Scott v. Scott

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
Robert E. Scott, appellant, v.
Rebecca F. Scott, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed September 12, 2025. 	No. S-24-512.
1. Divorce: 	Child 	Custody: 	Child 	Support: 	Property 	Division:
Alimony: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. In a marital dissolution
action, an appellate court reviews the case de novo on the record to
determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial
judge. This standard of review applies to the trial court’s determinations
regarding custody, child support, division of property, alimony, and
attorney fees.
2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the
reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters
submitted for disposition.
3. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an
appellate court is required to make independent factual determinations
based upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent con-
clusions with respect to the matters at issue.
4. ____: ____. When evidence is in conflict, the appellate court con-
siders and may give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and
observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather
than another.
5. Child Custody. The paramount consideration in determining child cus-
tody is the best interests of the children.
6. Divorce: Property Division. There is no mathematical formula by
which property awards can be precisely determined, but, generally, a
spouse should be awarded one-third to one-half of the marital estate, the
polestar being fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of
each case.
7. ____: ____. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the
equitable division of property is a three-step process: (1) classify the
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:06 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
parties’ property as either marital or nonmarital, setting aside the non-
marital property or nonmarital portion of the property to the party who
brought the property to the marriage; (2) value the marital assets and
marital liabilities of the parties; (3) calculate and divide the net marital
estate equitably between the parties.
8. Divorce: Property Division: Equity. The purpose of assigning a date
of valuation in a dissolution decree is to ensure that the marital estate is
equitably divided.
9. Divorce: Property Division. The date for valuation of property included
in the marital estate in a dissolution decree must be rationally related to
the property being divided.
10. Divorce: Property Division: Alimony. In dividing property and consid-
ering alimony upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider
four factors: (1) the circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of the
marriage, (3) the history of contributions to the marriage, and (4) the
ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without
interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of
each party.
11. Divorce: Property Division. In addition to the specific criteria listed
in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), a court should consider the
income and earning capacity of each party and the general equities of
the situation.
12. Alimony. The purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued main-
tenance or support of one party by the other when the relative economic
circumstances make it appropriate.
13. Alimony: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an alimony award, an appel-
late court does not determine whether it would have awarded the same
amount of alimony as did the trial court, but whether the trial court’s
award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a substantial right or a
just result.
14. Attorney Fees. Attorney fees and expenses may be recovered in a civil
action only where provided for by statute or when a recognized and
accepted uniform course of procedure has been to allow recovery of
attorney fees.
15. Divorce: Attorney Fees. A uniform course of procedure exists in
Nebraska for the award of attorney fees in dissolution cases.
16. ____: ____. In awarding attorney fees in a dissolution action, a court
shall consider the nature of the case, the amount involved in the contro-
versy, the services actually performed, the results obtained, the length of
time required for preparation and presentation of the case, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions raised, and the customary charges of the
bar for similar services.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Susan
I. Strong, Judge. Affirmed.
Amie C. Martinez and Megan M. Zobel, of Anderson,
Creager & Wittstruck, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Krista M. Carlson, of Carlson Family Law, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Miller-Lerman, 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik,
Freudenberg, and Bergevin, JJ.
Funke, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robert E. Scott appeals the order of the district court
for Lancaster County, Nebraska, dissolving his marriage to
Rebecca F. Scott. Robert claims that the district court erred
in awarding Rebecca primary physical custody of the parties’
minor children and in other custody-related matters. Robert
also claims that the district court erred in allocating the chil-
dren’s extracurricular expenses, dividing the marital estate,
and awarding Rebecca alimony and attorney fees. Finding
no merit to those arguments, we affirm the order of the dis-
trict court.
II. BACKGROUND
1. Events Prior to Trial
Robert and Rebecca married in 2005. They subsequently had
three children, born in 2009, 2012, and 2014, respectively.
In September 2021, Rebecca obtained an ex parte domestic
abuse protection order against Robert. Among other things,
that order awarded Rebecca temporary custody of the children
and required Robert to stay away from the marital home and
the children’s schools. In a subsequent order, the district court
affirmed the protection order.
While the protection order matter was pending, Robert filed
a complaint for dissolution of marriage, seeking custody of

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
the children. Rebecca subsequently filed an answer to Robert’s
complaint 	and 	a 	cross-complaint. 	In 	her 	cross-complaint,
Rebecca also sought custody of the children.
In October 2021, upon stipulation of the parties, the pro-
tection order was amended to eliminate the provisions giving
Rebecca temporary custody of the children and barring Robert
from the children’s schools. The court then entered a tempo-
rary order awarding Robert and Rebecca joint legal and physi-
cal custody of the children.
Several months later, in February 2022, Robert sought tem-
porary custody of the oldest child. In response, Rebecca filed
a motion alleging that the oldest child had been alienated from
her and asking that a therapist be appointed to work with her
and the child to “repair the relationship and resume regular
parenting contact.” The district court amended the temporary
order to give Robert physical custody of the oldest child,
subject to Rebecca’s parenting time every other weekend. The
parties continued to share legal custody of the oldest child,
although Robert was granted final decisionmaking authority
as to the child. There were no changes to the custody of the
other two children. The court also sustained Rebecca’s motion
asking that she and the oldest child work on their relationship
with a “neutral therapist.”
2. Evidence at Trial
A bench trial was held over 6 days in September and
November 2023. What follows is a broad summary of the
evidence presented at trial regarding custody of the children.
Additional evidence about custody and other matters is dis-
cussed later in the opinion insofar as it directly relates to the
parties’ arguments on appeal.
(a) Robert’s Witnesses
Robert presented testimony from Tim Riley, a clinical
psychologist who had provided “several courses of ther-
apy, some briefer, some a little bit longer,” to the oldest

