State v. Weber

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Levi W. Weber, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed March 6, 2026. 	No. S-25-044.
1. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress:
Appeal and Error. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an
appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding histori-
cal facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear
error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment pro-
tections is a question of law that is reviewed independently of the trial
court’s determination.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
3. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Investigative Stops:
Arrests: Probable Cause. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right
to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. This guarantee requires
that an arrest be based on probable cause and limits investigatory stops
to those made upon an articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
4. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Probable Cause. A traffic viola-
tion, no matter how minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of
a vehicle.
5. Appeal and Error. In determining whether a trial court’s findings of
historical fact are clearly erroneous, an appellate court does not reweigh
the evidence or resolve conflicts in the evidence, but, rather, recognizes
the trial court as the finder of fact and takes into consideration that it
observed the witnesses.
6. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain
and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
direct, and unambiguous.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:55 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
7. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. In construing a statute, a court must
determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature
as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its
plain, ordinary, and popular sense.
8. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning
into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
a statute.
9. Drunk Driving: Blood, Breath, and Urine Tests: Police Officers and
Sheriffs. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,199 (Reissue 2021) does not require an
arresting officer to inform the person to be tested of his or her right to
obtain an evaluation by an independent physician and additional testing.
Appeal from the District Court for Seward County, James C.
Stecker, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for
Seward County, C. Jo Petersen, Judge. Judgment of District
Court affirmed.
Matthew K. Kosmicki for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Nathan A. Liss, and
Danielle Jewell, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and
Bergevin, JJ.
Funke, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,199 (Reissue 2021), motorists
who are required by law enforcement officers to submit to
chemical tests of their blood, breath, or urine for the purpose
of determining the concentration of alcohol or the presence of
drugs can obtain independent testing in addition to and fol-
lowing the tests administered at the direction of the officer. If
the officer “refuses to permit such additional test to be taken,”
the original test or tests are not competent as evidence. 1
1 § 60-6,199. See, also, State v. Dake, 247 Neb. 579, 529 N.W.2d 46 (1995)
(permitting requested independent test is foundational to admission into
evidence of result of breath test performed by State).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
This appeal from the district court for Seward County,
Nebraska, sitting as an intermediate appellate court, raises a
question of first impression regarding whether an officer who
gratuitously, but mistakenly, advises a motorist about when
an independent test may be obtained effectively refuses to
permit an independent test, such that the results of the motor-
ist’s original test must be suppressed. We conclude that the
motorist’s statutory right to an independent test was not vio-
lated under these circumstances and that his other arguments
are without merit. As such, we affirm the order of the district
court, affirming the judgment of the county court.
BACKGROUND
Weber’s Encounter With
Law Enforcement
The present appeal arises from an encounter that Levi W.
Weber had with Deputy Anthony Gann and Sgt. Troy Schaefer
of the Seward County sheriff’s office at approximately 1 a.m.
on July 4, 2023. The following description of that encounter
is based on the evidence adduced at the hearing on Weber’s
motion to suppress and at the trial. It includes only those facts
necessary for our analysis. Where relevant, additional back-
ground is provided later in the opinion.
Gann and Schaefer were standing outside their vehicles
and talking after completing a traffic stop. The officers were
at the intersection of Priam and Achilles Streets in Cordova,
Nebraska, with their vehicles parked nearby. As they stood
there, they observed a vehicle, later determined to be driven
by Weber, turn onto Achilles Street. The officers would sub-
sequently testify that the vehicle turned without signaling and
then moved in a “slalom pattern” or “drastically swerve[d]”
as it proceeded toward them, although Weber would contest
both those claims. Gann and Schaefer would also testify that
when Weber reached the intersection, he stopped and rolled
down the vehicle’s passenger-side window, actions that they
took to mean the encounter was “consensual” and the driver

