Kate Romeo v.. Board of Education of the High Point Regional High School District, Sussex County, 1/29/19, (#32-19)

32-19
Kate Romeo, 	:
Petitioner, 	:
V. 	: 	Commissioner of Education
Board of Education of the 	: 	Decision
High Point Regional High School District,
Sussex County, 	:
Respondent. 	:
_______________________________________
Synopsis
The petitioner – a certified student assistance coordinator (SAC) employed in the respondent Board’s
school district prior to a Reduction in Force (RIF) – challenged the Board’s decision to abolish her
position. 	The petitioner argued that the Board violated N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-18 when it distributed her
former duties to other existing staff members and contended that she is entitled to reinstatement as a
SAC, with back pay and benefits. Further, 	petitioner maintained that she is 	also entitled to
reinstatement as a teacher of psychology. 	The Board contended that its actions were consistent with
law and regulations.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: 	petitioner’s contention that N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-18 requires all SAC-
related services to be provided only by a certificated SAC whose position is “separate and distinct”
from any other positions in the school district is without merit; the legislative history of the statute
reveals it was enacted in 1987 as a vehicle through which to pilot the introduction of SAC services to
local school districts, and nowhere does the statute preclude a district from providing student
assistance services through the use of properly certificated staff; 	the Board eliminated petitioner’s
position for legitimate reasons of economy, and distributed her duties among existing staff in a lawful
manner; petitioner did not hold tenure as a teacher of psychology, as the record revealed that she did
not deliver instruction to students under her certificate during the time she claims to have taught
psychology during the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years; 	and her claim to reinstatement as a
teacher of psychology therefore lacks merit. Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed the petition of appeal.
Upon comprehensive review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ’s findings and conclusions as
thoroughly set forth in the Initial Decision. Accordingly, the recommended decision of the OAL was
adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition of appeal was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has
been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
January 29, 2019

1
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 8261-17
Agency Dkt. No. 100-5/17
Kate Romeo, 	:
Petitioner, 	:
V. 	: 	Commissioner of Education
Board of Education of the 	: 	Decision
High Point Regional High School District,
Sussex County, 	:
Respondent. 	:
_______________________________________
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 by the
petitioner, Kate Romeo.1
The petitioner, a certified student assistance coordinator (SAC), is challenging the
High Point Regional Board of Education’s (Board) decision to abolish her position as a result of
a reduction in force (RIF).2 The petitioner maintains that she is entitled to reinstatement as a
SAC because the Board’s decision to distribute the duties she performed as a SAC to other
existing staff members violates N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-18. Additionally, the petitioner contends that
she is also entitled to reinstatement as a teacher of psychology. The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) found that the Board’s decision to abolish the petitioner’s SAC position and distribute her
duties among existing staff was not unlawful. The ALJ also determined that the petitioner has no
1 The Board submitted reply exceptions beyond the due date without seeking an extension to file late exceptions,
therefore, they were not considered.
2 The petitioner holds a certificate of eligibility with advance standing as a SAC and a certificate as a teacher of
psychology.

2
right to reinstatement as a teacher of psychology because she did not acquire tenure as a teacher
of psychology. As a result, the ALJ dismissed the petition of appeal.
In her exceptions, the petitioner argues that the Initial Decision should be rejected
because N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-18 mandates that the SAC position must be “separate and distinct
from any other employment positions in the District.” Moreover, the SAC’s duties may not be
delegated to “the district guidance counselors, school social workers, and school psychologists.”
The petitioner stresses that N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-14.2 also states that “the SAC position shall be
separate and distinct from any other employment position in the school.” Therefore, the Board’s
decision to abolish the SAC position violated the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions.
Further, the petitioner contends that in reaching her decision, the ALJ ignored the
most salient and material language from the lead case on this issue, Maren Bristol v. Northern
Valley Reg’l. High School District, Bergen County, EDU 9053-03, Initial Decision, decided
July 1, 2004, modified, Commissioner Decision No.322-04, decided August 4, 2004. The Bristol,
supra, decision deals with whether a school district, in the abstract, could subcontract the duties
of the SAC to a third-party vendor or whether the duties must be performed in-house by a SAC.
