State v. Collins

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
State of Nebraska, appellee and
cross-appellant, v. William P. Collins,
appellant and cross-appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 15, 2026. 	No. S-25-169.
1. Statutes. The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question
of law.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On questions of law, an appellate court
is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination
reached by the court below.
3. Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Because the application of undisputed
historical facts to the Nebraska speedy trial statute is a question of law,
it is not unusual for appellate speedy trial opinions to consider exclud-
able periods that differ from those considered by the trial court.
4. Speedy Trial. To calculate the deadline for trial under the speedy trial
statutes, a court must exclude the day the State filed the information,
count forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded
pursuant to the statutes.
5. ____. When the State files an amended information that charges the
same crime, the time continues to run against the State for purposes of
the speedy trial act.
6. Speedy Trial: Proof. To overcome a defendant’s motion for discharge
on speedy trial grounds, the State must prove the existence of excluded
time under the speedy trial statute by a preponderance of evidence.
7. Indictments 	and 	Informations: 	Aggravating 	and 	Mitigating
Circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are now part of the allega-
tions that must be set forth in the information before trial.
8. Indictments 	and 	Informations: 	Aggravating 	and 	Mitigating
Circumstances: Pleadings. An alleged defect in the aggravating cir-
cumstances set forth in the information is the proper subject of a
motion to quash, which may be made in all cases when there is a defect
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:42 AM CDT

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STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
apparent upon the face of the record, including defects in the form of the
indictment or in the manner in which an offense is charged.
9. Speedy Trial: Words and Phrases. A “proceeding,” within the meaning
of the exclusion of time for a period of delay resulting from other pro-
ceedings concerning a defendant under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a)
(Reissue 2016), is any application to a court of justice, however made,
for aid in the enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress of injuries, for
damages, or for any remedial object.
10. Speedy Trial. An accused cannot take advantage of a delay in being
brought to trial where the accused is responsible for the delay by either
action or inaction.
11. Speedy Trial: Words and Phrases. The period excludable under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (Reissue 2016) commences on the day imme-
diately after the filing of a defendant’s pretrial motion and ends at the
final disposition, which occurs on the date the motion is granted or
denied and not the date of a subsequent journal entry reflecting that a
prior order was made.
12. Statutes. In reading a statute, courts must attempt to give effect to all of
its parts, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be
rejected as superfluous or meaningless; it is not within the province of a
court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute.
13. Words and Phrases. When a general phrase follows a list of specific
things, the specific terms modify and restrict the interpretation of the
general phrase.
14. Pleas: Indictments and Informations: Waiver. A plea of not guilty,
whether made by the defendant or entered by the court when on arraign-
ment the defendant stands mute, is a waiver of all defects in an informa-
tion that can be reached by a motion to quash.
15. Speedy Trial. A period of delay is excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1207 (Reissue 2016) regardless of whether it overlaps with a
period of delay requested by or to the benefit of the State.
Appeal from the District Court for Washington County:
Bryan C. Meismer, Judge. Affirmed.
Timothy S. Noerrlinger, of Nebraska Commission on Public
Advocacy, for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust
for appellee.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Freudenberg, J.
INTRODUCTION
The defendant was charged with several crimes, includ-
ing first degree murder, for which the State sought the death
penalty. The issues on appeal relate to the district court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion for absolute discharge under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 2016), principally whether
the defendant’s motions to quash the death-qualifying aggra-
vating circumstances of the original information and several
subsequent amended informations constituted pretrial motions
excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a). In each motion to quash, the
defendant requested and was granted a hearing thereon before
trial. The parties dispute the applicability of our holding in
State v. Covey 1 to the defendant’s motions to quash. We held
therein that the defendant’s “‘Motion to Quash Death Penalty,’”
which expressly stated it was to be taken up only in the event
of a conviction, and which the court did not address before
trial, was neither a motion to quash, a pretrial motion under
§ 29-1207(4)(a), nor a motion identified in § 29-1207(4)(b)
through (e). 2 Albeit for somewhat different reasons than those
expressed by the district court, we affirm its order denying the
defendant’s motion for discharge.
BACKGROUND
Original Information January 8, 2024
The State filed its original information against William P.
Collins on January 8, 2024. It alleged nine counts: murder in
the first degree, two counts of possession of a deadly weapon
by a prohibited person, two counts of use of deadly weapon to
commit a felony, assault in the first degree, burglary, prohibited
1 State v. Covey, 267 Neb. 210, 673 N.W.2d 208 (2004).
2 Id. at 215, 673 N.W.2d at 212.

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Cite as 321 Neb. 381
acts with respect to a stolen firearm, and theft by unlaw-
ful taking.
The information also set forth notice by the State that it
intended to adduce three specified aggravating circumstances:
(1) The murder was committed in an effort to conceal the com-
mission of a crime or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator
of such crime; (2) the murder was committed for hire or for
pecuniary gain, or the defendant hired another to commit the
murder for the defendant; and (3) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel or manifested exceptional depravity
by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence.
The certificate of service set forth that Collins’ attorneys
were sent copies of the information via email on January 8,
2024. Arraignment was scheduled for January 11. The pro-
cedural complexities of the case commenced almost immedi-
ately thereafter.
January 11, 2024, Motion to Quash Original
Information Decided February 15, 2024, and
January 11, 2024, Continuance of Arraignment
Held on February 20, 2024
Docket notes indicate that on January 11, 2024, Collins
refused arraignment because of lack of service of the infor-
mation. That same date, Collins filed a “Motion to Quash
and Declare Sections of the Nebraska Death Penalty Statutes
Unconstitutional.” The motion contained a notice of hearing
for February 1 or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
A journal entry on January 16, 2024, reflects that, on
January 11, 2024, Collins, who was present in court with coun-
sel, requested a “continuance of the arraignment for service”
and moved to set a hearing date for his motion to quash. The
court found that because Collins was served with the informa-
tion by a county sheriff’s deputy in open court, the service of
the information had been perfected. The appellate record does
not contain the bill of exceptions for the January 11 hearing.