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SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
child in the 7 years before the trial. Riley testified that the
child’s “primary concern” was his relationship with Rebecca.
According to Riley, the child reported that at times, Rebecca
“actively ignored” him, gave him the “silent treatment,” and
“retreat[ed] to a different part of the house.” Riley said he
was aware that the child was sometimes “aggressive” with
Rebecca, but he opined that the child acted out “to try to cre-
ate a more consistent reaction from [her].”
Riley also opined that the oldest child was “doing well” in
Robert’s custody and that Robert was “very protective” of the
child. Riley rejected the notion that Robert alienated the child
from Rebecca, in part because the child “continued to express
a desire to improve his relationship with [her].” Riley said that
the child never expressed concerns about his ability to talk to
Rebecca while with Robert. Instead, Riley said that the child
was concerned about his “inability to contact [Robert]” while
at Rebecca’s house. Riley testified that solving problems like
those between Rebecca and the child “normally require[s] the
parent who has the poor relationship [with the child] to admit
their mistakes and fault, in an attempt to make changes in the
behavior towards that child.” Riley said he was not aware that
had occurred here. Riley also said that he offered to share his
“insight[s]” with Michael Keady, the family therapist who
began working with Rebecca and the child upon the court’s
order, but his offer was rebuffed.
Robert also presented testimony from his twin brother, his
brother’s wife, his best friend, and a former friend of Rebecca’s
whose son played golf with the oldest child. Those witnesses
testified that Robert was a good father, that he attended the
children’s events, and that the children “love[d]” being with
him. The witnesses also testified that the children were “good
kids” and were “very well behaved and respectful” but that
they “act[ed] out” against Rebecca. The witnesses stated that
Rebecca had always distanced herself from Robert’s family
and that she “with[drew] more and more” after the children

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
were born. In particular, Robert’s brother testified that in or
around 2019, Robert became the “primary parent” because
of Rebecca’s withdrawal. The witnesses said that Robert had
expressed concerns about Rebecca’s “mental health” or “well[-]
being” and had described efforts to “get her help.” However,
they viewed this as Robert being “supportive.”
Robert himself testified similarly that from the time of
their engagement, seemingly innocuous statements or actions
prompted Rebecca to “explo[de]” and then “disappear for
. . . hours, days” and “sometimes not talk to [him] for weeks.”
However, Robert stated that this behavior became more “pro-
nounced” when the oldest child was 10 years old. In fact,
Robert stated that he was the children’s primary caretaker
for the past several years because Rebecca “withdr[e]w com-
pletely for days on end.” According to Robert, he and Rebecca
consulted over a dozen “doctors, counselors, psychiatrists,
psychologists and acupuncturists” in the 10 years prior to
trial to address these issues. Robert testified that when a pro-
vider asked Rebecca to address her role in the situation, she
changed providers. Robert testified that Rebecca would break
off relationships with friends and family in a similar fashion,
always “blam[ing]” others. Robert acknowledged that the old-
est child acted out against Rebecca and said he had seen the
other children behave similarly. But Robert insisted that he had
admonished such behavior, even though he understood it was a
“reaction” to Rebecca.
Robert testified that the children were doing well, although
he suggested the younger children would benefit from more
time with the oldest child because he was “so integral” to
them. Robert also complained that he had “consistent prob-
lems” communicating with the children when they were with
Rebecca, that she scheduled medical appointments for the
children without telling him, and that she “failed to provide
the medication that should go with the [children].” In addi-
tion, Robert introduced evidence that Rebecca “smack[ed]”

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SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
or “slap[ped]” the oldest child on the arm one morning when
dropping him off at school. There was also evidence that
Rebecca accused the middle child of “‘caus[ing] the divorce’”
and that the fire department responded to a fire the children
started while in Rebecca’s care.
(b) Rebecca’s Witnesses
Rebecca presented testimony from Keady that he had pro-
vided therapy services to her and the oldest child for approxi-
mately 9 months. Keady testified that he observed the child
talking about the divorce, that the child was “well informed”
about the litigation, and that Keady had reason to believe the
child’s knowledge did not come from Rebecca. Keady stated
that the child told him he would “make a great witness for
[the child] and [Robert].” Keady also stated that the child
described Rebecca as a “narcissist” and “mentally ill,” just
like Robert did during meetings with Keady. Keady opined
that the child and Robert were “enmeshed” or had “blurred”
boundaries. Keady testified that the child “idealized” Robert
and “demonized” Rebecca, that he had no guilt for how
he treated Rebecca, and that his support for Robert was
“reflexive.” As to Riley’s offer to share information, Keady
agreed it would “have been important” to know that “one of
[the child’s] primary problems” was feeling “shut down” by
Rebecca. However, Keady said he did not know the validity
of that information.
Rebecca also presented testimony from clinical psycholo-
gist Alan Blotcky about parental alienation. Blotcky testified
that he had not met the parties or their children and did not
“know anything at all about any of the facts in this particular
case.” Instead, Blotcky generally described parental alien-
ation as “the intentional attempt of one parent to undermine
a child’s relationship with the other parent.” According to
Blotcky, “a diagnosis of parental alienation” requires the fol-
lowing five factors: (1) the child rejects the parent; (2) the
alienated child and the rejected parent had a prior positive

