez the petitioner was demoted, not suspended. She was assigned as an Acting Vice Principal from her Principal position. In the instant matter petitioner was suspended for cause. See Lin-Rodriguez letter of suspension. Other than cite Sanchez, supra, and claim irreparable harm without further evidence of the same does not satisfy the first prong of the Crowe test. As the burden is upon petitioners to prove each element of Crowe, and I have concluded that petitioners are unable to satisfy factor one, no further analysis is required. Based upon the foregoing, I CONCLUDE that petitioner’s request for emergent relief be DENIED.
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09176-25 - 5 - ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that petitioner’s request for emergent relief is DENIED. This Order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who/which by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision shall be issued without undue delay but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this order. If the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10. June 2, 2025 DATE THOMAS R. BETANCOURT, ALJ Date Received at Agency __________________________ Date Mailed to Parties:
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09176-25 - 6 - List of Moving Papers For Petitioner: Verified Petition of Appeal Notice of Motion for Immediate Relief Letter brief For Respondent: Notice of Motion to Dismiss Letter brief Certification of Jonathan Busch, Esq. List of Exhibits: Petitioner: P-1 Letter dated January 15, 2025 from Jonathan Busch, Esq Respondent: None
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