M.M.D. v. Roselle Board of Education, Union County, 4/21/26 (#139-26E)

139-26E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 04154-26
Agency Dkt. No. 063-02-26
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
M.M.D.,
Petitioner,
v.
Roselle Board of Education, Union County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to demonstrate
entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-34 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as the parties and the ALJ deem
necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	April 21, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	April 22, 2026

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04154-26
AGENCY DKT. NO. 063-02-26
Ma. M.,
Petitioner,
v.
ROSELLE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
UNION COUNTY,
Respondent.
______________________________
Ma. M., petitioner pro se,
Bryant L. Horsley, Jr. Esq., for respondent (Shabazz and Woolridge Law
Group, attorneys)
BEFORE ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The 	petitioner, 	Ma. 	M. 	seeks 	an 	emergent 	order 	to 	reverse 	respondent’s
(hereinafter District” or “School”) actions in restricting accessing in what was called a
“ban” by both her and respondent Roselle Board of Education, Ma. M., identified that
way to avoid confusion with the identify of her daughter Me. M., petitioned the Office of
Special Education Policy and Dispute Resolution in the New Jersey Department of
Education, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 et. seq., for an order for emergent relief,
identifying at the time of the application was made to the DOE was to “arrange a

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meeting with Superintendent Nathan L. Fisher and allow me to attend, my daughters
school (Kindergarten Success Academy) and allow to attend parent meetings and
school events.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 19, the 2026 petitioner filed the pro se Petition of Appeal seeking
the aforesaid Relief, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 et seq, although no Certification by
Ma. M. was provided, and the matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law
on March 11, 2026. 	After a short delay was caused by the petitioner and respondent
appeared in Court prepared to call witnesses, the requests of for same were denied,
and the parties were given additional time, respondent to supplement one certification
by the School Superintendent with a second by the school principal, and the petitioner
more time to prepare proper certifications and certified exhibits, along with providing a
legal argument address the issues of Crowe v. DeGoia, which petitioner failed to
provide. 	The emergent hearing was held on March 20, 2026, at which time the record
closed.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
The problem in granting relief to petitioner, the first being that she did not directly
with factual arguments based on law, address the standards for emergent relief and
thus could not advance a legal justification for same. Second the petitioner provided no
factual certified evidence whatsoever. 	She did provide about 30 pages of emails and
similar communications mostly between her and school officials, however none of those
“Exhibits” (they were not properly submitted as exhibits) helped advance her argument
that she is entitled to emergent relief from the school’s actions. 	In fact, although when
asked about the respondent’s factual allegations supporting their actions, petitioner just
said “that’s not true.” 	Such denials are not entitled to much weight as she failed to
provide certified evidence by anyone supporting her.
Further none of the documents she submitted even indicated a serious factual
dispute about who the District’s main exhibits, being the First and Second Restraining

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Orders issued by a Family Court Judge and the certifications by the Superintendent,
and the principal of the school that is alleged by the petitioner to be violating her rights.
The facts concern the controversy arising primarily from a family court custody
battle between Ma. M and her husband J.L. can their child Me. M., age 5. 	For school
year, 2025-2026, Me. M., had been attending the Roselle public Kindergarten, called
the Kindergarten Success Academy. 	A summary of the pertinent evidence per their
certifications and attached exhibits presented is as follows, and I FIND the following as
FACTS:
1. 	An 	“amended 	Final 	Restraining 	Order” 	was 	entered 	by 	a 	Superior 	Court
Chancery Division Family Part Judge on or about October 3, 2025 concerning
marital/parental 	rights 	and 	responsibilities 	of 	the 	parents 	Ma. 	M., 	and 	J.L.
regarding their daughter Me. M.
2. 	That Order gave J.L., the father primary residential custody allowing him to enroll
their five-year-old into school. 	The Order, however, entitled the mother, here
petitioner, to all school related and educational Information directly from the
school. In addition to her parenting time, she was entitled to bring the child to the
school Wednesdays and Fridays and to bring her to school on Mondays. 	The
Order also permitted both parents to attend back to school night but at different
times.
3. 	Ma. M. missed her scheduled date for back-to-school night. 	After that, Ma. M.
began on a course of what can mildly be considered abrasive conduct with
school officials. 	For example, after missing back to school night she demanded
another meeting “then screamed at the teacher when the meeting did not
happen” (Certification of Principal Lauren Gonzale)1
4. 	For the next several months and including the present day, Principal Gonzlez
and staff were confronted by repeated attempts by Ma. M. to “expand her
educational access that was not authorized by the FRO. 	For example, Ma. M.
often would come to the school with her sister “and persisted in shouting down
1 Unless noted otherwise all quoted factual allegations are from Principal Gonzalez’s certification

