1 Cono Contracting v. Lopez

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
1 Cono Contracting, LLC, and Mauro Rubio,
appellants, v. Catarino Lopez, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 2, 2026. 	No. S-25-859.
1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question
that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate
court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a
conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.
2. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read meaning into
a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a
statute.
3. ____. The absurd results doctrine allows a court to deviate from a stat-
ute’s plain language if application of the language would lead to mani-
fest absurdity.
4. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. A court may depart from statutory plain
language based on the absurd results doctrine only if the result is so
absurd that the Legislature could not possibly have intended it.
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
Riedmann, Chief Judge, and Moore and Bishop, Judges, on
appeal thereto from the District Court for Douglas County,
LeAnne M. Srb, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals vacated
and retained for further proceedings.
Theodore R. Boecker, Jr., of Boecker Law, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellants.
James R. Walz, of Walz Law Offices, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellee.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:50 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Papik, J.
After the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court entered
an award against Mauro Rubio and 1 Cono Contracting, LLC
(collectively Rubio), and the award was filed in the district
court, Rubio filed a complaint in district court in which he
asked the district court to vacate the award. The district
court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to do so. When Rubio
appealed, the Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
because it agreed that the district court lacked jurisdiction. We
granted Rubio’s petition for further review. We conclude that
the district court had jurisdiction to grant at least some of the
relief Rubio sought and that the Court of Appeals thus erred by
dismissing the appeal.
BACKGROUND
Rubio Files Complaint to Vacate.
This case began in the district court when Rubio com-
menced a new action by filing a complaint. He sought to
vacate an award of the compensation court. In the complaint,
he asserted that the compensation court had entered the award
against him and in favor of Catarino Lopez. He also asserted
that the award had “been transcribed over and registered”
with the district court. Rubio filed his complaint to vacate as
a new case, rather than filing it in the case in which the award
had been filed.
Rubio alleged in the complaint that the award should be set
aside for many reasons. He alleged that the award was pro-
cured by fraud, was obtained through irregularity, and was
“inequitable” and “contrary to the terms of justice and appli-
cable law.” Rubio asserted that his counsel in the compensa-
tion court, a now-disbarred attorney, was permitted to with-
draw on the first day of trial without prior notice to Rubio,

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
leaving him without counsel at trial. Rubio also alleged that
Lopez had “exaggerate[ed] his injuries” and “practic[ed] a
deceit upon” the compensation court.
Rubio identified Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001(4) (Reissue
2016) as a basis to vacate the judgment. Alternatively, he
asserted that the district court could vacate the judgment using
its “equitable powers.”
District Court Grants Motion to Dismiss.
Lopez filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Neb. Ct. R.
Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(1) and (6) (rev. 2025). In support of his
motion, Lopez argued that the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to vacate the award entered by the compensation court.
Alternatively, he contended that even if the district court had
jurisdiction to vacate awards entered by the compensation
court, Rubio had failed to identify a basis for vacating the
award in this case.
At the hearing on Lopez’ motion to dismiss, counsel for
Rubio argued that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-188 (Reissue
2021), judgments or awards of the compensation court, once
filed in the district court, are treated as though they are judg-
ments of the district court. And because a district court could
vacate its own judgments, Rubio’s counsel argued, it likewise
had the power to vacate a compensation court judgment or
award that has been filed in the district court. Counsel for
Lopez, on the other hand, argued that district courts have no
jurisdiction to vacate a judgment or award of the compensation
court. Lopez’ counsel argued that § 48-188 confers jurisdiction
on the district court over compensation court judgments and
awards but, with one exception not relevant here, this jurisdic-
tion is “for enforcement purposes only.”
Following the hearing, the district court entered an order
sustaining Lopez’ motion to dismiss. In the order, the district
court concluded that it did not have the authority to vacate or
modify a judgment or award of the compensation court. It also