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
relationship; (3) the rejected parent does not show any evi-
dence of being “abusive, neglectful[,] or seriously deficient
in parenting”; (4) alienating behaviors exist; and (5) the child
exhibits the characteristics of an alienated child. Blotcky also
opined that specific behaviors such as “badmouthing” and
limiting contact were alienating and that alienated children
were “totally negative” about the rejected parent.
In 	addition, 	Rebecca 	presented 	testimony 	from 	Lisa
Blankenau, a counseling psychologist, who had treated her
since 	November 	2021. 	Blankenau 	testified 	that 	Rebecca
had anxiety that was “especially triggered” by the divorce.
Blankenau 	said 	that 	Rebecca’s 	psychological 	evaluation
showed this, as well as histrionic traits. Blankenau also testi-
fied that Robert’s own psychological evaluation showed anxi-
ety, depression, and anger, as well as histrionic and narcissistic
traits. Blankenau stated that she met with Rebecca and the
oldest child in March 2022 to determine if she was a good
fit for family therapy with them and that it went “[t]errible.”
Blankenau said that the child attempted to record the conver-
sation and that he “started talking about how [Rebecca] was
crazy and asked if [Blankenau] was doing a psychological
evaluation on her.” Blankenau said that the child used “words
that 12-year-olds usually don’t use” and that this and other
factors made her think his statements were “rehearsed.”
There was also testimony from Rebecca’s parents, her
sister, her sister’s partner, and three friends contradicting
the description of the parties provided by Robert’s wit-
nesses. Rebecca’s witnesses testified that she was a good
mother; that she spent time with the children and coached
their sports teams; that she was consistent in her dealings
with the children; and that she did not ignore the children,
give them the “silent treatment,” or withdraw from them
or others. Instead, Rebecca’s witnesses testified that Robert
was generally absent. Rebecca’s witnesses said that they had
heard Robert describe Rebecca as “mentally ill.” Rebecca’s

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SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
witnesses also said they had overheard Robert on the phone
with the children disparaging Rebecca and her family, telling
the children to disregard what Rebecca said, and asserting
he would get “full custody.” In addition, Rebecca’s sister
described an incident where Robert “threw [the oldest child]
down onto the ice,” even though the child had recently suf-
fered a concussion.
Rebecca’s own testimony similarly contradicted that of
Robert’s witnesses. In particular, Rebecca testified that she
was never “diagnosed with” anything other than anxiety and
adjustment disorder, although she suspected she had post-
partum depression after the birth of the children. Rebecca
also testified that she saw only four therapists over the past
18 years and that her inability to care for the children at
times in 2020 and 2021 was not due to mental illness but
because she was “working a lot.” Rebecca said that Robert
had perpetuated this “mental illness dialogue” about her with
the children and others. Rebecca introduced evidence that
the oldest child had said she “need[ed] help” in “exactly the
way [Robert] said it.” There was also evidence that the old-
est child had described Rebecca as “‘bipolar’” and as his
“birther,” not his mother. Rebecca said that Robert did not
“give the children consequences” for hurting her but instead
seemed to “enjoy” it.
Rebecca also testified about the children’s academic and
medical issues, including incidents when two of the children
had “asthma attacks while biking without their inhalers”
while in Robert’s custody. According to Rebecca, she did not
prohibit the children from contacting Robert, although she did
require them to use specific devices and turn off their devices
overnight. Rebecca testified that Robert interfered with her
communication with the children and intruded on her parent-
ing time. In addition, Rebecca described various instances
when Robert “physically abuse[d]” the children, including
throwing the oldest child onto the ice. Rebecca also testified

