Jared Deppeler v. Board of Education of the Township of Middletown, Monmouth County, 2/17/2023, (#42-23)

New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
Jared Deppeler,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of
Middletown, Monmouth County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner, formerly a tenured teacher in the respondent Board’s school district, was absent from his
teaching duties for a majority of the 2017-2018 school year due to alcohol use disorder. 	Petitioner
alleged that the Board: violated N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3 when it required him to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation without providing a written statement of reasons or notifying him of his right to a hearing;
violated his rights regarding sick leave; and required him to enter into a Last Chance Agreement (LCA)
that violated his tenure rights. Petitioner sought to: have the LCA declared void; be paid for his unused
sick leave; rescind his resignation; and be reemployed in his former position without loss of tenure or
seniority rights and with full salary and benefits.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: petitioner failed to prove that the Board did not have the legal authority
to require him to submit to a psychiatric examination or to require alcohol testing as part of those
examinations; the Board’s October 2017 letters indicating that the administration was concerned with
petitioner’s ability to perform his job were sufficient to constitute the Board’s written statement of
reasons for requiring the psychiatric examination; petitioner himself advised district staff that he had
been self-medicating with alcohol due to anxiety; petitioner had exhibited excessive absenteeism
without notifying the district, to the point that the administration was so concerned that they twice
requested welfare checks by local police; N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b)(2) did not require the Board to notify
petitioner that he had a right to a hearing, but only required that a hearing be held if petitioner
requested one, which he did not; petitioner’s argument that the LCA violated District Policy 3218
because it was punitive and disciplinary rather than therapeutic is without merit; petitioner voluntarily
entered into the LCA and the agreement did not violate his tenure rights; the Board did not terminate
petitioner, as he voluntarily resigned and did not withdraw his resignation before it was accepted by the
Board; and the LCA did not violate petitioner’s sick leave rights, as it did not contain any terms
addressing sick leave. Accordingly, the ALJ affirmed the Board’s acceptance of petitioner’s resignation
and dismissed the petition.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred with the findings and conclusion of the ALJ and adopted the
Initial Decision as the final decision in this matter. The petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader.
It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
42-23

OAL Dkt. No. 01471-19
Agency Dkt. No. 309-12/18
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Jared Deppeler,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of
Middletown, Monmouth County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
and the exceptions filed by the petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 have been reviewed and
considered.1
Petitioner, a tenured high school social studies teacher, was absent from his teaching
duties for a majority of the 2017-2018 school year due to alcohol use disorder.2 He used
accumulated sick days and was then approved for leave pursuant to the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), with several extensions. During that time, petitioner missed several
appointments for psychiatric assessments which had been scheduled by the district in order to
determine petitioner’s fitness for duty.3 In April 2018, petitioner asked to be allowed to return
1 The Board did not file a reply to petitioner’s exceptions.
2 Petitioner testified that he suffers from anxiety and depression and that his alcohol use was a form of self-
medication to attempt to deal with those conditions.
3 Petitioner did attend an appointment for an assessment in October 2017.
42-23

2
to work, and district administration again scheduled petitioner for a psychiatric assessment,
which was completed on May 31, 2018. Dr. Alexander Iofin recommended that petitioner not
return to teaching for the 2017-2018 school year, attend outpatient treatment, submit to drug
and alcohol screenings, and have another psychiatric assessment in August 2018. The
recommendations were incorporated into a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) that petitioner
signed on August 20, 2018. On August 23, 2018, petitioner missed both his appointment with
Dr. Iofin and a drug and alcohol screening appointment. On September 14, 2018, petitioner
received a Rice4 notice informing him that his employment would be discussed at an upcoming
Board meeting. Petitioner submitted his resignation to the Board on September 17, 2018, and
it was accepted by the Board on September 26, 2018.
On December 21, 2018, petitioner filed a petition of appeal, alleging that: the Board
violated N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3 when it required him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation in
October 2017 without providing a written statement of reasons or notifying him of his right to a
hearing; the Board violated his rights regarding sick leave; the Board could not require him to
enter into the LCA; and the LCA violated his tenure rights. Petitioner sought to: have the LCA
declared void; be paid for all unused sick leave; rescind his resignation; and be reemployed –
effective July 1, 2018 – without loss of tenure or seniority rights and with full salary and
benefits for that time period.
Following multiple days of hearings, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that
petitioner failed to prove that the Board did not have the legal authority to require petitioner to
submit to a psychiatric examination or to require alcohol testing as part of those examinations.
4 Rice v. Union County Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 155 N.J. Super. 64, 73 (App. Div. 1977).

3
The ALJ rejected petitioner’s argument that the Board failed to comply with the requirements
of N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b)(1), finding that the Board’s October 2017 letters indicated that the
administration was concerned with petitioner’s ability to perform his job, which the ALJ
deemed sufficient as the Board’s written statement of reasons for requiring the examination.
The ALJ also noted that petitioner himself advised district staff that he had been self-medicating
with alcohol due to anxiety, and that petitioner had exhibited excessive absenteeism without
notifying the district, to the point that the administration was so concerned that they twice
requested welfare checks by local police. Additionally, the ALJ concluded that N.J.A.C. 6A:32-
6.3(b)(2) did not require the Board to notify petitioner that he had a right to a hearing, but
rather only required that a hearing be held if petitioner requested one, which he did not.
The ALJ rejected petitioner’s argument that the LCA violated District Policy 3218
because it was punitive and disciplinary, rather than therapeutic, in nature. The ALJ noted that
the Board did not require the LCA; rather, petitioner’s union suggested the agreement as a
compromise in order to return petitioner to his position rather than having tenure charges filed
against him. The ALJ also noted that case law authorizes LCAs specifying terms of employment,
if those terms do not contravene statutes or public policy. Here, the ALJ found that petitioner
voluntarily entered into the LCA, and that the agreement did not violate petitioner’s tenure
rights. Moreover, the Board did not terminate petitioner; he voluntarily resigned and did not
withdraw his resignation before it was accepted by the Board. Finally, the LCA did not violate
petitioner’s sick leave rights, as it did not contain any terms addressing sick leave; petitioner
received all the sick time allotted to him and was not owed any additional sick leave
compensation.

4
In his exceptions, petitioner argues that the ALJ failed to consider or to give proper
weight to a number of facts.5 Petitioner contends that the LCA was punitive and disciplinary
because it characterized his conduct as “behavioral and performance deficiencies,” required
petitioner to both acknowledge that he was subject to disciplinary action and to immediately
resign upon notice that he had engaged in further deficiencies, and compelled petitioner to
waive his tenure and contract rights. According to petitioner, a board of education cannot
impose disciplinary conditions on a tenured teaching staff member as a stipulation of returning
to his teaching duties following a board-approved absence for voluntary treatment of a board-
recognized disability. Finally, petitioner argues that the Board cannot require petitioner to
waive his statutory tenure rights in the absence of just cause such as insufficiency, incapacity,
or conduct unbecoming, such that petitioner’s resignation is void as a matter of law.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner’s resignation
should be affirmed. Initially, the Commissioner concludes that the LCA did not violate board
policy. District Policy 3218, regarding substance abuse, provides that when an employee has
reported a substance abuse problem but is not under the influence of, in possession of, or
distributing the substance during work hours, the employee shall be required to obtain
professional counseling or complete an appropriate rehabilitation program. The policy does
not provide for discipline based solely on the existence of a substance abuse problem.
Petitioner therefore argues that the LCA is in violation of the policy because the LCA is
disciplinary in nature. The Commissioner notes that Policy 3218 does not preclude the
5 These facts generally consist of information about petitioner’s employment history, including positive evaluations
and lack of discipline; information regarding his treatment for his alcohol use and mental health issues; and a
timeline of his interactions with the Board regarding the events at issue. Petitioner does not identify which facts
were not considered and which were not given proper weight, nor does petitioner explain how giving any of the
facts greater weight would change the outcome in this case.

5
possibility of discipline when an employee’s substance abuse affects his work performance, or if
an employee fails to comply with the professional counseling or rehabilitation program
requirements imposed by the district pursuant to the policy. Moreover, the LCA is clear that
petitioner’s performance deficiencies are “due to work absences and the negative impact on
the continuity of instruction he is required to provide.” Petitioner’s acknowledgment in the LCA
that he is subject to disciplinary action is therefore based on his attendance issues. The record
demonstrates that petitioner failed, on multiple occasions, to call in his absences,6 which he
was required to do under District Policy 3432 regarding sick leave. Further, District Policy 3212
provides that a teacher who fails to give prompt notice of an absence may be subject to
discipline, which may include the withholding of salary increments or certification of tenure
charges. Accordingly, the statement in the LCA whereby petitioner acknowledged that he is
subject to discipline for his absences merely reiterates existing Board policies and is not in
violation of those policies. Additionally, as the ALJ noted, the Board did not require petitioner
to sign the LCA.
The Commissioner further concludes that there is no basis to overturn petitioner’s
resignation. In Tracey Pitts v. State-Operated School District of the City of Camden, Camden Co.,
Commissioner Decision No. 32-17 (January 30, 2017), the school district certified tenure
charges against Pitts. Before the charges were filed with the Commissioner, Pitts agreed to
retire in exchange for remaining on the payroll for a period of time and avoiding the
prosecution of the tenure charges. Pitts then changed her mind and refused to sign the
settlement agreement. She filed a petition of appeal, arguing that the district had violated her
6 While petitioner testified that he believed he had always called in his absences, the ALJ found this testimony to
be not credible and contradicted by the record, and the Commissioner finds no reason to disturb that conclusion.

