State v. Mata

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Raymond Mata, Jr., appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed June 18, 2026. 	No. S-24-664.
1. Evidence: Appeal and Error. A trial court has the discretion to deter-
mine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and such determina-
tions will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of
that discretion.
2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists
only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable,
unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just
results in matters submitted for disposition.
3. Postconviction: Evidence: Witnesses: Appeal and Error. In an evi-
dentiary hearing on a motion for postconviction relief, the trial judge,
as the trier of fact, resolves conflicts in the evidence and questions of
fact. An appellate court upholds the trial court’s findings unless they are
clearly erroneous.
4. Postconviction: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Whether a claim
raised in a postconviction proceeding is procedurally barred is a ques-
tion of law which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower
court’s ruling.
5. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The admission or exclusion of
evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial
right of the complaining party.
6. ____: ____: ____. Erroneous exclusion of evidence does not require
reversal if the evidence would have been cumulative and other relevant
evidence, properly admitted, supports the trial court’s finding.
7. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Cumulative evidence means evi-
dence tending to prove the same point to which other evidence has
been offered.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:41 AM CDT

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STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
8. Rules of Evidence. Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403
(Reissue 2016), allows the exclusion of evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
9. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Right to Counsel. The Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant
the right to effective assistance of counsel.
10. ____: ____: ____. The right to effective assistance of counsel entitles
the accused to the undivided loyalty of an attorney, free from any con-
flict of interest.
11. Conflict of Interest: Words and Phrases. A conflict of interest exists
when a defense attorney is placed in a situation inherently conducive to
divided loyalties.
12. Attorney and Client: Conflict of Interest: Words and Phrases. The
phrase “conflict of interest” denotes a situation in which regard for one
duty tends to lead to disregard of another, where a lawyer’s represen-
tation of one client is rendered less effective by reason of his or her
representation of another client, or where it becomes a lawyer’s duty
on behalf of one client to contend for that which the lawyer’s duty to
another client would require him or her to oppose.
13. Constitutional Law: Effectiveness of Counsel: Conflict of Interest:
Proof. To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant
who raises no objection at trial must demonstrate that his or her lawyer
actively represented conflicting interests and that the actual conflict of
interest adversely affected the lawyer’s performance.
14. Effectiveness of Counsel: Conflict of Interest: Proof. While a
defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the
adequacy of his or her representation need not demonstrate prejudice,
such conflict of interest must be shown to have resulted in counsel’s
conduct detrimental to the defense.
15. Effectiveness of Counsel: Conflict of Interest. An asserted conflict of
interest must be actual, rather than speculative or hypothetical, before
a conviction can be overturned on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
16. Appeal and Error. An appellate court has the discretion to affirm, as
it deems appropriate, a correct result that was reached below for the
wrong reason.
17. Postconviction. The need for finality in the criminal process requires
that a defendant bring all claims for relief at the first opportunity.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
18. Postconviction: Pleadings. The effect of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(3)
(Cum. Supp. 2024) is to require that all available grounds for postcon-
viction relief must be stated in the initial postconviction motion and,
once that motion has been judicially determined, any subsequent post-
conviction motion regarding the same conviction and sentence may be
dismissed by the district court unless the motion affirmatively shows on
its face that the basis relied upon for relief was not available at the time
of filing the prior motion.
Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County: Leo
P. Dobrovolny, Judge. Affirmed.
Celeste Bacchi and Sylvia Irvin, Assistant Federal Public
Defenders for District of Nevada, pro hac vice, and Peder
Bartling for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph
for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and Vaughn, JJ., and
Moore and Bishop, Judges.
Funke, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Raymond Mata, Jr., appeals the order of the district court
for Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, dismissing his successive
motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred. Mata
argues that his successive motion should have been allowed
under State v. Williams, 1 because the counsel who represented
him for his initial motion for postconviction relief had con-
flicts of interest that prevented that counsel from raising the
ineffective assistance and conflicts of Mata’s trial and appel-
late counsel. Because we find no merit to that argument or
to Mata’s other arguments, we affirm the order of the dis-
trict court.
1 State v. Williams, 295 Neb. 575, 889 N.W.2d 99 (2017).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
II. BACKGROUND
1. Trial and Sentencing
We have opined on Mata’s convictions and sentences on
multiple occasions. 2 As is relevant here, we need note only the
following.
Mata was tried and convicted of first degree murder and
kidnapping in the killing of Adam Gomez, the 3-year-old son
of a woman with whom Mata had had an intimate relationship.
The presiding judge sentenced Mata to life imprisonment for
kidnapping, and after finding the existence of an aggravating
circumstance, exceptional depravity, a three-judge panel sen-
tenced Mata to death for first degree premeditated murder.
On direct appeal, we affirmed Mata’s convictions, as well as
the sentence of life imprisonment imposed for the kidnapping
conviction. However, based on Ring v. Arizona, 3 we vacated
Mata’s death sentence and remanded the cause for resentencing
on the first degree murder conviction.
On remand, a jury unanimously found the existence of the
aggravating circumstance of exceptional depravity. Thereafter,
a three-judge panel heard evidence on mitigating circum-
stances and sentencing disproportionality. Ultimately, the panel
determined that the penalty was not excessive or disproportion-
ate to the penalty imposed in similar cases and sentenced Mata
to death.
Mata appealed his resentencing, and we affirmed the impo-
sition of his death sentence. However, we determined that
electrocution as a method of execution was cruel and unusual
2 See, State v. Mata, 304 Neb. 326, 934 N.W.2d 475 (2019); State v. Mata,
280 Neb. 849, 790 N.W.2d 716 (2010), disapproved on other grounds,
State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29, 881 N.W.2d 864 (2016); State v. Mata,
275 Neb. 1, 745 N.W.2d 229 (2008); State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668
N.W.2d 448 (2003), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Falcon, 319
Neb. 911, 25 N.W.3d 462 (2025).
3 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002).

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STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
punishment in violation of the Nebraska Constitution and
stayed Mata’s execution.
During 	the 	proceedings 	described 	above, 	which 	lasted
from 1999 to 2008, Mata was represented by the Nebraska
Commission on Public Advocacy (NCPA). NCPA staff attor-
neys Jeffery A. Pickens and Jerry L. Soucie were Mata’s “pri-
mary lawyers,” but NCPA chief counsel James R. Mowbray
also represented Mata.
2. Initial and Amended Motions
for Postconviction Relief
In 	2009, 	Mata 	filed 	a 	“Pro 	Se 	Verified 	Motion 	for
Postconviction 	Relief 	and 	Request 	for 	Appointment 	of
Counsel,” although there was subsequently testimony that the
NCPA “prepared” the motion for Mata. The motion raised two
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel,
as well as five other grounds for relief.
The district court denied Mata’s motion for postconvic-
tion relief without an evidentiary hearing. Mata’s request for
the appointment of counsel was also denied, and he was not
granted leave to amend.
Mata appealed, and the Scotts Bluff County public defend-
er’s office was appointed to represent him on appeal. At that
time, the Scotts Bluff County public defender was Bernard
Straetker. As discussed below, Straetker had served as an
NCPA commissioner between 2004 and 2008, when the NCPA
represented Mata for his resentencing.
We found that the district court abused its discretion in
denying Mata leave to amend. As such, we reversed the order
of the district court and remanded the cause with directions to
appoint counsel for Mata and grant him leave to amend.
On remand, the Scotts Bluff County public defender’s
office was again appointed to represent Mata. When the
attorney in that office who had been handling Mata’s post-
conviction motion left in late 2011, Straetker personally took
on the responsibility. Straetker filed an amended motion for