The ALJ should not have relied on that case because Bristol, supra, did not deal with the issue
presented herein, which is whether employees within the District who do not hold a SAC
certificate can perform the SAC duties. The Superintendent himself testified that employees who
are not certified SACs are performing SAC duties in the District, including the behaviorist and
members of the Child Study Team. This contravenes the statutory scheme and deprived the
petitioner of the protection afforded her as a tenured teaching staff member under her SAC
certificate. Moreover, the ALJ inappropriately relied on a footnote from the Bristol, supra,

3
decision to support her determination that the programs and services required by statute need not
be provided exclusively by a SAC.
The petitioner also alleges that the ALJ erroneously found that she was not
entitled to reinstatement as a teacher of psychology. The petitioner acknowledges that she does
not have tenure as a teacher of psychology. 	However, by virtue of the fact that she taught
psychology for two years in the District at the alternative program under her teacher of
psychology certificate, she has preference to any position that requires a teacher of psychology
certificate over a non-tenured employee. 	The petitioner cites to case law that she contends
supports her position and right to reinstatement as a psychology teacher. 	Therefore, the
petitioner states that the Initial Decision should be rejected, and she should be found to have a
right to the tenured SAC position and the ability to exercise her rights over a non-tenured teacher
of psychology.
Upon a comprehensive review of the record in this matter, the Commissioner concurs
with the ALJ – for the reasons thoroughly set forth in the Initial Decision – that the Board’s decision
to abolish the petitioner’s SAC position as part of a RIF did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-18. As the
ALJ found, the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions require school districts to provide
prevention, intervention and treatment programs and services, but do not require all school districts
to employ a SAC. The statutory language requiring that school districts employ a SAC, separate and
distinct from other district positions, derived from an optional pilot program that commenced in 1987
to introduce SAC services to local school districts.3 Moreover, N.J.A.C. 6A9B-14.1 simply discusses
the functions that the SAC endorsement authorizes the holder to perform.
Despite the petitioner’s assertion to the contrary, the Initial Decision is also
consistent with Bristol, supra. In Bristol, supra, the Commissioner found that the board of
3 In the Initial Decision, the ALJ correctly examined the Legislative History of N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-18 and explained
why the petitioner’s argument that all school districts must employ a SAC, separate and distinct from any other
employment position, is a misinterpretation of the statute.

4
education violated the SAC’s tenure rights because the RIF was not for reasons of economy but
rather was based on concerns about the petitioner’s ability to provide the appropriate counseling
services to students. Importantly, in Bristol, supra, the Commissioner stated:
Irrespective of whether a local board of education chooses to hire a Substance
Awareness Coordinator, all local boards are statutorily obligated to offer the
prevention, intervention and treatment-referral programs and services required by
N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-1 et seq. 	Thus, while a Board may be prudent to employ a
Substance Awareness Coordinator to assist it in meeting its broad statutory
responsibilities, there is presently no requirement for it to do so. 	Consequently,
the programs and services compelled by the imposition of these mandates need
not, as petitioner argues, be provided exclusively by a Substance Awareness
Coordinator, or, necessarily, a district employee. [Id. at 3]
Here, it is undisputed that the District effectuated a RIF for budgetary concerns and a decline in
student enrollment. 	It is likewise uncontroverted that the employees who are performing the
petitioner’s prior duties are eligible to provide these services under their respective certificates.
Therefore, the Board’s decision to abolish the petitioner’s SAC position for economic reasons,
and to reassign her duties to existing employees, was not a violation of the statutory and
regulatory provisions.
The Commissioner is also in accord with the ALJ’s determination that the
petitioner has no right to reinstatement to a teacher of psychology position.4 In her exceptions,
the petitioner concedes that she does not have tenure under her instructional certificate, and
instead appears to argue that since she has worked in the District under her teacher of psychology
certificate, she should be entitled to a position over another non-tenured staff member. First, the
ALJ properly found that the work performed by the petitioner in the alternative program was
4 The petitioner’s tenure status under her substance awareness coordinator certificate does not entitle her to tenure
under her teacher of psychology certificate. See, Dennery v. Passaic City Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 131 N.J. 626 (1993)
(Tenure earned under one certificate does not transfer to another certificate; instead the staff member must serve for
the requisite time under the certificate in question.).