6
tenure rights by removing her from the payroll without certifying tenure charges to the
Commissioner. The Commissioner found that Pitts could only raise that claim if the agreement
had been revoked. The enforceability of the agreement in the absence of the parties’
signatures, and whether Pitts had effectively revoked the agreement, were the subject of
separate proceedings in the Superior Court, which arose out of the district’s motion to enforce
the settlement agreement after Pitts refused to sign it.7 Pitts did not appeal the
Commissioner’s decision, but she did appeal the Superior Court’s decision that the settlement
agreement was enforceable. The Appellate Division later determined that the agreement was
not effective because it had not been signed, but nonetheless estopped Pitts from rescinding
her promise to resign because the district had detrimentally relied on that promise by not
certifying the tenure charges and paying Pitts’ salary for an additional period of time.
Camden City. Sch. Dist. v. Pitts, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1686 (App. Div. Jul. 26, 2019).
Based on the Pitts decisions, it is clear that a tenured employee can agree to resign and that
such an agreement is enforceable.
Here, petitioner resigned his employment voluntarily. There is no evidence that anyone
forced petitioner to resign. In fact, petitioner testified that resigning “seemed like the most
reasonable thing to do” in order to avoid tenure charges, and further stated that he could not
afford an attorney and was extremely concerned that the tenure charges could lead to the
revocation of his teaching certificate. Tr. Jan. 6, 2021, 58:23-25; see also 43:22-44:4, 44:24-
45:6, 58:2-4. At the time of his resignation, petitioner had received a Rice notice indicating that
his employment would be discussed at an upcoming Board meeting, but the Board had taken
7 The Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to resolve this portion of the dispute because it arose out of contract law
rather than the school laws.

7
no other action regarding petitioner. Petitioner could have appeared at the Board meeting to
make a case for his continued employment. If he was unsuccessful and the Board voted to
certify tenure charges, he could have challenged them.8 The fact that petitioner’s choice may
have been difficult does not mean that his resignation was involuntary or should otherwise be
overturned.
Additionally, for the reasons thoroughly detailed in the Initial Decision, the
Commissioner concurs with the ALJ’s conclusions that: the Board met the requirements of
N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3 regarding petitioner’s psychiatric evaluation in October 2017; the Board had
the authority to require petitioner to undergo psychiatric evaluations and alcohol testing; and
petitioner failed to prove that the Board violated any of his rights regarding sick leave.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
8 The Commissioner recognizes that the LCA stipulated that petitioner waived his tenure rights. However, the
effectiveness of that waiver could also have been disputed by petitioner.
9 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
February 17, 2023
February 17, 2023

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
AGENCY DKT. NO. 309-12/18
JARED DEPPELER,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF MIDDLETOWN,
MONMOUTH COUNTY,
Respondent.
James T. Hundley, Esq., for petitioner (Hundley and Bradley, LLC, attorneys)
Roshan D. Shah, Esq., for respondent (Anderson & Shah, LLC, attorneys)
Record Closed: October 13, 2022 	Decided: November 28, 2022
BEFORE JEFFREY N. RABIN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, a former employee of the respondent, the Board of Education of the
Township of Middletown (Board), claims that respondent violated N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3
when it required him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation as part of claims regarding sick
leave related to his attempts to regain his position as a high school teacher for the Board,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
2
and that the Last Chance Agreement entered into by the parties was not an enforceable
agreement.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 21, 2018, petitioner filed a Petition of Appeal with the Commissioner
of 	the 	Department 	of 	Education. 	The 	petition 	was 	transmitted 	to 	the 	Office 	of
Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on January 29, 2019, for determination as a
contested case. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
On April 2, 2019, respondent filed a motion for summary decision claiming
petitioner’s due process case should be dismissed because petitioner failed to file his
Petition of Appeal within the ninety-day time limit set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i).
Respondent’s motion was denied on December 17, 2019.
Seven hearing dates were conducted by Zoom due to Covid-19 pandemic
protocols, on January 4, January 5, January 6, January 22, January 26 and January 27,
2021, and February 1, 2021. 	Closing briefs were submitted on or about November 1,
2021, and after delays caused by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, the record was closed
on October 13, 2022.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the parties’ arguments and briefs related to this hearing, I FIND the
following to be undisputed facts:
1. 	Petitioner was a high school teacher employed by respondent beginning on
February 4, 2013. As the result of a relapse of alcoholism, petitioner was
absent from his teaching duties for the majority of the 2017-18 school year,
using accumulated sick days until he was approved by respondent for leave
pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et
seq., on or about October 30, 2017.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
3
2. 	Respondent approved extensions of petitioner’s paid leaves, extending the
end dates to December 2, 2017, and then to December 8, 2017. On January
15, 2018, petitioner requested a third extension of his medical leave. On
January 	25, 	2018, 	respondent 	approved 	petitioner’s 	request 	that 	his
medical leave be extended through the end of the 2017-18 school year.
3. 	In April 2018, petitioner asked respondent to allow him to return to teaching
beginning on April 16, 2018. Having missed three prior appointments for a
Fitness For Duty (FFD) exam, a fourth appointment was scheduled with Dr.
Iofin for May 31, 2018. Dr. Iofin recommended that petitioner not be
permitted to return to teaching, recommending instead that petitioner focus
on maintaining his sobriety.
4. 	Dr. 	Iofin’s 	recommendations 	were 	incorporated 	into 	a 	Last 	Chance
Agreement (LCA). Petitioner executed the LCA on August 20, 2018.
5. 	Petitioner missed his mandatory appointment with Dr. Iofin on August 23,
2018, scheduled pursuant to the LCA. By letter dated September 14, 2018,
respondent advised petitioner that he was in breach of the LCA. As a result,
on September 17, 2018, petitioner submitted his resignation to the Board.
The Board formally accepted petitioner’s resignation on September 28,
20181, retroactive to September 17, 2018.
Testimony for petitioner
Petitioner, 	Jared 	Deppeler, 	began 	working 	with 	the 	Middletown 	Board 	of
Education in February 2013, as a social studies teacher at Middletown High School
South, and later a world history teacher. He achieved tenure in February 2016. Petitioner
was absent from work six and a half days in the 2013-14 school year, five and a half days
in 2014-15, ten days in 2015-16, and thirty-nine days in 2016-17. He attributed the thirty-
nine absences to relationship issues, which caused him to suffer anxiety.
1 The parties state different dates for the Board’s acceptance of petitioner’s resignation, with petitioner
stating September 26, 2018, and respondent using September 28, 2018.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
4
Prior to becoming a teacher with Middletown, petitioner had been treated for
alcoholism and anxiety. 	He sought rehabilitation in facilities in 2000 and on or about
2003-04. 	Petitioner also sought treatment in 2017 from a Mr. Richard Hadley, from
Neuropsychology and Counseling Associates. Hadley wrote letters dated April 19, 2017,
May 31, 2017, and September 18, 2017, regarding petitioner’s treatment. 	Petitioner
sought treatment for four days at Hampton Behavioral Health’s inpatient treatment
program in September 2017.
Petitioner returned to work for a few days in September 2017, before realizing he
needed 	longer-term 	help. 	Using 	FMLA 	approved 	by 	his 	employer, 	petitioner
subsequently entered inpatient treatment for alcohol abuse at Recovery Unplugged in
Austin, Texas on October 28, 2017, being discharged on November 26, 2017, and an
inpatient program at Immersion Recovery in Florida on or about December 6, 2017. After
completing a thirty-six-day program, he went to an Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP),
where he was discharged on March 26, 2018. Petitioner was out pursuant to FMLA until
February 2018. 	Petitioner stated that during these treatment periods he remained in
contact with Ms. Shopp and John Cholette, president of his union (the Middletown
Teachers Education Association, MTEA).
Before being able to return to teaching, respondent required petitioner to be
evaluated by Dr. Alexander Iofin, whom he saw on May 31, 2018. 	Iofin issued a report
dated June 14, 2018. 	Petitioner then began a program at GenPsych in Brick, New
Jersey. 	Petitioner did not receive an employment contract for the following school year
like he normally would by June of the prior year.
On July 30, 2018, petitioner met with Cholette at the MTEA’s office, where he was
presented with a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) provided by Pickus. Petitioner was not
familiar with LCAs or tenure charges, which could lead to the revocation of his teaching
license. The LCA required petitioner to submit to blood tests twice per month. Petitioner
did not speak with his union attorney, but was told by Cholette that the union attorney had
seen the LCA. 	Petitioner wanted to show the LCA to an attorney, but Cholette made it

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
5
clear that if petitioner did not execute the LCA right then, his case would be added to the
next school board agenda for tenure charges. Petitioner executed the LCA.
Cholette said respondent wanted a blood test performed that same day, but
petitioner put off the test so he could have the LCA reviewed by an attorney. The blood
test was rescheduled for August 23, 2018. Petitioner was to meet with Dr. Iofin on August
20, 2018, but did not attend that meeting because Iofin had already cleared petitioner to
return to work and because petitioner felt that requiring blood tests was illegal and a
violation of his rights.
Petitioner Deppeler met with Cholette again on September 17, 2018. Cholette told
him that he would be brought up on tenure charges if he didn’t resign. 	Petitioner then
resigned that same date, thinking he was buying himself some extra time until the next
school board meeting. 	He did not have the money to hire an attorney.
After resigning, petitioner continued alcohol counseling, using his New Jersey
State health care insurance. 	He had been seeing a Dr. Franco beginning in December
2019. Petitioner was not currently receiving any medical treatment. He was unsuccessful
at procuring another teaching position, but did accept other employment.
On cross-examination, petitioner stated that the break-up with his girlfriend of ten
years led to debilitating anxiety. 	He had been addressing his problem with alcohol use
since 2004, and agreed that he needed to be monitored, but disagreed that it was an
employer’s 	place 	to 	require 	monitoring. 	Employees 	should 	be 	able 	to 	monitor
themselves. 	Petitioner acknowledged that his employment contract required mental
health evaluations and FFD evaluations. 	Petitioner had advised Shopp in 2017 that he
had been self-medicating with alcohol due to his anxiety. His doctor, Dr. Hadley, had
advised the school on April 19, 2017, that petitioner was receiving neuropsychological
and counseling help, but his letters of April 19, 2017, and May 31, 2017, did not mention
an alcohol problem. Petitioner always called in sick any time he needed to be out.
On September 15, 2017, respondent sent petitioner a letter requesting that he
contact Human Resources as soon as possible, which letter petitioner signed for. In