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
postconviction relief on Mata’s behalf, followed by a sec-
ond amended motion for postconviction relief. The second
amended motion was the operative pleading. It raised the
same two claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appel-
late counsel that Mata had raised in his pro se motion, as well
as eight other grounds for relief.
The district court denied Mata’s second amended motion
for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Mata
appealed, and in 2019, we affirmed the order of the dis-
trict court.
3. Successive Motion for
Postconviction Relief
In 2021, represented by different counsel, Mata filed a 282-
page successive motion for postconviction relief. In so doing,
Mata relied on our statement in Williams that a defendant “may
raise . . . ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims in
[a] second postconviction motion” where the second motion
is the defendant’s “first opportunity” to raise those claims. 4
Mata argued that his situation was like that of the defendant in
Williams because, due to Straetker’s “conflicts and ineffective-
ness,” Mata’s successive postconviction motion was his “‘first
meaningful opportunity’” to raise the ineffective assistance
and conflicts of his trial and appellate counsel.
Mata’s successive motion for postconviction relief raised
28 claims (many with subparts) regarding the effectiveness of
his trial and appellate counsel and his initial postconviction
counsel, as well his trial and sentencing. Mata conceded that
some of those claims had been raised “in [his] direct appeal,
the appeal of his penalty retrial, or in his first postconvic-
tion proceeding.” However, Mata said that he had raised
those claims again in the present motion because they “must
be considered to properly analyze [his] claim that cumu-
lative error render[ed] his convictions and death sentence
4 Williams, supra note 1, 295 Neb. at 590, 889 N.W.2d at 114.

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STATE v. MATA
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unconstitutional.” As relevant here, one of Mata’s claims was
that Pickens had conflicts of interest that “unconstitutionally
. . . impaired” his representation of Mata.
The State responded that Mata’s claims were time barred,
procedurally barred, or otherwise unavailing.
A records hearing was held and additional briefing was
taken. Thereafter, the district court issued an order opining
that “Williams is not on all fours with this case,” because
the defendant in Williams had the same counsel for both his
direct appeal and his first postconviction motion. Nonetheless,
the court set the matter for hearing on the “limited issue” of
whether Straetker had a conflict of interest that prevented him
from raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appel-
late counsel and whether Pickens had a conflict of interest.
4. Evidentiary Hearing on Mata’s Successive
Motion for Postconviction Relief
An evidentiary hearing was subsequently held on Straetker’s
and Pickens’ alleged conflicts. At that hearing, Mata offered
210 exhibits that, broadly speaking, purported to show: (1)
Pickens had a conflict of interest due to his prior prosecu-
tion of Mata and Mata’s family members, his investigation
of Mata for another murder, and his prior representation of
Gomez’ grandfather; (2) Straetker had a conflict of interest
due to his prior service as an NCPA commissioner, his incen-
tives as a public defender to maintain a good relationship with
the NCPA, his alleged advice that Mata accept representation
by the NCPA, and his prior representation of Gomez’ grand-
father; and (3) the claims Straetker raised on postconviction as
compared to those that a conflict-free counsel would allegedly
have raised. Among the exhibits Mata offered were declara-
tions by Straetker and Pickens, as well as the depositions of
Straetker, Pickens, Mowbray, and Robert Lindemeier, another
former NCPA commissioner.
The State, in turn, offered one exhibit that detailed its objec-
tions, primarily on relevancy grounds, to the bulk of Mata’s

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
proposed exhibits. The State did not object to the declarations
and depositions noted above, although it did object to specific
testimony in the depositions.
The district court admitted into evidence the State’s exhibit
and all of Mata’s exhibits to which the State did not object.
It also took under advisement the admission of the remaining
exhibits and the State’s objections to the deposition testimony.
The following paragraphs summarize the pertinent evidence
admitted at or after the hearing. Other evidence is discussed
later in the opinion as it relates to our analysis of the parties’
arguments. Our discussion of the evidence is informed by the
parties’ briefs and by our own review of the record. However,
insofar as there may be additional evidence in the record that
supports Mata’s arguments, but that was not cited by him in
his brief, we would note that an appellate court ordinarily does
not scour the record in search of facts that might support an
appellant’s claim. 5
(a) Evidence Regarding Pickens’
Alleged Conflicts
There was evidence that while Pickens was employed by
the Scotts Bluff County public defender’s office between 1991
and 1994, he represented Gomez’ grandfather and saw the
grandfather “frequently” at the courthouse. Pickens said that
he “always enjoyed seeing” Gomez’ grandfather and that the
two were “friendly with each other.” Pickens also said that
later, during Mata’s “guilt trial,” Gomez’ grandfather “attended
every day.” Pickens could not remember whether he told Mata
about his “representation, relationship, or interactions” with
Gomez’ grandfather.
There was also evidence that while Pickens was employed
by the Scotts Bluff County Attorney’s office between 1994
and 1996, he prosecuted Mata and members of Mata’s fam-
ily and investigated Mata for another murder. Pickens and
5 See State v. Wood, 310 Neb. 391, 966 N.W.2d 825 (2021).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
Mowbray (who was Pickens’ supervisor at all relevant times)
both testified that when the NCPA was approached about rep-
resenting Mata in Gomez’ death, they were cognizant of the
conflict or the appearance of a conflict. Mowbray, in particular,
said that Mata’s convictions in cases prosecuted by Pickens
could have “play[ed] a role” in Mata’s sentencing in the capital
proceeding and that Pickens would have been responsible for
interviewing members of Mata’s family, some of whom he had
prosecuted, as “part of a mitigation investigation.”
However, both Pickens and Mowbray indicated that Mata
had waived the conflict. Pickens said he discussed the matter
with Mata, first by telephone and later in person, and con-
firmed that Mata knew Pickens had previously prosecuted and
investigated him and that both he and Mata were “comfortable”
with his representing Mata. Mowbray testified similarly that he
viewed the “issue” as “null and void” once there was a written
waiver from Mata. Pickens said he did not think he secured a
written waiver from Mata. Mowbray said he had not reviewed
a written waiver prior to his deposition, with the potential
implication that there was such a waiver. However, Mowbray
agreed that waivers could be oral.
(b) Evidence Regarding Straetker’s
Alleged Conflicts
The evidence showed that as a result of his work in
the Scotts Bluff County public defender’s office, Straetker
knew Mata prior to March 17, 1999, the date when Mata
was arraigned for Gomez’ murder. However, while Straetker
agreed he was “probably” in the courthouse that day, he did
not recall talking to Mata “at or before [Mata’s] arraignment.”
Straetker conceded that it was “possible” he or someone else
from his office spoke to Mata about “accepting” represen-
tation by the NCPA, and Straetker said he had no “reason
to dispute” Mata’s claim that Straetker recommended Mata
“accept[]” representation by the NCPA. Even so, Straetker
indicated that he was unlikely to have made such a comment

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STATE v. MATA
Cite as 321 Neb. 566
because he was not then the public defender, and his “boss did
not want us talking to anybody like that.” Straetker also noted
that indigent defendants do not have a choice of counsel; that
the courtroom where Mata was arraigned was on the other
side of the building; that there was heavy security surrounding
Mata, and he might not have been allowed to talk to Mata; and
that it was not his “practice to . . . go up and talk to people”
in Mata’s situation.
The evidence also showed that subsequently, in 2000, while
still with the public defender’s office, Straetker represented
Gomez’ grandfather. Straetker admitted that he never disclosed
this fact to Mata.
Straetker similarly admitted that in March 2012, shortly
after he personally began working on Mata’s case, he told
Mata he was “concerned there may be a conflict of interest in
[his office’s] representation of [Mata] in postconviction pro-
ceedings,” because of his service as an NCPA commissioner.
Straetker said his concern was based on his belief that another
attorney who had served as an NCPA commissioner was not
appointed to represent a former NCPA client on postconvic-
tion because that attorney had a conflict due to his service as
a commissioner. However, Straetker said he “talked about”
the issue with Mata and later learned that he was mistaken in
his belief about why the other attorney was not appointed to
represent the former NCPA client. Otherwise, Straetker said
he thought he was “okay” to keep Mata’s case because he was
no longer a commissioner, and the commissioners “didn’t have
any direct involvement with any of the ongoing cases.”
In contrast, Pickens, Mowbray, and Lindemeier all testi-
fied, at times over the State’s objection, that current or for-
mer NCPA commissioners should not “accept[] postconviction
appointments in cases where [the NCPA] served as trial or
appellate counsel.” According to Mowbray, this was because
the claims raised on postconviction often involve ineffective
assistance of counsel, and it is “difficult” for commissioners
to raise such claims due to the relationships they build with