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SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
that Robert yelled at the children and drank alcohol from a
flask while driving a vehicle with the children inside.
3. Dissolution Decree
After the trial, the district court entered a decree dissolving
the parties’ marriage. The court awarded Robert and Rebecca
joint legal custody. However, it awarded Rebecca primary
physical custody and the “final say in decisions concerning the
children’s medical, educational, and religious needs.”
In so doing, the court said the oldest child had a “particu-
larly close bond with [Robert]” but that Keady testified this
“was an unhealthy bond that appeared to be enmeshment.”
The court also said the allegation that Rebecca hit the old-
est child was a factor in its decision to amend the temporary
order to give Robert primary physical custody of that child.
However, the court found that “no other credible allegations
of physical abuse” were made against Rebecca. The court
similarly acknowledged Robert’s allegation that Rebecca was
“‘mentally ill’” but found no evidence that either party’s
mental state prevented them from functioning as a parent.
Instead, the court said that it was more concerned with “how
each party attends to any mental health issues they may have
and whether they are positive and effective role models.”
Ultimately, the court concluded that Rebecca, “for the most
part, has acted in the children’s best interests,” while Robert’s
actions “have served to alienate the minor children” from her,
even if that was not his intent.
The parenting plan incorporated into the decree incorrectly
prohibited Rebecca from consuming alcohol during, or for 24
hours prior to, her parenting time, as is discussed below.
Also, as is relevant to this appeal, the court awarded
Rebecca the parties’ marital home in Lincoln, Nebraska, ali-
mony of $5,000 per month for 9 years, and $30,000 in attor-
ney fees. Robert was awarded the parties’ cabin in Minnesota,
but items of personal property from the cabin were awarded
to Rebecca.

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SCOTT v. SCOTT
Cite as 319 Neb. 877
4. Subsequent Motions
Robert moved for a new trial, challenging the award
to Rebecca of custody, alimony, attorney fees, the marital
home, and personal property from the cabin. Robert also
challenged:
• the requirement that he generally pay 70 percent of the chil-
dren’s vehicle, cell phone, and technology expenses and the
“items required for their activities such as clothing, uniforms,
or equipment”;
• the district court’s decision to value a specific investment
account as of the date of the parties’ separation;
• Rebecca’s allegedly receiving items of his premarital and non-
marital personal property that were not listed in the “Personal
Property Division” in “Appendix E” of the decree; and
• the district court’s failure to attribute to Rebecca the value of
personal property included in an appraiser’s report that Robert
claimed was not included in Appendix E.
Rebecca, in turn, filed a motion for an order nunc pro tunc
asking that the district court correct the decree to reflect that it
is Robert who is barred from consuming alcohol in conjunction
with his parenting time. Rebecca also sought changes to the
decree based on the provisions regarding the children’s vehicle
and related expenses described above.
After a hearing, the court sustained in part Robert’s motion
and amended the decree to eliminate the provisions regard-
ing the children’s vehicle and related expenses. The court
also clarified the provisions regarding personal property in
Appendix E. Among other things, Appendix E was amended
to state that
[e]ach party is awarded as his/her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any interest of the other, their
premarital and nonmarital personal property unless other-
wise awarded in Appendices D & E. [Robert’s] gold coin
collection and watches belonging to him or his family are
specifically designated his nonmarital property and are
awarded to him.

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SCOTT v. SCOTT
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Otherwise, Robert’s motion was overruled.
Rebecca’s motion was sustained in part. Specifically, the
parenting plan was amended to prohibit Robert from consum-
ing alcohol in conjunction with his parenting time.
Robert appealed, and we moved the matter to our docket. 1
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Robert assigns, restated and reordered, that the district court
erred in (1) “order[ing] the parenting plan,” (2) allocating
“extracurricular activity expenses” for the minor children, (3)
dividing the marital estate, (4) awarding Rebecca alimony, and
(5) awarding Rebecca attorney fees.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court
reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether
there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 2 This
standard of review applies to the trial court’s determinations
regarding custody, child support, division of property, ali-
mony, and attorney fees. 3 A judicial abuse of discretion exists
if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable,
unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying
just results in matters submitted for disposition. 4
[3,4] In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court
is required to make independent factual determinations based
upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent
conclusions with respect to the matters at issue. 5 When evi-
dence is in conflict, the appellate court considers and may
give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
2 Seemann v. Seemann, 318 Neb. 643, 18 N.W.3d 118 (2025).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.

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the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than
another. 6
V. ANALYSIS
1. Custody and Custody-Related Provisions
Robert’s first assignment of error concerns the “parent-
ing plan.” Robert argues that the district court erred in (1)
awarding Rebecca primary physical custody of the children;
(2) giving her decisionmaking authority over medical, educa-
tional, and religious matters; and (3) ordering him to refrain
from consuming alcohol in conjunction with his parent-
ing time.
(a) No Abuse of Discretion in Awarding Rebecca
Primary Physical Custody
Robert claims that Rebecca should not have been awarded
primary physical custody of the children. Instead, Robert
claims that based on the evidence at trial, “at minimum,” the
district court should have “maintain[ed] the temporary custody
order and parenting time schedule.” 7 Rebecca disagrees.
[5] The paramount consideration in determining child cus-
tody is the best interests of the children. 8 Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-2923 (Reissue 2016) of Nebraska’s Parenting Act sets
forth a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered in deter-
mining the best interests of a child in regard to custody. 9 Such
factors include the relationship of the minor child to each
parent; the desires and wishes of the minor child; the general
health, welfare, and social behavior of the minor child; cred-
ible evidence of abuse inflicted on any family or household
6 Stava v. Stava, 318 Neb. 32, 13 N.W.3d 184 (2024).
7 Brief for appellant at 19.
8 Donald v. Donald, 296 Neb. 123, 892 N.W.2d 100 (2017).
9 See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, 27 Neb. App. 869, 937 N.W.2d 260 (2019).