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
6
response, petitioner had Dr. Hadley send respondent a letter on September 18, 2017, to
explain petitioner’s absences. 	This letter also failed to mention alcohol abuse. 	On
October 4, 2017, concerned about petitioner’s absences, respondent sent a police officer
to conduct a wellness check on petitioner Deppeler. This was a traumatic time period for
petitioner, and he was not able to recall a lot of the details from that time. He was also
taking various medications at this time, but could not recall which medications.
Respondent sent petitioner a letter dated October 11, 2017, stating that he would
be placed on unpaid administrative leave as of October 16, 2017, pending his scheduling
of a psychological assessment, and paid leave once he had scheduled the assessment.
Respondent scheduled a FFD assessment for petitioner with Dr. Iofin for October 26,
2017. By letter dated October 30, 2017, petitioner requested that Ms. Shopp place him
on unpaid medical leave for one week. On October 31, 2017, petitioner advised
respondent that he would be seeking treatment and could be there until November 6,
2017.
Petitioner attended the October 26, 2017, Iofin appointment. 	Prior to receiving the
results, petitioner voluntarily decided to go to Recovery Unplugged in Texas, to address
his anxiety and because he was concerned for the safety of children.
On November 21, 2017, respondent approved petitioner’s medical leave request,
effective November 1, 2017 through December 1, 2017. On December 4, 2017, petitioner
emailed a request for an FMLA extension to Shopp, the same date he had been
scheduled for a FFD examination with Dr. Iofin. 	That appointment was rescheduled to
December 6, 2017. Petitioner did not attend that FFD because he was not well, and was
not well enough at that time to return to work. Shopp had emailed him a reminder of the
FFD appointment. Petitioner could not recall advising anyone that he was going to miss
the appointment.
On December 11, 2017, respondent wrote petitioner, advising him that he had
missed another appointment with Dr. Iofin, and requesting that he send in a doctor’s note
substantiating his FMLA request

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
7
Respondent scheduled another psychiatric examination with Iofin for December
14, 2017. 	Petitioner instead flew to Florida to attend another rehabilitation facility,
admitting himself on December 15, 2017. 	Petitioner was discharged from Immersion
Recovery on March 22, 2018. During his stay there, respondent approved an extension
of his FMLA leave. 	The facility was in contact with Shopp, when petitioner’s estimated
stay period was to be from December 12, 2017, to January 12, 2018. 	On January 10,
2018, petitioner telephoned Shopp and requested to use twelve weeks of FMLA and then
take unpaid leave until the end of the 2017-18 school year. During this time, petitioner’s
mother made his health insurance payments.
Petitioner was sent a Rice notice by letter from respondent dated February 26,
2018, advising that he was going to be discussed during the closed session board
meeting on February 28, 2018, which letter petitioner signed for. On February 28, 2018,
petitioner requested another FMLA extension. 	Recovery Unplugged sent an email to
Shopp advising that petitioner was in an outpatient program with a targeted completion
date of March 26, 2018. Respondent approved petitioner’s FMLA extension request.
By letter dated March 1, 2018, respondent advised petitioner that he was on
approved leave, and that they would pay his insurance premiums during his twelve-week
unpaid FMLA leave, set to expire on March 25, 2018, and that if his leave went beyond
March 31, 2018, he would be responsible for paying his health care premiums.
Petitioner had a FFD evaluation scheduled with Dr. Iofin on May 31, 2018. Iofin
issued his report on June 14, 2018. 	Iofin did not recommend that petitioner be able to
return to finish the 2017-18 school year, but that petitioner attend an Intensive Outpatient
Program (IOP) over the summer to address his alcohol use, and that petitioner be seen
again in August 2018. Cholette advised petitioner to sign up for IOP if he wanted to return
to work in September 2018. Respondent agreed to continued covering petitioner’s health
care premium payments, despite petitioner failing to pay them. Petitioner attended
outpatient treatment at GenPsych that summer.
On July 16, 2018, petitioner received an email from Mr. Cholette advising that he
had missed a scheduled meeting with Cholette and the school administration regarding

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
8
his employment. Petitioner contacted Cholette later that day to reschedule that meeting
to July 20, 2018. 	On July 20, Cholette presented petitioner with a Last Chance
Agreement, which they reviewed together. Petitioner would have to submit to drug tests.
The LCA contained a waiver of claims. Respondent never told petitioner he could have
his own doctor perform an examination, at his own expense, never told him he could have
an attorney review the LCA, and never told him he could file an appeal with the
Commissioner of Education. Petitioner executed the LCA, even though he had not met
with Pinkus or the union attorney, Sandy Oxfeld, or hired any attorney to review it.
Cholette had told petitioner that if he didn’t execute the LCA, respondent would file tenure
charges against him, affecting his teaching license.
Rather than face tenure charges, petitioner submitted his letter of resignation on
September 17, 2018. He had left Oxfeld a voicemail message that day, but did not speak
to him prior to submitting his letter of resignation.
Testimony for respondent
Dr. William George was the Superintendent of Schools for the Middletown
Township Public School District for nine years, until his retirement on August 31, 2020,
overseeing approximately 900 teachers and 1,500 employees, including administration,
custodial, ground and security staff. He was aware that petitioner was a tenured teacher
who had attendance issues, but did not know him personally.
The District had an Attendance Policy (Policy 3212), posted on its website.
Attendance was regularly reviewed and documented as part of the teacher’s annual
evaluation. During the 2016-17 school year, there were gaps in petitioner’s attendance,
which became more significant during 2017-18. 	Petitioner had not complied with the
protocols for getting substitute teachers, causing a gap in learning for the students and a
disruption for them educationally. It was always difficult finding enough substitutes; some
days over 100 teachers could be absent. 	In the 2016-17 school year, petitioner was
absent from September 19through September 23, 2016 and February 21 through
February 23, 2017.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
9
Respondent was trying to be flexible and supportive of petitioner in 2016-17, and
began to see that he was possibly having mental health issues. But petitioner’s
communication with respondent was poor in 2016-17 and virtually non-existent in 2017-
18. At the start of 2017-18, petitioner attended the first week of school, but then began
missing school days. 	Kimberly Pickus, Assistant Superintendent of Instruction and
Personnel and Human Resources, wrote petitioner a letter dated September 15, 2017,
indicating concern over his absences and failure to communicate with the school. On
October 4, 2017, having not heard from petitioner, respondent asked the Manasquan
Police Department to perform a wellness check on him.
Eventually George learned that petitioner was dealing with alcohol abuse issues
in addition to mental issues. 	Shopp and Pickus were having increasing difficulty
contacting petitioner. Respondent was not even sure that petitioner intended on returning
to teaching. 	As a result, respondent wanted Dr. Iofin to perform a FFD evaluation.
George kept the school board informed as to petitioner’s issues. George stated that the
intention was not to punish petitioner but rather to support him.
Employees could receive Family and Medical Leave Act benefits. Petitioner
received these, and was also granted additional leave benefits and health benefits.
Petitioner then missed several Iofin appointments. When petitioner finally attended a FFD
appointment with Iofin, Iofin did not clear him to return to work, at which point the school
began considering terminating petitioner’s employment, via tenure charges.
When termination is under consideration, Dr. George would meet with the
employee and in the presence of an MTEA representative. Because petitioner had not
been present, the MTEA served as an intermediary between respondent and petitioner.
It was Cholette who introduced the idea of an LCA as opposed to immediate tenure
charges. 	An LCA was also discussed with Vice President Mason and MTEA attorney
Oxfeld. 	The purpose of an LCA would be to give petitioner the expectations for him to
follow in order to return to teaching. The LCA was reviewed by the respondent’s counsel,
Jeff Merlino.