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STATE v. MATA
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the NCPA attorneys. Mowbray was less sure there were con-
cerns arising from “[i]nformation and insights that a commis-
sioner receives that perhaps others might not be as privy to.”
Lindemeier similarly noted the relationships that commission-
ers develop with the NCPA attorneys. In addition, Lindemeier
said it “doesn’t pass the smell test” to argue that attorneys
whom one had “overseen as a commissioner” were not effec-
tive when NCPA policies call for effective representation.
Mowbray was not “aware of any other instance where an
active or former commissioner [had] accepted an appointment”
to represent a former client of the NCPA on postconviction.
He and Pickens also indicated they would support a policy
prohibiting this, but the evidence showed this had “never been
a policy.”
(c) Evidence Regarding NCPA
The evidence showed that the NCPA was created to relieve
counties of the expenses that can arise from the appointment
of counsel for indigent defendants, although the witnesses
disagreed about the difficulties that public defenders faced
in obtaining funds from county commissioners. Lindemeier
said that “[a]s a public defender . . . , [he did not] get a lot
of financial support from the [county] commissioners. They
don’t like to pay for . . . criminals.” In contrast, Straetker
said that he “didn’t really have very many problems with . . .
asking for money through the county commissioners.” There
was also evidence that the NCPA’s taking a case had other
benefits, including giving public defenders more time for
other cases and “taking some pressure off of the local bar” in
“messy” cases. The evidence similarly showed that the NCPA
made sample motions and briefs available to criminal defense
attorneys and provided other assistance to them.
According 	to 	the 	witnesses, 	the 	NCPA 	commissioners
“hired” and had “oversight” over the chief counsel, and the
chief counsel “reported” to them. The witnesses also said that
the commissioners “evaluate[d]” or “review[ed]” the chief

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STATE v. MATA
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counsel’s performance annually, with one “consideration[]”
being whether clients “were receiving . . . adequate repre-
sentation.” However, one witness who testified to this effect
seemed to characterize this evaluation as a “housekeeping”
matter, centered upon “whether [the chief counsel] should
continue . . . in his position.” There was also evidence that the
commissioners adopted policies, “signed off” on expenses for
expert witnesses and other items, and promoted the NCPA to
legislators, judges, and county commissioners. However, the
evidence showed that the commissioners were not “involved
in [the] individual decisions that were made in the representa-
tion of any client,” and the chief counsel never sought their
“permission” to take specific positions in cases. The evidence
likewise showed that the commissioners’ review of expenses
was limited to determining whether the expense was “a legiti-
mate cost of the defense.” Lindemeier, in particular, said he
could not “recall ever even informally talking” about whether
an expert should be retained.
In addition, the witnesses testified that, formally or infor-
mally, 	the 	commissioners 	received 	information 	about 	the
NCPA’s cases. Specifically, the witnesses said they received
“case 	lists,” 	identifying 	the 	NCPA’s 	clients, 	the 	charges
against 	them, 	their 	attorneys, 	and 	the 	case’s 	procedural
posture, as well as “financial reports” with “case costs.”
However, the witnesses said the information was provided
purely for “aware[ness]” and involved matters of “public
record.” According to the witnesses, the commissioners were
not aware of any “confidences” or “details,” they knew noth-
ing of the “guts of the case,” they did not know the case
strategy or litigation plans, and they had no access to the
attorneys’ files or communications. There was evidence that
“Mata’s case,” and, in particular, rulings in Mata’s case, were
discussed with the commissioners, in part because “a lot of
things that happened in that case . . . were pretty noteworthy
and newsworthy.” Also, Mowbray, who was the chief counsel

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at the time, said he wanted the commissioners to be “aware”
and “informed” of matters, such as the challenge to electrocu-
tion as a means of carrying out a death sentence, “[b]ecause
of the cost of all of that, I wanted them to be aware that what
we were doing wasn’t cheap.”
5. Subsequent Orders of District Court
After the hearing, the district court entered a journal entry
ruling on the admission of Mata’s exhibits. The court sustained
the State’s objections to the exhibits based on relevancy,
except as to the objections made during the depositions.
Subsequently, the court overruled all objections in the deposi-
tions and dismissed Mata’s successive motion for postconvic-
tion relief.
The court began by noting that this case was unlike Williams
because the counsel who filed Mata’s direct appeal did not also
file his initial postconviction motion. However, the court then
concluded that “Mata’s case [was] not a Williams situation”
because Straetker had no conflict of interest. In so conclud-
ing, the court observed that Mata was tried and sentenced
before Straetker began his term as an NCPA commissioner
and that Straetker was not appointed as Mata’s postconvic-
tion counsel until “years after” Mata was resentenced and
Straetker’s term as commissioner ended. The court acknowl-
edged Mata’s argument that the commissioners were “involved
in” and “supervis[ed]” the cases handled by the NCPA attor-
neys, “‘directly and indirectly supervised’” Mata’s attorneys,
and were “privy to information” about Mata’s case. However,
the court found that the evidence did not support Mata’s argu-
ment here. The court also opined that in acting as postconvic-
tion counsel, Straetker “was attentive” to the issue of conflicts,
but ultimately did not believe there was a conflict. The court
similarly observed that Straetker had raised claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of trial and appellate counsel, as well as other
claims, on Mata’s behalf.

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The court also concluded that Mata waived any conflict
based on Pickens’ prosecution of Mata and members of
Mata’s family. The court said it was “unclear whether a writ-
ten waiver was obtained,” but it found that there was “no dis-
pute” that Mata was aware of this circumstance and waived
the conflict.
As such, the court concluded that Mata was “not entitled
to bring” a successive postconviction motion. In particular,
the court said that Mata’s present claims could have been
raised either on direct appeal or in his initial postconviction
proceedings.
Mata appealed, and the case was assigned to our docket. 6
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Mata assigns, restated, renumbered, and reordered, that the
district court erred in (1) sustaining the State’s objections to
his exhibits; (2) rejecting his argument that due to conflicts
on the part of his initial postconviction counsel, his succes-
sive motion for postconviction relief was his first opportunity
to raise his claims; (3) finding that he waived any conflict on
Pickens’ part; (4) dismissing his successive motion for post-
conviction relief on procedural grounds; and (5) not granting
him a further evidentiary hearing on the merits of his claims.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] A trial court has the discretion to determine the rel-
evancy and admissibility of evidence, and such determinations
will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse
of that discretion. 7 A judicial abuse of discretion exists only
when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly unten-
able, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and
denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. 8
6 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
7 State v. Price, 320 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.3d 70 (2025).
8 Id.