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
“wanted to speak” with them, although Weber would dispute
those claims, too.
Gann approached the vehicle and observed that Weber had
red, bloodshot, watery eyes and a “closed beer can” inside the
front cab area of the vehicle and that he spoke slowly, loudly,
and with “somewhat of a slur.” Based on those observations
and the vehicle’s driving pattern, Gann asked Weber to step
out of the vehicle with the intent of initiating a driving under
the influence (DUI) investigation. During the course of that
investigation, Weber said that he had a bottle of whiskey
in his vehicle, that he had been drinking whiskey and soda,
and that his last drink was approximately 1 hour before the
encounter. Based on the results of the investigation, Weber
was placed under arrest at 1:56 a.m. and transported by Gann
to the Seward County Detention Center. Weber’s vehicle was
towed, and an inventory of his vehicle revealed an open bottle
of whiskey on the front passenger seat.
Gann and Weber arrived at the detention center at approxi-
mately 2:25 a.m. Shortly after they arrived, Gann advised
Weber that he was requiring Weber to submit to a chemi-
cal breath test to determine the concentration of alcohol in
his body. Weber had questions about the advisement form,
which also addressed blood and urine tests. Weber said that
he would “let [Gann] take blood or urine,” but that Gann had
already taken a sample of his breath. Thereafter, there was “a
lot of discussion back and forth” between Weber and Gann
about the type of test to be administered. However, Weber
ultimately consented to a breath test, which was administered
at 2:53 a.m. That test indicated Weber’s blood alcohol content
was .131 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
After the test was completed, Gann escorted Weber to the
booking area. As they walked there, Weber again asked Gann
whether he got a blood or urine test. Gann told Weber that he
did not. Weber asked the reason for this. Gann said, “Because
we don’t need to do it. . . . [I]f you want to seek your own
independent blood test afterwards, you’re welcome to do so.”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
Weber then asked, “[H]ow soon afterwards?” Gann replied,
“As soon as you get out. If you want to do your own blood test,
that’s fine.” On appeal in the present matter, the parties agree
that this latter statement was incorrect insofar as it suggested
that Weber could not obtain an independent test until he was
released from the detention center.
At 3:15 a.m., Gann turned Weber over to the staff of
the detention center, who commenced booking Weber into
the facility. The booking process was completed at 6:17 a.m.
There is nothing in the record to indicate why the booking
process took 3 hours.
Shortly after booking was completed, Weber made two tele-
phone calls to his father regarding bond and related matters.
Weber was released from the detention center at 8:46 a.m.
after posting bond. Subsequently, a complaint was filed in the
county court for Seward County charging Weber with DUI and
an open container violation.
Motion to Suppress
Weber pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress “any
and all statements and evidence obtained by law enforcement
officers regarding th[e] case” based on alleged violations of
his constitutional rights, including his rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the corresponding
provisions of the Nebraska Constitution. 2 Weber also argued
that the results of his original breath test should be suppressed
because law enforcement “hindered” him from exercising his
statutory right to an independent test.
A hearing was held, at which the county court received
evidence consistent with the foregoing description of Weber’s
encounter with law enforcement. At the hearing, counsel for
Weber specifically questioned officers about their testimony
that Weber turned his vehicle without signaling, Weber’s vehi-
cle weaved from one side of the road to the other, and Weber
2 See Neb. Const. art. I, § 7.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
voluntarily spoke with them. However, Gann and Schaefer
maintained that they were in a position to see whether Weber
had used a turn signal and that they saw no signal. In addition,
Gann, who was the only one questioned about this matter,
opined that the “flicker” that can be seen on a video record-
ing of the encounter was Weber’s vehicle lights glimpsed
through vegetation, and not a turn signal. Schaefer similarly
resisted the suggestion that a vehicle that moved as the offi-
cers claimed Weber’s vehicle had moved would have gone off
the road and into a ditch, although Gann’s comments on that
matter were less clear. In addition, both officers maintained
that they took no action to signal Weber to stop and that they
were not blocking the intersection.
Weber testified too, although his testimony did not address
his initial encounter with law enforcement. Weber said that
he asked to make a telephone call “[s]hortly after” Gann left
the detention center and before Weber was placed in a hold-
ing cell for booking, but that he was not given an opportunity
to do so until approximately 6:20 a.m. Weber conceded that
he did not ask his father to contact a hospital or find a doc-
tor who could come to the detention center to administer a
blood test. However, Weber said that no one “ever explain[ed]
to [him] that [he] could arrange for a blood test from inside
the jail” and that he did not understand how he could have
done so.
After the hearing, the county court overruled Weber’s
motion to suppress. The county court began by rejecting
Weber’s claim that the “stop of [his] vehicle was invalid”
because the officers had no basis for stopping him. The
county court observed that “courts have long held” that the
stop of a vehicle is objectively reasonable when the officer
has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred and that traffic violations, no matter how minor, cre-
ate probable cause to stop the driver. Here, the county court
said that “[t]he testimony of the [officers] was that [Weber]
made a turn without signaling the same.” As such, the county

