A.P., On Behalf of Minor Child, A.P. V. Board of Education of The City of Burlington, Burlington County, 8/23/2024, (#307-24)

307-24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
A.P., on behalf of minor child, A.P.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	City 	of 	Burlington,
Burlington County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Pro se petitioner challenged the determination of the respondent Board that several interactions between
petitioner’s daughter, A.P., and a school lunchroom aide did not constitute harassment, intimidation, or
bullying (HIB) under New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14. Following an
investigation by the school district’s anti-bullying specialist into the allegations that A.P. was a victim of HIB,
the Board found that the incidents reported did not satisfy the Act’s definition of HIB. The District’s anti-
bullying specialist concluded that there was no HIB but recommended that the lunchroom aide should not
interact with A.P. at lunch and recess. Petitioner subsequently filed the within appeal. The Board filed a
motion for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue in this case, and the matter is ripe for
summary decision; 	the decision of a board acting within the scope of its authority is entitled to a
presumption of correctness and will not be overturned unless there is an affirmative showing that such
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; further, the action of a board which lies within the area
of its discretionary powers may not be upset unless patently arbitrary, without rational basis or induced by
improper motives; in this case, petitioner’s allegations did not meet the legal standards of the HIB statute;
for a finding of HIB, the alleged behavior must reasonably be perceived as being motivated by an actual or
perceived distinguishing characteristic of the victim, a critical element that is missing in this case; petitioner
instead argued that the lunchroom aide targeted A.P. because of an acrimonious relationship between
petitioner and the aide, who were long-time acquaintances. The ALJ concluded that the lunchroom aide’s
actions did not permit a finding of HIB because her behavior was not motivated by an actual or perceived
characteristic of A.P. Accordingly, there was no violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 and the Board’s actions were
not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Summary decision was granted to the Board and the petition
was dismissed.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that the Board’s determination in this matter was
not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted as the
final decision in this matter, and the petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has been
neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

307-24
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 02104-24
Agency Dkt. No. 17-1/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
A.P., on behalf of minor child, A.P.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the City of Burlington,
Burlington County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), and
the exceptions filed by the petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, have been reviewed and
considered. The Board did not file exceptions or reply to petitioner’s exceptions.
Petitioner alleged that her child, A.P.,1 was bullied when, on several separate occasions, a
lunch aide made A.P. sit by herself at lunch, miss recess for doing nothing wrong, and cry.
Additionally, petitioner alleged that the lunchroom aide singled out A.P. due to the aide’s personal
history with petitioner. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the lunchroom aide’s
actions did not permit a finding of HIB because her behavior was not motivated by an actual or
perceived characteristic of A.P.
In her exceptions, petitioner fails to address the ALJ’s conclusion that the lunchroom aide’s
actions were not motivated by an actual or perceived characteristic of A.P. Instead, petitioner argues
1 Because petitioner and her child share the same initials, petitioner will be referred to herein as
“petitioner,” and her child will be referred to herein as “A.P.”

2
that there are four different kinds of harassment, intimidation, and bullying (HIB). 	Petitioner
contends that in reaching his decision, the ALJ utilized the incorrect type of HIB, which had been
provided by the Board, rather than the type of HIB under which she filed. While petitioner does not
define her preferred type of HIB (or the three other types of HIB), she cites to an excerpt from
guidance published by the Department of Education that identifies four distinct kinds of bullying
behavior.2 It appears petitioner misunderstands these four behaviors to be separate grounds upon
which an individual may file an HIB complaint. 	Petitioner’s preferred type of HIB is likely
“psychological,” as it is the only bullying behavior highlighted in the excerpt she provides. The guide
defines psychological bullying as, “… purposefully keeping people from activities and breaking up
friendships and other relationships.” Ibid. Lastly, petitioner claims that the lunchroom aide has a
history of harassment and cites to a screenshot of the aide’s records from a New Jersey Municipal
Court Case Search.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that the lunch aide’s actions do not
warrant a finding of a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14. When a local board of education acts within its
discretionary authority, its decision is entitled to a presumption of correctness and will not be
disturbed unless there is an affirmative showing that the decision was “patently arbitrary, without
rational basis or induced by improper motives.” Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288,
294 (App. Div. 1960). Furthermore, “where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or
capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration[,]” and the Commissioner will not
substitute his judgment for that of the board. Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 122
N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974).
2 According to the guidance, “Guidance for Parents on the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (P.L.2010, c.122),”
the 	four types of bullying behavior are verbal, physical, psychological, and electronic. 	See
https://www.nj.gov/education/mksd/docs/HIB%20ParentGuide.pdf (page 10).