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[3] In an evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconvic-
tion relief, the trial judge, as the trier of fact, resolves con-
flicts in the evidence and questions of fact. 9 An appellate
court upholds the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. 10
[4] Whether a claim raised in a postconviction proceeding
is procedurally barred is a question of law which an appellate
court reviews independently of the lower court’s ruling. 11
V. ANALYSIS
1. Any Error in Excluding Mata’s
Exhibits Was Harmless
Mata claims that the district court abused its discretion
in excluding most of his proposed exhibits on relevancy
grounds. Mata argues that relevancy is a “‘low bar’” 12 and
“‘requires only that the probative value be something more
than nothing.’” 13 Mata maintains that the excluded exhibits
cleared this bar and are relevant for various reasons. As such,
Mata argues that the evidence was admissible under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 2016), which prescribes that “[a]ll
relevant evidence is admissible” except as otherwise provided.
The State, in turn, argues that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding Mata’s exhibits. The State also argues
that even if the district court did abuse its discretion here, any
error was harmless because the evidence was cumulative. The
table below illustrates Mata’s claims regarding his exhibits and
their purported relevancy:
9 State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 317 Neb. 174, 9 N.W.3d 426 (2024).
10 Id.
11 State v. Harms, 315 Neb. 445, 996 N.W.2d 859 (2023).
12 Brief for appellant at 36 (quoting State v. Munoz, 303 Neb. 69, 927
N.W.2d 25 (2019)).
13 Brief for appellant at 36 (quoting State v. Devers, 306 Neb. 429, 945
N.W.2d 470 (2020)).

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Exhibit Numbers and
Contents
Purported Relevancy
1001-1006 (prior Nebraska
Supreme Court opinions
in Mata’s case and related
briefs)
Relevant to compare the
claims Mata asserts should
have been raised to those
appellate counsel raised
1001-1006, 1008, 1009,
1013 (prior Nebraska
Supreme Court opinions
in Mata’s case and related
briefs); 1016, 1046, 1059-
1062, 1068, 1069, 1165
(materials related to trial
and sentencing); 1176-1178
(materials related to initial
postconviction proceeding)
Relevant to the constitution-
ality of Mata’s conviction
and death sentence
1017-1034, 1069, 1070,
1187 (materials related to
trial and sentencing); 1048-
1058 (records related to
Pickens’ prior prosecution
of Mata and Mata’s family
members); 1063-1067 (infor-
mation about Mata’s mental
health and family back-
ground); 1170-1175 (NCPA
correspondence regarding
Mata’s case); 1179 (death
penalty defense manual);
1185, 1186 (Scotts Bluff
County budgets and audits)
Show the claims that
conflict-free counsel would
allegedly have raised on
postconviction

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Exhibit Numbers and
Contents
Purported Relevancy
1048-1058, 1085, 1170,
1171 (records related to
Pickens’ prosecution of
Mata and Mata’s family
members); 1172 (materials
related to sentencing); 1173
(records related to Pickens’
investigation of Mata for
murder)
Show Pickens previously
prosecuted Mata and Mata’s
family members and inves-
tigated Mata for another
murder
1075-1081 (ethics advisory
opinions for lawyers)
Address circumstances like
those allegedly present here
1082-1085 (records from
cases where Straetker or his
office represented Mata);
1180 (Mata’s declara-
tion); 1205, 1206 (court
records from day of Mata’s
arraignment)
Relevant to Mata’s claim
that Straetker advised him to
accept representation by the
NCPA
1086-1106 (NCPA annual
reports); 1107 (webpage
listing commissioners and
staff); 1108-1122, 1161
(rules and regulations);
1123-1125 (NCPA policy
and procedure manuals);
1126-1135, 1140-1156
(NCPA agendas and min-
utes); 1159, 1160, 1204
(standards); 1162 (statutes);
1163 (news coverage)
Explain the NCPA and the
types of actions Straetker
would have taken as an
NCPA commissioner

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Exhibit Numbers and
Contents
Purported Relevancy
1167 (email chain involving
Pickens and Straetker)
Shows that the NCPA was a
resource for Straetker
1168, 1174, 1187-1203
(materials related to
Mowbray’s work on case)
Show Mowbray’s involve-
ment in Mata’s case
1168, 1169 (NCPA’s costs
in defending Mata); 1185,
1186 (Scotts Bluff County
budgets and audits)
Show the financial benefits
to the county of the NCPA’s
representation of Mata
[5-7] We agree with the State that any error in excluding
Mata’s exhibits was harmless because the evidence was cumu-
lative. The admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible
error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the
complaining party. 14 Specifically, the erroneous exclusion of
evidence does not require reversal if the evidence would have
been cumulative and other relevant evidence, properly admit-
ted, supports the trial court’s finding. 15 Cumulative evidence
means evidence tending to prove the same point to which
other evidence has been offered. 16 In this case, even without
the exhibits noted above, there was other properly admitted
evidence that supported the district court’s conclusion that
Straetker had no conflict, as explained below. That conclusion
is dispositive of Mata’s claim that Pickens, too, had conflicts,
as also explained below.
Mata attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that
the State “effectively conceded” that most of “the exclusions
were in error” by giving only “‘illustrative’” examples of
14 Jaeger v. Jaeger, 307 Neb. 910, 951 N.W.2d 367 (2020).
15 Id.
16 State v. Hagens, 320 Neb. 65, 26 N.W.3d 174 (2025).

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how the excluded exhibits were cumulative and not “specifi-
cally address[ing] the other excluded exhibits.” 17 Moreover,
Mata argues that even when the State did address specific
exhibits by way of illustration, it “failed to do so with suffi-
cient particularity,” 18 apparently because it did not “articulate
which specific facts [were] cumulative.” 19 However, Mata
bases those arguments on opinions of this and other courts
that have no application here 20—and that would not preclude
us from affirming the trial court’s order on the ground that
the evidence was cumulative even if the State had waived
the argument.
Mata’s apparent argument that evidence cannot be cumula-
tive if it includes any fact not contained in the admitted evi-
dence is equally unavailing. In arguing that there is no merit
to the State’s claim that the excluded evidence of Mowbray’s
involvement in Mata’s case was cumulative, Mata points to an
excluded exhibit he claims showed Mowbray “spent at least
81.75 hours working on Mata’s case.” 21 Mata seems to suggest
that this exhibit was improperly excluded insofar as this fact
17 Reply brief for appellant at 16.
18 Id. at 17.
19 Id. at 19.
20 See, State v. Garcia, 315 Neb. 74, 994 N.W.2d 610 (2023) (to be
considered by appellate court, party asserting alleged error must both
specifically assign and specifically argue error in party’s initial brief of
error); Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, 313 Neb. 302, 984 N.W.2d
596 (2023) (same); State v. Cook, 290 Neb. 381, 860 N.W.2d 408 (2015)
(same). See, also, U.S. v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 2009) (similar);
Gilbert v. Des Moines Area Community College, 495 F.3d 906 (8th Cir.
2007) (appellate court limiting its review to specific arguments that
appellant raised before trial court); White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
904 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1990) (on motion for summary judgment, trial court
is not required to speculate on which portion of record nonmoving party
relies).
21 Reply brief for appellant at 19.

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was not in the admitted evidence. We disagree. Mata’s example
is inapposite because the admitted evidence actually included
Mowbray’s testimony that he “logged” 81.75 hours “for reim-
bursement purposes” in Mata’s case. However, even if the
admitted evidence had failed to show the specific number of
hours Mowbray “logged,” the excluded exhibit would still be
cumulative insofar as Mata offered it to show that Mowbray—
someone he claims was “directly supervised” 22 by Straetker—
was extensively involved in the case. 23
[8] We similarly reject Mata’s claim that in arguing that
the evidence was cumulative, the State proves the evidence
was relevant and, as such, should have been admitted. Under
the standard of review noted above, in determining whether
the erroneous exclusion of evidence requires reversal, we look
not only to whether the evidence was cumulative, but also to
whether other relevant evidence, properly admitted, supports
the trial court’s finding. 24 However, we also note that Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2016) allows the exclusion of
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 25 Here,
for example, the presentation of all of the NCPA’s annual
reports, even for years when Straetker was not a commis-
sioner, appears to be needless, given the extensive testimony
22 Brief for appellant at 52.
23 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 252 Neb. 187, 203, 560 N.W.2d 829, 841 (1997)
(exhibits that incorporated “same substantive themes” as another exhibit
and “tend[ed] to prove the same point” were cumulative evidence),
disapproved on other grounds, State v. Myers, 258 Neb. 300, 603 N.W.2d
378 (1999). See, also, State v. Kruger, 320 Neb. 361, 27 N.W.3d 398
(2025) (similar).
24 See Jaeger, supra note 14.
25 State v. Wilson, 320 Neb. 728, 30 N.W.3d 165 (2026).