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STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
court reasoned that the traffic violation of failure to signal,
“as testified to by the [officers],” was valid grounds to stop
Weber’s vehicle.
The county court took a similar view of Weber’s motion to
suppress based on the alleged violation of his statutory right
to an independent test. Apparently focusing on Weber’s initial
conversation with Gann at the detention center, the county
court stated that when viewed “in its entirety,” the testimony
and video recordings showed that Weber did not seek an inde-
pendent test, but, rather, sought to have Gann perform “all
three tests”—blood, breath, and urine. According to the county
court, “[t]he only time that it can even be said that [Weber]
makes any comment about getting his own independent test is
at the very end” of his contact with Gann, when Gann raised
the matter of an independent test. However, the county court
said that Gann “[was] not required to so advise” and that there
was no further inquiry by Weber and no further interaction
between Weber and Gann. The county court also noted that
there was testimony that Weber was allowed access to, and in
fact used, the “jail telephone,” but “no testimony as to whether
[he] made calls to obtain an independent test,” despite being
given the opportunity to do so. As such, the county court con-
cluded that nothing in the conversation between Weber and
“the officers” hampered or prohibited Weber from obtaining
an independent test.
Trial and Sentencing
A bench trial was subsequently held in the county court, with
all the evidence submitted by stipulated exhibits. At the trial,
Weber renewed his motion to suppress in order to preserve it
for appeal. Weber was convicted of DUI and an open container
violation. He was subsequently sentenced to 6 months’ proba-
tion with various terms and conditions, including a $500 fine
and a 60-day revocation of his license, for the DUI offense and
fined $50 for the open container violation.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
Appeal to District Court
Weber appealed to the district court, assigning, summarized
and in relevant part, that the county court erred in overruling his
motion to suppress on constitutional and statutory grounds. The
district court affirmed the judgment of the county court, appar-
ently under the following standard of review: “Propositions of
law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an indepen-
dent conclusion irrespective of the decision below.”
As to Weber’s constitutional claim, the district court agreed
with the county court that the stop of a vehicle is objectively
reasonable when an officer has probable cause to believe a
traffic violation has occurred. Here, the district court said that
“[t]he testimony of the [officers] was that [Weber] made a turn
without signaling the same.” The district court also opined
that its review of the video recordings showed that Weber
“voluntarily stopped his vehicle,” rolled down his window,
and engaged in a “consensual conversation” with Gann, dur-
ing which Gann smelled alcohol—a smell that, in combination
with Gann’s observations of Weber’s driving, created reason-
able suspicion for Gann to ask Weber to step out of the vehicle
and for Gann to initiate a DUI investigation. The district
court noted Weber’s argument that the officers’ vehicles were
parked in such a way that he could not proceed through the
intersection. However, the district court rejected that argument
based on its review of the video recordings. The district court
then reiterated that the officers observed a traffic violation and
concluded that the county court properly overruled the motion
to suppress as it related to Weber’s initial encounter with Gann
and Schaefer.
The district court similarly concluded that the county court
did not err in overruling Weber’s motion to suppress as it
related to the independent test. In so doing, the district court
noted Weber’s argument that Gann’s “misstatement of the law
hampered [his] efforts to obtain an independent test.” However,
the district court observed that Weber “cite[d] no caselaw that
indicates that a partial[ly] incorrect statement is sufficient to

