Kingston v. Kingston

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
Laura A. Kingston, appellee and cross-appellant,
v. Trevor L. Kingston, appellant
and cross-appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed March 13, 2026. 	No. S-25-050.
1. Modification 	of 	Decree: 	Child 	Support: 	Appeal 	and 	Error.
Modification of child support payments is entrusted to the trial court’s
discretion, and although, on appeal, the issue is reviewed de novo on the
record, an appellate court will affirm the trial court’s decision absent an
abuse of discretion.
2. Child Support: Appeal and Error. Whether a child support order
should be retroactive is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, and
an appellate court will affirm its decision absent an abuse of discretion.
3. Modification of Decree: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. In an
action for modification of a marital dissolution decree, the award of
attorney fees is discretionary with the trial court, is reviewed de novo on
the record, and will be affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
4. Modification of Decree: Child Support: Proof. A party seeking to
modify a child support order must show a material change in circum-
stances that (1) occurred subsequent to the entry of the original decree
or previous modification and (2) was not contemplated when the
decree was entered.
5. Modification of Decree: Child Support. Among the factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether a material change of circumstances has
occurred are changes in the financial position of the parent obligated to
pay support, the needs of the children for whom support is paid, good
or bad faith motive of the obligated parent in sustaining a reduction in
income, and whether the change is temporary or permanent.
6. Trial: Appeal and Error. A party cannot be heard to complain of an
error which the party was instrumental in bringing about.
7. Modification of Decree: Child Support: Time. Absent equities to
the contrary, modification of a child support order should be applied
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:51 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
retroactively to the first day of the month following the filing date of the
application for modification.
8. Modification of Decree: Child Support. In determining whether to
order a retroactive modification of child support, a court must consider
the parties’ status, character, situation, and attendant circumstances.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: W.
Russell Bowie III, Judge. Affirmed.
Kathryn D. Putnam, of Astley Putnam, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellant.
Benjamin M. Belmont and Mariah E. Shaffer, of Brodkey,
Cuddigan, Peebles, Belmont & Line, L.L.P., for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Papik, J.
When Trevor L. Kingston and Laura A. Kingston divorced,
the dissolution decree ordered Trevor to pay Laura child sup-
port. In calculating Trevor’s child support obligation, the dis-
trict court did not count as income restricted stock units (RSUs)
Trevor received from his employer. Laura later sought an order
modifying Trevor’s child support obligation, primarily arguing
that his child support obligation should be recalculated with
the RSUs included as income. After a trial held before a child
support referee, the referee concluded that Trevor’s sales of
his RSUs after the entry of the dissolution decree constituted
a material change in circumstances and that the RSUs should
be counted as income. The district court adopted the referee’s
recommendation and increased Trevor’s child support obliga-
tion. Trevor now appeals, and Laura cross-appeals. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Initial Dissolution Proceedings; Appeal.
In 2021, Trevor and Laura divorced, having two children
under the age of 18 at the time. In calculating Trevor’s child

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
support obligation, the district court included his salary and
bonuses as income. The district court did not count as income
RSUs Trevor received from his employer as compensation.
RSUs are shares of stock of Trevor’s employer that vest sev-
eral years after they are initially issued. These shares, which
have long been part of Trevor’s compensation, are given as an
incentive to remain with the employer. If an employee leaves
before RSUs vest, the employee does not receive those shares
of stock.
In the dissolution decree, the district court ordered Trevor
to pay $667 per month in child support until the older child
reached the age of majority and then $444 per month until
the younger child reached the age of majority. Although not
counted as income, the district court divided Trevor’s RSUs as
part of the marital estate.
Following the entry of the dissolution decree and the fil-
ing of some posttrial motions, Laura filed an appeal. She
asserted several assignments of error, including a claim that
the district court erred in calculating Trevor’s child support
obligation. Trevor also assigned several errors in a cross-
appeal. The Nebraska Court of Appeals, however, dismissed
both Laura’s appeal and Trevor’s cross-appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. See Kingston v. Kingston, 31 Neb. App. 201, 979
N.W.2d 277 (2022).
Modification Proceedings.
In April 2023, after the dismissal of the appeal and cross-
appeal, Laura filed a complaint to modify the divorce decree,
arguing she was entitled to a higher child support payment.
In her complaint to modify, Laura identified material changes
in circumstances that would support modification. Among the
material changes in circumstances alleged was an assertion
that modification was warranted based on this court’s deci-
sion in Vanderveer v. Vanderveer, 310 Neb. 196, 964 N.W.2d
694 (2021), which was handed down after the original divorce
decree was entered. Laura requested that any adjustment to