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STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
An exhibit reflects that the sheriff served Collins by personal
service on January 11.
The court set the hearing on Collins’ motion to quash and
for arraignment for February 1, 2024. Collins’ motion asked
the court to quash all the aggravating circumstances alleged
in the information and declare certain sections of Nebraska’s
death penalty statutes unconstitutional.
In the motion, Collins argued, among other things, that after
the passage of 2002 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1, 3d Spec. Sess., codi-
fied in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2519 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 2024),
aggravating factors are the functional equivalent of greater
offenses, with requirements that the State specify which statu-
tory aggravators it intends to prove, which proof the jury must
determine beyond a reasonable doubt.
A journal entry on February 5, 2024, reflects that an eviden-
tiary hearing on the motion to quash was held on February 1
and that the matter was taken under advisement. Arraignment
was set for February 20.
On February 15, 2024, the court entered an order denying
and dismissing the motion to quash. The court found Collins’
facial challenges to the death penalty lacked merit and that his
as-applied challenges were premature and not appropriate for a
motion to quash.
A journal entry on February 21, 2024, states Collins was
arraigned on February 20. Neither the January 11 hearing nor
the February 1 hearing is in the record.
February 22, 2024, Motion for Bill of
Particulars Decided March 5, 2024
On February 22, 2024, Collins moved for a bill of par-
ticulars requiring the State to plead with more specificity
the allegations of murder in the first degree, burglary, and
the aggravating circumstances so that he could adequately
prepare his defense. For the burglary charge, Collins pointed
out the information did not allege what felony he intended
to commit. Collins also took issue with the murder charge’s

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STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
being pleaded as both premeditated and felony murder in con-
junction with the aggravating circumstances that the murder
was committed to conceal the commission of a crime or the
identity of the perpetrator and that the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain, because both aggravators could not apply
to both theories of first degree murder.
A journal entry on March 11, 2024, explains that the hearing
on the bill of particulars had been held on March 5 and that the
court had granted the motion in part as to the burglary charge
and ordered the State to file an amended information within
10 days. The court set rearraignment on the ordered amended
information for March 19.
The State filed an amended information on March 6, 2024.
The amended information specified that the underlying felonies
Collins intended to commit when breaking and entering were
theft, possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person,
assault, and false imprisonment in the first degree. Copies of
the amended information were served via email to Collins’
attorneys on March 6.
Motion for Discovery Made and
Decided February 28, 2024
Collins had moved for discovery on February 28, 2024. The
motion was granted that same day.
March 19, 2024, Motion to Quash Amended
Information Announced; Requested Hearing
Set for April 4, 2024; Motion Filed
March 28, 2024; and Second Amended
Information Filed April 3, 2024
In a journal entry on March 19, 2024, the court explained
that, at a hearing on that same date, Collins announced he
would be filing a motion to quash the burglary count of the
amended information and had moved to have the matter set
for hearing. Collins did not enter a plea. The hearing was

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STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
set for April 4. The record does not contain a transcription of
the hearing.
The written “Motion to Quash” the amended information
was filed on March 28, 2024. In the motion, Collins chal-
lenged the possession of a firearm by a prohibited person as
an underlying felony for the burglary charge. Collins also
reiterated his challenges from the motion for bill of particu-
lars as to the two aggravating circumstances being incapable
of application to both the theories of felony murder and
premeditated murder. The motion to quash set forth a notice
of hearing for April 4 or as soon thereafter as counsel may
be heard.
April 4, 2024, Order Finding Motion to Quash
Amended Information Moot; April 4, 2024,
Oral Motion to Reschedule Hearing to
May 8, 2024; and April 29, 2024, Motion
to Quash Second Amended Information
Decided May 16, 2024
On April 3, 2024, the day before the scheduled hearing on
the motion to quash, the State filed a second amended infor-
mation removing the possession of a firearm as an underlying
felony for the burglary charge. Collins’ attorneys were served
on April 3 with copies of the second amended information.
A journal entry on April 8, 2024, states that, at the April
4 hearing, Collins advised the court his motion to quash was
moot due to the filing of the second amended information. The
journal entry further states that Collins moved to reschedule
the hearing on the motion to quash to allow him time to file a
new motion to quash the second amended information.
The transcription of the April 4, 2024, hearing, entered
into evidence at the later hearing on Collins’ motion for
absolute discharge, reflects that the hearing on April 4 began
at 9:03 a.m. Collins said he could be arraigned at that time
but not plead; he was amenable to how the court wished to
handle it. Collins then agreed that, despite the court’s being