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04154-26
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me and staff.” 	On another occasion, Ma. M.’s sister physically “grabbed the
ID/lanyard from a staff member demanding to know who she was.”
5. 	Because J.L. had primary decision-making authority it was, by the school’s
determination, to name emergency contact persons. 	He apparently did not want
Ma. M. to know the confidential information containing his and his girlfriend’s
address. 	However, Ma. M. “came to the school and attempted to rip off the
emergency contact card and take it with her.” 	Despite being told by the school
officials that it would be a breach of FERPA, she continues making demands that
the school release emergency contact information.
6. 	On still another occasion, Ma. M. took a picture of a student/parent sign in sheet.
It contained the confidential information of other students and parents. 	Despite
being told taking such an unauthorized picture was a violation of FERPA, Ma. M.
was “belligerent and refused to delete” the picture.
7. 	There was also an off-site field trip to an Imagine That Museum. to which Ma. M.
and her sister showed up without first obtaining the form needed to be listed as a
chaperone’s 	accompanying 	Me. 	M. 	Principal 	Gonzalez 	believed 	Ma. 	M.’s
presence was motivated by her and her sister’s intention to confront J.L.’s
girlfriend. 	After being loud and disruptive she was asked to leave but refused
and police had to be called. 	Even though the police told Ma. M. not to reenter
the premises, after the police left, Ma. M. tried to sneak into the museum’s back
door.
8. 	Principal Gonzalex described other inappropriate behavior by Ma. M. at the
school such as invading the personal space of staff and pointing fingers in their
faces, falsely accusing a staff member of telling her daughter that she didn’t love
her, and attempting to show photos of her husband J.L. allegedly at a liquor store
while making disparaging remarks about him in front of other Kindergarten
students.
9. 	Staff and principal Gonzalez have been forced to call the police at least another
time and have had to threaten to do so on other occasions. 	As a result,
Gonzalez says she and her staff do not “feel safe when she [Ma. M.] is present”
and have required security with them when she is present.

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10. 	Finally, 	a new 	FRO was 	filed 	March 9, 2026. 	[Exhibit 	D to 	Gonzalez’s
certification]. 	This Order states “All education decisions will remain” with the
father “due to evidence presented pertaining to [Ma. M.] being banned from
school and having issues with the Child’s School.” Principal Gonzalex noted that
under this new FRO, pickups by Ma. M. are no longer at the school but are not at
the local police station.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1 provides that the affected parent(s), guardian, board or public
agency may apply in writing for emergent relief. 	An emergency relief application is
required to set forth the specific relief sought and the specific circumstances the
applicant 	contends 	justify 	the 	relief 	sought. 	N.J.A.C. 	6A:3-1.6(b) 	sets 	forth 	the
standards governing motions for emergent relief:
A motion for stay or emergent relief shall be accompanied by
a 	letter 	memorandum 	or 	brief 	which 	shall 	address 	the
following 	standards 	to 	be 	met 	for 	granting 	such 	relief
pursuant to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982):
1. 	The 	petitioner 	will 	suffer 	irreparable 	harm 	if 	the
requested relief is not granted;
2. 	The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. 	The petitioner has the likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of the underlying claim; and
4. 	When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the
respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not granted.
The petitioner has the burden of establishing all of the above requirements in
order to warrant relief in their favor. 	D.I. and S.I. on behalf of T.I. v. Monroe Township
Board of Education, 2017 N.J. Agen LEXIS 814, 7 (OAL Docket No. EDS 10816-17,
October 25, 2017). 	The moving party bears the burden of proving each of the Crowe
elements “clearly and convincingly.” 	Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth.,
399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008).