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
concluded that Rubio’s complaint “fail[ed] to state a claim for
which relief can be granted under . . . § 25-2001.”
Rubio appealed the dismissal of his complaint. The case was
docketed in the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals Dismisses Appeal.
Before Rubio had filed an initial brief, the Court of Appeals,
acting on its own initiative, dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. In a minute entry, the Court of Appeals stated that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify an award of the
compensation court. Because the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion, the Court of Appeals reasoned, it also lacked jurisdiction
of the appeal.
Rubio subsequently filed a motion for rehearing. In support
of the motion for rehearing, Rubio renewed his argument based
on § 48-188.
The Court of Appeals denied Rubio’s motion for rehearing.
Its minute entry denying the motion cited § 48-188 and Allen
v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 278 Neb. 41, 767 N.W.2d 502 (2009),
for the proposition that district courts have authority only for
the “[e]nforcement” of judgments and awards of the compen-
sation court.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In his petition for further review, Rubio assigns two errors
that can be effectively restated as one: Rubio contends that the
Court of Appeals erred by dismissing his appeal based on its
conclusion that the district court lacked jurisdiction to vacate
the compensation court’s award.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion inde-
pendent of the lower court’s decision. State v. Jones, 320 Neb.
766, 30 N.W.3d 293 (2026).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
ANALYSIS
Section 48-188.
Both the district court and the Court of Appeals were per-
suaded by Lopez’ argument that § 48-188 gives district courts
authority only to “enforce” compensation court orders or judg-
ments that have been filed in the district court. Now on further
review, Lopez makes the same argument to us. We understand
Lopez to contend that, once a compensation court judgment
or award has been filed in the district court, § 48-188 would
permit a district court to issue orders in aid of execution of
that judgment or award, but the statute gives no authority to
the district court to vacate such a judgment or award.
As we will explain, however, the reasoning of the district
court, the Court of Appeals, and Lopez is at odds with the lan-
guage of § 48-188. That statute provides in relevant part:
Any 	order, 	award, 	or 	judgment 	by 	the 	Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Court . . . which is certified by
the clerk of the compensation court . . . may, as soon as
the same becomes conclusive upon the parties at interest,
be filed with the district court of any county or counties
in the State of Nebraska upon the payment of a fee of two
dollars to the clerk of the district court or courts where
such order, award, or judgment is filed. Upon filing,
such order, award, or judgment shall have the same force
and effect as a judgment of such district court . . . and
all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the
same as though the order, award, or judgment had been
rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by such
district court . . . .
§ 48-188.
As with any statute, we are obligated to identify the plain
and ordinary meaning of § 48-188, understood in context,
and then give effect to that meaning. See McGill Restoration
v. Lion Place Condo. Assn., 313 Neb. 658, 986 N.W.2d 32
(2023). But nothing in the language of § 48-188 even suggests
that once a compensation court judgment or award is filed