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STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
unable to set the hearing until May, setting the matter for a
future hearing was the best course of action. The hearing was
rescheduled for May 8.
Collins’ “Motion to Quash Second Amended Information”
was filed on April 29, 2024. In the motion, Collins reiterated
that the two specified aggravators could not apply to both
theories of murder, as well as his general challenges to the
death penalty. He also asserted that neither discovery nor
the allegations of the second amended information supported
the alleged aggravating circumstance of the offender’s having
been previously convicted of another murder or crime of vio-
lence. Collins’ motion contained a notice of hearing for May 8
or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
No transcription of the hearing is in the appellate record.
A journal entry indicates the evidentiary hearing was held on
May 7, 2024, and the court took the matter of the motion to
quash under advisement. Arraignment on the second amended
information was scheduled for May 21.
On May 16, 2024, the court issued its order on the motion
to quash the second amended information. The court denied
and dismissed the motion. It reiterated its conclusion regard-
ing the general challenge to the death penalty and found no
merit to the motion to quash the aggravators on the ground
that they were logically inconsistent or not yet supported by
the evidence.
Collins was arraigned on the second amended information
on May 21, 2024, whereupon Collins stood mute and the court
entered a plea on his behalf.
March 20, 2024, Objection to
Expanded Media Coverage
On March 20, 2024, Collins filed an objection to requests
made on March 19 for expanded news and media coverage.
Collins explained that the requests covered pretrial hearings
and were not limited in scope. The motion set forth that a
hearing thereon was set for April 4, but the record does not

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STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
reflect that the court considered the matter at the April 4 hear-
ing. On September 27, the court entered an order modifying
expanded media coverage. The State has not raised this period
as excludable.
July 29, 2024, Motion to Suppress
Decided October 20, 2024
On July 29, 2024, Collins filed a motion to suppress state-
ments and for a hearing to determine which, if any, of his
pretrial admissions were made voluntarily, intelligently, or
understandingly, or in violation of constitutional rights. In
an order filed on August 1, the court set forth that there had
been a hearing that was not on the record due to technical
difficulties. Collins had “waived a hearing on the record and
asked that the matter be scheduled for hearing on the Motion
to Suppress.”
The hearing on Collins’ motion to suppress was continued
to September 30, 2024. Following the evidentiary hearing on
September 30 and subsequent briefing received on October 15,
the court took the matter under advisement. It did not issue its
order on the motion until November 20. The court denied the
motion to suppress and set the trial for January 13, 2025.
October 18, 2024, Pretrial Motions
Decided October 25, 2024
On October 18, 2024, Collins filed several motions. He
moved for orders requiring the State to disclose whether it
intended to produce other acts evidence at trial pursuant to
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(2)(Cum. Supp. 2024), requiring the
State to disclose if it intended to produce prior convictions
as impeachment evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-609
(Reissue 2016), directing the clerk to send out his attached
expanded jury questionnaire before voir dire, directing him to
wear civilian clothing, and directing the sheriff to remove all
visible restraints when he is in the presence of the jury. He also

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STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
moved for an order directing that all prospective witnesses be
sequestered during the trial.
All the motions had notices of hearing set for October 25,
2024, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
The hearing occurred as scheduled on October 25, 2024. A
transcription of the hearing was entered as an exhibit at the
hearing on the later motion for discharge. It reflects that the
court orally pronounced it was granting the motion for a sup-
plemental jury questionnaire. On the motions for the State to
disclose, the court pronounced that it was giving the State 30
days to file notice; that if there is notice, the matter could be
set for further hearing; and that if there is no notice, “it takes
care of itself.” While the State said it had no objections to
the motions to sequester the jury, wear civilian clothing, and
remove visible restraints, the court did not orally pronounce
rulings on those motions. It also expressly noted there was
still a defense motion pending that was tolling the speedy trial
period, which defense counsel appeared to concede.
In a written order dated October 27, 2024, the court granted
Collins’ motions to send out an expanded jury questionnaire,
wear civilian clothing, remove visible restraints, and sequester
the jury. The court also granted his motions for disclosure of
prior convictions and prior bad acts, giving the State 30 days
to file its notice of intent.
A final pretrial hearing was set for December 19, 2024, and
trial was set at that time for March 24, 2025. However, on
October 30, 2024, the court, on its own motion, set the trial for
January 13, 2025.
January 7, 2025, Motion for Discharge
Following the final pretrial hearing on December 19, 2024,
the trial was still set for January 13, 2025. On January 7,
Collins filed a motion to discharge pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1207 et seq. (Reissue 2016).
Collins conceded that 12 days, from February 23 until
March 5, 2024, were excludable due to his motion for a

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STATE v. COLLINS
Cite as 321 Neb. 381
bill of particulars. He also conceded 6 days were exclud-
able, from March 28 to April 3, 2024, due to his motion to
quash the amended information, because that motion to quash
included challenges to the burglary charge.
Collins argued his motions to quash the original informa-
tion and second amended information, on the other hand, were
not excludable as pretrial motions under § 29-1207(4)(a),
because they pertained only to the death penalty and aggra-
vating circumstances, which are not essential elements of
any crime charged. Collins argued that though captioned as
motions to quash, in substance they were not. According to
Collins, the two motions were merely motions to quash the
death penalty, which, under State v. Covey, are not pretrial
motions that fall under § 29-1207(4)(a). 3 He argued that the
motions could only fall under the catchall good cause provi-
sion of § 29-1207(4)(f), that the State had made no specific
showing of good cause, and that there were no specific find-
ings of good cause.
Collins argued that, even if the periods attributable to all
three motions to quash were excludable for good cause, his
statutory right to a speedy trial had run. This apparently fol-
lowed from the fact that the State had failed to serve Collins
with the information as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1802
(Cum. Supp. 2024), which provides, in part, that “[n]o one
shall be, without his or her assent, arraigned or called on
to answer to any indictment until one day has elapsed after
receiving in person or by counsel or having an opportunity
to receive a copy of such indictment.” Collins argued that
because he was not served before the arraignment on January
11, 2024, any delay up to February 1 was attributable to
the State.
The State argued that State v. Covey was distinguishable
and not controlling of Collins’ motions to quash. Thus, it con-
tended, the period attributable to all three motions to quash
3 State v. Covey, supra note 1.