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10
Petitioner violated the LCA when he failed to communicate with respondent and
missed his Iofin FFD examination in August 2018 and failed to submit to drug testing.
There was no need to seek tenure charges because petitioner voluntarily resigned
following his LCA violations.
Rosie 	Shopp 	was 	a 	secretary 	in 	respondent’s 	Human 	Resources 	(HR)
Department, working with principals and administrators regarding personnel issues and
union negotiations, and monitoring teachers’ attendance and hiring substitute teachers.
Teachers enter their attendance records in the ASOP software program. A teacher must
enter an absence at the beginning of the school day, or it would be entered by the Human
Resource Department or the principal’s secretary.
The HR Department received a letter dated April 19, 2017, from Neuropsychology
and Counseling Associates, addressing petitioner’s absences from May 23, 2017, to May
31, 2017, that being close to the end of the 2016-17 school year. 	On September 15,
2017, the Board wrote petitioner to advise him that they had been trying to contact him
but that he had not responded, and petitioner then sent respondent a medical note
covering his absences from September 11, 2017 through September 18, 2017, as
reflected in a spreadsheet Shopp kept of her communications with petitioner. 	In
response, 	Shopp emailed and telephoned petitioner and asked him to contact HR.
Petitioner told Shopp that he was suffering from anxiety and had a hard week.
On October 4, 2017, having not heard from petitioner that day, Shopp asked John
McGuire, head of security, to check on him. 	The Manasquan Police Department
conducted a welfare check and spoke with petitioner.
On October 4, 2017, Shopp scheduled petitioner for a FFD examination with Dr.
Iofin for October 12, 2017. 	Shopp was told by petitioner’s mother that he was treated at
Hampton Hospital on October 5, 2017. 	On October 10, 2017, Shopp advised his mother
that he would need to complete a FFD examination before returning to work. On October
13, 2017, petitioner’s mother told Shopp he was going to be discharged from the hospital.
Shopp sent petitioner a release for medical records so they could be forwarded to Iofin.
On October 13, 2017, Shopp spoke with the hospital, who indicated that petitioner was

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considering signing the release. On October 17, 2017, petitioner’s mother advised Shopp
that he was home. 	By letter dated October 19, 2017, respondent placed petitioner on
paid leave effective October 11, 2017, which petitioner confirmed during a telephone call
on that date. Shopp confirmed with petitioner that he was scheduled for a FFD exam with
Iofin on October 26, 2017.
Petitioner attended the October 26 appointment with Iofin. On October 30, 2017,
petitioner left Shopp a voicemail message informing her that he was going to Texas for
treatment for two weeks, and emailed her requesting FMLA leave. She was advised that
his anticipated release date was November 15, 2017. She sent an email to petitioner on
November 1, 2017, requesting that he execute a release for medical records for Dr. Iofin.
On November 1, 2017, Shopp received an email from Cholette stating that
petitioner sought to use the sick bank while at the Texas rehabilitation facility. Shopp
advised Cholette that petitioner had used all of his paid leave and would have to use
FMLA, and would have to start making payments towards his health benefits. 	On
November 14, 2017, Shopp forwarded the FMLA documentation to petitioner at Recovery
Unplugged. She received the completed documentation, indicating a discharge date of
December 2, 2017. A letter dated November 21, 2017, was sent to petitioner confirming
he would be on the Board agenda. On November 28, 2017, Shopp sent an email to
Recovery Unplugged to confirm petitioner’s discharge date of December 2, 2017, and to
advised him that he was scheduled for December 2, 2017, FFD with Dr. Iofin. She spoke
with petitioner when he returned home and reminded him of the December 4, 2017, FFD
examination, then spoke with him again to advise that the FFD had to be rescheduled to
December 6, 2017. Petitioner failed to appear for the FFD on December 6, 2017, telling
HR on December 7 that he had not been feeling well. On December 11, 2017, respondent
sent petitioner a letter confirming the missed appointment, and telling him that he needed
to be at a FFD exam on December 14, 2017, otherwise, it would be considered an
abandonment of his job; that same day, respondent hand-delivered to petitioner’s home
a Rice Notice advising him that the School Board would be discussing his case at the
next closed personnel meeting. 	Shopp also left voicemail messages with petitioner
confirming this information, which she confirmed in an email to Cholette. 	Petitioner
missed the December 14 appointment.

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Because petitioner missed his FFD and failed to communicate with the school for
the last week, on December 15, 2017, respondent again requested that the Manasquan
Police conduct a welfare check on petitioner. Shopp later became aware that petitioner
had entered a new rehabilitation facility in Florida, and would be there until the end of
February 2018. Respondent forwarded petitioner a second Rice Notice, dated February
26, 2018, which petitioner signed for. Shopp had a conversation with petitioner on
February 27, 2018, wherein he requested an extension of his FMLA leave from February
8, 2018 to March 26, 2018, the new anticipated rehabilitation discharge date. Respondent
approved his FMLA extension request.
Kimberly 	Pickus 	was 	respondent’s 	Assistant 	Superintendent 	of 	Human
Resources, Curriculum and Instruction, handling HR matters such as staffing, hiring,
unemployment 	claims, 	bringing 	in substitute 	teachers, 	and addressing 	disciplinary
matters. She was familiar with petitioner.
Petitioner had been absent from work thirty-nine days during the 2016-17 school
year, this was a significant number, as the average was seven to ten days for school
employees. Petitioner also failed to input his absences into the ASOP system in a timely
fashion. He was a “no-show, no-report” type of employee. This had a trickle-down effect,
because they would not know whether they needed to hire a substitute teacher to cover
for petitioner.
When petitioner’s Principal asked Pickus how to address his absences, she
recommended requiring a doctor’s note. Petitioner then provided a note from Mr. Hadley
for his 2016-17 absences. 	The absenteeism issue arose again in 2017-18. 	Petitioner
provided another doctor’s note. Pickus sent a letter to petitioner on September 15, 2017,
stating that respondent was trying to reach him because he failed to report for work. On
October 4, 2017, they asked the Manasquan Police Department to conduct a welfare
check.
Because respondent had become aware from his doctor’s notes that petitioner had
mental health issues, and because he was not reporting to work and not returning

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telephone messages from the school, this was becoming an abandonment of position
case, and respondent sent petitioner two letters advising him that he was on paid leave
and would have to receive a FFD evaluation. 	Petitioner was given notice that he was
scheduled for a FFD exam for October 26, 2017, which appointment he missed. He then
advised work that he had entered a facility for alcohol abuse rehabilitation. 	Petitioner
requested and was approved for FMLA leave for November 1, 2017, to December 1,
2017, during which time he would be responsible for paying his share of health benefit
premiums.
Petitioner failed to appear for an FFD on December 6, 2017 which was then
rescheduled for December 14, 2017. 	Respondent had difficulty getting petitioner’s
medical records from his rehabilitation facility, and difficulty having petitioner execute a
release for them. On December 15, 2017, respondent requested the Manasquan Police
Department to conduct a welfare check on petitioner, believing that petitioner had
returned from Texas. She then learned that petitioner had begun treatment at another
facility on December 15, 2017.
On January 17, 2018, respondent received an email from Immersion Recovery
Center requesting additional FMLA leave on behalf of petitioner, and the Board at its next
meeting extended his FMLA to February 7, 2018. 	Petitioner was then approved for
unpaid medical leave until June 30, 2018; this allowed respondent to bring in a permanent
substitute for his class.
On May 31, 2018, petitioner attended a FFD exam with Dr. Iofin (who later told
respondent that he wanted to see petitioner again in August). 	Iofin concluded that
petitioner was not fit to return to teaching for 2017-18. Respondent set up a meeting for
the last week in June for petitioner to go over Iofin’s recommendations with Dr. George,
Board counsel Jeff Merlino, Esq., union representative John Cholette and union counsel,
Sandy Oxfeld, Esq., but petitioner failed to attend. 	Petitioner had not been complying
with Iofin’s recommendations, and Pickus told Cholette and Oxfeld that respondent had
no options left but to pursue tenure charges, and Oxfeld suggested an LCA reflecting
Iofin’s recommendations.

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Pickus reviewed the initial draft LCA, the two sides negotiated some of the terms,
and a final version was provided to petitioner’s union; she had advised Cholette that if the
LCA was not signed, they would pursue tenure charges. 	On August 20, 2018, petitioner
met with Cholette and executed the LCA. 	Thereafter, petitioner was scheduled for
alcohol testing on August 20, 2018, which petitioner then moved to August 23, 2018.
Petitioner failed to appear for the alcohol test on August 23. 	As a result, Pickus told
Cholette that petitioner had failed to comply with the terms of the LCA and that they would
be pursuing tenure charges. Petitioner emailed his resignation to Shopp on September
17, 2018. No respondent employees forced petitioner to resign.
John Cholette had been employed by the District for thirty-three years. He had
been the President of the Middletown Township Education Association for four years.
Cholette would often act as a go-between between school administration and an
employee. The MTEA would pay for an attorney for a teacher facing tenure charges or if
where there was an employment issue not covered by the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA); Cholette would not be privy to privileged discussions. Petitioner was
a member of the MTEA.
On November 1, 2017, Cholette emailed Shopp about petitioner’s FMLA request,
as well as being able to use the sick bank. Cholette was aware that petitioner had
attendance issues in the 2016-17 school year, and the effect this had on the school’s
ability to hire substitutes, and discussed this with Shopp and Pickus. He was aware that
petitioner missed his October 2017 FFD exam, and knew about the Manasquan Police
welfare check. 	Petitioner was approved for FMLA leave and received his health
insurance the entire year from respondent. Petitioner attended a rehabilitation facility in
Spring 2018, and once done, went for a FFD with Dr. Iofin in May 2018. 	Iofin did not
recommend petitioner returning to his teaching position.
Respondent raised concerns about petitioner missing FFD appointments and
suggested an LCA in lieu of tenure charges. 	Petitioner missed several meetings with
Cholette in which they were to discuss the LCA. Cholette told petitioner that tenure
charges could result in him losing his teaching certificate as well as his job. With

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Cholette’s recommendation, petitioner executed the LCA in August 2018. Cholette spoke
with petitioner at some time regarding how to resign his teaching position, and gave him
the protocol for submitting a resignation.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Credibility:
In evaluating evidence, it is necessary to assess the credibility of the witnesses.
Credibility is the value that a finder of the facts gives to a witness’s testimony. It requires
an overall assessment of the witness’ story in light of its rationality or internal consistency
and the manner in which it “hangs together” with the other evidence. 	Carbo v. United
States, 314 F.2d 718, 749 (9th Cir. 1963). 	“Testimony to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself,” in that “[i]t
must be such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable in the circumstances.” In re Perrone, 5 N.J. 514, 522 (1950).
A fact finder “is free to weigh the evidence and to reject the testimony of a witness
. . . when it is contrary to circumstances given in evidence or contains inherent
improbabilities or contradictions which alone or in connection with other circumstances in
evidence excite suspicion as to its truth.” In re Perrone, 5 N.J. at 521–22; see D’Amato
by McPherson v. D’Amato, 305 N.J. Super. 109, 115 (App. Div. 1997). A trier of fact may
also reject testimony as “inherently incredible” when “it is inconsistent with other testimony
or with common experience” or “overborne” by the testimony of other witnesses.
Congleton v. Pura-Tex Stone Corp., 53 N.J. Super. 282, 287 (App. Div. 1958).
Further, “‘[t]he interest, motive, bias, or prejudice of a witness may affect his
credibility and justify the [trier of fact], whose province it is to pass upon the credibility of
an interested witness, in disbelieving his testimony.’” 	State v. Salimone, 19 N.J. Super.
600, 608 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 10 N.J. 316 (1952) (citation omitted). The choice of
rejecting the testimony of a witness, in whole or in part, rests with the trier and finder of
the facts and must simply be a reasonable one. 	Renan Realty Corp. v. Dep’t of Cmty.
Affairs, 182 N.J. Super. 415, 421 (App. Div. 1981).