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about the NCPA and the “types of actions” Straetker would
have taken as an NCPA commissioner. 26
Previously, in State v. Boppre, 27 we “expressly disapprove[d]”
of the practice of submitting particularly lengthy motions
(in fact, the district court noted Boppre in connection with
Mata’s 282-page successive motion for postconviction relief).
We take this opportunity to expand on Boppre by expressly
disapproving of offering particularly large numbers of cumula-
tive exhibits.
Finally, having declined to disturb the district court’s rel-
evancy ruling, we must address Mata’s argument that we could
nonetheless take judicial notice of the exhibits containing our
prior opinions and other court filings. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-201
(Reissue 2016) authorizes courts to take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts. 28 However, even assuming a motion for
judicial notice can be made in a brief, as Mata purports to
do, we decline to take judicial notice of the exhibits in ques-
tion because we can resolve the case without doing so. 29 Also,
insofar as Mata apparently argues that the court filings “dem-
onstrate ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel,” 30 the
U.S. Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan 31 did not recognize
a constitutional right to effective assistance of postconvic-
tion counsel. As such, there is no cognizable constitutional
claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel under
Nebraska law. 32
26 Brief for appellant at 53.
27 State v. Boppre, 315 Neb. 203, 227, 995 N.W.2d 28, 49 (2023).
28 See, e.g., Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, 235 Neb. 816, 458 N.W.2d 443
(1990) (fact is adjudicative if it affects determination of controverted issue
in litigation).
29 See, e.g., State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing, 319 Neb.
663, 24 N.W.3d 861 (2025).
30 Reply brief for appellant at 20.
31 Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012).
32 See, e.g., State v. Hessler, 288 Neb. 670, 850 N.W.2d 777 (2014).

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2. Mata’s Case Was Properly Distinguished
From Williams Because Straetker
Had No Conflict of Interest
Mata also claims that the district court erred in concluding
that he was not entitled to bring a successive motion for post-
conviction relief under Williams. 33 In Williams, the defendant
was represented by the same counsel for both his direct appeal
and his first postconviction proceeding. Under those circum-
stances, we concluded that the defendant was entitled to raise
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a second
postconviction motion, because the defendant’s initial postcon-
viction counsel could not be expected to raise his own ineffec-
tiveness. 34 Specifically, we reasoned that “requir[ing] counsel
to raise his or her own ineffectiveness, . . . ‘would create the
potential for a conflict of interest.’” 35
Unlike the defendant in Williams, Mata had different counsel
for his direct appeal and for his first postconviction proceed-
ing. Nonetheless, Mata maintains that his case is like Williams
because Straetker had four separate conflicts of interest that,
individually and collectively, kept him from raising claims
regarding the effectiveness and conflicts of Mata’s trial and
appellate counsel. Mata argues that the district court failed to
address or recognize Straetker’s conflicts and, thus, incorrectly
concluded that Mata’s case was distinguishable from Williams.
The State counters that Mata’s reliance on Williams is mis-
placed because Straetker had no conflict of interest.
(a) Sixth Amendment Right to
Conflict-Free Counsel
[9-12] The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guarantees every criminal defendant the right to effective
33 Williams, supra note 1.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 589, 889 N.W.2d at 113.

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assistance of counsel. 36 The right to effective assistance of
counsel entitles the accused to the undivided loyalty of an
attorney, free from any conflict of interest. 37 A conflict of
interest exists when a defense attorney is placed in a situa-
tion inherently conducive to divided loyalties. 38 The phrase
“conflict of interest” denotes a situation in which regard for
one duty tends to lead to disregard of another, where a law-
yer’s representation of one client is rendered less effective by
reason of his or her representation of another client, or where
it becomes a lawyer’s duty on behalf of one client to con-
tend for that which the lawyer’s duty to another client would
require him or her to oppose. 39
[13-15] To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment,
a defendant who raises no objection at trial (and Mata does
not allege that he raised any such objection) must demonstrate
that his or her lawyer actively represented conflicting interests
and that the actual conflict of interest adversely affected the
lawyer’s performance. 40 While a defendant who shows that
a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his or
her representation need not demonstrate prejudice, such con-
flict of interest must be shown to have resulted in counsel’s
conduct detrimental to the defense. 41 An asserted conflict of
interest must be actual, rather than speculative or hypothetical,
before a conviction can be overturned on the ground of inef-
fective assistance of counsel. 42
In this case, for the reasons set forth below, we agree with
the State that Mata failed to show that Straetker had an actual
36 State v. Hudson, 270 Neb. 752, 708 N.W.2d 602 (2005).
37 State v. Narcisse, 260 Neb. 55, 615 N.W.2d 110 (2000).
38 State v. Marchese, 245 Neb. 975, 515 N.W.2d 670 (1994).
39 Id.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 Id.

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conflict of interest due to (1) his service as an NCPA commis-
sioner, (2) his incentives as a public defender, (3) his alleged
advice that Mata accept representation by the NCPA, or (4) his
representation of Gomez’ grandfather. As such, we need not
address Mata’s arguments about how Straetker’s performance
was allegedly adversely affected. 43
(b) Straetker’s Service as NCPA Commissioner
Mata argues that the district court erred in failing to rec-
ognize that Straetker had a conflict of interest based on his
service as an NCPA commissioner. Mata takes issue with
specific aspects of the district court’s order, as noted below.
However, Mata primarily points to evidence he claims shows
that as a commissioner, Straetker was part of the “same
organization” 44 as the NCPA attorneys for purposes of Neb.
Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. § 3-501.10 and effectively served as
a managing partner of that organization. Mata argues that in
representing him on postconviction, Straetker would have had
to raise his own effectiveness and that of his coworkers—
something that has been recognized to create the “‘potential
for a conflict of interest.’” 45 Mata also argues that Straetker’s
“loyalty” to the NCPA and his “relationships” with NCPA
attorneys “constituted a ‘personal interest’ that hindered his
43 See, e.g., Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554 (11th Cir. 1994) (declining to
address whether counsel’s performance was adversely affected when there
was no proof of conflict).
44 Brief for appellant at 49.
45 Williams, supra note 1, 295 Neb. at 589, 889 N.W.2d at 113. See State
v. Payne, 289 Neb. 467, 855 N.W.2d 783 (2014). See, also, Christeson v.
Roper, 574 U.S. 373, 135 S. Ct. 891, 190 L. Ed. 2d 763 (2015); Cannon
v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds,
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557
(2011) (abrogation recognized by United States v. Freeman, No. 24-5019,
2025 WL 1179147 (10th Cir. Apr. 23, 2025)); Koste v. Dormire, 345 F.3d
974 (8th Cir. 2003); Burns v. Gammon, 173 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Rossbach, 701 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1979).