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STATE v. COLLINS
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was excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a). Alternatively, the State
sought to admit the court’s calendar to establish good cause.
Court’s Order Overruling Motion
for Absolute Discharge
The district court overruled Collins’ motion for absolute dis-
charge. It found five periods of time were excluded from the
statutory 6-month period.
First, the court excluded 21 days from January 11 to
February 1, 2024. Although the court accepted Collins’ argu-
ment that State v. Covey held that a motion to quash the death
penalty is not a pretrial motion and should be considered only
under § 29-1207(4)(f), the court found the continuance of the
matter from January 11 to February 1 was “at the defendant’s
request, and with at least tacit acknowledgement that the
speedy trial clock would be stopped.” 4 The court explained that
at the scheduled arraignment hearing on January 11, defense
counsel had told the court he had not yet been served with
the information and had drafted a motion to quash he would
later be filing. The court explained that defense counsel also
said at the January 11 hearing, “‘[w]ith respect to the speedy
trial clock, once that motion to quash is filed, that will stop
the speedy trial clock. So, any concerns ( . . . the State) might
have related to that should not be an issue.’” The court said it
set the matter for February 1 based on these representations by
defense counsel.
Second, the court excluded 11 days from February 22 to
March 5, 2024. This period was attributed to the defense
motion for a bill of particulars, and its exclusion was not dis-
puted by defense counsel.
Third, the court excluded 15 days from March 19 to April
3, 2024. The court found this time attributable to the motion
to quash the amended information, which defense counsel did
not dispute was excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a). The court
4 See id.

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also found that defense counsel’s request to set a new hearing
on the then-forthcoming motion to quash should be considered
a request for a continuance under § 29-1207(4)(b). The court
found that the filing by the State of the second amended infor-
mation on April 3 mooted the motion to quash the amended
information and restarted the speedy trial calculation.
Fourth, the court excluded 34 days from April 4 to May 8,
2024. The court did not exclude the time attributable to Collins’
motion to quash the second amended information as such;
therefore, the court did not exclude the time after the hearing
on that motion while it was under advisement. However, the
court excluded the continuance of the hearing date for arraign-
ment on the second amended information and on the pending
motion to quash as being at defense counsel’s request and thus
falling under § 29-1207(4)(b).
Finally, the court excluded 114 days from July 29 to November
20, 2024. It found this period attributable to the defense’s
motion to suppress and excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a).
In its order, the court generally noted that, at a hearing on
May 21, 2024, defense counsel told the court:
“[T]here’s probably a large amount of excludable time.
There’s been two separate — actually, there’s been a
motion for bill of particulars as well as two motions to
quash, which excluded large chunks of time from the date
of the initial information being filed. I’ll defer — I will
tell the Court I have not discussed that with . . . Collins. I
don’t know — and I’ll leave it at that.”
Regardless, the court found that the five excluded periods
totaled 195 days, which put the speedy trial date at January 19,
2025. Because the motion for discharge preceded that date, the
court overruled the motion.
The court denied the State’s request to admit the court’s
calendar, because it was irrelevant to the proceedings. The
court 	reasoned 	it 	never 	delayed 	the 	proceedings 	under
§ 29-1207(4)(f) and never made any finding of good cause

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for delay. Instead, all hearing dates were set with deference
to counsels’ schedules.
Collins 	appeals 	from 	the 	court’s 	order 	overruling 	his
motion for discharge, and the State cross-appeals certain rul-
ings of the court during the hearing on the motion and certain
findings made in its order.
Considering the parties’ dispute over the applicability of
State v. Covey, we granted the State’s petition to bypass the
Nebraska Court of Appeals. 5
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Collins assigns that the district court erred by failing to grant
his motion to discharge, because his statutory right to a speedy
trial had run.
In the State’s cross-appeal, it assigns that the district court
erred by (1) not excluding time under § 29-1207(4)(a) for
Collins’ motions to quash the information and second amended
information; (2) finding that Collins’ motion to quash the
amended information was moot, and that the speedy trial
clock restarted when the State filed the second amended infor-
mation; (3) failing to consider whether the record established
that good cause existed to exclude time under § 29-1207(4)(f);
and (4) denying the State’s motion to admit the court’s cal-
endar and failing to consider such evidence as part of a good
cause analysis.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a ques-
tion of law. 6
[2] On questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to
reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached
by the court below. 7
5 See id.
6 State v. Nelson, 313 Neb. 464, 984 N.W.2d 620 (2023).
7 Id.