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Beginning with the first requirement, it is well-settled that relief should not be
granted except “when necessary to prevent irreparable harm.” 	Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-
33. 	In this regard, harm is generally considered irreparable if it cannot be adequately
redressed by monetary damages. 	Id. at 132-33. 	In other words, it has been described
as “substantial injury to a material degree coupled with the inadequacy of money
damages.” 	Judice’s Sunshine Pontiac v. General Motors Corp., 418 F.Supp. 1212,
1218 (D.N.J. 1976) (citation omitted).
The moving party bears the burden of proving irreparable harm. More than a risk
of irreparable harm must be demonstrated. 	Continental Group v. Amoco Chemicals
Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1980). 	Ordinarily, the opportunity at issue here,
namely the chance to walk in a high school graduation ceremony, is an event that, once
missed, cannot be regained since it is a once in a lifetime event. See C.D. o/b/o S.C. v.
Mainland Regional Bd. of Educ., EDS 08459-17, Decision on Emergent Relief, (June
16, 2017) http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.html (“[T]he opportunity to participate
in the graduation ceremony is an event that, once missed, cannot be regained since it is
a once in a lifetime event”); 	K.H. o/b/o M.G. v. Kingsway Regional Bd. of Educ., EDS
6903-11, 	Decision 	on 	Emergent 	Relief, 	(June 	17, 	2011)
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.html; 	R.C. o/b/o M.C. v. Pemberton Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 	EDS 	4212-02, 	Decision 	on 	Emergent 	Relief, 	(June 	17, 	2002)
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.html. 	But see T.S. v. Jackson Township Board
of 	Education, 	EDS 	4113-07, 	Oral 	Decision 	on 	Emergent 	Relief, 	(May 	25, 	2007)
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.html (concluding “prom and graduation, although
important in one’s young life, will not result in irreparable harm if missed”). 	Under the
circumstances, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has not met the burden of establishing
a clear showing of immediate irreparable injury unless the requested relief is granted.
The only injury she described in argument on the motion (and nowhere supported by a
brief, exhibits or certification), is that her child’s grades may suffer. 	However, other
exhibits showed the child was averaging an 85 in all subjects and nothing under an 80
in any grade. 	From my review, the child’s school attendance has been excellent. 	In
any event even if this five-year old’s grades were impacted, because of her mother’s

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temporary 	limited 	access 	to 	the 	school, 	were 	impacted 	adversely, 	that 	is 	hardly
irreparable harm.
Secondly, the petitioner must also demonstrate that the legal right underlying her
claim is settled and petitioner must make a preliminary showing of a reasonable
probability of success on the merits. 	Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133. 	The law on this point is,
however, well-settled in favor of the respondent, who has broad discretion to take the
actions needed to effectively operate its public schools and to protect the health,
welfare, and safety of its students. 	C.D. o/b/o S.C., EDS 08459-17. 	Rules and
regulations regarding 	school events and meetings such as graduation ceremonies are
matters clearly within the purview of the respondent’s discretion. 	J.M. o/b/o C.P. v.
Hanover Park Regional Board of Education, EDS 5606-00, Final Decision, (June 23,
2000) http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.html (matters concerning graduation are
within the discretion of the district); J.Z. o/b/o C.Q. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Buena
Regional School Dist., Atlantic County, EDS 0297-07, Final Decision, (July 23, 2007)
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.html. 	See also Buonasorte v. Bd. of Educ. of
Mainland 	Regional 	High 	School 	District, 	EDU 	8012-09, 	Order 	on 	Application 	for
Emergent 	Relief, 	(June 	19, 	2009), 	adopted, 	Comm’r 	(June 	19, 	2009)
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/ (“The applicable case law establishes beyond
question that participation in a graduation ceremony is a privilege and not a right”).
Thus, school l board policies and actions such as setting up guidelines for field trips and
other extracurricular activities, protecting privacy rights of students and other parents.
limiting parents access to a school facility, are well within their authority and are entitled
to a presumption of lawfulness and good faith, and where they are challenged, the
challenger 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	proving 	that 	the 	actions 	are 	unlawful, 	arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. 	Schuster v. Bd. of Educ. Montgomery Twp., 96 N.J.A.R.
2d (EDU) 670, 676 (citing Schnick v. Westwood Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 448
(App.Div. 1960) and Quinlan v. Bd. of Educ. of North Bergen Twp., 73 N.J. Super. 40
(App.Div. 1962)). 	See also Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327,
332 (App.Div. 1965), aff’d, 46 N.J. 581 (1966); Kopera v. West Orange Bd. of Educ., 60
N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App. Div. 1960).