5
actually under her SAC certificate and constituted group counseling rather than curriculum-based
instruction in psychology.5 Even assuming arguendo, that the petitioner did work in the District
under her psychology certificate, her argument that she has a right to a teacher of psychology
position is completely inconsistent with the tenets of seniority. 	“Seniority provides a
mechanism for ranking all tenured teaching staff members so that reductions among the tenured
force can be effected in an equitable fashion and in accord with sound educational policies.”
Capodilupo v. West Orange Bd of Educ., 218 N.J. Super. 510, 514 (App Div 1987) certif. denied,
109 N.J. 514 (1987). 	It is well established that seniority rights are not triggered until tenure is
acquired, and the petitioner admits that she does not have tenure as a teacher of psychology.
Therefore, the petitioner has no right to reinstatement as a teacher of psychology.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter and
the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	January 29, 2019
Date of Mailing: 	January 29, 2019
5 The ALJ heard testimony from the petitioner and the Board’s Superintendent regarding the nature of the
petitioner’s work at the alternative program between 2011 and 2013, and – based on the evidence in the record –
determined that the work performed by the petitioner was not under her instructional certificate.
6 Pursuant to P.L. 2008, c. 36 (N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1), Commissioner decisions are appealable to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
AGENCY DKT. NO. 100-5/17
KATE ROMEO,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE HIGH POINT
REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,
SUSSEX COUNTY,
Respondent.
_________________________________
Sanford Oxfeld, Esq., for petitioner (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys)
Brent Polhman, Esq., for respondent (Methfessel and Werbel, attorneys)
Record Closed: November 26, 2018 	Decided: December 17, 2018
BEFORE ELLEN S. BASS, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Kate Romeo, is a certificated student assistance coordinator (SAC),
and teacher of psychology who was formerly employed by the respondent, High Point

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
2
Regional Board of Education (the Board).7 	She appeals the action of the Board
terminating her employment effective September 2017, pursuant to a reduction in force
(RIF), and asserts that she is entitled to reinstatement and back pay. The Board replies
that its actions were consistent with law and regulation.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter arose with the filing of a petition of appeal by Romeo on May 25,
2017. 	The Board filed an answer on June 9, 2017, and the matter was transmitted to
the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case on June 12, 2017. 	The case was
initially assigned to Judge Joan Bedrin-Murray; upon her elevation to the Tax Court, the
matter was reassigned to me on December 15, 2017. 	A hearing was conducted on
August 8, 2018. Post-hearing submissions were filed on November 21 and 26, 2018, at
which time the record closed.
Prior to the August hearing, I conferred several times with counsel via telephone
conference. 	I asked whether the outcome of this case, if favorable to Romeo, could
implicate the employment of other school district staff. 	I was repeatedly advised that it
was unnecessary to provide notice to potential intervenors, and that the Board did not
anticipate that my decision would affect the jobs of other district employees.
I renewed my concern at the hearing. 	I was again advised that my decision was
unlikely to affect other staff members; and that if it did, the Board could not presently
advise who might be affected. 	Counsel urged that the Board was facing additional
budget deficits and could not presently predict how it would juggle staffing if Romeo
were to prevail. 	For this reason, no notice was supplied to potential intervenors, as
required by N.J.A.C. 1:1-16.4.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The petition raises the following issues for determination:
7 Her certificate reads “Substance Awareness Coordinator”; the position’s title was changed statutorily,
but the work authorized by the certificate remains the same. See: L. 2009, c. 54 §4, eff. May 6, 2009.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
3
1. 	Whether the duties previously performed by Romeo as an SAC have been
distributed among existing staff members, and if so, did the action of the Board in
doing so contravene N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-18?