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ANALYSIS
[3] Because the application of undisputed historical facts
to the Nebraska speedy trial statute is a question of law, 8 it is
not unusual for our speedy trial opinions to consider exclud-
able periods that differ from those considered by the trial
court. 9 For the reasons that follow, we hold that all three
defense motions to quash were, in both form and substance,
pretrial motions resulting in periods of delay excludable under
§ 29-1207(4)(a) and that our holding in State v. Covey is inap-
plicable to the facts of the case at bar. 10 Although our calcula-
tions differ somewhat from the trial court’s, combining these
excludable periods with other periods of delay, we ultimately
agree with the district court’s ruling that Collins’ motion for
discharge was premature.
[4-6] Nebraska’s speedy trial statute, § 29-1207, requires
discharge of a defendant whose case has not been tried within
6 months after the filing of the information, unless the 6
months are extended by any period to be excluded in com-
puting the time for trial. 11 To calculate the deadline for trial
under the speedy trial statutes, a court must exclude the day
the State filed the information, count forward 6 months, back
up 1 day, and then add any time excluded pursuant to the
statutes. 12 When the State files an amended information that
charges the same crime, the time continues to run against
the State for purposes of the speedy trial act. 13 To overcome
a defendant’s motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds,
the State must prove the existence of excluded time under the
8 See, State v. Brooks, 319 Neb. 377, 22 N.W.3d 640 (2025); State v. Nelson,
supra note 6.
9 State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749, 962 N.W.2d 510 (2021).
10 See State v. Covey, supra note 1.
11 State v. Craig, 15 Neb. App. 836, 739 N.W.2d 206 (2007).
12 State v. Blocher, 307 Neb. 874, 951 N.W.2d 499 (2020).
13 See State v. Newman, 21 Neb. App. 29, 838 N.W.2d 317 (2013).

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speedy trial statute by a preponderance of evidence. 14 The par-
ties agree that, without any time excluded under subsections
(4)(a) through (4)(f) of § 29-1207, the State had until July 8,
2024, to bring Collins to trial.
Section 29-1207(4)(a) provides that periods of delay result-
ing from proceedings concerning the defendant, including pre-
trial motions, shall be excluded in computing the time for trial.
Section 29-1207(4) states:
The following periods shall be excluded in computing the
time for trial:
(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to, an
examination and hearing on competency and the period
during which he or she is incompetent to stand trial;
the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial
motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress
evidence, motions to quash the indictment or information,
demurrers and pleas in abatement, and motions for a
change of venue; and the time consumed in the trial of
other charges against the defendant.
The question of whether Collins’ motions to quash the
original information and the second amended information are
excludable pretrial motions under § 29-1207(4)(a) presents a
question of law that we determine independently of the court
below. 15 Collins concedes the period of delay from the filing
of his motion to quash the amended information until its final
disposition was properly excluded.
In State v. Covey, we held that the defendant’s “‘Motion to
Quash Death Penalty,’” despite being captioned a “‘motion
to quash,’” was not excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a). 16 We
observed that, “by its terms, this motion was not to be decided
before trial as to guilt nor did it impact the commencement
14 State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (2009).
15 See State v. Nelson, supra note 6.
16 State v. Covey, supra note 1, 267 Neb. at 215, 673 N.W.2d at 212.

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of trial.” 17 Rather, the motion stated that a hearing on its sub-
stance should be taken up only if the defendant was convicted
of first degree murder, and the district court said it would not
take up the substance of the motion before trial because it was
premature. We also reasoned there was no “period of delay”
due to the “motion.” 18 As a result, it was not any motion iden-
tified in § 29-1207(4)(a) through (e).
After State v. Covey, the U.S. Supreme Court in United
States v. Tinklenberg, 19 reading similar language found in 18
U.S.C. § 3161 (2018), held that the excludable periods for
pretrial motions apply automatically and are not dependent
upon whether the motions cause a delay or the expectation of a
delay of trial. The Court explained that the word “delay” does
not inevitably indicate a postponement; it can also mean the
“‘interval of time between two events.’” 20
Subsequently, in State v. Coomes, 21 we explained that a
“period of delay” is synonymous with a “period of time.” We
said excludable periods can result from delays in the progres-
sion of a criminal case regardless of whether the trial date
was postponed or remained unchanged. 22 We also commented
on State v. Covey, stating, “The circumstances in Covey were
unique in that the defendant’s pretrial motion did not have
any bearing at all on the preparation for, or commencement
of, trial, and by its own terms was not to be taken up until
after trial.” 23
Collins argues State v. Covey broadly stands for the propo-
sition that motions to quash the death penalty or any of its
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 179 L. Ed. 2d
1080 (2011).
20 Id., 563 U.S. at 654.
21 State v. Coomes, supra note 9, 309 Neb. at 768, 962 N.W.2d at 524.
22 Id. See, also, State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (2019).
23 State v. Coomes, supra note 9, 309 Neb. at 767, 962 N.W.2d at 524.

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aggravators are not excludable under § 29-1207 under any
circumstances. He relies on State v. Palmer 24 to bolster this
assertion and argues that the allegations of aggravating cir-
cumstances in the information are merely a contingent notice
of intent and that thus, any challenge to the aggravators is
not ripe until there is a conviction of first degree murder. He
asserts that unripe challenges cannot be the subject of exclud-
able motions to quash, even if they seek pretrial hearings. 25 We
find these arguments unavailing.
State v. Palmer did not determine whether a motion to quash
aggravating circumstances is excludable under § 29-1207(4);
nor did it address ripeness. Instead, in relation to claims by
the defendant that the lower court erred in imposing the death
penalty, we held in State v. Palmer that the district court did
not err in overruling a defense motion to require the State to
specify which aggravating circumstances it intended to rely on.
We rejected the defendant’s argument that he had a constitu-
tional right to such notice under the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and Neb. Const. art. I, § 11.
State v. Palmer was decided before the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Ring v. Arizona, 26 which held the defendant has the
right to have a jury determine aggravating circumstances in
a capital case. State v. Palmer was also decided before the
passage of L.B. 1. 27 L.B. 1 includes the requirement codified
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1603(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024),
that any information in which the death penalty is sought shall
allege one or more aggravating circumstances, which, under
§ 29-1603(2)(b), the State can add to or amend only “up to and
including the thirtieth day prior to the trial of guilt.”
Section 29-1603 states:
24 State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 706 (1986), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Garcia, 315 Neb. 74, 994 N.W.2d 610 (2023).
25 See id.
26 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002).
27 2002 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1, 3rd Spec. Sess.