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
constitute” hampering or hindering under § 60-6,199. Instead,
relying on State v. Dake 3 and State v. Jasa, 4 the district court
reasoned that the case law “clearly reflects that the only
responsibility of law enforcement is to allow phone calls to be
made. Law enforcement has no other responsibility to assist a
[motorist] in obtaining an independent test.” Here, the district
court said that law enforcement did not deny Weber an oppor-
tunity to obtain an independent test, because “[he] had access
and used the telephone. [He] had [the] opportunity to obtain an
independent test but did not obtain one.”
Weber timely appealed the order of the district court.
Thereafter, the State petitioned to bypass review by the Court
of Appeals in part on the grounds that the case involved an
issue of first impression as to whether Gann’s “gratuitous but
partially incorrect statement about the right to an independent
chemical test runs afoul of § 60-6,199 and triggers suppres-
sion of the original chemical test.” We granted the State’s peti-
tion and moved the matter to our docket. 5
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Weber assigns, restated, that the district court erred by
affirming the county court’s order overruling his motion to
suppress because (1) he was seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the corresponding provision of the Nebraska
Constitution, and (2) Gann “hindered” or “denied” his right to
an independent test under § 60-6,199. We hereinafter reference
the first of these claims as Weber’s Fourth Amendment claim,
because article 1, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution is phrased
identically to the Fourth Amendment and has previously been
construed to afford no greater protections against governmental
searches and seizures than its federal counterpart. 6
3 Dake, supra note 1.
4 State v. Jasa, 297 Neb. 822, 901 N.W.2d 315 (2017).
5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
6 State v. Hoehn, 316 Neb. 634, 6 N.W.3d 487 (2024).

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STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
press based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment,
an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. 7
Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial
court’s findings for clear error, but whether those facts trig-
ger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question
of law that is reviewed independently of the trial court’s
determination. 8
[2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. 9
ANALYSIS
Motion to Suppress on Fourth
Amendment Grounds
In his first assignment of error, Weber challenges the district
court’s conclusion that the county court did not err in over-
ruling his motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Weber claims that the district court applied the incorrect
standard of review in affirming the order of the county court.
Weber also claims that the district court (like the county court
before it) misconstrued the evidence in concluding that there
was no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The State,
in contrast, argues that the district court did not err in agreeing
with the county court that Weber’s Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated.
[3] The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of
unreasonable search and seizure. 10 This guarantee requires that
an arrest be based on probable cause and limits investigatory
7 State v. Falcon, 319 Neb. 911, 25 N.W.3d 462 (2025).
8 See id.
9 Streck, Inc. v. Ryan, ante p. 638, 29 N.W.3d 782 (2026).
10 Jasa, supra note 4.

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STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
stops to those made upon an articulable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity. 11
[4] However, not all encounters between police and citizens
constitute seizures within the realm of Fourth Amendment
protection. 12 Police-citizen encounters that involve no restraint
of the citizen’s liberty, but, rather, the citizen’s voluntary coop-
eration, elicited through noncoercive questioning, do not “‘rise
to the level of a seizure’” and, as such, are “‘outside the realm
of Fourth Amendment protection.’” 13 Moreover, even when
a police-citizen encounter does constitute a seizure, it could
still be objectively reasonable if the officer has specific and
articulable facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion
that a person has committed or is committing a crime, or if the
officer has probable cause to believe that a person has com-
mitted or is committing a crime. 14 As is relevant here, a traffic
violation, no matter how minor, creates probable cause to stop
the driver of a vehicle. 15
The parties here raise various arguments as to whether the
encounter between Weber and the officers was a seizure within
the realm of Fourth Amendment protection, whether there was
reasonable articulable suspicion of DUI, and whether there
was probable cause to believe Weber had committed a traf-
fic violation. However, we need not resolve most of those
disputes. Nor need we resolve Weber’s claim that the district
court applied the incorrect standard of review. This is because,
even assuming that the district court applied the incorrect
standard of review and that the encounter between Weber and
the officers was a seizure, the district court cannot be said
to have erred in affirming the county court’s conclusion that
11 Id.
12 See State v. Drake, 311 Neb. 219, 971 N.W.2d 759 (2022).
13 Id. at 229, 971 N.W.2d at 769.
14 See Drake, supra note 12.
15 State v. Perry, 318 Neb. 613, 17 N.W.3d 504 (2025).