2. 	If so, is Romeo entitled to reinstatement and back pay?
3. 	Whether Romeo served during the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 school years
under her Teacher of Psychology certificate, and if so, did she earn tenure and
seniority as a teacher of psychology?
4. 	If so, are there psychology classes presently being taught by less senior teachers
to which Romeo should have been assigned?
FINDINGS OF FACT
Stipulated Facts
The parties were able to agree to the following background facts via a joint
stipulation. I FIND:
1. 	The Board operates a comprehensive four-year public high school, which
educates students in ninth through twelfth grades, for the following constituent
Sussex 	County 	school 	districts: 	Branchville 	Borough, 	Frankford 	Township,
Lafayette Township, Sussex Borough, and Wantage Township. 	Students from
Montague Township also attend High Point pursuant to a sending/receiving
agreement.
2. 	Romeo began her employment with the Board on September 1, 2008, as
a substance awareness coordinator, and remained in that position until June 30,
2017.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
4
3. 	She was employed as a SAC for the Livingston School District during the
2017–2018 school year.
4. 	Romeo is employed as a SAC for the 2018–2019 school by the Vernon
public schools.
5. 	On June 7, 2013, Romeo filed a grievance seeking compensation for
teaching one period weekly in an alternative-education program.
6. 	On June 17, 2013, Dr. Terrance Brennan denied the grievance.
7. 	The grievance proceeded to the Personnel and Policy Committee of the
Board.
The Testimony
The SAC
It is uncontroverted, and I FIND, that Romeo holds a Certificate of Eligibility with
Advanced Standing as a SAC, and a Standard Certificate as a Teacher of Psychology.
She held both certificates at the time she commenced her employment with the Board.
As a SAC, Romeo supported anyone in the school community who was in crisis,
including students and staff. 	She counseled students on addiction issues and was
available to address concerns about student suicide.
Her full-time employment was terminated effective June 30, 2017. 	In the spring
of 2017, Romeo was the president of the local teachers’ association, and had been
made aware that staff cuts were anticipated in the school district. She was invited in her
capacity as president to discuss the impending cuts with the superintendent; Romeo
was completely blindsided when the conversation turned to reducing her job as well.
She was presented with a letter dated March 8, 2017, indicating that she would be
reduced to a 2/5 position. 	She would no longer be eligible for health benefits. 	By the
time Romeo attended a Board meeting on April 25, 2017, the agenda reflected that the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
5
recommendation of the superintendent was to only reduce the SAC position to 3/5,
which would have permitted Romeo to maintain her health benefits. After a recess, the
Board acted on the staff reductions. 	To her surprise, the Board cut the SAC position
entirely; Romeo learned she would be unemployed simultaneously with the public.
Superintendent of schools Scott Ripley explained that the district was struggling
with budget constraints and decreasing enrollments.8 	In 2008, there were 1,469
students in the school district; by 2017 there were only 920. 	During the intervening
years, staff levels had remained static. 	Ripley and the Board were thus forced to
analyze budget figures, enrollments, tax revenues, and staffing needs. 	A letter from
Ripley dated April 28, 2017, appears intended to assuage public concern about the
impact the reductions would have on school programs and services. Ripley advised the
High Point community that during the 2017–2018 school year, “[a] full-time crisis
counselor/behaviorist who has many years of experience working as a counselor, and
working with adolescents battling substance abuse,” would be employed by the school
district. 	The district would continue to employ “[f]ive exceptional guidance counselors,
one of whom is a certified SAC with experience in this field.” 	And the district would
have other interventions available to assists students, to include an Intervention and
Referral 	Services 	Team, 	a 	special 	disciplinary 	approach 	known 	as 	“restorative
practices,” and an enhanced Child Study Team that would include two psychologists.
Edward Blevins has been employed by the Board since 1999, in a variety of
capacities. For approximately the last three years, he has worked as a behaviorist. He
holds certification in Pupil Personnel Services and Elementary Education, and as a
Teacher of the Handicapped. 	Blevins confirmed that some of the duties that were
previously performed by Romeo have now fallen on him. 	He attends monthly County
SAC meetings and has referred to himself as a school substance counselor in emails.