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(2)(a) Any information charging a violation of section
28-303 and in which the death penalty is sought shall
contain a notice of aggravation which alleges one or
more 	aggravating 	circumstances, 	as 	such 	aggravating
circumstances 	are 	provided 	in 	section 	29-2523. 	The
notice of aggravation shall be filed as provided in section
29-1602. It shall constitute sufficient notice to describe
the alleged aggravating circumstances in the language
provided in section 29-2523.
(b) The state shall be permitted to add to or amend a
notice of aggravation at any time up to and including the
thirtieth day prior to the trial of guilt.
(c) The existence or contents of a notice of aggravation
shall not be disclosed to the jury until after the verdict is
rendered in the trial of guilt.
Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2520(4)(c) (Cum. Supp. 2024),
If the jury serving at the aggravation hearing is the jury
which determined the defendant’s guilt, the jury may con-
sider evidence received at the trial of guilt for purposes
of reaching its verdict as to the existence or nonexistence
of aggravating circumstances in addition to the evidence
received at the aggravation hearing.
[7,8] Aggravating circumstances are thus now part of the
allegations that must be set forth in the information before
trial. They are not, as Collins seems to suggest, mere unripe
placeholders. Rather, the aggravating circumstances must be
specifically alleged and cannot be added to or amended after
the 30th day prior to the trial of guilt. Given that the same
jury will determine if the State has proved the alleged aggra-
vating circumstances and may consider the evidence received
at trial in so doing, which aggravating circumstances the State
plans on pursuing can be relevant to defense strategy during
the trial of the underlying crime. In sum, an alleged defect
in the aggravating circumstances set forth in the information
is the proper subject of a “motion to quash,” which “may be
made in all cases when there is a defect apparent upon the

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face of the record, including defects in the form of the indict-
ment or in the manner in which an offense is charged.” 28
Without deciding whether, as a general proposition, a pretrial
motion must be ripe to be excludable under § 29-1207(4), we
find that Collins’ motions to quash the aggravating circum-
stances set forth in the informations were ripe for determina-
tion before the trial commenced.
[9] Even if Collins’ motions were not characterized as
motions to quash, they would still be pretrial motions under
§ 29-1207(4)(a), because they sought delays for the court to
consider and determine, before trial, his applications for relief.
We have explained that a “proceeding,” within the meaning of
the exclusion of time for a period of delay resulting from other
proceedings concerning a defendant under § 29-1207(4)(a), is
any application to a court of justice, however made, for aid in
the enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress of injuries, for
damages, or for any remedial object. 29
[10] As illustrated by the Court of Appeals in State v.
Castillo, 30 whether the defense insists on a hearing to con-
sider and determine the merits of a defense motion before the
commencement of trial is more important than the motion’s
label in determining whether the motion is a pretrial motion
under § 29-1207(4)(a). The Court of Appeals in State v.
Castillo held that a statutorily required notice by the defendant
of intent to offer specific instances of the victim’s past sexual
behavior, though ordinarily a pleading that does not con-
stitute a pretrial motion, was a pretrial motion excludable
under § 29-1207(4)(a) under the facts presented. The court
explained that the defendant not only captioned the pleading
as a “motion” but included a notice of hearing scheduling the
matter to be heard. 31 The defendant observed that the Court
28 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1808 (Reissue 2016).
29 See State v. Hernandez, 309 Neb. 299, 959 N.W.2d 769 (2021).
30 State v. Castillo, 11 Neb. App. 622, 657 N.W.2d 650 (2003).
31 Id.

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of Appeals did not simply file the statutorily required notice,
but “took the additional step of requesting a pretrial hearing
and ruling.” 32 At the scheduled hearing on the motion, other
matters were considered, but the defendant did not argue the
motion, which remained pending at the time of the defendant’s
motion for discharge. The Court of Appeals agreed with the
district court’s determination that, under those circumstances,
the entire period from the filing of the motion of intent to
offer instances of past sexual behavior, up until the filing of
the motion for discharge, was excludable as owing to a pretrial
motion. This holding in State v. Castillo is consistent with our
general proposition that an accused cannot take advantage of a
delay in being brought to trial where the accused is responsible
for the delay by either action or inaction. 33
All three motions to quash by Collins, similar to the
motions in State v. Castillo, contained notices of hearings.
Collins took the additional steps of requesting pretrial hear-
ings and court rulings on the motions before the commence-
ment of trial. He cannot benefit from the trial delays resulting
from such requests. All three motions to quash fall under
§ 29-1207(4)(a).
[11] The express terms of § 29-1207(4)(a) exclude all time
“from filing until final disposition” regardless of the prompt-
ness or reasonableness of the delay. 34 We have said the period
excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a) commences on the day
immediately after the filing of a defendant’s pretrial motion
and ends at the final disposition, which occurs on the date the
motion is granted or denied and not the date of a subsequent
journal entry reflecting that a prior order was made. 35
The statutory period set forth in § 29-1207(4)(a) does not
include the time from the announcement of a defendant’s
32 Id. at 627, 657 N.W.2d at 655.
33 See State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (2014).
34 State v. Williams, supra note 14.
35 See, State v. Nelson, supra note 6; State v. Williams, supra note 14.

