Christine Wells v. Board of Education of the Mercer County Special Services School District, Mercer County, 7/11/25 (#352-25E)

352-25E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10184-25
Agency Dkt. No. 173-6/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
Christine Wells,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Mercer County Special
Services School District, Mercer County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has failed to demonstrate
entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-34 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted for the reasons stated therein. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as
the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	July 11, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	July 14, 2025

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENCY RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 173-6/25
CHRISTINE WELLS,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
MERCER COUNTY SPECIAL SERVICES
SCHOOL DISTRICT, MERCER COUNTY,
Respondent.
Christine Wells, appearing pro se
Geoffrey Stark, Esq., appearing for respondent (Capehart & Scatchard, attorneys)
BEFORE KIM C. BELIN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By request for emergent relief, petitioner Christine Wells (petitioner or Wells)
challenges the decision of the respondent, the Mercer County Special Services School
District (MCSSSD or respondent), to non-renew her contract. Is the petitioner entitled to
emergent relief and immediate return to her former position? No, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b)
requires proof of irreparable harm, which is not present in this case.

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2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 2, 2025, the petitioner received notice that she was being placed on
administrative leave. On May 28, 2025, the petitioner filed a petition of appeal challenging
respondent’s decision to non-renew her contract. The director of the Office of
Controversies and Disputes within the Department of Education transmitted the petition
and motion for emergent relief to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was
filed on June 10, 2025. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13; N.J.A.C. 1:1-
8.2. Oral argument was held on June 16, 2025, and the record on the motion for emergent
relief closed on that date.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following FACTS are undisputed, and I therefore FIND:
The petitioner was hired as assistant transportation coordinator on June 1, 2019.
She is employed under annual employment contracts from July through June, and the
contract for the 2024-25 school year expires on June 30, 2025. (R-1.) The petitioner
serves in a twelve-month, non-affiliated position. (Ibid.)
On April 15, 2025, the petitioner was presented with a letter notifying her that her
employment contract would not be renewed for the 2025-26 school year.1 (R-2.) On May
2, 2025, she was notified that she was placed on administrative leave immediately and
not permitted to return to the school. (P-2.)
On May 28, 2025, the petitioner filed for emergent relief.
The collective bargaining agreement between the MCSSSD and the Mercer
County Special Services Support Staff Association, effective July 1, 2022, through June
30, 2025, covers all “full-time salaried, part-time salaried, full-time hourly and part-time
1 The letter is dated April 14, 2025, and is unsigned.

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hourly cleaning, clerical, custodial, grounds person, [and] transportation employees of the
school district” but excludes the transportation coordinators. (R-4.)
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Emergent Relief
The regulations governing controversies and disputes before the Commissioner of
Education provide that “[w]here the subject matter of the controversy is a particular course
of action by a district board of education . . . , the petitioner may include with the petition
of appeal, a separate motion for emergent relief or a stay of that action pending the
Commissioner’s final decision in the contested case.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a). The
regulations further provide that the Commissioner may “[t]ransmit the motion to the OAL
for immediate hearing on the motion.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(c)(3).
At such a hearing, a petitioner must show that the following four standards are met:
1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the
requested relief is not granted;
2. The legal right underlying petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of the underlying claim; and
4. When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than
the respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not
granted.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b) (citing Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126
(1982)).]
Thus, the purpose of emergent relief is “to ‘prevent some threatening, irreparable
mischief, which should be averted until opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate
investigation of the case.’” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132 (quoting Thompson ex rel. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. Paterson, 9 N.J. Eq. 624, 625 (E. & A. 1854)). The petitioner has
the burden of establishing all the above requirements in order to warrant relief in their

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favor and must prove each of these Crowe elements “clearly and convincingly.” Waste
Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008); D.I.
& S.I. ex rel. T.I. v. Monroe Twp. Bd. of Educ., 2017 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 814 at *7.
It is well settled that injunctive relief should not be granted except “when necessary
to prevent irreparable harm.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132. In this regard, harm is generally
considered irreparable if it cannot be adequately redressed by monetary damages. Id. at
132-33. Moreover, the harm must be substantial and immediate. Judice’s Sunshine
Pontiac, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (D.N.J. 1976). More than a
risk of irreparable harm must be demonstrated. Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp.,
614 F.2d 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1980). “In certain circumstances, severe personal
inconvenience can constitute irreparable injury justifying issuance of injunctive relief.
Hodge v. Giese, 43 N.J. Eq. 342, 350 (Ch. 1887) (one tenant temporarily granted right to
enter other tenant’s premises to service heater).” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 134.
Here, Wells asserts that she will suffer irreparable harm if her employment is not
reinstated because she cares for a disabled spouse and is the sole source of income and
health benefits for her family. Specifically, she asserts that her medical benefits provide
life-sustaining medical insurance for her family, and the loss of income and benefits would
cause emotional distress. Undoubtedly, the loss of income and health benefits would
indeed be stressful for any family. However, counsel for the respondent stated at oral
argument that the petitioner would have the ability to apply for continued health insurance
coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). COBRA
allows the continuation of health benefits for workers and families who have lost health
benefits due to job loss, reduction in work hours, death, divorce, or separation.2
Thus, the petitioner would still have access to the insurance coverage she had with
the respondent. In addition, the petitioner would not be precluded from applying for
unemployment benefits to temporarily replace a portion of her income. While this tribunal
recognizes the petitioner’s urgency in resolving this matter, the relief requested by the
2 Department of Labor, Continuation of Health Coverage, located at:
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/cobra#:~:text=The%20Consolidated%20Omnibus%
20Budget%20Reconciliation,and%20plans%20to%20provide%20notice (last visited June 17, 2025).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
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petitioner, namely, continued income and health benefits, is strictly monetary in nature
and is easily quantified. Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has not satisfied
the first prong of the Crowe test.
Because Wells has not satisfied the first prong, discussion of the other prongs is
unwarranted.
Conclusion
To justify the granting of emergent relief, all four of the Crowe standards as codified
in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 must be met and, for the reasons detailed above, the first prong has
not been met in this matter. I CONCLUDE, therefore, that the petitioner has not met
these required standards, and the petition for emergent relief therefore must be denied.
This Order, however, takes no position on the ultimate resolution of the factual dispute
which must await a plenary hearing. Crowe, 90 N.J. at 135.
ORDER
I ORDER that the petitioner’s motion for emergent relief is DENIED, and the case
will proceed with the underlying due process petition.

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This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is
authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision shall be issued
without undue delay, but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this order. If
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not adopt, modify or
reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall become a final
decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
June 17, 2025
DATE KIM C. BELIN, ALJ
KCB/am
cc: OAL clerk

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APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For petitioner
Letter Brief with exhibits in support of petitioner’s application for emergent relief
For respondent
Letter Brief dated June 13, 2025, with exhibits in opposition to petitioner’s
application for emergent relief