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ability to investigate and litigate” the errors of Mata’s trial
and appellate counsel, 46 in violation of Neb. Ct. R. of Prof.
Cond. § 3-501.7(a)(2) (rev. 2019). We see no merit to those
arguments.
The NCPA is essentially a legal services agency, and it
has long been recognized that the relationship of board mem-
bers and staff attorneys within such organizations “differs
in important respects” from that between attorneys within a
law firm or legal services agency. 47 As such, it has gener-
ally been recognized that so long as the board “limit[s] itself
to establishing broad policies governing the operation of the
program,” 48 attorney members of the board and staff attorneys
may represent clients with adverse interests. 49 It is when the
board has an “opportunity for shared knowledge of a client’s
affairs,” 50 or “interfere[s] or in any manner attempt[s] to influ-
ence a staff attorney or his [or her] independent judgement in
the handling of the case,” 51 that conflicts can arise. Although
Mata does not expressly rely on the authorities cited here,
he claims that the commissioners shared in the staff attor-
ney’s knowledge and “exert[ed] considerable control” over
46 Brief for appellant at 48.
47 Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (D. Conn. 1974).
48 Neb. Ethics Adv. Op. for Lawyers No. 80-8 (1980). See, also, Estep, supra
note 47, 383 F. Supp. at 1326 (board’s responsibility for “broad policy
formulation poses no general threat to the staff attorney’s independence”);
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 324 (1970)
(similar).
49 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Luby’s, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D. Ariz. 2004);
Neb. Ethics Adv. Op. for Lawyers No. 11-04 (2011); Neb. Ethics Adv. Op.
for Lawyers No. 80-8, supra note 48; Neb. Ethics Adv. Op. for Lawyers
No. 79-8 (1979).
50 Estep, supra note 47, 383 F. Supp. at 1325. See, also, Luby’s, Inc., supra
note 49; Allen v. Academic Games Leagues of America, Inc., 831 F. Supp.
785 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Berry v. Saline Memorial Hosp., 322 Ark. 182, 907
S.W.2d 736 (1995); William H. Raley Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App.
3d 1042, 197 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1983).
51 Neb. Ethics Adv. Op. for Lawyers No. 80-8, supra note 48.

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the NCPA and its attorneys. 52 However, even if the situation
here were seen to be tantamount to a board member and a staff
attorney representing clients with conflicting interests, the
evidence does not support Mata’s claims about the commis-
sioners’ knowledge or their control over the staff attorneys’
handling of individual cases.
Mata asserts that the NCPA commissioners were “privy to
information about [his] case.” 53 However, the evidence shows
the commissioners’ knowledge was limited to matters of “pub-
lic record.” The commissioners knew “the client, the charges,
the procedural posture of a case, whether a case was going to
trial, and specific rulings in the case.” 54 However, they were
not aware of any “confidences” or “details,” and they did not
know the case strategy or litigation plan. Moreover, the meet-
ings at which Mata claims his and other cases were discussed
were “public” or “open” meetings that anyone could attend.
Insofar as Mata complains of a conflict of interest, and not
a breach of confidentiality, 55 we reject the suggestion that
Straetker could have received information about Mata’s case to
which other people were not privy at a public meeting. There
was evidence of informal discussions with the commissioners
outside the public meetings. However, as explained above,
there was nothing to suggest the information shared in those
discussions included nonpublic information.
There is a similar lack of evidentiary support for Mata’s
claim that the commissioners could control the staff attorneys’
judgment in handling individual cases. Mata claims that the
commissioners “directly and indirectly supervised” the staff
attorneys, 56 “implemented personnel policy,” 57 “navigat[ed]”
52 Brief for appellant at 43.
53 Id. at 41.
54 Id. at 45-46.
55 See Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. § 3-501.6(a) (rev. 2019).
56 Brief for appellant at 49.
57 Reply brief for appellant at 13.

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grievances and personnel issues, 58 addressed issues with attor-
ney representation, and maintained the NCPA’s reputation,
among other things. In so arguing, Mata overstates the evi-
dence in the record. For example, Mata’s claim that the com-
missioners supervised the attorneys is based in part on evi-
dence showing that the commissioners hired the chief counsel,
evaluated his or her performance, and had oversight over him
or her. 59 But “report[ing]” and “oversight” do not constitute
direct supervision as that term is conventionally understood. 60
There were similar issues with the evidence underlying Mata’s
other claims here, as the table below illustrates, and the evi-
dence otherwise shows that the commissioners had no involve-
ment in the individual decisions that were made in the repre-
sentation of any client.
Mata’s Claim 	Evidence at Trial
Commissioners were seen as
bosses by the NCPA staff
Staff attorneys called
Lindemeier the “boss” when
they saw him at events to
“give [him] a hard time”
Commissioners policed the
office and made sure things
got done correctly
Lindemeier made this
statement in response to a
question about whether staff
could report issues with the
chief counsel to the com-
missioners; otherwise, the
evidence showed the chief
counsel “administered” and
“managed” the office
58 Brief for appellant at 44.
59 Cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3928 (Cum. Supp. 2024) (chief counsel appointed
by commissioners and serve at their pleasure with salary set by them).
60 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hegar, 484 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. App. 2016)
(“direct supervision” involves supervisor’s being physically present and
personally directing performance of directed acts).

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Mata’s Claim 	Evidence at Trial
Commissioners could direct
the activities of the NCPA
staff through the chief
counsel
Mowbray understood a
commissioner’s comments
about defense attorneys’
being misquoted in the press
to mean he should talk to
Soucie about his comments
to the press and did so
Commissioners interacted
with the NCPA staff and
could convene them for
meetings
Staff rarely attended com-
mission meetings; but one
time, at a commissioner’s
request, the commissioners
had lunch with the staff to
get to know them
Commissioners could award
performance-based pay to
NCPA staff
Lindemeier said Mowbray
occasionally brought
requests for bonus pay to
the commissioners and they
usually deferred to him;
Mowbray said the com-
missioners considered his
requests, but he made the
final decision; attorney
performance was discussed
in connection with requests
for bonus pay, but the only
examples of this concerned
the amount of work

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Mata’s Claim 	Evidence at Trial
Commissioners implemented
personnel policy and played
a crucial role in navigat-
ing grievances or personnel
issues between the chief
counsel and NCPA staff;
the chief counsel discussed
personnel problems and dis-
cipline issues with them
Lindemeier and Mowbray
gave somewhat different
testimony as to whether
the chief counsel discussed
performance problems and
discipline issues with the
commissioners; however,
there was no evidence the
discussions involved con-
fidential information about
specific cases; general infor-
mation about staff turnover
and activities was shared for
awareness, and not for board
action
Commissioners were respon-
sible for addressing issues
with attorney representation,
ensuring the NCPA provided
effective representation, and
maintaining the NCPA’s
reputation
There was evidence the
commissioners advocated for
the NCPA with judges, leg-
islators, and county commis-
sioners and they sometimes
heard from judges about
staff attorneys’ performance,
but only comments noted
concerned matters of public
record, like the number and
length of motions and the
tasks they completed

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Mata’s Claim 	Evidence at Trial
Commissioners referred to
specific cases when explain-
ing why they believed
clients were receiving effec-
tive assistance when evalu-
ating the chief counsel’s
performance
When referring to specific
cases, the commissioners
focused on matters of public
record, such as the fact that
a charge was dismissed
or the death penalty was
avoided
Commissioners evaluated
attorneys’ work product
Commissioners discussed
attorney performance, as
described above, but there
was no evidence they
reviewed materials prepared
by or for attorneys to assist
in prosecution or defense of
pending suits or in reason-
able anticipation of litigation
Similarly, we see no merit to Mata’s argument that Straetker
had a personal interest conflict due to his “loyalty” to the
NCPA, his “relationships” with NCPA attorneys, and other
alleged interests of this nature. 61 We have historically viewed
personal interest conflicts as “arguably the least consequential
type of conflict,” because “‘when the attorney has a personal
conflict, the attorney can still fulfill his or her duty of loy-
alty to a client, although doing so may be to the detriment
of the attorney’s personal interest.’” 62 And the record in this
case does not support a finding that Straetker’s purported
personal interests “would have tempted him” to act against
61 See brief for appellant at 48. See, also, Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond.
§ 3-501.7(a)(2) (rev. 2019).
62 State v. Malone, 308 Neb. 929, 948, 957 N.W.2d 892, 912 (2021), modified
on denial of rehearing 309 Neb. 399, 959 N.W.2d 818.