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
Trevor’s child support obligation be made retroactive to May
2023, the month after she filed the complaint to modify. Upon
a joint motion of the parties, the district court directed that the
case be assigned to a child support referee to conduct a hearing
and make findings and recommendations.
The referee held a hearing at which both Trevor and Laura
testified and the parties submitted other evidence. At the hear-
ing, Trevor testified that during the parties’ marriage, he never
sold any of the RSUs he received, instead treating them as a
“retirement vehicle.” Trevor acknowledged, however, that he
sold RSUs after the dissolution decree was entered.
Trevor also testified that he believed it would be inequi-
table if the district court modified his child support obligation
retroactively to the month after Laura filed the complaint
to modify. He testified that he had not budgeted for having
to make retroactive payments and that he would have to sell
additional RSUs and incur additional capital gains taxes to
meet his obligations if the child support obligations were
made retroactive.
After the hearing, the referee issued a report recommending
that Trevor’s child support obligation be increased. The referee
determined in its report that the doctrine of issue preclusion
did not prevent Laura from seeking to modify Trevor’s child
support obligation. The referee also concluded that Trevor’s
sales of his RSUs after the dissolution decree was entered
“constitute[d] a material change of circumstances as it pertains
to the question of a child support modification.” The referee
explained that “[i]t would not be logical” to include RSUs
as income at the time of the dissolution decree when Trevor
was keeping them for retirement, rather than selling them, but
found that after Trevor sold the RSUs for 3 years after the
decree, “the funds should be included as income for child sup-
port purposes.”
Having determined that modification was appropriate, the ref-
eree next considered the amount by which to increase the child
support obligation. To do so, the referee first determined each