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member; and credible evidence of child abuse or neglect or
domestic intimate partner abuse. 10
In addition to the “best interests” factors listed in § 43-2923,
a court making a child custody determination may also con-
sider matters such as the moral fitness of the child’s parents,
including the parents’ sexual conduct; respective environ-
ments offered by each parent; the emotional relationship
between child and parents; the age, sex, and health of the
child and parents; the effect on the child as the result of con-
tinuing or disrupting an existing relationship; the attitude and
stability of each parent’s character; and the parental capacity
to provide physical care and satisfy the educational needs of
the child. 11
Reviewing this case de novo on the record, we cannot say
the district court abused its discretion in concluding that it
was in the children’s best interests for Rebecca to have pri-
mary physical custody. In arguing otherwise, Robert primarily
points to evidence in the record that was favorable to him.
That evidence generally concerns (1) the children’s relation-
ship to each parent; (2) the children’s health, welfare, and
social behavior; (3) credible evidence of abuse; (4) the effect
on the children because of continuing or disrupting an existing
relationship; and (5) the parents’ moral fitness and character
and the environments they offered. Broadly summarized, the
evidence showed that Robert had a good relationship with the
children, that the children were doing well under the current
custody arrangement, and that there were issues with Rebecca
that Robert claims should have precluded her from being
awarded primary physical custody of the children, including
her mental illness, her history of failed relationships that she
blames on others, and her interference in the children’s rela-
tionships with Robert and his family.
10 Id.
11 Schrag v. Spear, 290 Neb. 98, 858 N.W.2d 865 (2015).

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SCOTT v. SCOTT
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The district court heard all this evidence and also heard
other evidence regarding these factors, favorable to Rebecca,
and it awarded primary physical custody of the children to
Rebecca. Under the standard of review previously noted,
even when reviewing a case de novo on the record, where
evidence is in dispute, we may give weight to the fact that
the fact finder heard and observed the witnesses and accepted
one version of the facts rather than another.
Robert also takes issue with specific aspects of the dis-
trict court’s decision, including its “improper[] reli[ance]” on
Keady’s testimony in concluding that Robert had an “unhealthy
bond” with the oldest child. 12 Robert points to the fact that
Keady had only worked with the child for a few months and
“refused to receive or consider collateral information from
more knowledgeable professionals,” such as Riley. 13 We see
no issue with the district court’s reliance on Keady’s testimony
here. The district court heard the evidence regarding how long
Keady had been treating the oldest child, Riley’s offer to share
his “insight[s]” with Keady, and Keady’s reasons for declin-
ing that offer. We also observe that there was other evidence,
beyond Keady’s testimony, to support the view that Robert’s
relationship with the oldest child was problematic. Blankenau
testified that the child attempted to record her session with
him and Rebecca and that he used “words that 12-year-olds
usually don’t use.”
We take a similar view of Robert’s claim that the district
court “improperly found no credible evidence of abuse by
Rebecca towards [the oldest child].” 14 We do not understand
the district court to have made such a finding. Instead, after
explaining the role the allegation that Rebecca hit the oldest
child had played in its decision to award Robert temporary
custody of the child, the district court found that “[t]here
12 Brief for appellant at 19.
13 Id. at 19-20.
14 Id. at 24.

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were no other credible allegations of physical abuse made
against [Rebecca].” However, looking solely to the incident
where Rebecca allegedly hit the child, we observe the district
court correctly noted that Rebecca denied the allegation, that
the school counselor who observed the incident testified in a
deposition that she did not see any “red marks” or bruising
on the child, and that Riley himself viewed the allegation
as “minor” and “not concerning.” As such, we see no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that credible
evidence of abuse did not weigh against awarding Rebecca
primary physical custody.
We take a similar view of Robert’s claim that the dis-
trict court’s statement that its primary concerns, as to men-
tal health, were how the parties attended to the children’s
needs and whether they were role models for the children
was “inconsistent with awarding Rebecca custody.” 15 Robert
claims that Rebecca’s denial of “mental illness” was not cred-
ible in light of evidence that she “withdrew from the [chil-
dren] for days at a time,” withheld affection from them, and
gave them the “silent treatment.” 16 However, Robert ignores
the conflicting testimony that Rebecca exhibited none of
those behaviors.
Robert also relies on a “[p]atient [i]nformation” form where
Rebecca wrote “mental illness affects everything [she does],”
Rebecca’s admission at trial that she had postpartum depres-
sion, and the psychological evaluation showing that Rebecca
has what Robert characterizes as “problematic personality fea-
tures, such as histrionic personality style and unspecified per-
sonality (turbulent) style.” 17 However, there was also evidence
that the patient information form was completed 2 months
after the youngest child was born—at a time when Rebecca
was believed to have postpartum depression, that postpartum
15 Id. at 26.
16 Id. at 27.
17 Id.