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
in the district court, the district court only has the power to
issue orders in aid of execution of that judgment or award. To
the contrary, § 48-188 provides that such judgment or award
“shall have the same force and effect as a judgment” of the
district court and that “all proceedings in relation thereto shall
thereafter be the same as though the order, award, or judgment
had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by such
district court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Undeterred by the absence of statutory language supporting
his argument, Lopez invokes cases from this court, specifi-
cally Burnham v. Pacesetter Corp., 280 Neb. 707, 789 N.W.2d
913 (2010); Allen v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 278 Neb. 41, 767
N.W.2d 502 (2009); and Koterzina v. Copple Chevrolet, 249
Neb. 158, 542 N.W.2d 696 (1996), disapproved, Allen, supra.
He argues that, in those cases, we have interpreted § 48-188
to give to district courts only the power to “enforce” work-
ers’ compensation awards that have been filed in the district
court. But Lopez is reading those cases to say far more than
they do.
The 	cases 	Lopez 	relies 	upon 	all 	recognize 	that 	under
§ 48-188, compensation court awards and judgments, once
filed with the district court, have “the same force and effect as
a judgment of such district court.” Based on that premise, we
have held that once a compensation court award or judgment
has been filed in the district court, a party can pursue gar-
nishment proceedings related to that judgment or award, see,
Burnham, supra; Koterzina, supra, and statutes related to exe-
cution and dormancy apply to that judgment, see Allen, supra.
But none of these cases speak to whether § 48-188 would
permit a district court to vacate a compensation court award
or judgment that has been filed in the district court, much less
hold that the district court would lack such power.
[2] We could conclude that § 48-188 permits a district
court to issue only orders in aid of execution of compensation
court judgments and awards if we ignored the statutory phrase
“all proceedings in relation thereto” and substituted in the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
phrase “proceedings in aid of execution,” as Lopez’ counsel
urged us at oral argument. But, as we often say, it is not within
the province of the courts to read meaning into a statute that is
not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute.
State v. Clausen, 318 Neb. 375, 15 N.W.3d 858 (2025).
[3,4] Neither could we decline to apply the plain language
of the statute based on the absurd results doctrine. We have
recognized that the absurd results doctrine allows a court
to deviate from a statute’s plain language if application of
the language would lead to manifest absurdity. See Parks v.
Hy-Vee, 307 Neb. 927, 951 N.W.2d 504 (2020). But we have
said that a court may depart from statutory plain language
based on the absurd results doctrine only if the result is so
absurd that the Legislature could not possibly have intended it.
See id. And, given the fact that, as a tribunal of limited juris-
diction, the compensation court has limited authority to vacate
or modify its own orders, see, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-180
(Reissue 2021); Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp., 311 Neb. 262,
971 N.W.2d 335 (2022), it is not beyond imagination that
the Legislature determined that the district court should have
authority to vacate compensation court awards or judgments
that have been filed there.
For these reasons, we reject Lopez’ argument that § 48-188
only authorizes district courts to issue orders in aid of execu-
tion of compensation court awards or judgments that have
been filed in the district court. But this leaves the question of
whether the district court had jurisdiction to vacate the com-
pensation court award. We turn to that issue next.
District Court’s Equitable Jurisdiction.
Rubio 	alleged 	in 	his 	complaint 	that 	the 	district 	court
should vacate the compensation court’s award both based on
§ 25-2001(4) and under its equitable jurisdiction. We first
address whether the district court had equitable jurisdiction to
vacate the compensation court award. We find that it did.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
A district court has equitable jurisdiction to vacate its
own judgments. See, e.g., Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems,
258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2d 764 (2000). See, also, John P.
Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure, § 35:15 (2026). A party
may invoke the district court’s equitable jurisdiction by fil-
ing a motion to vacate in the action in which the judgment
was entered or by filing an independent action in that district
court. See Lenich, supra.
As discussed above, § 48-188 provides that once a judg-
ment or award of the compensation court is filed in the district
court, the award or judgment has “the same force and effect as
a judgment of such district court” and “all proceedings in rela-
tion thereto” shall be as if the award or judgment was entered
by the district court. If the compensation court award in this
case had been a judgment rendered by the district court, the
district court would have had equitable jurisdiction to entertain
an independent action to vacate that judgment. Accordingly,
applying the plain language of § 48-188, we conclude that the
district court had equitable jurisdiction to vacate the compen-
sation court’s award.
At the risk of stating the obvious, we express no view on
the merits of Rubio’s claim that the district court should have
vacated the compensation court’s award under its equitable
jurisdiction in this case. We conclude only that it had equi-
table jurisdiction to do so.
Jurisdiction to Vacate Under § 25-2001(4).
Rubio also contends that the district court had jurisdiction to
vacate the compensation court’s award under § 25-2001(4). An
oft-cited commentator, however, has written that proceedings
to vacate or modify a judgment under § 25-2001(4) “are part of
the case in which the judgment or order was entered” and that
the complaint should have “the same case title and number as
the judgment or order.” Lenich, supra, § 35:13 at 1674. But in
this case, Rubio did not file his complaint to vacate in the case

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
in which the compensation court’s award was filed; he filed an
independent action to vacate the award.
For reasons we will explain below, however, it is not neces-
sary for us to determine at this stage whether the district court
had jurisdiction under § 25-2001(4).
Disposition.
Based on our conclusion that the district court had equitable
jurisdiction to vacate the compensation court’s award, we find
that the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing Rubio’s appeal.
The district court had jurisdiction to grant at least some of the
relief Rubio sought, and thus, the Court of Appeals had juris-
diction of Rubio’s appeal and should not have dismissed it.
As 	mentioned 	above, 	the 	Court 	of Appeals 	dismissed
this appeal before any briefing had taken place. That leaves
this case in an unusual procedural posture. It is likely Lopez’
position that even if the district court had jurisdiction to vacate
the compensation court’s award, the district court did not err
in finding that Rubio failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. But we are not currently positioned to assess
whether that is correct. Rubio must first be given an opportu-
nity to file a brief assigning and arguing error to the district
court’s dismissal.
Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of
Rubio’s appeal. And, pursuant to our authority to regulate the
dockets of the appellate courts, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
(Cum. Supp. 2024), we will retain this case on our docket and
will issue a briefing schedule after which the appeal will pro-
ceed in the normal course.
Because we find that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
of the appeal and should not have dismissed it, it is not neces-
sary for us to determine at this stage whether the district court
also had jurisdiction under § 25-2001(4) to vacate the com-
pensation court’s award. That determination can wait until the
matter is fully briefed and submitted for decision.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
1 CONO CONTRACTING v. LOPEZ
Cite as 321 Neb. 728
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of this appeal and retain the case on our
docket for further proceedings.
Vacated and retained for
further proceedings.