His business card uses the title “Crisis and Substance Use Counselor”; these clearly,
previously, were Romeo’s roles. An email discussing abuse of vapes in schools directs
concerned individuals to Blevins. 	And students and staff in crisis, or who have
substance or mental-health concerns, come to him for assistance. 	Guidance performs
8 Ripley has been employed by the district for about twenty-one years, and in a variety of prior roles, to
include teacher, assistant principal, and director of curriculum.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
6
the prevention components of drug interventions in the school; this too was previously
handled by Romeo. 	Lisa Frisbie is currently employed as a guidance counselor, but
had been previously employed by the school district as a SAC.
Ripley likewise confirmed that although the district no longer employs a full-time
SAC, the supportive services typically offered by a SAC remain available in the district.
Students or staff can direct crisis or drug and alcohol concerns to case managers, the
behaviorist, and five guidance counselors. 	It is thus uncontroverted, and I FIND, that
the interventions offered by Romeo were still available during the 2017–2018 school
year, having been distributed among existing staff, none of whom worked exclusively as
a SAC.
The Alternative School Program
Romeo contends that she provided instruction to students under her Teacher of
Psychology certification during the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 school years at the High
School Alternative School Program. 	Ripley shared that this program was created to
serve special-education students at risk of dropping out; it was a self-contained special-
education 	program 	and 	instruction 	was 	supplied 	by 	a 	special-education 	teacher.
Eventually the program was expanded to include “push-in” services; these are services
integrated into the classroom setting that would aid the students in transitioning post-
graduation. 	While Ripley had limited involvement with the Alternative School Program
during the 2011–2012 school year, during the next year he served as director of
curriculum and was very well versed in the particulars of the program.
Ripley was quite firm that Romeo’s work was a “push-in” service rather than
instruction that required that she utilize her Teacher of Psychology certificate. She went
into the transitional classroom one period per week to provide life-skills instruction and
offer transitional resources to her students. 	Ripley pointed out, persuasively, that
offering a psychology class to students would have required development of a formal
curriculum, and formal approval of that curriculum, none of which took place.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
7
Romeo urged that she was indeed teaching psychology during the 2011–2012
and 2012–2013 school years. Romeo shared the history of a grievance filed in 2013, in
which 	she 	sought 	additional 	compensation 	under 	a 	provision 	of 	the 	collective-
negotiations agreement that offered such compensation to a teacher who taught a sixth
class.9 She sought remuneration for one-fifth of a sixth period, insofar as she met with
the students once per week. 	On May 24, 2013, director of special services Rosalie
Haller advised the superintendent of schools that the work done by Romeo in the
alternative program was “counseling,” and part of her responsibilities as a SAC. 	Haller
reiterated that view in a June 3, 2013, memorandum. The grievance was denied by the
then superintendent of schools, Dr. Terrance Brennan, on June 17, 2013. It was in turn
appealed to the Personnel and Policy Committee of the Board, which granted the
grievance via letter dated August 28, 2013. 	Unfortunately, however, that letter offered
no insight into the rationale for granting the grievance. 	But Romeo contends that the
grievance result lends clear support to her claims.
She additionally explained that she taught her students about the biology of
emotions like sadness or anger and used this as a vehicle for instruction on self-
regulation. She taught them about character traits, recalling that the effect of birth order
on personality was of interest to the students. 	She disagreed that the work she
performed was counseling. 	But she also conceded that the work was performed in a
rather unstructured environment, and that although she was teaching special-education
students she was unware of any IEP goals related to the instruction she offered. 	And
although Romeo indicated that she prepared lesson plans and was observed and
evaluated, she produced copies of neither.
Romeo and Ripley thus offered diametrically opposed viewpoints of the nature of
Romeo’s work during the two school years in question. Both were credible and sincere
witnesses. 	But Ripley’s understanding of the parameters of the position simply made
more sense. 	It was compelling that there was no curriculum attached to the position.