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320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
party’s income. The referee found that Laura received only
disability payments that totaled a little under $5,000 a month.
The referee acknowledged that Laura had received some of
Trevor’s RSUs but did not count them as income because she
would not receive them under the decree beyond 2025.
The referee found that Trevor’s income should include three
components: salary, bonuses, and RSUs. To determine his
income from the bonuses, the referee averaged his bonuses
from the prior 3 years, which were $45,000 in 2022, $47,500 in
2023, and $34,000 in 2024. At the hearing, Trevor had testified
that his bonus pay should be averaged because it is a “better
reflection over time of how much [he’s] getting paid.”
To determine the income to attribute to Trevor for the sales
of the RSUs, the referee multiplied the average number of
shares that vested for the prior 3 years by the average vested
market price. The referee did so, even though, pursuant to
the dissolution decree, Laura received some of the RSUs in
the years considered. In explaining this aspect of the recom-
mendation, the referee stated that “[t]he purpose of averag-
ing the income amounts from RSU sales is not to assess that
amount to [Trevor] as past income, but rather to arrive at a
baseline for the income [Trevor] will likely receive from the
sale of RSUs going forward.” The referee noted that under
the decree, Laura would not be entitled to additional RSUs
after early 2025.
In calculating the parties’ income, the referee also deducted
just over $1,000 from Trevor’s monthly income to represent
capital gains taxes Trevor incurred for the RSUs. Based on its
determinations of the parties’ incomes, and through use of an
attached child support worksheet, the referee recommended
that Trevor’s child support payment be increased to $1,123
per month while both children were under the age of majority
and then to $774 per month after the older child reached the
age of majority.
The referee recommended declining Laura’s request to
make the child support payments retroactive to May 2023.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
The referee also recommended declining Trevor’s request that
any modified child support obligation not be made retroac-
tive at all. Instead, the referee recommended that the modi-
fied child support obligation be made retroactive to February
2024. The referee also recommended that both parties be
ordered to pay their own attorney fees.
Both 	Trevor 	and 	Laura 	filed 	exceptions 	to 	the 	refer-
ee’s report. Among the exceptions Trevor took to the ref-
eree’s report was a contention that the referee should have set
deadlines by which the parties would be required to submit
requests and reimburse each other for the children’s expenses.
During the modification hearing, both parties claimed they
had incurred certain expenses on behalf of the children for
which the other party did not reimburse them as required by
the decree.
Following a hearing, the district court adopted the ref-
eree’s recommendation in full. Trevor appeals, and Laura
cross-appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Trevor assigns six errors on appeal. We paraphrase and
reorder those assignments as follows: The district court erred
(1) by determining that Vanderveer v. Vanderveer, 310 Neb.
196, 964 N.W.2d 694 (2021), constituted “new law” in the
State of Nebraska for purposes of modification; (2) by find-
ing that Laura showed a material change in circumstances
warranting modification of Trevor’s child support obligation;
(3) by finding that Laura’s attempt to have Trevor’s RSUs
counted as income was not barred by preclusion doctrines;
(4) by counting the RSUs as income; (5) in its calculation
of Trevor’s income; and (6) in failing to set timeframes for
the parties to request and make reimbursements for the chil-
dren’s expenses.
On cross-appeal, Laura assigns that the district court abused
its discretion (1) by failing to apply the new child support
obligation retroactively to the month following the filing of

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KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
the complaint for modification and (2) by failing to award
attorney fees to Laura.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Modification of child support payments is entrusted to
the trial court’s discretion, and although, on appeal, the issue is
reviewed de novo on the record, we will affirm the trial court’s
decision absent an abuse of discretion. Freeman v. Groskopf,
286 Neb. 713, 838 N.W.2d 300 (2013). Whether a child sup-
port order should be retroactive is also entrusted to the discre-
tion of the trial court, and we will affirm its decision absent an
abuse of discretion. Id.
[3] In an action for modification of a marital dissolution
decree, the award of attorney fees is discretionary with the trial
court, is reviewed de novo on the record, and will be affirmed
in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Tilson v. Tilson, 307
Neb. 275, 948 N.W.2d 768 (2020).
ANALYSIS
Material Change in Circumstances.
[4] We first address Trevor’s assignments of error pertain-
ing to whether Laura demonstrated a material change in cir-
cumstances that would permit modification of Trevor’s child
support obligation. A party seeking to modify a child support
order must show a material change in circumstances that (1)
occurred subsequent to the entry of the original decree or
previous modification and (2) was not contemplated when the
decree was entered. Hotz v. Hotz, 301 Neb. 102, 917 N.W.2d
467 (2018).
Trevor devotes much of his brief on appeal to an argument
that the referee, and, by extension, the district court, erred by
finding that our opinion in Vanderveer, supra, constituted a
material change in circumstances. He argues that Vanderveer
did not recognize any new principle of law and therefore
could not serve as the basis for a modification of his child
support obligation.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
Trevor’s argument, however, ignores the actual material
change in circumstances found by the referee. The referee did
not find that our opinion in Vanderveer constituted a material
change in circumstances. It found that Trevor’s postdecree
sales of his RSUs—after never selling the RSUs during the
marriage—amounted to a material change in circumstances.
[5] Trevor’s briefs on appeal make little to no effort to dem-
onstrate that it was error to find that his postdecree sales were
a material change in circumstances. In any event, we discern
no abuse of discretion in that conclusion. Among the factors
to be considered in determining whether a material change
of circumstances has occurred are changes in the financial
position of the parent obligated to pay support, the needs
of the children for whom support is paid, good or bad faith
motive of the obligated parent in sustaining a reduction in
income, and whether the change is temporary or permanent.
Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 299 Neb. 76, 907 N.W.2d 275 (2018).
Here, Trevor’s sales of the RSUs occurred after the entry of
the dissolution decree and there is no indication that sales
of the RSUs were contemplated when the decree was entered.
Furthermore, the sales of the RSUs changed Trevor’s finan-
cial position as they provided him with additional funds that
could be spent. The referee also found that sales occurred in
3 different years, a factor that cuts against a finding that the
change was merely temporary.
Because we find no error in the district court’s conclusion
that Trevor’s selling of the RSUs constituted a material change
in circumstances, we need not address Trevor’s argument that
our decision in Vanderveer did not recognize new principles
of law.
Preclusion.
In addition to arguing that there was no material change
in circumstances that would permit modification of his child
support obligation, Trevor argues that the doctrines of issue
and claim preclusion barred Laura from seeking modification