3
The Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (the Act) defines HIB as follows:
[A]ny gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any electronic
communication, whether it be a single incident or a series of incidents,
that is reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any actual
or perceived characteristic, such as race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and
expression, or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by any other
distinguishing characteristic, that takes place on school property, at
any school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school grounds
as provided for in section 16 of P.L. 2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that
substantially disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation of the
school or the rights of other students and that:
a. a reasonable person should know, under the circumstances, will
have the effect of physically or emotionally harming a student or
damaging the student's property, or placing a student in reasonable
fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or damage to his
property;
b. has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or group of
students; or
c. creates a hostile educational environment for the student by
interfering with a student's education or by severely or pervasively
causing physical or emotional harm to the student.
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.
Therefore, a finding of HIB requires three elements.3 First, the conduct must be reasonably perceived
as motivated by any actual or perceived enumerated characteristic or other distinguishing
characteristic and, second, the conduct must substantially disrupt or interfere with the rights of other
students or the orderly operation of the school. The third condition is that one of the three criteria
enumerated in the Act regarding the effect of the conduct must also be satisfied. Wehbeh v. Bd. of
Educ. of the Twp. of Verona, Essex County, Commissioner Decision No. 51-20 (decided February 4,
2020).
3 The statute also requires that the conduct take place on school property, at a school-sponsored function,
on a school bus, or off school grounds as provided for in N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15.3. The parties do not contest
that this requirement has been met.

4
In her exceptions, petitioner misconstrues the legal analysis undertaken when considering
HIB matters. Pivotal to the analysis is the first element, an act that is reasonably perceived as being
motivated by any actual or perceived characteristic. 	However, petitioner fails to identify a
distinguishing characteristic of A.P. that might have motivated the lunchroom aide’s behavior.
Further, even if true, the lunch aide targeting A.P. due to the aide’s personal history with petitioner,
while inappropriate, does not constitute a distinguishing characteristic under N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14. See
K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.J. Super. 337, 351 (“[H]armful or demeaning conduct
motivated only by another reason, for example, a dispute about relationships … or aggressive conduct
without identifiable motivation, does not come within the statutory definition of bullying.”)
(emphasis added). Absent a distinguishing characteristic, the lunch aide’s conduct cannot satisfy the
first prong required for a finding of HIB; therefore, the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition
of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.4
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	August 23, 2024
Date of Mailing: 	August 26, 2024
4 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
AGENCY REF. NO. 17-1/24
A.P. ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD, A.P.,
Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF BURLINGTON
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
A.P. on behalf of minor child, A.P., pro se
Alicia D’Anella, Esq., for respondent (Gorman, D’Anella, and Morlok, LLC,
attorneys)
BEFORE MICHAEL R. STANZIONE, ALJ:
Record closed: May 14, 2024 Decided: July 10, 2024
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from petitioner A.P.’s challenge of the determination by
respondent, City of Burlington Board of Education (respondent or Board), that there was