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Jared Deppeler testified in a calm, clear manner. He was knowledgeable of the
facts in the matter, and spoke in a straightforward, open fashion regarding his alcohol
abuse in a way that appeared honest. At times he gave emotional answers. Sometimes
he stated when he was unable to recall details, but at other times he had difficulty
remembering certain facts, such as information regarding a Doctor Abel, and the dates of
his first rehabilitation stay. It was clear that he had not reviewed the exhibits prior to his
testimony; 	he 	often 	had 	difficulty 	recalling 	specific 	dates, 	correspondence 	and
conversations, such as how often he spoke with Cholette. 	He was apologetic when
unable to recall details. He referred to the time period of his alcoholism relapse as a
“muddy period,” for which he had little recollection. He had difficulty with details on cross-
examination; although he remained calm in his testimony, he also seemed somewhat
evasive in his answers, often beginning an answer with, “Well, I assume. . .” 	Petitioner
testified that he always called in to work to announce that he needed a sick day, but the
records were clear that he often took a sick day without advising the school. I ultimately
found petitioner not to be a credible witness.
Dr. William George was a credible witness. He appeared knowledgeable, saying
when he knew something and when he did not. He spoke from memory, without relying
on notes, and seemed to have an excellent memory of the general events that took place
regarding petitioner, although he was unable to recall certain dates and other specific
details. 	He remained calm and informative on cross-examination, and never became
argumentative.
Rosie Shopp was a good witness, testifying in a calm, knowledgeable manner.
She also was clear as to what she knew and what she did not know. She often began a
statement by saying, “If I recall correctly. . .” that might have undercut some of the details
she testified towards, but she also displayed an excellent memory regarding all the efforts
expended in attempting to correspond with petitioner. 	As a result, I found her to be a
credible witness.
Kimberly Pickus testified in a serious manner and seemed very knowledgeable
of the facts and events regarding petitioner. 	She spoke in succinct sentences, with an

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authoritative 	but 	non-judgmental 	manner. 	She 	remained 	composed 	on 	cross-
examination. She was a credible witness.
John Cholette was a calm witness who answered with great specificity. He would
state when he did not know an answer or when he did not understand a question. But he
was unable to recall many details, stating that these events had happened too long ago.
He required documents to refresh his memory, and even those did not always help. He
often qualified his answers by first saying, “I believe...”, “I do not recall...”, “That could
have happened...” 	Ultimately, I did not find him to be a credible witness.
Therefore, 	after 	reviewing 	the 	testimony 	and 	the 	evidence, 	I 	FIND, 	by 	a
preponderance of credible evidence, the following additional FACTS:
Prior to becoming a teacher with Middletown, petitioner had been treated for
alcoholism and anxiety, seeking rehabilitation in facilities in 2000 and on or about 2003-
04; petitioner achieved tenure in February 2016; petitioner was absent from work six and
a half days in the 2013-14 school year, five and a half days in 2014-15, ten days in 2015-
16, and thirty-nine days in 2016-17; the average number of missed days for employees
per school year were between seven and ten; 	respondent had an Attendance Policy
(Policy 3212), posted on its website; teachers had to enter their attendance records in the
ASOP software program; a teacher had to enter an absence at the beginning of the school
day; petitioner had not complied with the ASOP requirements or protocols for getting
substitute teachers, causing a gap in learning for the students and a disruption for them
educationally.
In 	2017, 	petitioner 	sought 	treatment 	from 	Dr. 	Richard 	Hadley, 	from
Neuropsychology and Counseling Associates; petitioner sought treatment for four days
at 	Hampton 	Behavioral 	Health’s 	inpatient 	treatment 	program 	in 	September 	2017;
petitioner had advised Shopp in 2017 that he had been self-medicating with alcohol due
to anxiety, stating that the break-up with his girlfriend of ten years led to debilitating
anxiety; Dr. Hadley had advised the school on April 19, 2017, that petitioner was receiving

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neuropsychological and counseling help, but his letters of April 19, 2017, and May 31,
2017, did not mention an alcohol problem.
On September 15, 2017, petitioner received a letter from respondent requesting
that he contact Human Resources as soon as possible; in response, petitioner had Dr.
Hadley send respondent a letter on September 18, 2017, to explain petitioner’s absences,
which letter also failed to mention alcohol abuse; on October 4, 2017, concerned about
petitioner’s absences and his absence that day, respondent sent a police officer to
conduct a wellness check on petitioner; respondent sent petitioner a letter dated October
11, 2017, stating that he would be placed on unpaid administrative leave as of October
16, 2017, pending his scheduling of a psychological assessment, and paid leave once he
had scheduled the assessment; petitioner’s employment contract required mental health
evaluations 	and 	“fit 	for 	duty” 	(“FFD”) 	evaluations; 	respondent 	scheduled 	a 	FFD
assessment for petitioner with Dr. Iofin for October 26, 2017; petitioner attended the
October 26, 2017, Iofin appointment; prior to receiving the Iofin results, on October 28,
2017, petitioner voluntarily entered inpatient treatment for alcohol abuse at Recovery
Unplugged in Austin, Texas, using FMLA approved by respondent; by letter dated
October 30, 2017, petitioner requested that Ms. Shopp place him on unpaid medical leave
for one week; on October 31, 2017, petitioner advised respondent that he would be
seeking treatment and could be there until November 6, 2017; on November 21, 2017,
respondent 	approved 	petitioner’s 	medical 	leave 	request, 	effective 	November 	1 	to
December 1, 2017; 	a Rice Notice dated November 21, 2017, was sent to petitioner
advising him that the School Board would be discussing his case at the next closed
personnel meeting; petitioner was discharged from Recovery Unplugged on November
26, 2017.
On November 28, 2017, Shopp sent an email to the Recovery Unplugged to
confirm petitioner’s discharge date of December 2, 2017, and advised that he was
scheduled for a December 4, 2017, FFD with Dr. Iofin; Shopp spoke with petitioner when
he returned home and reminded him of the December 4, 2017, FFD examination, then
spoke with him again to advise that the FFD had to be rescheduled to December 6, 2017;
on December 4, 2017, petitioner emailed a request for an FMLA extension to Shopp;
petitioner failed to appear for the FFD on December 6, 2017, telling HR on December 7

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
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that he had not been feeling well; on December 11, 2017, respondent sent petitioner a
letter confirming the missed appointment, and telling him that he needed to be at a FFD
exam on December 14, 2017, otherwise it would be considered an abandonment of his
job; on December 11, 2017, respondent hand-delivered to petitioner’s home a Rice Notice
advising him that the School Board would be discussing his case at the next closed
personnel meeting, and Shopp also left voicemail messages with petitioner confirming
this information, confirming the messages in an email to Cholette; petitioner missed the
December 14, 2017 appointment, and because he failed to communicate with the school
for 	the 	last 	week, 	on 	December 	15, 	2017, 	respondent 	again requested 	that 	the
Manasquan Police conduct a welfare check on petitioner; instead of attending the FFD,
petitioner had flown to Florida to enter Immersion Recovery rehabilitation facility,
admitting himself on December 15, 2017; after completing a thirty-sixday program, he
went to an Intensive Outpatient Program (“IOP”), where he was discharged on March 26,
2018; petitioner was approved in January 2018 for unpaid medical leave until June 30,
2018, which allowed respondent to bring in a permanent substitute for petitioner’s
classes.
Petitioner received a Rice Notice by letter from respondent dated February 26,
2018, advising that he was going to be discussed during the closed session Board
meeting on February 28, 2018; 	Recovery Unplugged sent an email to Shopp advising
that petitioner was in an outpatient program with a targeted completion date of March 26,
2018; respondent approved petitioner’s FMLA extension request.
Petitioner attended a FFD evaluation with Dr. Iofin on May 31, 2018; Iofin issued
his report on June 14, 2018, in which he concluded that petitioner was not fit to return to
teaching for 2017-18; Iofin recommended that petitioner attend an Intensive Outpatient
Program (IOP) over the summer to address his alcohol use, and that petitioner be seen
again in August 2018; Cholette advised petitioner to sign-up for IOP if he wanted to return
to work in September 2018; respondent agreed to continue covering petitioner’s health
care premium payments, despite petitioner failing to pay them; petitioner attended
outpatient treatment at GenPsych.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
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Respondent had set up a meeting for the last week in June for petitioner to go over
Iofin’s recommendations with Dr. George, Board counsel Jeff Merlino, Esq., John
Cholette and Sandy Oxfeld, Esq., but petitioner failed to attend; petitioner had not been
complying 	with 	Iofin’s 	recommendations, 	and 	Oxfeld 	suggested 	a 	Last 	Chance
Agreement reflecting Iofin’s recommendations; on July 16, 2018, petitioner received an
email from Cholette advising that he had missed a scheduled meeting with Cholette and
the school administration regarding his employment, and petitioner contacted Cholette
later that day to reschedule that meeting to July 20, 2018; on July 20, Cholette presented
petitioner with a LCA, which they reviewed together; the LCA required petitioner to submit
to drug/alcohol tests; after negotiating minor changes to the LCA, petitioner executed the
LCA without having an attorney review it or discussing it with Pinkus or the union attorney,
Sandy Oxfeld; Cholette had told petitioner that if he didn’t execute the LCA, respondent
would file tenure charges against him, affecting his teaching license; petitioner was
scheduled for alcohol testing on August 20, 2018, which petitioner then moved to August
23, 2018; petitioner failed to appear for the alcohol test on August 23, and Pickus then
advised Cholette that petitioner had failed to comply with the terms of the LCA and that
they would be pursuing tenure charges; rather than face tenure charges, petitioner
submitted his letter of resignation via email to Shopp on September 17, 2018.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The issue is whether petitioner met his burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that respondent violated N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3 when it required him to undergo
a psychiatric evaluation and drug/alcohol testing as part of claims regarding sick leave
related to his attempts to regain his position as a high school teacher for the Board.
Petitioner argued that the Last Chance Agreement imposed by respondent as a
condition of petitioner’s return to his tenured teaching position was contrary to respondent
Board’s District Policy 3218 and violated petitioner’s tenure rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-
5 et. seq., as respondent did not provide a statement of reasons for the requirement of
psychiatric evaluations. They also claimed that respondent singled out petitioner when it
required him to execute an LCA, although petitioner offered no evidence proving such
claim or indicating that this issue was germane to petitioner’s appeal.