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depression lasts for a “short term” after a child’s birth, and
that Robert’s own psychological evaluation revealed anxiety,
depression, anger, and “significant histrionic and narcissistic
personality features/style.”
Nor are we persuaded by Robert’s claim that the district
court erred in relying on Blotcky’s testimony to “find[] paren-
tal alienation.” 18 Robert points to evidence he claims shows
that he did not engage in parental alienation, but that Rebecca
did. Robert also argues there should have been expert testi-
mony that there was parental alienation and that absent such
testimony, the district court erred in “diagnos[ing]” parental
alienation. 19 However, the evidence as to whether Robert or
Rebecca engaged in alienating behavior is—once again—less
conclusive than Robert suggests. Also, the district court did
not purport to rely on a diagnosis of parental alienation in
determining custody. Instead, consistent with opinions of this
court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals dating back over 60
years, the district court considered the specific conduct alleged
to be alienating in determining the best interests of the chil-
dren. 20 There was no error in so doing.
(b) No Abuse of Discretion in Granting
Rebecca Decisionmaking Authority
on “Legal Custody Issues”
Robert also argues the district court abused its discretion
in granting Rebecca final decisionmaking authority over the
children’s medical, educational, and religious needs. Robert
18 Id. at 34.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Hossack v. Hossack, 176 Neb. 368, 374, 126 N.W.2d 166, 170
(1964) (“‘conduct toward a child which tends to poison the child’s mind
against, and alienate his affection from, his mother or father, is so inimical
to the child’s welfare as to be grounds for a denial of custody’”); Conley
v. Conley, 33 Neb. App. 98, 121, 11 N.W.3d 671, 688 (2024) (court
considering “actions” of one parent that allegedly “undermine” other
parent’s relationship with child when assessing children’s best interests).
See, also, Larson v. Larson, 33 Neb. App. 609, 23 N.W.3d 670 (2025).

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points to evidence that he claims “should have raised con-
cerns about [Rebecca’s] ability to make decisions in [the]
children’s best interests regarding mental health.” 21 As such,
Robert argues that “[a]t minimum, the record supports joint
legal custody with Rebecca maintaining final decision-making
authority on education, dental[,] and religious issues, and
[him] having final say on mental health issues.” 22 Rebecca
counters that the district court properly awarded her final say
over medical, educational, and religious matters because she
historically made those decisions for the children.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we agree with
Rebecca that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting her final decisionmaking authority over the specified
matters. As the district court observed, the “last years of the
[parties’] marriage [were] unusually hostile,” and that hostil-
ity continued during the dissolution proceedings. Each party
complained of the other’s failure to meet the children’s medi-
cal and educational needs and expressed concerns about the
other’s decisionmaking. There were also complaints about
communication between the parties. This supports the district
court’s conclusion that one party needed to have final deci-
sionmaking authority. 23
As to the district court’s conclusion that Rebecca specifi-
cally should have that decisionmaking authority, there was
evidence that Robert missed a well-child check and delayed
seeking dental care and physical therapy for the oldest child;
that Rebecca coached the children’s sports teams, volunteered
in their classrooms, and helped with their homework; and
21 Brief for appellant at 35.
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., Schmeidler v. Schmeidler, 25 Neb. App. 802, 912 N.W.2d 278
(2018) (courts typically do not award joint legal custody when parties
are unable to communicate effectively), disapproved on other grounds,
State on behalf of Kaaden S. v. Jeffery T., 303 Neb. 933, 932 N.W.2d 692
(2019).

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that the children attended church with her. Robert seemingly
concedes as much, insofar as he suggests that even if Rebecca
were to be given final decisionmaking authority over educa-
tion, dental, and religious issues, he should have final say
over matters of mental health. However, the evidence that
Robert relies upon to argue against giving Rebecca final say
over matters of mental health was disputed at trial, and there
was evidence that Robert used allegations of mental illness to
disparage Rebecca to the children.
(c) No Abuse of Discretion in Ordering Robert
to Abstain From Alcohol in Conjunction
With His Parenting Time
In addition, Robert argues the district court abused its dis-
cretion in ordering him to abstain from alcohol in conjunction
with his parenting time. Robert claims the only incident that
Rebecca relates regarding his alcohol use allegedly affect-
ing the children occurred in March 2017 and was too remote
in time. Robert here refers to the testimony by Rebecca and
her sister that he “threw” the oldest child down onto the ice.
Otherwise, Robert claims there was no evidence he had issues
with alcohol or that Rebecca had previously had concerns
about his alcohol consumption.
We again see no abuse of discretion. Robert is correct that
the 2017 incident was the only incident testified to at trial
where Robert allegedly physically harmed a child while he was
allegedly intoxicated. However, there was other evidence that
Robert drank around the children and “g[o]t angry” when he
drank. There was also evidence that Robert drank while driving
a vehicle. Rebecca testified that Robert would “put . . . alco-
hol in a flask or in a mug and he would drive with alcohol,”
including when the children were in the vehicle. Robert himself
admitted some of this, testifying that he “used to carry flasks
in [his] bag” and that he had carried alcohol in his vehicle.
In addition, Robert’s psychological evaluation noted signs of
developing a problem with alcohol, “at least in the past.”