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STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
there was probable cause to stop Weber for failing to signal
before turning, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,161
(Reissue 2021). 16
In arguing otherwise, Weber claims that the district court
and the county court “clearly erred” in concluding that there
was probable cause to stop him for a traffic violation. 17 Weber
maintains that the courts below simply “defer[red]” to the
officers’ testimony that he turned his vehicle without signaling
and “ignored” other allegedly “more probative and relevant”
evidence that he claims “refuted” the officers’ testimony. 18 In
particular, Weber points to video recordings and other exhibits
that he claims show, in relevant part, that the officers could
not have observed whether he signaled before turning and
that he actually signaled before turning. Weber also argues
that Schaefer’s testimony that Weber turned without signaling
should be “disregard[ed]” because Schaefer did not mention
any failure to signal by Weber in his supplemental report
regarding the encounter. 19
[5] We see no clear error here. Weber complains of the
district court’s affirmance of the trial court’s findings of
historical fact in connection with his motion to suppress and
would have us find that certain testimony was “not cred-
ible” based on alleged discrepancies in the evidence. 20 That
request misunderstands the role of an appellate court. As we
have repeatedly stated, in determining whether a trial court’s
findings of historical fact are clearly erroneous, an appel-
late court does not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts
16 See, e.g., Sebade v. Sebade, ante p. 398, 28 N.W.3d 19 (2025) (appellate
court has discretion to affirm, as it deems appropriate, correct result that
was reached below for wrong reason).
17 Brief for appellant at 8.
18 Id. at 15.
19 Id. at 16.
20 Id. at 17.

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STATE v. WEBER
Cite as 320 Neb. 934
in the evidence, but, rather, recognizes the trial court as the
finder of fact and takes into consideration that it observed
the witnesses. 21
We also observe that the video recordings and other exhibits
on which Weber relies are less conclusive than he suggests,
especially when considered in conjunction with the totality
of the officers’ testimony. The officers testified not only that
they observed a traffic violation, but also that they were in
a position to observe whether Weber signaled before turning
and saw no such signal. In addition, Gann testified that the
“light” seen in the video recording “flickering from” Weber’s
vehicle 22—which Weber asserts was his use of a turn signal—
was the vehicle’s lights glimpsed through vegetation, not a
turn signal. And Schaefer explained that he did not include the
traffic violation in his supplemental report because he did not
“think it was important” insofar as he viewed the “stop [as] a
consensual encounter.”
Any suggestion that the courts below failed to review the
video recordings is similarly misplaced. The district court did,
in fact, refer to “the video” several times in its discussion of
Weber’s motion to suppress. Granted, those references pertain
to Weber’s meeting with the officers at the intersection, and
not the traffic violation preceding that meeting. However, the
references make clear that the district court considered other
evidence beyond the officers’ testimony. The county court
similarly mentioned “the video” in its order denying Weber’s
motion to suppress.
Weber raises similar arguments as to the officers’ testimony
that his vehicle weaved from side to side as it progressed
down Achilles Street, with the apparent intent of refuting
the claim that there was reasonable articulable suspicion that
21 State v. Briggs, 308 Neb. 84, 953 N.W.2d 41 (2021).
22 Brief for appellant at 16.

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Weber was driving while under the influence. 23 However, we
need not address those arguments because we conclude that
the district court did not err in affirming the county court’s
conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that Weber
had committed a traffic violation.
Motion to Suppress Under § 60-6,199
In his second assignment of error, Weber challenges the
district court’s conclusion that the county court did not err in
overruling his motion to suppress evidence of his chemical
breath test under § 60-6,199. Weber argues that the district
court erred in failing to realize that the county court was mis-
taken in concluding that he had not requested an independent
test. Weber also argues that the district court “incorrectly
appl[ied] the law with respect to independent blood tests”
by failing to recognize that Gann “denied, hampered or pre-
vented him” from obtaining an independent test. 24 In addition,
Weber argues that the district court “misapplied the facts” in
finding it “dispositive that [he] had access to a phone.” 25 The
State, on the other hand, argues that Weber did not request an
independent test and that even if he were seen to have made
such a request, the officers did not refuse to permit an inde-
pendent test.
We see no conduct by the officers in this case that would
require suppression of Weber’s chemical breath test under
§ 60-6,199. In arguing otherwise, Weber points in part to
Gann’s failure to advise him that he would have access to a
telephone and that he could or would (Weber uses both for-
mulations here) have to make his own arrangements for an
23 See, e.g., Drake, supra note 12 (because of its less intrusive character,
investigatory stop, as defined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), requires only that stopping officer have specific
and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion that
person has committed or is committing crime).
24 Brief for appellant at 17.
25 Id. at 22.