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
on the ground that Trevor’s RSUs should be included as
income. Trevor argues that because the district court, when
it entered the dissolution decree, rejected Laura’s contention
that Trevor’s RSUs should be counted as income, preclusion
doctrines bar her from relitigating that issue in a modification
proceeding. We find no merit to Trevor’s argument.
As we just discussed, a party seeking to modify a child
support order must demonstrate that there has been a material
change in circumstances since the entry of the initial order.
As we will explain, however, when such a material change
is demonstrated, claim and issue preclusion have no role
to play.
Although we have specifically recognized that the doctrine
of claim preclusion will not apply when there has been an
intervening change in facts or circumstances, see Ichtertz v.
Orthopaedic Specialists of Neb., 273 Neb. 466, 730 N.W.2d
798 (2007), and Moulton v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 251
Neb. 95, 555 N.W.2d 39 (1996), that “exception” naturally
follows from a straightforward application of the doctrines of
issue and claim preclusion.
Issue preclusion applies only where “an identical issue was
decided in a prior action.” Hara v. Reichert, 287 Neb. 577,
581, 843 N.W.2d 812, 816 (2014). But when there has been a
material change in circumstances, a new issue is presented, so
the identical issue would not have been decided in the prior
action. And while claim preclusion bars relitigation not only
of those matters actually litigated, but also of those matters
which might have been litigated in the prior action, see, e.g.,
Schaeffer v. Frakes, 313 Neb. 337, 984 N.W.2d 290 (2023),
an issue could not have been litigated in the prior action if
it depends on circumstances that came about after that action
was decided. This case illustrates the point. The issue in the
modification proceeding was whether the RSUs should be
counted as income after Trevor started selling them post-
decree. That issue was not and could not have been decided in
the initial dissolution proceeding.

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KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
We often say that in proceedings on a complaint to modify,
proof of a material change in circumstances is a “threshold
inquiry” because issues determined in a prior decree or order
“are deemed preclusive in the absence of proof of new facts
and circumstances.” Weaver v. Weaver, 308 Neb. 373, 388, 954
N.W.2d 619, 630 (2021) (emphasis supplied). Where there has
been proof of new facts and circumstances, however, issues
determined in the prior decree or order are not preclusive.
Inclusion of RSUs as Income.
Trevor also argues that even if there was a material change
in circumstances, it was still error for the district court to
count the RSUs as income for purposes of child support. Here,
Trevor principally argues that his case is distinguishable from
Vanderveer. In Vanderveer, we held that the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to attribute any income to
the husband for RSUs he received as compensation from his
employer. The evidence in that case showed that the husband
annually received RSUs from his employer and that each year,
he sold vested RSUs and, “as a result, . . . receive[d] sig-
nificant income above and beyond his base salary and annual
bonus.” Vanderveer, 310 Neb. at 218, 964 N.W.2d at 711. We
held that there was “no principled reason to exclude all RSU
income from the child support calculation.” Id. at 220, 964
N.W.2d at 712. We reversed the decree in part and remanded
the cause to the district court for it to recalculate child support
without excluding all income from RSUs.
Trevor attempts to draw a contrast between himself and
the husband in Vanderveer. He argues that the husband in
Vanderveer routinely sold his RSUs while Trevor did not. He
also argues that in this case, the RSUs were divided as part
of the dissolution decree. We are not persuaded that it was
an abuse of discretion to include Trevor’s RSUs as income.
As we have discussed, Trevor sold RSUs following the entry
of the decree. In addition, we rejected in Vanderveer an argu-
ment that “when calculating child support, courts must make