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pretrial motion to its actual filing, but it does not follow
that such period is not excludable under other provisions
of § 29-1207(4). The circumstances surrounding Collins’
motions to quash the amended information and the second
amended information are unique in that, per defense coun-
sel’s request, the hearings were set on the motions before
they were filed. As set forth above, at previously scheduled
hearings, defense counsel announced his intent to file the
motions to quash, which he had yet to prepare. Defense coun-
sel orally requested that the court set the matters for future
pretrial hearings on the motions to quash that defense coun-
sel intended to file, and the court granted his request. The
motions themselves were not submitted to the court and file
stamped until sometime later.
A similar situation was presented to the U.S. Supreme
Court in Bloate v. United States, 36 wherein the Court held
that the period of delay from the trial court’s grant of the
defendant’s request for time to file pretrial motions was
excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The Court held
that the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s request to extend
the time previously granted to file pretrial motions was not
excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) as “[a]ny period
of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
defendant, including but not limited to— . . . (D) delay result-
ing from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion
through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
disposition of, such motion.” (Emphasis supplied.) By its
plain terms, the more specific language, that the delay is
excludable only “from the filing of the motion,” 37 controlled
the more general phrases “[a]ny period of delay resulting
from other proceedings concerning the defendant” and “delay
36 Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 130 S. Ct. 1345, 176 L. Ed. 2d 54
(2010).
37 Bloate v. United States, supra note 36, 559 U.S. at 206 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

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resulting from any pretrial motion” in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1).
However, the Court acknowledged it “would be unpalatable
to interpret the Speedy Trial Act to ‘trap’ district courts for
accommodating a defendant’s request for additional time to
prepare pretrial motions” and held that such requests could
be excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) as periods of
delay resulting from continuances granted at the request of
the defendant or his or her counsel or at the request of the
attorney for the Government—when accompanied by a trial
court’s finding that the ends of justice served by the granting
of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial. 38 Two Supreme Court jus-
tices dissented and opined that granting defense requests for
additional time to complete pretrial motions entails a delay
resulting from a proceeding concerning the defendant and was
thus a delay automatically excluded under § 3161(h)(1) with-
out any express findings by the trial court.
[12,13] We agree with the reasoning in Bloate v. United
States that a more specific statutory phrase, herein namely “the
time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions,” 39
restricts a more general one, herein “[t]he following periods
shall be excluded in computing the time for trial: (a) The
period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning
the defendant, including, but not limited to . . . .” 40 In reading a
statute, we must attempt to give effect to all of its parts, and if
it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected
as superfluous or meaningless; it is not within the province of
a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out
of a statute. 41 When a general phrase follows a list of specific
38 Id., 559 U.S. at 213.
39 § 29-1207(4)(a).
40 § 29-1207(4).
41 See SID No. 1 v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 253 Neb. 917, 573 N.W.2d
460 (1998).

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things, the specific terms modify and restrict the interpretation
of the general phrase. 42
But we find that the additional periods of delay tied to
Collins’ requests at the scheduled hearings to set for future
hearings, matters relating to his intended motions to quash,
are excludable under § 29-1207(4)(b) as continuances. Section
29-1207(4)(b) sets forth the following as excludable:
The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted
at the request or with the consent of the defendant or his
or her counsel. A defendant without counsel shall not be
deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he or
she has been advised by the court of his or her right to a
speedy trial and the effect of his or her consent. . ..
Relying in part on the definition by Black’s Law Dictionary
400 (11th ed. 2019) of a “continuance” as the “adjournment or
postponement of a trial or other proceeding to a future date,”
we held in State v. Space 43 that a “‘continuance’” refers to
the circumstance where a court proceeding set for one date is
postponed to a future date and not the mere passage of time.
We said “such a definition necessarily presumes that before
there can be a ‘continuance’ of a proceeding, there must have
been an initial setting,” 44 i.e., “the circumstance where a court
proceeding set for one date is postponed to a future date.” 45 We
accordingly held in State v. Space that the lack of a defense
objection to the court’s pronouncement at the final plea hearing
of the initial setting of the trial date did not entail continuance
under § 29-1207(4)(b), because there had been no postpone-
ment of something previously scheduled for a certain date.
[14] In contrast to the facts of State v. Space, Collins
requested or consented to delays of previously scheduled
42 See Kuhn v. Wells Fargo Bank of Neb., 278 Neb. 428, 771 N.W.2d 103
(2009).
43 State v. Space, 312 Neb. 456, 466, 980 N.W.2d 1, 9 (2022).
44 Id.
45 See id. at 467, 980 N.W.2d at 10.