Equally compelling was the fact that the “class” met only once per week and was part of
a self-contained special-education program. 	Romeo was unaccompanied by any other
9 The normal workload for teachers is five instructional periods; if assigned a sixth class, they are entitled
to extra compensation.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
8
instructional staff during her time with the students, but does not hold certification as a
special-education teacher. 	For all these reasons, I FIND that the work performed by
Romeo in the alternative program was under her SAC certification and constituted
group counseling rather than curriculum-based instruction in psychology.
Jacqueline McCarthy is a non-tenured teacher who holds certification as a
Teacher of Social Studies. 	She utilizes that certificate to teach a course in behavioral
science, and a course in honors behavioral science. 	Because students in the honors
class can sit for the AP Psychology examination, McCarthy was sent for training so that
she could structure her class presentation to allow her students to properly prepare.
Romeo believes that this is a course that she could teach, and that the Board was
required to offer these classes to her. 	The Board contends that McCarthy teaches
under her social studies certification, and that these are not courses in psychology. It is
unnecessary that I resolve this factual dispute, as Romeo is not entitled to assignment
to the classes in question regardless, as will be more fully explained below.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Romeo’s Entitlement to Reinstatement as a SAC
The prerogative of the Board to reduce force is well established. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:28-9 provides that
[n]othing in this title or any other law relating to tenure of
service 	shall 	be held to limit 	the right 	of 	any board of
education to reduce the number of teaching staff members,
employed in the district whenever, in the judgment of the
board, 	it 	is 	advisable 	to 	abolish 	any 	such 	positions 	for
reasons of economy or because of reduction in the number
of pupils or of change in the administrative or supervisory
organization of the district or for other good cause upon
compliance with the provisions of this article.
Subsequent to a RIF, a teaching staff member’s right to recall is governed by N.J.S.A.
18A:28-11 and N.J.A.C. 6A:32-5.1.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
9
Romeo does not contend that the decision to RIF her was grounded in bad faith,
or that the Board continues to employ a SAC who holds less seniority in the school
district.10 Rather, she contends that the statute requires that all SAC-related services in
a school district be provided only by a certificated SAC whose position is “separate and
distinct from any other employment positions in the District.” She thus contends that the
action of the Board in redistributing her duties violates the requirements of N.J.S.A.
18A:40A-18 and is ultra vires.
Romeo has misinterpreted the import and meaning of this statute. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:40-18 was enacted in 1987 as a vehicle through which to pilot the introduction of
SAC services in local school districts. The Senate Statement provides that
[u]nder the bill’s provisions, a local school board which wants
to participate in the pilot program would submit a proposal to
the commissioner which outlines the district’s plan to provide
alcohol 	and 	drug 	abuse 	prevention, 	intervention 	and
treatment services to students through the employment of a
substance awareness coordinator. 	The Commissioner is to
select 120 school districts to participate in the program and
the State will pay the salary of the coordinator for a three-
year period.
[Senate Bill No. 2684, October 23, 1986.]
Consistent with the Senate Statement, the statutory language offers districts the option
to participate in this program; if they do so, the statute stipulates that a funded SAC
position must be separate and distinct from other district positions. The statute reads:
The Commissioner of Education, in consultation with the
Commissioner of Health, shall develop and administer a
program 	which 	provides 	for 	the 	employment 	of 	student
assistance coordinators in certain school districts.
a. 	Within 	90 	days 	of 	the 	effective 	date 	of 	this 	act, 	the
Commissioner 	of 	Education 	shall 	forward 	to 	each 	local
10 The parties appear to agree that Romeo was tenured as a SAC, notwithstanding the fact that she did
not hold standard certification. In any event, this issue was not raised before me. The focus of Romeo’s
claim is her interpretation of the Board’s obligations under N.J.S.A. 18A:40-18.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08261-17
10
school board a request for a proposal for the employment of
a student assistance coordinator. 	A board which wants to
participate in the program shall submit a proposal to the
commissioner which outlines the district’s plan to provide
substance 	abuse 	prevention, 	intervention, 	and 	treatment
referral services to students through the employment of a
student assistance coordinator. 	Nothing shall preclude a
district which employs a student assistance coordinator at
the time of the effective date of this act from participating in
this program. 	The commissioner shall select school districts
to participate in the program through a competitive grant
process. 	The 	participating 	districts 	shall 	include 	urban,
suburban, and rural districts from the north, central, and
southern geographic regions of the State with at least one
school district per county. In addition to all other State aid to
which the local district is entitled under the provisions of
other 	pertinent 	statutes, 	each 	board 	of 	education
participating in the program shall receive from the State, for
a three-year period, the amount necessary to pay the salary
of its student assistance coordinator.