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
a binary choice between classifying something as marital
property subject to equitable division and considering it as
income for purposes of child support.” 310 Neb. at 219, 964
N.W.2d at 711. Instead, we emphasized that we take a “flex-
ible approach” to determining income for purposes of child
support to account for “the wide variety of circumstances that
may be present.” Id.
Given the flexibility afforded to the district court in deter-
mining Trevor’s income and the fact that he, like the husband
in Vanderveer, sold vested RSUs and thereby received funds
in addition to his salary and bonus, we see no basis on which
to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
including Trevor’s RSUs when determining income for pur-
poses of calculating child support.
Calculation of Trevor’s Income.
Trevor also assigns error to the district court’s calculations
of his income. Specifically, he asserts that the district court
erred in choosing to average his bonus pay, in the amount it
attributed to Trevor for his RSUs, and in its treatment of taxes
for the RSUs. None of these arguments convince us the district
court abused its discretion.
[6] Trevor first argues that the district court should not
have averaged Trevor’s bonus income. It is a general rule,
however, that a party cannot be heard to complain of an error
which the party was instrumental in bringing about. City of
Omaha Human Relations Dept. v. City Wide Rock & Exc.
Co., 201 Neb. 405, 268 N.W.2d 98 (1978). Here, Trevor testi-
fied that his bonus pay should be averaged. And even if we
were to consider Trevor’s argument on the merits, we would
not find an abuse of discretion. This court has acknowledged
that when a party’s income has fluctuated during “the imme-
diate past 3 years, the income may be averaged.” Gress v.
Gress, 274 Neb. 686, 692, 743 N.W.2d 67, 73 (2007) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). See Neb. Ct. R. ch. 4, art. 2,
worksheet 1, n.5 (rev. 2016). Trevor’s bonus pay was $45,000

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KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
in 2022, $47,500 in 2023, and $34,000 in 2024. Based on
these amounts, it was not clear that Trevor’s income was
consistently increasing or decreasing. When presented with
this type of fluctuation, Nebraska law allows for an averag-
ing of incomes. See Gress v. Gress, supra. See, also, Peter v.
Peter, 262 Neb. 1017, 637 N.W.2d 865 (2002) (holding that
income averaging should not be used when income is consis-
tently increasing).
Trevor also asserts that the district court erred in calculat-
ing the amount of income attributable to the RSUs. First,
Trevor relies on Cronin v. Cronin, 31 Neb. App. 38, 977
N.W.2d 273 (2022), to argue that averaging the RSUs by price
and quantity involves unnecessary speculation. Second, he
argues that in the years the district court used for its calcula-
tion of the RSUs, some of the RSUs went to Laura and there-
fore should not have been counted as his income. We find no
abuse of discretion.
We find Cronin distinguishable. In that case, the Court of
Appeals was troubled by the district court’s “[a]ttempting to
average the value of [a party’s] unvested [RSUs].” Id. at 49,
977 N.W.2d at 283. The Court of Appeals explained that it was
not known at what price those shares would later vest. Here,
the referee calculated Trevor’s income from the RSUs with
reference to shares that had vested.
We also find no abuse of discretion in counting all of
Trevor’s RSUs even though Laura received some of the RSUs
in the preceding 3 years. As the referee explained, Laura would
receive the last RSUs pursuant to the decree in early 2025. The
referee did not subtract the shares Laura had received in earlier
years because an attempt was being made to assess the RSUs
Trevor would receive going forward. This was not untenable
or unreasonable and therefore not an abuse of discretion.
Trevor finally argues that his child support obligation was
calculated through the referee’s application of “an unneces-
sarily complicated tax effect” to the income from the RSUs.
Brief for appellant at 34. Trevor’s argument on this point,