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arraignment hearings in conjunction with the motions to quash
he announced he was intending to file. This was logical, as a
plea of not guilty, whether made by the defendant or entered by
the court when on arraignment the defendant stands mute, is a
waiver of all defects in an information that can be reached by
a motion to quash. 46
We hold that these periods of delay of arraignment are
continuances excludable under § 29-1207(4)(b). The period
excludable for a continuance under § 29-1207(4)(b) com-
mences on the day immediately after the continuance is granted
and includes the day on which the continuance ends.
For the January 11, 2024, motion to quash the information,
Collins asked for a continuance of the arraignment on the
subject information, which had been originally scheduled for
January 11. At the hearing on February 1 on Collins’ motion
to quash, the court set arraignment for February 20, which is
when arraignment on the information ultimately occurred.
In conjunction with Collins’ March 19, 2024, announcement
of his intent to file a motion to quash the amended informa-
tion that was filed in response to the court’s ruling on Collins’
motion for a bill of particulars, Collins was not arraigned as
planned at that hearing. Though Collins was presumably to be
arraigned on the amended information at the April 4 hearing,
the State had filed its second amended information the day
before the hearing, so that never occurred.
In 	conjunction 	with 	Collins’ April 	4, 	2024, 	announce-
ment that he would be filing the motion to quash the second
amended information, defense counsel agreed that arraignment
on the second amended information could be delayed until
May 8. However, it appears the hearing was held on May 7. At
that hearing, arraignment was moved to May 21. Arraignment
occurred on May 21.
46 See Trimble v. State, 61 Neb. 604, 85 N.W. 844 (1901). See, also, e.g.,
State v. Liston, 271 Neb. 468, 712 N.W.2d 264 (2006).

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These postponements of arraignment were periods of delay
resulting from continuances granted at the request or with the
consent of the defendant or his or her counsel.
We find no merit to Collins’ argument that the entirety of
the delays of the January 11 and April 4, 2024, arraignments
are not excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a) and (4)(b), because
the State failed to have the sheriff serve him with a copy of the
operative informations at least 24 hours before those hearings.
Though Collins acknowledges the arraignments could have
been delayed by a mere 24 hours, he argues the entirety of the
delays until the arraignment hearings should be attributable to
the State because there is no record that the State requested
that the arraignments take place sooner. Collins relies on
§ 29-1802, which provides that “[n]o one shall be, without his
or her assent, arraigned or called on to answer to any indict-
ment until one day has elapsed after receiving in person or by
counsel or having an opportunity to receive a copy of such
indictment.” Section 29-1802 also sets forth that
[w]ithin twenty-four hours after the filing of an indict-
ment for felony, and in every other case on request,
the clerk shall make and deliver to the sheriff and the
defendant or his or her counsel a copy of the indictment,
and the sheriff on receiving such copy shall serve the
same upon the defendant.
[15] Leaving aside whether § 29-1802 in fact prohibits
arraignment for lack of service of process by the sheriff, as
opposed to lack of receipt in person or by counsel or oppor-
tunity to receive a copy of the indictment, we disagree with
Collins’ premise that the State was bound to bring the par-
ties into court for arraignments before the hearings scheduled
at Collins’ request to consider his motions to quash those
indictments. A period of delay is excludable under § 29-1207
regardless of whether it overlaps with a period of delay
requested by or to the benefit of the State. To accept Collins’
argument that the entire period of the delay of the arraign-
ments is not excludable would only establish the kind of

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“‘trap’” the U.S. Supreme Court in Bloate v. United States
was careful not to set. 47
According to our calculations, once periods of delay are
excluded under § 29-1207(4)(a) as resulting from pretrial
motions and under § 29-1207(4)(b) as continuances, the last
date for trial with an original speedy trial date of July 8, 2024,
was January 29, 2025.
The period from January 12 to February 15, 2024 (35 days)
is excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a) due to Collins’ filing of
the motion to quash the original information. Discounting the
overlapping days already excluded from the time of filing to
the court’s disposition of the motions to quash, 5 additional
days are excluded under § 29-1207(4)(b), from February 15
to 20, as a continuance of the arraignment that was originally
scheduled for January 11 on the original information and was
postponed to February 20. These two periods of delay together
total 40 days.
Collins does not contest the court’s finding that the days
attributable to his motion for a bill of particulars filed on
February 22, 2024, between his first and second motions
to quash, and decided on March 5, were excludable under
§ 29-1207(4)(a). We calculate these to be 12 additional exclud-
able days.
The period from March 29 to April 4, 2024, is excludable
under § 29-1207(4)(a) from the day after the filing of the
motion to quash the amended information on March 28 to and
including the court’s final disposition of the motion on April 4,
in which it found the motion moot. We agree with the State that
relevant to the speedy trial clock is the court’s order disposing
of the motion to quash the amended information as moot, and
not when the mootness arose. Additionally, the period from
the day after Collins’ March 19 announcement of his intended
motion to quash the amended information, at the hearing the
court had scheduled for arraignment, up to and including
47 Bloate v. United States, supra note 36, 559 U.S. at 213.

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March 29, is excluded as a continuance under § 29-1207(4)(b).
These two periods add 16 days.
The period from the filing of the motion to quash the sec-
ond amended information on April 29, 2024, until its disposi-
tion on May 16 is excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a). This is
encompassed by the period from Collins’ agreement on April
4 to delay arraignment on the second amended information,
which did not occur until May 21, which is excludable under
§ 29-1207(4)(b). Discounting overlapping periods, these total
47 excludable days.
Adding the above 115 excludable days sets the new speedy
trial date for October 31, 2024.
Collins does not dispute that, if the speedy trial clock did
not expire beforehand, the days attributable to his motion to
suppress, filed on July 29, 2024, and decided November 20, are
also excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a). We calculate this period
of delay as 114 days, for a speedy trial date of February 22,
2025. This encompasses the period of delay attributable to the
court’s final disposition of all the October 19, 2024, motions,
which did not occur until its order on October 27. Because
Collins filed his motion for discharge before February 22,
2025, it lacked merit. We affirm the judgment of the district
court. We find it unnecessary to address the State’s cross-
appeal, which all relates to its attempts to show good cause.
Good cause is not an element of the above excludable periods
of delay.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
Affirmed.