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
2
no harassment, intimidation or bullying (HIB) during several interactions between
petitioner A.P.’s daughter, A.P., and a school lunchroom aide.
Petitioner’s daughter is a student in the City of Burlington School District (District).
Following an investigation by the District’s anti-bullying specialist into the allegation that
she was a victim of HIB, the Board found that the incident reported did not satisfy the Anti-
Bullying Bill of Rights Act’s (ABR) definition of HIB. The District’s anti-bullying specialist
concluded that there was no HIB. The specialist determined that the only corrective action
that should be required was that the lunchroom aide should not interact with the student
at lunch and recess.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The HIB investigation concluded on October 20, 2023, and the HIB investigation
summary report completed by the anti-bullying specialist was submitted to the
superintendent on October 25, 2023. On or about December 11, 2023, petitioner’s
requested appeal hearing on the investigation determination was held. Following the
appeal hearing, the Board affirmed the determination that the incident did not satisfy the
ABR definition of HIB. On or about February 14, 2024, petitioner filed an appeal of that
determination. The matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
where it was filed on February 14, 2024, for a hearing as a contested case. N.J.S.A.
52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
The Board filed an answer and a motion for summary decision on February 13,
2024, before the matter was transmitted to the OAL. An initial prehearing conference was
held on March 12, 2024. On March 14, 2024, petitioner emailed a response to the Board’s
motion for summary decision. This was followed by a prehearing conference on March
25, 2024. On May 14, 2024, oral argument was held on the motion via Zoom with the
consent of the respondent, as the petitioner was unable to travel for an in-person oral
argument.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
3
MOTION
Respondent has filed a motion for summary decision, arguing that the undisputed
facts demonstrate that the alleged actions by the lunchroom aide do not constitute HIB
as defined by the ABR. Specifically, respondent relies on the anti-bullying specialist’s
finding that the student lacked a defining characteristic to meet the requirements of a
finding of HIB.
Petitioner opposes respondent’s motion, arguing generally that the actions of the
District’s lunchroom aide meet the definition of HIB. She argues that her daughter was
singled out by the employee because of petitioner’s history with the employee.
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT
The following FACTS of the case are not in dispute:
1. At all times relevant to this matter, petitioner’s daughter was a student
attending school in the District.
2. The lunchroom aide had A.P. sit by herself in the cafeteria and sit-out recess.
The petitioner and the lunchroom aide have had multiple interactions in their
past and they “were not good ones.”
3. Respondent’s investigation concluded that the alleged conduct was not
reasonably perceived as being motivated by an actual or perceived
characteristic of petitioner’s child. R-4 at ¶ 3. The report noted that no
motivating factor was determined. R-5, Exhibit A, at 4. It stated that the
“student was reprimanded for not following school rules. Student was not
targeted for any real or perceived characteristics.” Id. at 6. The incident,
according to the anti-bullying specialist, did not satisfy the definition of HIB.
Id. at 7.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
4
4. The anti-bullying specialist found that the lunchroom aide was responding to
the student’s behavior. R-4 at ¶ 4.
5. Respondent took steps to ensure that the student would not have any future
contact with the lunchroom aide Id. at ¶ 5. The lunchroom aide was moved
to a different lunch period than A.P.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Petitioner:
Petitioner, through oral argument, alleged that the staff member is “singling out”
her daughter. Referencing her personal history with the lunchroom aide, she argues that
the staff member unfairly harassed and bullied her daughter because she is petitioner’s
child. Petitioner asserted that she and the staff member “have never been friends” and
queried why the staff member told her daughter that they knew each other. P-2. Prior to
these interactions with the lunchroom aide, her daughter always loved school; however,
since interacting with the aide, she no longer wants to attend school.
Respondent:
Respondent argues that its motion must be granted because the staff member’s
conduct was not motivated by an actual or perceived distinguishing characteristic. R-4 at
¶ 3.
First, the Board concluded in its HIB investigation report that the actions of the
lunch aide toward petitioner’s child were found to be in direct response to the student’s
behavior. Id. at 4. Although the incident was not determined by the Board to meet the
criteria of HIB, the District took steps to ensure that the student did not have further
contact with the accused staff member. Id. at 5.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
5
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary decision may be granted “if the papers and discovery which have been
filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). The OAL summary decision rule is essentially the same as the
summary judgment rule under the New Jersey Court Rules, which states:
The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
or order as a matter of law. An issue of fact is genuine only if,
considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence
submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all
legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving
party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.
[R. 4:46-2(c).]
The New Jersey Supreme Court has modified and clarified the analysis required
when considering a motion for summary decision/judgment. In Brill v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the Court adopted the summary
judgment standard utilized by federal courts:
Under this new standard, a determination whether there exists
a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary
judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the
competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to
permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed
issue in favor of the non-moving party. The “judge’s function
is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986).] . . . If there exists a single, unavoidable
resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue
should be considered insufficient to constitute a “genuine”
issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 4:46-2. Liberty
Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct. at 2511, 91 L. Ed.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
6
2d at 213. The import of our holding is that when the evidence
“is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law,” Liberty Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at
2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 214, the trial court should not hesitate to
grant summary judgment.
The burden is on the moving party to exclude all reasonable doubt as to the
existence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences of doubt are drawn
against the moving party and in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana v. DiMedio, 275
N.J. Super. 488, 494 (App. Div. 1994). The critical question, therefore, is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require [a hearing] or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 533 (citation
omitted). If the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment should not be denied. See Bowles v. City of Camden, 993
F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.N.J. 1998).
All of the material facts in this case are undisputed. The petitioner has not
contested any material fact put in front of this tribunal. Petitioner argued only that the
legal definition under ABR of what constitutes HIB is not good enough.
The ABR defines harassment, intimidation or bullying as follows:
any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident or a
series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being
motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic,
such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, or a
mental, physical or sensory disability, or by any other
distinguishing characteristic, that takes place on school
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus,
or off school grounds as provided for in section 16 of
P.L.2010, c. 122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts
or interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the
rights of other students and that:
a. a reasonable person should know, under the
circumstances, will have the effect of physically or
emotionally harming a student or damaging the
student’s property, or placing a student in reasonable