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KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
however, is difficult to track. He appears to argue that he
should have received a different deduction for taxes because
he claims his RSUs are taxed as ordinary income, rather than
as capital gains, and because he paid income tax on shares
that Laura received in the years prior to the district court’s
modification order. He does not explain, however, how a dif-
ferent tax rate would have affected the deduction, nor does
he explain why his payment of taxes for Laura in past years
should affect his child support obligations going forward.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the way the referee
accounted for Trevor’s tax obligations.
Reimbursement Deadline.
Trevor’s final assignment of error is that the district court
should have set deadlines for the parties to submit reimburse-
ment requests for the children’s expenses to each other and to
make required reimbursements. Although the decree requires
reimbursement, it does not include deadlines by which reim-
bursement is to be requested and paid. Trevor argues the dis-
trict court erred by not setting such deadlines.
Trevor is contending that the district court should have
modified the decree to include deadlines for reimbursement.
Trevor, however, did not file a complaint to modify the decree.
He does not explain what would have authorized the dis-
trict court to modify the decree in the manner he suggests,
much less what would have obligated it to do so. The district
court did not err by not modifying the decree in the manner
Trevor argues.
Retroactivity.
Having addressed Trevor’s assignments of error, we turn
to the errors Laura assigns in her cross-appeal. She first takes
issue with the district court’s decision to make the child sup-
port payments retroactive to February 2024. Although the
district court ordered the increase in child support obligations
to be made retroactive, she argues that the increase in child

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KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
support obligation should have been made retroactive to May
2023—the first month following the complaint to modify.
[7,8] Absent equities to the contrary, modification of a child
support order should be applied retroactively to the first day
of the month following the filing date of the application for
modification. Johnson v. Johnson, 290 Neb. 838, 862 N.W.2d
740 (2015). In determining whether to order a retroactive
modification of child support, a court must consider the par-
ties’ status, character, situation, and attendant circumstances.
Id. One of the factors to consider is the ability to pay. See
Wilkins v. Wilkins, 269 Neb. 937, 697 N.W.2d 280 (2005).
Laura argues that the above-mentioned precedent estab-
lishes that the district court should have made the payments
retroactive to May 2023. We find no abuse of discretion.
District courts are not restricted to making child support
obligations retroactive to the month after the complaint was
filed or imposing no retroactivity at all. If equity requires, it
is within a district court’s discretion to make the payments
retroactive to a date other than the month after the complaint
was filed. Given Trevor’s testimony that he would have had
to sell additional RSUs and incur additional capital gains
taxes to meet his obligation if the modified payments were
made retroactive to May 2023, we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the district court’s making the payments retroactive to
February 2024.
Attorney Fees.
Laura also asserts in her cross-appeal that the district court
erred by failing to award her attorney fees. While a district
court can award attorney fees in proceedings where a party
seeks to modify a dissolution decree, the decision of whether
to award such fees is committed to the district court’s discre-
tion. See Garza v. Garza, 288 Neb. 213, 846 N.W.2d 626
(2014). Laura argues that attorney fees should be awarded
here because it took nearly 18 months for the complaint
to modify to be litigated in the district court. Because we

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KINGSTON v. KINGSTON
Cite as 320 Neb. 981
believe the district court could have concluded that both par-
ties bore some responsibility for the time it took to resolve
this matter in the district court, we find no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s decision to have both parties pay their
own attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
Finding no merit to the errors assigned in Trevor’s appeal or
Laura’s cross-appeal, we affirm.
Affirmed.