b. 	The position of student assistance coordinator shall
be separate and distinct from any other employment position
in the district, including, but not limited to district guidance
counselors, school social workers, and school psychologists.
The State Board of Education shall approve the education
and 	experience 	criteria 	necessary 	for 	employment 	as 	a
student assistance coordinator. 	The criteria shall include a
requirement 	for 	certification 	by 	the 	State 	Board 	of
Examiners. 	In addition to the criteria established by the
State 	board, 	the 	Department 	of 	Education 	and 	the
Department of Health shall jointly conduct orientation and
training programs for student assistance coordinators and
shall also provide for continuing education programs for
coordinators.
The statute nowhere precludes a district from providing student-assistance services by
using other properly certificated staff. 	Consistent with the plain statutory language, the
Commissioner has held that
[i]rrespective of whether a local board of education chooses
to hire a Substance Awareness Coordinator, all local boards
are statutorily obligated to offer the prevention, intervention
and treatment-referral programs and services required by
N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-1 et seq. 	Thus, while a Board may be
prudent to employ a Substance Awareness Coordinator to

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assist it in meeting its broad statutory responsibilities, there
is presently no requirement for it to do so. 	Consequently,
the programs and services compelled by the imposition of
these mandates need not, as petitioner argues, be provided
exclusively 	by 	a 	Substance 	Awareness 	Coordinator, 	or,
necessarily, a district employee.
[Maren Bristol v. N. Valley Bd. of Educ., EDU 09053-03, Initial
Decision, 	(July 	1, 	2004), 	modified, 	Comm’r 	(August 	4, 	2004),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.]
Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that this record reveals nothing improper or illegal about the
action of the Board in abolishing Romeo’s SAC position. 	The Board eliminated
Romeo’s position for legitimate reasons of economy and distributed her duties among
existing staff. Its action in doing so was compliant with N.J.S.A. 18A:28-9.11
Romeo’s Entitlement to Reinstatement as a Teacher of Psychology
Romeo seeks reinstatement to a position as a teacher of psychology. 	But I
CONCLUDE that Romeo did not hold tenure as a teacher of psychology; for this
reason, she has no viable claim to reinstatement.12 	N.J.S.A. 18A:28-1 to -18 defines
the conditions under which teaching staff members are entitled to the security of tenure.
Tenure is a “statutory right imposed upon a teacher’s contractual employment status.”
Zimmerman v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 38 N.J. 65, 72 (1962), cert. den., 371 U.S. 956
(1963). These statutory provisions supersede contractual terms. Spiewak v. Rutherford
Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 63, 72 (1982). They are “designed to aid in the establishment of a
competent 	and 	efficient 	school 	system 	by 	affording 	to 	principals 	and 	teachers 	a
measure of security in the ranks they hold after years of service.” 	Viemeister v.
Prospect Park Bd. of Educ., 5 N.J. Super. 215, 218 (App. Div. 1949).
11 	The prerogative of the Board to reassign a “riffed” employee’s duties to existing staff is well
established. 	See, e.g., Polaha v. Buena Reg. Bd. of Educ., 85 S.L.D. 1982; Cinnaminson Teachers’
Ass’n v Cinnaminson Bd. of Educ., 83 S.L.D. 758, aff’d 84 S.L.D. 1915; Lippincott v. Watchung Hills Reg.
Bd. of Educ., 80 S.L.D. 857.