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2. Ordering Robert to Contribute Specified
Percentages of Costs of Minor Children’s
Extracurricular Activities
Robert’s second assignment of error concerns the require-
ment that he pay 70 percent of the costs of any extracurricular
activity previously agreed upon by the parties that occurs dur-
ing both parties’ parenting time and 100 percent of the costs
of any activity that occurs solely during his parenting time
or to which Rebecca did not consent prior to the children’s
enrollment. Robert argues, summarized, that this requirement
would have been proper if he had been awarded joint custody.
However, Robert argues that because Rebecca was awarded
primary physical custody, those expenses should be paid by
her. Robert bases this argument on the fact that Neb. Ct. R.
ch. 4, art. 2, worksheet 1 (rev. 2016), was used to determine
his monthly child support obligations. Robert claims that the
“[w]orksheet 1 computation . . . limits the additional obliga-
tions to out-of-pocket medical, dental, orthodontic, and vision
expenses not covered by insurance.” 24 Rebecca, in turn, argues
that the Court of Appeals “examined this exact issue and
approved of” 25 a similar provision regarding extracurricular
expenses in Kelly v. Kelly. 26
We agree with Rebecca that Kelly effectively forecloses
Robert’s arguments regarding the requirement that he pay
specified percentages of the costs of extracurricular activities.
In Kelly, as in this case, the mother was awarded physical
custody of the minor children, and the father was required,
in relevant part, to pay 70 percent of all expenses for previ-
ously agreed-upon extracurricular activities. 27 On appeal, the
father challenged the requirement that he pay the specified
24 Brief for appellant at 46.
25 Brief for appellee at 36 (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 29 Neb. App. 198, 952
N.W.2d 207 (2020)).
26 Kelly, supra note 25.
27 See id.

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percentage of the extracurricular expenses, claiming that this
requirement constituted an abuse of discretion. 28 The Court of
Appeals rejected that argument. 29
In so doing, the Court of Appeals relied upon this court’s
view that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364.17 (Reissue 2016)
provides categories of expenses incurred by a child which
can be ordered by a trial court in addition to the monthly
child support calculation determined under the guide-
lines. . . . One incident of support is the regular monthly
payment established under the Nebraska Child Support
Guidelines. . . . “But the guidelines recognize other inci-
dents of ‘support’ that are wholly or partly outside of
the monthly installment.” . . . “The expenses stated in
§ 42-364.17—including, among others, extracurricular,
education, and other extraordinary expenses—merely rep-
resent other incidents of ‘support’ to be addressed in a
dissolution decree.” 30
The Court of Appeals concluded that because extracurricu-
lar expenses were specifically referenced in § 42-364.17, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in allocating those
expenses between the parties as it did. 31
Robert’s argument here is slightly different, insofar as he
claims that worksheet 1 limits the expenses that a noncus-
todial parent can be required to pay to specified items and
that extracurricular expenses are not among those items.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 Kelly, supra note 25, 29 Neb. App. at 210, 952 N.W.2d at 217 (citations
omitted) (quoting Caniglia v. Caniglia, 285 Neb. 930, 830 N.W.2d 207
(2013)).
31 See Kelly, supra note 25. But see Smith v. King, 29 Neb. App. 152,
953 N.W.2d 258 (2020) (district court abused its discretion in requiring
noncustodial father to purchase approximately one-half of children’s
clothing because § 42-364.17 does not expressly mention such expenses,
and they cannot be seen as “extraordinary expenses”).

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However, we see nothing in worksheet 1 or in Neb. Ct. R.
§ 4-206 (rev. 2020) that imposes such a limit.
3. No Abuse of Discretion in
Dividing Marital Estate
Robert’s third assignment of error concerns the “division of
the marital estate.” In particular, Robert challenges the disposi-
tion of certain personal property, the valuation of an investment
account, and the award of the marital home to Rebecca.
[6] We have previously stated:
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) provides for
the “division of property as may be reasonable, having
regard for the circumstances of the parties, duration of the
marriage, [and] a history of the contributions to the mar-
riage by each party,” and, further, § 42-365 provides that
“[t]he purpose of a property division is to distribute the
marital assets equitably between the parties.” 32
There is no mathematical formula by which property awards
can be precisely determined, but, generally, a spouse should be
awarded one-third to one-half of the marital estate, the polestar
being fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of
each case. 33
[7] Under § 42-365, the equitable division of property is a
three-step process: (1) classify the parties’ property as either
marital or nonmarital, setting aside the nonmarital property or
nonmarital portion of the property to the party who brought
the property to the marriage; (2) value the marital assets and
marital liabilities of the parties; (3) calculate and divide the
net marital estate equitably between the parties. 34 In the pres-
ent case, there is no dispute over the property’s classification.
Instead, the disputes primarily concern the valuation of one
marital asset and the division of the net marital estate.
32 Stava, supra note 6, 318 Neb. at 41, 13 N.W.3d at 192.
33 Id.
34 Karas v. Karas, 314 Neb. 857, 993 N.W.2d 473 (2023).