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independent blood test. Weber claims that such an advise-
ment was “required” under § 60-6,199 and Jasa. 26 Weber also
points to Gann’s “incorrect statement” about when Weber
could obtain an independent blood test. 27 Weber seems to sug-
gest that insofar as Gann was mistaken about when a motor-
ist could obtain an independent test, Gann failed in his duty
under State v. Albarenga 28 to know the laws he was charged to
enforce. Weber asserts that Gann’s failures, individually and
collectively, “hampered,” “hindered,” “prevented,” “denied,”
or “effectively denied” Weber’s right to obtain an indepen-
dent test. 29
Section 60-6,199 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the
officer refuses to permit [an] additional test to be taken, then
the original test or tests shall not be competent as evidence.”
[6-8] Statutory language, like that quoted here, is to be
given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court
will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of
statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 30 In
construing a statute, a court must determine and give effect to
the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from
the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordi-
nary, and popular sense. 31 It is not within the province of the
courts to read a meaning into a statute that is not there or to
read anything direct and plain out of a statute. 32
We see nothing in the text of § 60-6,199, or in our prior
opinions construing that statute, requiring Gann to inform
Weber that he would be allowed access to a telephone and
could or would have to make arrangements for someone to
26 Id. at 21. See Jasa, supra note 4.
27 Brief for appellant at 20.
28 State v. Albarenga, 313 Neb. 72, 982 N.W.2d 799 (2022).
29 Brief for appellant at 17, 18, and 20.
30 Streck, Inc., supra note 9.
31 Id.
32 Id.

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come to the detention center to take a blood sample. The
statutory text itself does not purport to impose any duties on
officers to assist motorists in obtaining an independent test,
and we have previously relied on this factor in rejecting motor-
ists’ claims that officers should be seen to have certain duties
(beyond allowing access to a telephone) under § 60-6,199. 33
[9] We see nothing in Jasa to the contrary. Weber is correct
that in Jasa, the motorist was advised that he “had a right to
undergo independent testing but would have to procure and
pay for it himself.” 34 However, those were the facts of the
case, and we recited them as such. We did not suggest that
such an advisement was required; in fact, to do so would have
been to overrule sub silentio a long line of cases concluding
that § 60-6,199 and its predecessors do not require an arrest-
ing officer to inform the person to be tested of his or her
right to obtain an evaluation by an independent physician and
additional testing. 35
We take a similar view of Weber’s argument that Gann
incorrectly stated when Weber could obtain an independent test
and, in so doing, failed in his duty under Albarenga to know
the laws he was charged with enforcing. As noted above, we
have long and repeatedly taken the view that officers have no
duty under § 60-6,199 and its predecessors to advise motor-
ists of their right to an independent test. 36 Consistent with that
33 See, e.g., Jasa, supra note 4 (looking to plain text of statute in rejecting
motorist’s claim that insofar as he could not be released on bond for
several days due to nature of his offense and he subsequently learned that
none of entities he contacted would have come to jail for an independent
test, intent of § 60-6,199 would be defeated if officers were not required
to do more than provide access to telephone).
34 Jasa, supra note 4, 297 Neb. at 827, 901 N.W.2d at 320.
35 See, e.g., Heusman v. Jensen, 226 Neb. 666, 414 N.W.2d 247 (1987); State
v. Klingelhoefer, 222 Neb. 219, 382 N.W.2d 366 (1986); State v. Miller,
213 Neb. 274, 328 N.W.2d 769 (1983); State v. Brittain, 212 Neb. 686,
325 N.W.2d 141 (1982); Zadina v. Weedlun, 187 Neb. 361, 190 N.W.2d
857 (1971).
36 See id.