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Respondent argued that it complied with N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3, which allowed them
to require petitioner to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to ensure his fitness as a teacher,
complied with N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1 et seq. when addressing petitioner’s absenteeism
issues, and that the LCA was a legally valid contract which petitioner voluntarily entered
into.
Respondent was correct in asserting that teachers must be physically and mentally
fit for the challenges of teaching young people. 	Diaz v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of
Mahwah, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 01751-09, Initial Decision (March 2, 2010), adopted, Comm'r
(August 27, 2010).
In In re Tenure Hearing of Grossman, 127 N.J. Super. 13, 30 (App. Div. 1974)
(quoting Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952), the court found
that because of the role teachers play in shaping young minds, state and school
authorities had the right and duty to screen school officials, teachers, and employees as
to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools. Respondent then relied on N.J.A.C.
6A:32-6.3(b), 	which 	states 	that, 	pursuant 	to 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:16-2, 	district 	boards 	of
education may require physical or psychiatric examinations of a school district employee
when in the judgment of the district the employee showed evidence of deviation from
normal physical or mental health. This was allowed in order to determine the individual's
physical and mental fitness to perform their job or to detect any health risks to students
and other employees.
N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3 states in pertinent part:
Requirements of physical or psychiatric examinations
(a) Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2, district boards of education shall require
candidates for employment who have received a conditional offer of employment
to undergo a physical examination such as testing for usage of controlled or
dangerous substances or to determine whether the candidate is able to perform,
with reasonable accommodation, job-related functions pursuant to P.L. 101-336,
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

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(b) Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2, a district board of education may require
physical or psychiatric examinations of a school district employee whenever, in the
district board of education’s judgment, an employee shows evidence of deviation
from normal physical or mental health. The purpose of the physical or psychiatric
examination shall be to determine the employee’s physical and mental fitness to
perform, with reasonable accommodation, the position the employee currently
holds, or to detect any health risk(s) to students and other employees. When a
district board of education requires an employee to undergo a physical or
psychiatric examination:
1. The district board of education shall provide the employee with a
written statement of the reason(s) for the required examination.
2. The district board of education shall provide the employee with a
hearing, if requested.
It is therefore clear that a school may require a mental health evaluation of a
teacher. 	Respondent 	further 	correctly 	asserted 	that 	petitioner 	did 	not 	object 	to
respondent’s requirement for a psychiatric evaluation prior to being allowed to return to
teaching. 	Additionally, 	petitioner’s 	employment 	contract 	required 	mental 	health
evaluations and FFD evaluations. Petitioner’s claim was that the respondent did not follow
the protocols for such an evaluation by not providing him with a statement of reasons and
not advising him of his right to a hearing.
Respondent had established, however, that petitioner received a letter from
respondent on or about October 11, 2017, which required that petitioner undergo a
psychiatric 	assessment 	with 	Dr. 	Iofin, 	which 	letter 	stated, 	“The 	administration 	of
Middletown Township Public Schools is concerned with your ability to perform your job
as a High School Social Studies Teacher. Therefore, this letter is to advise you that as
authorized by state law, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2(a), the Board of Education is hereby directing
you to undergo a psychiatric assessment to ensure your fitness for continued full-time
regular duty as a teacher with the Board psychiatrist . . . .” A second letter, dated October
19, 2017, was provided to petitioner, again advising him that the Board was concerned
about his ability to perform his job.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
23
N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b)(1) did not require statements of specific medical reasons for
evaluations, only that in the judgment of the Board the employee had shown evidence of
deviation from normal physical or mental health.
It would be disingenuous for petitioner to argue that he had never shown deviations
from normal physical nor mental health, because in 2017 he himself had sought treatment
from Dr. Richard Hadley, from Neuropsychology and Counseling Associates, and himself
had requested that Dr. Hadley report to the school on April 19, 2017, that petitioner was
receiving neuropsychological and counseling help. 	It is true that Dr. Hadley’s letters of
April 19, 2017, and May 31, 2017, referred to neuropsychological and counseling help,
but did not mention an alcohol problem. 	Yet petitioner himself advised Ms. Shopp in
September 2017 that he had been self-medicating with alcohol due to anxiety, telling her
that the break-up with his girlfriend of ten years led to debilitating anxiety.
Further, petitioner exhibited excessive absenteeism, including many times when
he failed to show for work or even call in sick, at the start of the 2017-2018 school year.
After 	receiving 	notification 	from 	petitioner 	and 	Hadley 	that 	petitioner 	had
neuropsychological and alcohol issues to address, petitioner’s failure to appear for work
or call the school to report absences was of such concern to respondent that on two
occasions they had to request welfare checks by the Manasquan Police Department.
Respondent was correct in citing to I/M/O Dugan and Jersey City Board of Education,
2012 N.J. Agen. Lexis 249, for the proposition that excessive absenteeism constituted
incapacity, unbecoming conduct and/or just cause within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
10.
Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that respondent failed to comply with the requirements
of N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b)(1) when it wrote to petitioner requiring a psychiatric examination.
Regarding petitioner’s claim that respondent violated N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3 based on
not being notified of his right to a hearing, respondent was correct in asserting that the
statute does not require a board to “advise” a teacher of said right, only that a district

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24
board of education shall provide the employee with a hearing “if requested.” 	Petitioner
offered no statutory or caselaw support to contradict respondent’s interpretation. No
evidence had been proffered showing that petitioner had requested a hearing.
I 	CONCLUDE 	that 	petitioner 	failed 	to 	meet 	his 	burden 	of 	proving 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence that respondent did not have the legal authority to require
petitioner to submit to a psychiatric examination and/or a Fitness For Duty examination.
Petitioner in its summation brief confirmed that respondent adopted District Policy
3218, which recognized alcohol dependency as an illness. 	Further, it was petitioner
himself who advised respondent that his issues included alcohol abuse as well as mental
health issues. Therefore, I CONCLUDE that that petitioner failed to meet his burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent did not have the legal
authority to require alcohol testing as part of its psychiatric examination and/or Fit For
Duty examination.
Petitioner argued that District Policy 3218 required a therapeutic approach to
alcohol dependency rather than an approach which was solely punitive in nature, and that
the Last Chance Agreement was therefore a violation of that policy because it was on its
face both punitive and disciplinary. Towards that end, petitioner relied on language in the
LCA wherein petitioner was to acknowledge that “he is subject to disciplinary action, up
to and including termination because of such behavior and deficiencies,” as well as the
language stating that petitioner agreed “to resign from his employment with the Board
immediately upon notice that his Principal had substantiated to the Superintendent of
Schools that Employee engaged in further behavior and/or performance deficiency,” and
agreed to “to waive any notice, tenure and/or contracted rights with regard to same.” More
generally, petitioner argued that respondent lacked the authority to “require” a LCA.
Petitioner’s argument is flawed in that it appeared that it was not respondent who
“required” a LCA, but rather petitioner’s own people. 	It was petitioner’s union, via the
union counsel, Sandy Oxfeld, who suggested a LCA as a compromise in order to get
petitioner back to teaching. Oxfeld’s intention was for Dr. Iofin’s recommendations to be
memorialized in a legal document. It was petitioner’s union representative, John Cholette,

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25
who presented the LCA to petitioner. Respondent did not present the LCA and state that
petitioner had to sign it or lose his job. Rather, it was Cholette who told petitioner that if
he didn’t execute the LCA, respondent would file tenure charges against him, affecting
his teaching license. Nothing was offered to show that the school or Board said or wrote
anything to petitioner demanding that he execute the LCA. Petitioner could have refused
to execute the LCA and then appeared before the School Board and challenged any
tenure charges that might have been brought, or not executed the LCA and then provided
respondent with proof that he had complied with the Board’s requirement that he attend
IOP and attend a follow-up appointment with Dr. Iofin.
Respondent had been attempting to work with petitioner throughout the entire
process. 	It scheduled a meeting with petitioner and Cholette for July 16, 2018, but
petitioner missed the meeting and later received an email from Cholette advising that he
had missed the scheduled meeting with Cholette and the school administration regarding
his employment. Petitioner contacted Cholette later that day to reschedule that meeting
to July 20, 2018, and petitioner did appear at the meeting on July 20. It was at the July
20 meeting that Cholette presented petitioner with the proposed LCA, which they
reviewed together. That draft LCA required petitioner to submit to drug and alcohol tests.
Petitioner negotiated minor changes to the LCA, but left in the drug and alcohol testing
requirement. 	Then petitioner executed the LCA without having an attorney review it or
discussing it with Oxfeld.
Petitioner had already submitted to a full FFD examination, and therefore it could
not be argued that requiring continuing testing on its face was “punitive.” Petitioner had
a severe absenteeism and communication issue regarding his teaching position with the
school, and the LCA was a compromise created in order to allow petitioner to return to
his job. 	The LCA contained discipline language, but was in and of itself not a penalty
imposed on petitioner. 	The “discipline” contained therein was only to be meted if
petitioner failed to comply with the requirements set forth in the LCA, that being continued
mental health and alcohol prevention care and testing to confirm that petitioner was no
longer abusing alcohol.