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Mata’s interests. 63 There was evidence Straetker “enjoyed”
his service on the NCPA. However, he never described feel-
ing loyalty to the NCPA. It was Lindemeier, who served far
longer as a commissioner than Straetker did, who testified to
that effect. There was similarly no evidence Straetker had a
particularly close relationship with any NCPA attorney. There
was merely testimony that commissioners got to know the
NCPA attorneys, assuming that they did not already know
them from other contexts. We have previously declined to
find a conflict of interest under similar circumstances. 64
Mata also seems to suggest that Straetker had a personal
interest conflict because Mowbray “recruited” him and “advo-
cated” for his appointment as a commissioner. 65 However, the
evidence shows only that, consistent with his usual practice,
Mowbray contacted Straetker to see if he would be willing to
fill a vacancy on the commission and then forwarded his name
to the Governor for consideration.
Mata’s remaining arguments as to why the district court
was mistaken in not finding a conflict of interest based on
Straetker’s service as a commissioner are equally unavailing.
Mata takes issue with the district court’s reading of Williams
and its statement that (1) there was “little if any temporal con-
nection” between Straetker’s service as a commissioner and
63 See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 294 Neb. 1, 22, 880 N.W.2d 642, 655 (2016).
64 See, e.g., Malone, supra note 62 (finding that purported family relationship
between defendant’s attorney and victim did not amount to actual conflict
of interest where attorney was, at best, distant relative of victim, and there
was nothing in record to suggest attorney felt any loyalty to victim or
victim’s immediate family); Edwards, supra note 63 (despite defendant’s
claim that his counsel was friend of material prosecution witness, evidence
showed relationship was strictly professional, and counsel and witness
never went out to dinner or drinks or engaged in any kind of activity
typically done with friends); State v. Jackson, 275 Neb. 434, 747 N.W.2d
418 (2008) (no evidence to show trial counsel had personal relationship
with appellate counsel).
65 Reply brief for appellant at 20.

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his representation of Mata on postconviction, (2) Straetker
was attentive to conflicts, and (3) Straetker raised claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on Mata’s behalf. 66
However, even if we were to agree the district court was mis-
taken in one or more of those regards, it would not change our
view that the district court did not err in concluding that Mata
failed to show Straetker had a conflict due to his service as an
NCPA commissioner.
(c) NCPA Resources
Mata also argues that the district court erred by failing to
find that Straetker had a conflict based on his “incentives” as
a public defender to remain on good terms with the NCPA. 67
Mata points to evidence he claims shows that the financial and
other benefits of the NCPA’s taking cases in Scotts Bluff County
were such that there was a conflict between “[Straetker’s] duty
to argue NCPA attorneys ineffectively represented Mata” 68 and
his “responsibility to . . . Scotts Bluff County [public defender]
clients who benefited from NCPA’s resources,” 69 in violation
of § 3-501.7(a)(2). The State disagrees that Straetker was “dis-
incentivized to criticize [the NCPA] attorneys.” 70 As such, the
State claims there was no conflict.
Mata’s argument here is based in part on evidence regard-
ing the impetus behind the creation of the NCPA, the services
it provides, the financial and other benefits of its taking a
case, its discretion in accepting cases, and Straetker’s use of
NCPA resources to obtain sample briefs and identify experts
that, were it seen to create a conflict of interest on Straetker’s
part, would also seem to create a conflict of interest on the
part of every public defender and criminal defense counsel in
66 See Williams, supra note 1.
67 Brief for appellant at 59.
68 Id. at 57.
69 Id. at 57-58.
70 Brief for appellee at 22.

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the State. Mata cites no authority to support such a view, and
we decline to find a conflict on that basis.
As to the other evidence upon which Mata relies, it is less
conclusive than he suggests. Mata points to evidence he claims
shows that Straetker never objected to the NCPA’s taking a
case; that Straetker had to submit a proposed budget every
year to the county commissioners, “who at times[] directed
[him] to make cuts” 71; and that attorneys can “have ‘hard
feelings’ when facing allegations of ineffective assistance.” 72
However, there was also evidence that Straetker declined to
have the NCPA take certain cases and instead had his office
handle them; that “most of the time” the county commission-
ers would “just approve” his proposed budget; that the com-
missioners supported him in hiring another attorney; that he
never informed staff that “they needed to limit the number
of trainings that they attended” due to budget constraints;
and that the only time the county commissioners requested
he make some budget cuts was in his “last year” as public
defender—which, depending upon what Straetker meant by
that phrase, could have been after he filed Mata’s second
amended motion for postconviction relief.
There was also evidence that the NCPA attorneys had had
friends raise claims of ineffective assistance against them,
that they were not “offended” by such claims, and that their
practice of providing briefs and other assistance to criminal
defense counsel would not have been “change[d]” by claims of
ineffective assistance raised against them. In fact, the NCPA’s
“major case resource center” is required by statute to be avail-
able, subject to the caseload standards of the commission,
“to assist public defenders, contracting attorneys, or court-
appointed attorneys with the defense of a felony offense.” 73
There are similar statutory requirements as to the provision of
71 Brief for appellant at 57.
72 Id.
73 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3930(5) (Cum. Supp. 2024).

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other assistance by the commission, 74 although it is generally
not required to take specific cases, 75 as Mata argues.
The district court heard all this evidence and did not con-
clude that Straetker had a conflict of interest based on his
purported incentives as a public defender to remain on good
terms with the NCPA. Under the standard of review set forth
above, we give deference to that conclusion, and we see no
error here.
(d) Alleged Advice to Accept
Representation by NCPA
Mata similarly argues that the district court erred in fail-
ing to find that Straetker had a conflict based on his alleged
advice that Mata accept representation by the NCPA. Mata
claims that Straetker “personally vouched for the quality
of representation [he] would receive.” 76 Mata argues that
Straetker could not challenge the quality of the NCPA’s
representation 	without 	acknowledging 	his 	own 	“ineffec-
tive advice” that Mata should accept representation by the
NCPA. 77 The State counters that “Straetker’s advice to Mata
would not itself have been ineffective assistance, so Straetker
was not being forced to acknowledge his own ineffectiveness
to raise those claims.” 78
Mata is correct that courts have opined that “‘[a]dvice as
well as advocacy is permeated by counsel’s self-interest, and
no rational defendant would knowingly and intelligently be
represented by a lawyer whose conduct was guided largely
74 § 29-3930(1) through (4).
75 But see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4122 (Reissue 2016) (under DNA Testing
Act, NCPA shall be appointed to represent indigent defendant unless chief
counsel declines appointment due to conflict of interest or because case
would exceed caseload standards set by commission).
76 Brief for appellant at 60.
77 Id.
78 Brief for appellee at 22.

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by a desire for self-preservation.’” 79 However, we see noth-
ing in the record to support Mata’s assertion that Straetker’s
purported advice implicated his self-interest. As noted above,
Mata claims Straetker “personally vouched for the quality” of
the representation Mata would receive from the NCPA. 80 But
even if Mata’s deposition had been admitted into evidence, it
would have shown only that Mata claimed Straetker told him
the NCPA “had really good lawyers or . . . would do a really
good job” and “would have more resources available to defend
[him],” and he relied on Straetker’s advice in agreeing to
accept NCPA representation. We are not persuaded that those
comments amount to personally vouching for the quality of
the NCPA’s representation.
We also note that there was evidence calling into ques-
tion whether the conversation described by Mata occurred.
Straetker did not dispute that he was “probably” in the court-
house on the day of Mata’s arraignment and that he or some-
one else from the public defender’s office “possibl[y]” talked
to Mata. Nor did he dispute Mata’s account of the alleged
conversation. However, Straetker said he had no recollection
of this conversation and indicated that he was unlikely to have
made such a statement for various reasons, as discussed earlier
in this opinion.
Mata relies primarily upon Christeson v. Roper 81 in arguing
that Straetker had a conflict based on his purported advice to
Mata. In Christeson, the defendant’s counsel failed to meet
with him until more than 6 weeks after his federal habeas
petition was due and finally filed the petition 117 days late.
Tolling of the relevant statute of limitations was available for
“‘serious instances of attorney misconduct.’” 82 However, the
79 Brief for appellant at 60 (quoting U.S. v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.
1993)).
80 Brief for appellant at 60.
81 Christeson, supra note 45.
82 Id., 574 U.S. at 378.