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view, we agree with the State that insofar as officers have no
duty to advise motorists of their right to an independent test,
they cannot be seen to have a duty to correctly advise motorists
of that right. We also note that while we recited the principle
that officers have a duty to know the law in Albarenga, we
did so in rejecting the defendant’s argument that the principle
required the suppression of evidence obtained when the officer
stopped the defendant for violating a municipal ordinance that
we later determined was preempted by state law. 37
Framing the conduct complained of as “hampering” or
otherwise impeding the motorist’s ability to obtain an inde-
pendent test—rather than asserting an affirmative duty on the
part of officers—does not change the analysis here. Weber is
correct that in Dake, we agreed with courts in other jurisdic-
tions that had construed statutes similar to § 60-6,199 to mean
that “while . . . police cannot hamper a motorist’s efforts to
obtain independent testing, they are under no duty to assist
in obtaining such testing beyond allowing telephone calls to
secure the test.” 38 However, subsequently, in Jasa, we looked
to the language of the statute when reasoning that “the offi-
cer must ‘refuse[] to permit’—that is, deny authorization or
consent for—such additional test to trigger the suppression of
any officer-directed test.” 39 As such, we understand our sub-
sequent statement in Jasa that the principle set forth in Dake
regarding “‘hamper[ing],’” assisting, and allowing telephone
calls “[was] still a reasonable statement of the law” to mean
only that purported “‘hamper[ing]’” must be equivalent to a
refusal to permit. 40 The conduct of which Weber complains
was not a “refus[al] to permit” an independent test in that
sense. 41 We likewise reject Weber’s argument that we would
37 See Albarenga, supra note 28.
38 Dake, supra note 1, 247 Neb. at 584, 529 N.W.2d at 49.
39 Jasa, supra note 4, 297 Neb. at 838, 901 N.W.2d at 326.
40 Id.
41 See § 60-6,199.

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be “playing games with semantics” and reading § 60-6,199
“too strict[ly],” thereby undermining its intent, if we were
to construe “refuse[al] to permit” in that statute to mean that
officers “literally tell” the motorist that he or she cannot make
a telephone call or “physically stop” the motorist from mak-
ing a call. 42 Under the principles of statutory interpretation set
forth above, we will not look beyond the statute to determine
the legislative intent when the words are plain, direct, and
unambiguous. 43 Here, the words of § 60-6,199 plainly, directly,
and unambiguously prescribe that the officer must “refuse[] to
permit” an independent test for the results of the initial test or
tests to be excluded, and Jasa construed “‘refuse[] to permit’”
to mean to “deny authorization or consent for.” 44 Since that
opinion, nearly a decade ago, the Legislature has not revisited
the language in § 60-6,199, suggesting it does not disagree
with our assessment of what must occur for a motorist’s initial
test or tests to be suppressed. 45
That leaves only Weber’s argument that the district court
“misapplied the facts” insofar as it found it “dispositive that
[he] had access to a phone.” 46 As we understand it, in conclud-
ing that he was not denied his right to an independent test,
the district court focused on the fact that Weber had access
to a telephone after the booking process was completed and
did not use it to arrange for an independent test. Weber, in
contrast, points to his own testimony at the suppression hear-
ing that he asked to use a telephone at the start of the booking
42 Brief for appellant at 9.
43 Inland Ins. Co. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 316 Neb. 143, 3 N.W.3d
354 (2024), modified on denial of rehearing 316 Neb. 417, 4 N.W.3d 884.
44 Jasa, supra note 4, 297 Neb. at 838, 901 N.W.2d at 326.
45 See, e.g., Perkins Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Mid America Agri Prods., 317
Neb. 1, 8 N.W.3d 716 (2024) (where statute has been judicially construed
and that construction has not evoked amendment, it will be presumed
that Legislature has acquiesced in court’s determination of Legislature’s
intent).
46 Brief for appellant at 22.

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process but was not allowed to do so until the booking process
was completed, 3 hours later. Relatedly, Weber argues that any
independent test he could have obtained at that point would
have been “meaningless,” given the passage of time since he
consumed alcohol. 47
In Dake, we did state that officers have a duty under
§ 60-6,199 to allow telephone calls to secure an independent
test. 48 Here, however, despite Weber’s testimony that he asked
to use the telephone “[s]hortly after Gann had left and before
[he] was put in the cell,” the trial court made the factual
determination that no request for an independent test was
made. Under our standard of review, we find no clear error in
that determination. 49
CONCLUSION
Because Weber’s Fourth Amendment rights were not vio-
lated, and because officers did not refuse to permit Weber to
obtain an independent test under § 60-6,199, we affirm the
order of the district court, which affirmed the judgment of
the county court.
Affirmed.
47 Id. at 23.
48 Dake, supra note 1.
49 See, e.g., Jones v. Colgrove, 319 Neb. 461, 24 N.W.3d 1 (2025) (trial court
did not abuse its discretion in not awarding child tax credit to father where
it heard father’s testimony on mother’s alleged fraud in financial matters
and impliedly did not find it credible).