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26
Respondent correctly posited that public entities, such as school boards, were
authorized to enter into LCAs specifying terms of employment, as long as the terms
therein did not contravene statutes controlling an employee’s terms or conditions of
employment or violate New Jersey public policy, citing Watson v. City of E. Orange, 175
N.J. 442, 445, (2003); Merlino v. Borough of Midland Park, 172 N.J. 1, 12-13 (2002).
The New Jersey Supreme Court held in Merlino that, because the agreement
between the employer and employee abrogated no legislative terms or conditions of
employment, the agreement constituted a valid contract by mutual consent of the parties.
Respondent found factual similarities between Merlino and the within matter: 	in both
cases, an employee entered into an agreement with his employer in order to keep his job
and preclude tenure issues. 	In both cases, the agreement was entered into by mutual
consent. 	In both scenarios, no statutory terms or public policies were violated, and in
both scenarios the employee had every right and opportunity to seek legal counsel or
advice but chose not to.
Although respondent chose to expound on the Merlino decision, because it dealt
with tenure issues, the afore-cited Watson case was even more on-point. In Watson, the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld an employer’s ability to negotiate and enforce LCAs,
and opted not to reinterpret the terms of the LCA lest the court “discourage their use by
making their terms meaningless,” citing to Golson-El v. Runyon, 812 F. Supp. 558,
561 (E.D.Pa.). 	In Watson, the City of East Orange chose to offer a patrolman an LCA
rather than suspend or terminate his position, which LCA unambiguously reflected that
the patrolman could return to work only when he completed a mutually acceptable
program for alcohol recovery. When the patrolman failed to comply with the requirement
of attending an alcohol recovery program in a timely fashion, he was found to have
violated the LCA. 	The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the LCA and affirmed the
termination of the patrolman’s employment.
The within LCA did not violate petitioner’s tenure rights. 	Respondent properly
argued that the right to tenure was created and governed entirely by statute, per
Breitwieser v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 286 N.J. Super. 633 (App.Div.1996) (citing
Spiewak v. Board of Ed., 90 N.J. 63 (1982) at 72-73). In New Jersey, the statutory basis

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for tenure of public-school employees was N.J.S.A. 18A:28-1, et seq. , which states that
“The service of all teaching staff members . . . shall be under tenure during good behavior
and efficiency and they shall not be dismissed or reduced in compensation except for
inefficiency, incapacity, or conduct unbecoming such a teaching staff member or other
just cause . . . “ It is therefore clear that in New Jersey, tenured teaching staff members
cannot be terminated or reduced in compensation except for those specific reasons.
Additionally, tenured teachers may voluntarily resign their positions, per N.J.S.A.
18A:28-8, which states that, “Any teaching staff member, under tenure of service, desiring
to relinquish his position shall give the employing board of education at least 60 days
written notice of his intention, unless the board shall approve of a release on shorter notice
and if he fails to give such notice he shall be deemed guilty of unprofessional conduct
and the commissioner may suspend his certificate for not more than one year.” 	See
Camden City Sch. Dist. v. Pitts, 2019 N.J.Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1686 (App. Div. July 26,
2019), which upheld the resignation of a tenured teacher, where that teacher had
voluntarily entered into an agreement with her school board in exchange for the board’s
agreement not to pursue tenure charges for inefficiency.
Further, a teacher has the ability to withdraw their resignation prior to the school
board meeting in which the board votes to accept the resignation, although the withdrawal
may be rejected absent compelling and unique circumstances. See Lovett v. Flemington-
Raritan Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2683, **23-24 (App. Div.
2013).
In the within matter, petitioner Deppeler missed two appointments for medical
examinations 	scheduled 	for 	August 	24, 	2017, 	which 	were 	required 	by 	the 	LCA.
Respondent did not terminate petitioner’s employment as a result of those LCA violations.
Instead, petitioner voluntarily submitted a letter of resignation to the respondent Board on
September 17, 2018. 	Petitioner’s resignation was submitted more than three weeks
subsequent to his violation of the LCA, and subsequent to discussing the matter with his
union representative Cholette. 	Petitioner had been informed that his resignation would
be on the School Board agenda for September 26, 2018, but at no time between
September 17, 2018 and September 26, 2018 did petitioner attempt to withdraw his

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resignation. Respondent correctly asserted that petitioner did not attempt to withdraw his
resignation until he filed the within appeal on or about December 17, 2018.
Not only was an LCA permissible in the within matter, but it was also further
evidence that respondent did everything it could to help petitioner despite petitioner’s
numerous failings. Petitioner had been dealing with alcoholism and anxiety since 2000.
Despite achieving tenure in February 2016, 	petitioner was absent from work six and a
half days in the 2013-14 school year, five and a half days in 2014-15, ten days in 2015-
16, and thirty-nine days in 2016-17, well above the average number of sick days taken
by a typical teacher. 	Petitioner often failed to call the school to advise of his absences
and often failed to enter his absences into the ASOP computer program, as required,
which made it difficult for respondent to locate and hire substitute teachers to cover
petitioner’s classes. 	The school was so concerned about petitioner’s unreported and
unexplained absences that it twice had to request the police to conduct a wellness check
of petitioner.
Despite mental health issues, alcohol issues, and a problem with absenteeism,
respondent continued to work with petitioner. The Board continued to approve FMLA for
petitioner and approve petitioner’s leave requests, enabling him to continue to seek the
help he so clearly needed. 	Respondent made every attempt to stay in communication
with petitioner, as evidenced by the dozens of letters, emails and telephone calls made
by the school to petitioner. 	Respondent continued scheduling FFD examinations for
petitioner, despite petitioner continuing to miss those appointments. 	Respondent often
had to play “catch-up” with petitioner, only learning after the fact that petitioner had missed
doctor appointments because he had flown out-of-state to attend rehabilitation.
Respondent stood by petitioner even after he did attend an appointment with Dr.
Iofin and Iofin deemed him not ready to return to work. 	This was where the LCA was
suggested by petitioner’s union representative and attorney, which the Board approved
entering into. 	The respondent even agreed to continue covering petitioner’s health
coverage premiums to assist petitioner in meeting the terms of the LCA. 	Despite the
Board sticking with petitioner through years of absenteeism, it was petitioner’s own
actions which led him to lose his job: petitioner continually missed FFD appointments as

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29
well as meetings with respondent and his own union representatives, and petitioner failed
to review the LCA with his union attorney, Sandy Oxfeld, and failed to seek independent
review from an attorney of his own choosing. 	It was petitioner’s choice to preclude the
filing of any tenure charges by submitting a resignation and not attempting to withdraw it
prior to the scheduled School Board meeting.
I CONCLUDE that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the LCA was not a legally valid agreement voluntarily
entered into between petitioner and respondent. 	I CONCLUDE that petitioner voluntarily
resigned his position and did not withdraw his resignation prior to the School Board
meeting to accept his resignation.
Regarding whether the LCA abrogated any legislative terms or conditions of
employment, petitioner claimed in its Appeal that respondent had violated petitioner’s
rights regarding sick days. But the LCA did not violate any of his sick leave rights, as it
contained no language addressing petitioner’s sick time, and therefore on its face could
not be contrary to any other statutory terms under N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1 et seq.
Unrelated to the LCA, petitioner further argued in its Appeal that respondent
violated petitioner’s rights to sick leave under N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1 et seq. when it placed
him on ‘unpaid days’ status effective October 16, 2017. But N.J.S.A. 18A:30-2 states that
all local school district employees were entitled to ten days paid sick leave in any school
year, and N.J.S.A.18A:30-2.1 provides for the payment of sick leave to district employees
for service-connected disability; subsection (a) allowed for payment of full salary when
any employee was absent from work “as a result of a personal injury caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.” 	As recorded by respondent,
respondent allowed petitioner to use his full allotment of sick days and personal days,
totaling sixteen days, which he used in consecutive absences from Monday, September
11, 2017, through Thursday, October 5, 2017. Based on this information, petitioner was
paid in full for all the sick time he was entitled to for that time period, as he did not have
a job-related injury. The record also indicated that from Friday, October 6, 2017, through
Wednesday, 	February 	7, 	2018, 	petitioner 	was 	placed 	on 	paid 	medical 	leave 	by
respondent. Regarding any claim that petitioner was entitled to sick leave pay because