12 And it is for this reason that the factual question of whether Jacqueline McCarthy teaches psychology,
as opposed to social studies, is of no moment. 	Nor does it matter whether, as the Board contends, it
presently offers no classes in the area of psychology. Without tenure, Romeo has no claim regardless.

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12
The “position” in which a teaching staff member achieves tenure is either one of the
specifically designated positions in N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5 or other employment for which an
appropriate certificate is required. Ellicott v. Frankford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 251 N.J. Super.
342, 347 (App. Div. 1991); Howley v. Ewing Bd. of Educ., 1982 S.L.D. 1328, 1339, aff’d,
1983 S.L.D. 1554; Capodilupo v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 218 N.J. Super. 510, 514 (App.
Div.), certif. den., 109 N.J. 514 (1987). The system of educational certificates established
by the New Jersey Department of Education provides for three distinct types of certificates:
the Instructional Certificate, the Educational Services Certificate, and the Administrative
Certificate. 	N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-5.2 et seq. 	Endorsements on these certificates specify the
categories within which an individual is authorized to provide service in a public school.
Romeo’s service as a SAC was under an Educational Services Certificate. 	Romeo’s
Teacher of Psychology credential is an endorsement to an Instructional Certificate.
Our Supreme Court has held that tenure earned under one certificate does not
transfer to another; the staff member must serve for the requisite time under the
certificate in question. 	Dennery v. Passaic Cty. Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 131 N.J. 626
(1993). 	The Court confirmed that tenure protection is earned only if a staff member
“works in a position for which a teaching certificate is required; . . . holds the appropriate
certificate; and . . . has served the requisite period of time.” Id. at 638.
Romeo claims to have taught psychology during the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013
school years only. 	The record reveals that she did not deliver instruction to students
using her instructional certificate during the years in question. 	I thus CONCLUDE that
she could not have earned tenure under her Instructional Certificate, and that her claim
to reinstatement lacks merit. 	But even assuming, for argument’s sake, that Romeo did
teach psychology at the Alternative School Program, she simply did not serve long
enough in that role to earn tenure. 	The Board correctly points out that her right to
tenure would be governed by N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6, which provides that, where a tenured
staff member is transferred to another position, tenure is earned after “employment for
two academic years in the new position together with employment in the new position at

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13
the beginning of the next succeeding academic year.” 13 She was not reemployed in the
controverted alternative school position for the 2013–2014 year. 	I thus CONCLUDE
that Romeo did not earn tenure in that position, even if it was a Teacher of Psychology
position. 	See King v. Keansburg Bd. of Educ., 84 S.L.D. 922, 927. 	I moreover
CONCLUDE that even if, for argument’s sake, the Board is offering its students classes
in psychology, Romeo could have no possible claim to assignment to those classes.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the petition of appeal is DISMISSED.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
13 	If Romeo was not tenured as a SAC, the time frame for tenure acquisition would have been even
longer. See N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5.

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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, P.O. Box 500, Trenton, New
Jersey 08625-0500, marked “Attention: 	Exceptions.” 	A copy of any exceptions must
be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
December 17, 2018
DATE 	ELLEN S. BASS, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	December 17, 2018
Date Mailed to Parties:
sej

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APPENDIX
WITNESSES
For Petitioner:
Kate Romeo
Jacqueline McCarthy
Edward Blevins
For Respondent:
Scott Ripley
EXHIBITS
For Petitioner:
P-1 	Certificates
P-2 	Letter dated March 8, 2017
P-3 	Board agenda
P-4 	Letter dated April 28, 2017
P-5 	Emails dated January 22, 2018
P-6 	Board policies
P-7 	Grievance packet from 2013
P-8 	High Point Employee List
P-9 	Professional development activities for Board agenda
P-10 	Email to staff
P-11 	Business card
P-12 	Clarification of P-8
For Respondent:
R-1 	Request for Answers to Interrogatories
R-2 	Answers to Interrogatories
R-3 	Coordinator records

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R-4 	Memorandum dated April 4, 2017
R-5 	Reemployment letter
R-6 	Revision to reemployment letter
R-7 	Collective Negotiations Agreement