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U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that advancing such a claim
would have required the attorneys to “denigrate their own
performance.” 83 The circumstances here, however, fall far short
of those in Christeson, even assuming Mata did accept repre-
sentation by the NCPA based on Straetker’s statement that the
NCPA attorneys were “good lawyers” or would do a “good
job” and had “more resources available to defend [him].”
(e) Prior Representation of Gomez’ Grandfather
Finally, Mata argues that the district court erred in failing
to find that Straetker had a conflict based on his prior repre-
sentation of Gomez’ grandfather. Mata claims that as a result
of this representation, Straetker owed Gomez’ grandfather a
“duty of continued loyalty” that was incompatible with his
representation of Mata, and he did not secure Mata’s waiver
of the conflict. 84 The State concedes Straetker owed Gomez’
grandfather a duty of loyalty, but argues that this duty did
not preclude his representing Mata. The State also argues that
there is nothing in the record showing Straetker “maintained
a relationship with his former client that would have affected
his ability to represent Mata.” 85 We see no error by the dis-
trict court here.
In arguing otherwise, Mata relies on Neb. Ct. R. Prof. Cond.
§ 3-501.9 and Jennings v. Purkett. 86 Section 3-501.9 does not
preclude a lawyer from representing a person whose interests
are adverse to those of a former client in every case. Rather, it
prohibits a lawyer, who formerly represented a client in a mat-
ter, from thereafter representing another person “in the same
or a substantially related matter in which that person’s inter-
ests are materially adverse” to the former client’s interests,
83 Id.
84 Brief for appellant at 62.
85 Brief for appellee at 23.
86 Jennings v. Purkett, 7 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1993).

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absent the former client’s informed consent, confirmed in
writing. 87 Section 3-501.9 also prohibits a lawyer from using
information related to the representation of the former cli-
ent to the former client’s disadvantage or revealing informa-
tion related to the representation, except as provided in the
rule. 88 There is nothing to suggest this matter is the same as
or substantially related to the matter in which Straetker repre-
sented Gomez’ grandfather, 89 or that Straetker used informa-
tion related to his representation of Gomez’ grandfather to the
grandfather’s disadvantage or revealed information related to
that representation.
Mata’s reliance on language in Jennings regarding conflicts
based on a defense attorney’s “‘ties with the [] victim’s fam-
ily’” is similarly misplaced. 90 In Jennings, a federal court of
appeals concluded that the defendant might be able to show
the prejudice required to excuse a procedural default if the
conflict of interest he alleged on the part of his trial counsel
were proved. 91 The alleged conflict in Jennings involved a
situation where the defendant’s attorney had sold real estate
to the victim’s mother; the deed to the property may have
required the victim’s mother to make payments to the attorney
while he represented the defendant; the attorney suggested the
defendant’s mother talk with the victim’s mother because she
was “‘a good woman and I know her very well’” 92; and the
attorney discussed the case with the victim’s mother prior to
87 § 3-501.9(a).
88 § 3-501.9(c).
89 See, e.g., § 3-501.9, comment 3 (“[m]atters are ‘substantially related’ for
purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or
if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information
as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would
materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter”).
90 Brief for appellant at 62 (quoting Jennings, supra note 86).
91 Jennings, supra note 86.
92 Jennings, supra note 86, 7 F.3d at 780.

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the defendant’s plea, purportedly to evaluate the strength of
the State’s case. During one of those discussions, the victim’s
mother told the attorney she believed the defendant raped her
daughter. The attorney said he was “‘a little bit afraid that
[the victim’s mother] might have held [his representation of
the defendant] against [him] a little bit from the standpoint that
she was thinking about the property there.’” 93
Here, in contrast, there was no evidence of any ties between
Straetker and Gomez’ family beyond Straetker’s representa-
tion of Gomez’ grandfather on a matter that is not alleged to
be related to the present matter. The previous matter occurred
9 years before Mata filed the pro se motion for postconviction
relief in connection with which the Scotts Bluff County pub-
lic defender’s office was subsequently appointed to represent
him. Unlike in Jennings, there was no evidence that Straetker
had any business dealings or other relationship with Gomez’
grandfather while he represented Mata, that he discussed
the case with Gomez’ grandfather or heard the grandfather’s
views regarding Mata’s guilt, or that he was concerned that
Gomez’ grandfather might hold his representation of Mata
against him.
That Gomez’ father is a statutorily defined “victim” for pur-
poses of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1848(1) (Reissue 2024) does not
change our conclusion here. 94
3. Claim Regarding Pickens’ Alleged
Conflicts Is Procedurally Barred
[16] Mata claims the district court erred in failing to rec-
ognize that Pickens had a conflict of interest based on his
representation of Gomez’ grandfather and in finding that Mata
waived Pickens’ other conflicts. The district court granted
an evidentiary hearing on Pickens’ purported conflicts and
reached a conclusion based, at least in part, on its view of
93 Id.
94 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-119 (Supp. 2025).

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the merits of that claim. We, however, affirm the order of the
district court because we find Mata’s claim regarding Pickens’
conflicts to be procedurally barred for the reasons set forth
below. An appellate court has the discretion to affirm, as it
deems appropriate, a correct result that was reached below for
the wrong reason. 95
4. Mata’s Other Claims Are Also Procedurally
Barred or Not Cognizable
Finally, Mata argues that the district court erred in dismiss-
ing his successive motion for postconviction relief on proce-
dural grounds and in not granting him any further evidentiary
hearing on the merits of his claims. We disagree. Our conclu-
sion that Mata failed to prove his postconviction counsel had
conflicts of interest that prevented counsel from raising Mata’s
claims regarding his representation by the NCPA is dispositive
of all Mata’s claims except his claim that he received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel from Straetker in conjunction with
his initial motion for postconviction relief.
[17,18] The need for finality in the criminal process requires
that a defendant bring all claims for relief at the first opportu-
nity. 96 The effect of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(3) (Cum. Supp.
2024) is to require that all available grounds for postconviction
relief must be stated in the initial postconviction motion and,
once that motion has been judicially determined, any subse-
quent postconviction motion regarding the same conviction
and sentence may be dismissed by the district court unless the
motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis relied
upon for relief was not available at the time of filing the prior
motion. 97
In this case, Mata could have raised all his claims, except
his claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel,
95 Sebade v. Sebade, 320 Neb. 398, 28 N.W.3d 19 (2025).
96 State v. Galindo, 315 Neb. 1, 994 N.W.2d 562 (2023).
97 State v. Lotter, 311 Neb. 878, 976 N.W.2d 721 (2022).

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on direct appeal or in his initial motion for postconviction
relief. Therefore, those claims are procedurally barred.
Mata’s constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel is not cognizable, as explained above. 98
VI. CONCLUSION
Mata was not entitled to bring a successive motion for post-
conviction relief under Williams, and his other arguments are
without merit. As such, we affirm the order of the district court.
Affirmed.
Freudenberg and Bergevin, JJ., not participating.
98 See Hessler, supra note 32.