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In other words, while the Board cannot be arbitrary and capricious in its actions, it
does have the authority to establish and enforce rules with regard to attendance and
participation at school-sponsored events, even key events in a student’s life such as
graduation ceremonies. 	The same applies to meetings with teachers and other school
staff. 	The arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable standard of review imposes a heavy
burden on challengers of board actions. This standard has been defined by New Jersey
courts as follows:
In the law, “arbitrary” and “capricious” means having no
rational 	basis. 	Arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	action 	of
administrative bodies means willful and unreasoning action,
without consideration and in disregard of circumstances.
Where there is no room for two opinions, action is not
arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon
due consideration, even though it may be believed that an
erroneous conclusion has been reached . . . Moreover, the
court 	should 	not 	substitute 	its 	judgment 	for 	that 	of 	an
administrative 	or 	legislative 	body 	if 	there 	is 	substantial
evidence to support the ruling.
[Piccoli v. Ed. of Educ. of Ramapo Indian Hills Regional
School District, EDU 1839-98, Initial Decision, (January 22,
1999) 	http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.html 	(citing
Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dent. of Envir. Protection, 122 N.J.
Super. 184, 199-200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff'd 131 N.J. Super.
37 (App. Div. 1974)).]
While 	restrictions 	on 	some 	parents 	as 	getting 	preapproval 	and 	respecting
procedures such as sign-in sheets may be galling to some parents, they don’t approach
violating their rights, nor does that complaint rest on any well settled principle or right
clearly established in that law. 	It is well known that our Family courts are the primary
vehicle in which parental rights, between parents are settled. Even if there was a logical
connection between the two present legal controversies, it would seem the child’s father
J.L. is an indispensable party to this action. 	In any event, under the second and third
prongs of the Crowe test, the applicable “arbitrary and capricious” legal standard makes
the probability of success on the merits dubious. Further it seems at this stage that Ma.
M. is largely to blame for backing the school into a corner by trying to unfairly implicate
them in her ongoing matrimonial challenge. 	And while I make no decision on a point
raised by the District that the matter being brought here is an issue of res judicata

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because the family court has already ruled on it, or an issue of collateral estoppel, it
would appear to be in the interest of both sides that petitioner focus on the matrimonial
case most preferably with attorney guidance.
I CONCLUDE, therefore, that the petitioner has not shown a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim given the applicable “arbitrary and
capricious” standard which applies. 	Although petitioner challenges the accuracy of
allegations as set forth in the District’s Certifications and Exhibits, the only real dispute
with the allegations as articulated in the proceeding is that no harm has yet occurred to
anyone as a result of this latest episode. 	That is clearly not enough to satisfy this third
standard as provided for in Crowe.
Although none of the other three Crowe standards have been met, and all of
them must be met to grant emergent relief, in order to give a full review of the petition, I
will also discuss the equities. 	Based on Ma. M.’s conduct, the equities could hardly be
more weighed in favor of the Board’s than as they are here. Moreover, as noted by
petitioner herself, the child will only be attending the school another two and one half
months, and then moves on to another school. 	The school appears to have had to
spend more than enough of its time and efforts on dealing with a very upset mother, but
her primary upset comes I believe from her unsatisfactory (to her) results in Family court
so far. 	That is hardly a reason to put the school as this emergent application does. 	I
therefore conclude the balance of equities rests with the School District.
All four of the Crowe v. De Gioia standards as codified in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 must
be met in order for emergent relief to be granted. Here, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner
has not met any of the four standards, and the petition for emergent relief therefore
must be DENIED.

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ORDER DENYING EMERGENT RELIEF
The petitioner’s request that emergent relief to Order the District to permit more
access to the school by petitioner to compel the Superintendent to meet with her, and any
other requested relief is DENIED.
This Order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by
law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	The final decision shall be
issued without undue delay but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this
order. 	If the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not
adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall
become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10.
March 23, 2026
DATE 	ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ
Date Received at Agency 	3/24/26______________________
Date Mailed to Parties: 	3/24/26
id