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
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respondent placed him on unpaid sick leave effective February 8, 2018, it is documented
that from October 6, 2017, through February 7, 2018, respondent approved all of
petitioner’s FMLA leave requests permitted under law. As petitioner received all his sick
pay starting at September 11, 2017, respondent was correct in arguing that petitioner was
not entitled to additional paid sick leave starting on February 8, 2018.
I CONCLUDE that that petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that respondent committed violations regarding its
application of sick day leave for petitioner and owed additional sick leave compensation
to petitioner.
ORDER
I hereby ORDER that petitioner’s appeal be DISMISSED, and that respondent’s
acceptance of petitioner’s resignation be AFFIRMED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

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31
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: 	Exceptions.” 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
judge and to the other parties.
November 28, 2022
DATE 	JEFFREY N. RABIN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	November 28, 2022
Date Mailed to Parties: 	November 28, 2022
JNR/dw

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APPENDIX
WITNESSES
For petitioner:
Jared Deppeler, petitioner
For respondent:
Dr. William George, former Superintendent
Rosie Shopp, Confidential Secretary- Human Resources
Kimberly Pickus, Assistant Superintendent
John Cholette, President of the Middletown Township Education Association
EXHIBITS
For petitioner:
P-1 	Petitioner’s 2017-18 Salary Statement
P-2 	Notice scheduling appointment, dated October 11, 2017
P-3 	Petitioner email to Shopp, dated October 30, 2017
P-4 	Recovery Unplugged Letter, dated October 31, 2017
P-5 	FMLA Certification, dated November 16, 2017
P-6 	Respondent FMLA letter, dated November 21, 2017
P-7 	Petitioner email, dated December 4, 2017
P-8 	Respondent letter to petitioner, dated December 14, 2017
P-9 	Immersion Recovery email, dated December 22, 2017
P-10 	Petitioner email, dated January 15, 2018
P-11 	Immersion Recovery email, dated January 17, 2018
P-12 	Respondent letter, dated January 25, 2018
P-13 	Immersion Recovery letter, dated February 26, 2018

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P-14 	Petitioner email, dated February 28, 2018
P-15 	Iofin letter, dated June 14, 2018
P-16 	Iofin Report, dated June 15, 2018
P-17 	Last Chance Agreement, dated July 30, 2018
P-18 	George letter, dated September 14, 2018
P-19 	Petitioner resignation, dated September 17, 2018
P-20 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, undated
P-21 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, dated November 1, 2017
P-22 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, dated November 1, 2017
P-23 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, dated November 16, 2017
P-24 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, dated November 16, 2017
P-25 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, dated November 16, 2017
P-26 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, dated November 16, 2017
P-27 	Agreement between Middletown Education Association and Board of
Education 2017-2021
P-28 	Petitioner’s Masters of Education diploma, dated August 31, 2012
For respondent:
R-1 	Middletown High School Faculty Manual
R-2 	Covert letter to petitioner, dated January 29, 2013
R-3 	Salary Statement
R-4 	Delivery receipt, dated September 15, 2017
R-5 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated October 11, 2017
R-6 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated October 19, 2017
R-7 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated November 21, 2017
R-8 	George letter to petitioner, dated December 11, 2017
R-9 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated December 14, 2017
R-10 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated December 14, 2017
R-11 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated January 25, 2018
R-12 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated January 25, 2018
R-13 	Delivery receipt, dated February 27, 2018
R-14 	Petitioner absence letter, dated August 20, 2018

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R-15 	Petitioner Employment Contract, dated May 8, 2015
R-16 	Shopp email to petitioner, dated October 30, 2017
R-17 	Email chain, dated November 1, 2017
R-18 	Email to Shopp, dated November 16, 2017
R-19 	Petitioner email, dated December 4, 2017
R-20 	Shopp email, dated December 6, 2017
R-21 	Shopp email, dated December 6, 2017
R-22 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated December 11, 2017
R-23 	Shopp email, dated December 12, 2017
R-24 	Immersion email, dated December 22, 2017
R-25 	Immersion email, dated January 17, 2018
R-26 	Bacos email to Shopp, dated January 18, 2018
R-27 	Bacos email to Shopp, dated January 18, 2018
R-28 	Last Chance Agreement, dated July 30, 2018
R-29 	Correspondence Notes
R-30 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, dated November 1, 2017
R-31 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, undated
R-32 	FMLA Form, Department of Labor, undated
R-33 	Hadley letter, dated September 18, 2017
R-34 	Abel letter, dated September 29, 2017
R-35 	Consent to Release Records, dated December 2017
R-36 	Advanced Psychiatric Care facsimile, dated June 14, 2018
R-37 	Advanced Psychiatric Care facsimile, dated June 18, 2018
R-38 	Petitioner resume
R-39 	New Jersey Standard Certificate
R-40 	Petitioner Oath of Allegiance
R-41 	George letter, dated November 3, 2014
R-42 	Provisional Teacher Program
R-43 	Petitioner Absence Report for 2013-14
R-44 	Middletown Dismissal Policy, dated March 21, 2006
R-45 	Recovery Unplugged letter, dated October 31, 2017
R-46 	(not admitted)
R-47 	Shopp email, dated September 14, 2018

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01471-19
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R-48 	Shopp email accepting resignation, dated September 17, 2018
R-49 	Collucci email, dated August 24, 2018
R-50 	Iofin office email to Shopp, dated August 24, 2018
R-51 	Merlino email, dated July 27, 2018
R-52 	Shopp email to petitioner, dated February 28, 2018
R-53 	Cholette email to Shopp, dated February 26, 2018
R-54 	Bacos email to Shopp, dated January 17, 2018
R-55 	Iofin staff email to Shopp, dated December 14, 2017
R-56 	FMLA Former, Department of Labor, November 16, 2017
R-57 	Immersion Discharge Documentation, dated October 9, 2018
R-58 	Aftercare Plan/Discharge Instruction, dated November 22, 2017
R-59 	Pauline Tyas, APN, Progress Note, dated July 12, 2018
R-60 	Certification of Record Custodian, dated December 26, 2020
R-61 	Agreement between Middletown Education Association and Board of
Education 2017-2021
R-62 	Facsimile to Iofin, dated October 20, 2017
R-63 	Hundley letter to Respondent, dated October 10, 2018
R-64 	DeRosa letter to petitioner, dated March 1, 2018
R-65 	George letter to petitioner, dated December 11, 2017
R-66 	Prescription data
R-67 	Draft Last Chance Agreement
R-68 	Pickus email, dated July 30, 2018
R-69 	Cholette email, dated August 16, 2018
R-70 	Hundley letter, dated August 6, 2020
R-71 	Middletown Family Leave Policy, dated February 2016
R-72 	Iofin staff email to Shopp, dated November 22, 2017
R-73 	Proof of hand delivery, dated December 11, 2017
R-74 	Proof of hand delivery, dated September 14, 2018
R-75 	Pickus letter to petitioner, dated August 13, 2018
R-76 	Anderson memo, dated October 5, 2017
R-77 	Shopp email, dated November 1, 2017
R-78 	Cholette email, dated November 1, 2017
R-79 	Shopp email, dated January 20, 2021

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R-80 	Shopp email, dated November 14, 2017
R-81 	Shopp email, dated December 13, 2017
R-82 	Manasquan Police welfare check, dated October 4, 2017
R-83 	Middletown Substance Abuse Policy, dated March 2016
R-84 	Middletown Sick Leave Policy, dated March 2006
R-85 	Middletown Family Leave Regulations, dated August 2007
R-86 	Middletown Sick Leave Policy, dated March 2006
R-87 	Middletown Substance Abuse Policy, dated March 2016
R-88 	Middletown Pupil Liability Policy, dated March 2006
R-89 	Middletown Pupil Liability Policy, dated March 2006
R-90 	Middletown Certification of Tenure Charges, dated November 2010
R-91 	Middletown Staff Attendance Policy, dated March 2006
R-92 	Middletown Certification of Tenure Charges, dated March 2006
R-93 	Middletown Attendance Policy, dated March 2006
R-94 	Petitioner email, dated February 28, 2018
R-95 	Shopp email, dated March 8, 2018
R-96 	Lanzot email, dated January 20, 2021
R-97 	Cholette email, dated March 9, 2018
R-98 	Cholette email, dated March 16, 2018
R-99 	Cholette email, dated March 30, 2018
R-100 Shopp email, dated April 13, 2018
R-101 Cholette email, dated April 13, 2018
R-102 Cholette email, dated April 19, 2018
R-103 Shopp email, dated April 24, 2018
R-104 Shopp email, dated May 1, 2018
R-105 Petitioner email, dated May 14, 2018
R-106 Pickus email, dated March 15, 2018
R-107 Shopp email, dated May 25, 2018
R-108 Shopp email, dated May 30, 2018
R-109 Shopp email, dated June 5, 2018
R-110 Cholette email, undated
R-111 Shopp email, dated July 3, 2018
R-112 Shopp email, dated August 13 2018

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R-113 Shopp email, dated August 13, 2018
R-114 Shopp email, dated August 16, 2018
R-115 Cholette email, dated August 16, 2018
R-116 Petitioner email, dated August 19, 2018
R-117 Shopp email, dated August 23, 2018
R-118 Shopp email, dated September 14, 2018
R-119 Shopp email, dated January 20, 2021
R-120 Cholette email, dated January 26, 2018
R-121 Cholette email, dated April 2, 2018
R-122 Cholette email, dated May 15, 2018
R-123 Cholette email, dated December 11, 2017
R-124 Cholette email, dated March 13, 2018
R-125 Shopp email, dated September 14, 2018