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
7
fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or
damage to his property;
b. has the effect of insulting or demeaning any
student or group of students; or
c. creates a hostile educational environment for
the student by interfering with a student’s education or
by severely or pervasively causing physical or
emotional harm to the student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 (emphasis added).]
The requirement that the conduct is reasonably perceived as being motivated by
a distinguishing characteristic is fundamental to the decision. The statutory definition of
HIB “does not include all violent or aggressive conduct.” K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 423 N.J. Super. 337, 350 (App. Div. 2011).
On October 25, 2023, the HIB investigation report was submitted to the District
superintendent. In its summary of findings, the report noted that no motivating factor was
determined. R-5, Exhibit A, at 4. It stated that the “student was reprimanded for not
following school rules. Student was not targeted for any real or perceived characteristics.”
Id. at 6. The incident, according to the anti-bullying specialist, did not satisfy the definition
of HIB. Id. at 7.
In other words, the petitioner’s child, according to the investigation, was not
targeted due to race, color, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, or a mental,
physical, or sensory disability, or due to any other distinguishing characteristic. Petitioner
corroborated the findings of the investigation, because she asserted in her opposition to
the motion for summary decision, during oral argument, and in her pro se petition of
appeal that the school staff member targeted her child due to her personal history with
the petitioner.
Accordingly, accepting petitioner’s version of the facts as accurate and undisputed,
I CONCLUDE that the school lunchroom aide’s actions were not motivated by an actual

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
8
or perceived characteristic of student A.B. This does not permit a finding of a violation of
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.
I therefore CONCLUDE that the respondent’s motion for summary decision should
be granted.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that respondent’s motion for
summary decision is GRANTED.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
9
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed
by email to ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of
Controversies and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton,
New Jersey 08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the
other parties.
July 10, 2024
DATE MICHAEL R. STANZIONE, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02104-24
10
APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For Petitioner:
P-1 Pro Se Petition of Appeal
P-2 Response email to respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision
For Respondent:
R-1 Filed answer to petition of appeal
R-2 Notice of Motion for Summary Decision
R-3 Brief in support of respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision
R-4 Certification of superintendent Dr. John Russell
R-5 Exhibits A and B