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(a) Personal Property From Cabin
Robert argues that the district court erred in awarding
Rebecca personal property from the parties’ cabin. Robert
claims that it was “not equitable and appeared to be an over-
sight[] for the trial court to award Rebecca the personal prop-
erty located at a residence not awarded to her.” 35 Rebecca
counters that Robert forfeited his right to challenge the issue
on appeal because he has “already accepted the benefits of
the [dissolution] [d]ecree with respect to the personal property
[that] he was awarded.” 36
Rebecca produced an affidavit in conjunction with her oppo-
sition to Robert’s motion for a new trial stating that after the
decree was entered, Robert “took at least six truckloads/trailer
loads of personal property from the marital home.” We have
held that generally, under the acceptance of benefits rule, an
appellant may not voluntarily accept the benefits of part of a
judgment in the appellant’s favor and afterward prosecute an
appeal or error proceeding from the part that is against the
appellant. 37 Because of various issues with the identification of
the personal property in this case, as discussed in greater detail
below, we cannot confidently state that Robert waived his right
to appeal the issue of the personal property from the parties’
cabin. The result, however, is the same as if Robert had waived
the issue.
Despite Robert’s argument to the contrary, the award to
Rebecca of the personal property at the cabin does not appear
to be an “oversight.” 38 The district court based its division of
personal property on an exhibit that listed property by loca-
tion, clearly identifying specific items as being in the cabin
or the marital home. The district court’s order did likewise.
Subsequently, at the hearing on his motion for a new trial,
35 Brief for appellant at 37.
36 Brief for appellee at 27.
37 Gentele v. Gentele, ante p. 182, 21 N.W.3d 599 (2025).
38 Brief for appellant at 37.

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Robert raised this same exact issue, arguing that awarding the
personal property at the cabin to Rebecca was an “oversight.”
The district court did not amend the decree in relevant part,
nor did it state its reasons for overruling Robert’s motion in
relevant part. However, the district court did note Rebecca’s
argument that if Robert were awarded the personal property
at the cabin, he would have “all of the furniture and personal
property because he has already taken the furniture and prop-
erty he wanted from the marital home.” We surmise the district
court’s legal rationale from this statement and cannot say it
abused its discretion in so concluding.
(b) Robert’s Premarital and Nonmarital
Personal Property
Robert also argues that the division of personal property
set forth in the decree, as modified, “failed to set off [his]
undisputed premarital property.” 39 In particular, Robert points
to family silver, watches, and furniture, as well as other pre-
marital furniture and artworks, that he seemingly suggests were
not awarded or returned to him. Rebecca counters that “almost
everything of which [Robert] complain[s]” was awarded to
him. 40 Rebecca also claims that regardless of whether the items
were awarded to Robert, she returned all of Robert’s “premari-
tal personal items” to him. 41
We see no abuse of discretion here. The record before us
shows that at trial, Robert relied primarily on exhibits 13 and
19 as evidence of his premarital personal property. In rel-
evant part, exhibit 13 includes broad references to “[f]amily
silver,” “[o]ld family furniture bedroom sets,” and similar
items, while exhibit 19 includes receipts for “armchairs,”
“etageres,” and similar items. The district court did not
39 Id. at 38.
40 Brief for appellee at 29.
41 Id.

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expressly reference either of those exhibits in the division of
personal property in Appendix E. Instead, the district court
relied on Rebecca’s exhibit 252, which the court viewed
as “more accurate as to the value of the . . . property.”
Nonetheless, in Appendix E, Robert was awarded “silver
and kitchen ware,” a sterling silver set, a painting, and
multiple pieces of furniture that were identified as premari-
tal property.
Robert then moved for a new trial, pointing to a listing of
personal property allegedly not included in Appendix E that he
claimed was effectively awarded to Rebecca insofar as it was
in the marital home. Robert asked that the decree be amended
to state that he was awarded his premarital and nonmarital
property, “‘including [specific] items from [his] Exhibit 13
. . . and [the] furniture itemized in Exhibit 19.’” The district
court declined to adopt this approach, although it did add the
language about Robert’s premarital property quoted above.
The district court reiterated its view that exhibit 252 “was
complete, accurate, and more clearly identified the items to be
awarded.” In contrast, the district court said Robert’s lists were
“vague, inaccurate, and contained items that were duplicated
[or] could not be identified.”
On appeal, Robert renews his claim that not all his premari-
tal personal property was returned to him. However, Robert
failed to specifically identify such property so that we can
compare it to the list of personal property in Appendix E.
Robert resorts to the broad terminology of “silver,” “tables,”
and so on used in his exhibits. However, such listings are
insufficient to show that Robert failed to receive his premarital
personal property.
(c) Personal Property Allegedly Not
Accounted for in Decree
Robert similarly argues that there was personal property
listed in the appraiser’s report, but not listed in Appendix E,

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that was effectively awarded to Rebecca “at no value.” 42 Robert
claims that the total value of this property was nearly $17,000
and that, as such, there should be a corresponding reduction in
his equalization payment to Rebecca.
Once again, we see no abuse of discretion. When he raised
this same issue before the district court in conjunction with
his motion for a new trial, Robert prepared a listing of items
that he claimed were in the appraiser’s report but were not
reflected in Appendix E. However, our review of this list-
ing suggests that a number of those items were included in
Appendix E under slightly different names, as shown in the
table below.
Items allegedly not included
in decree’s division of per-
sonal property, according to
Robert:
Item included in decree’s
division of personal property:
Two upholstered chairs,
$650
Two wingback chairs, $650
Six dozen Riedel crystal
wine glasses, $1,080
Riedel glasses from wedding,
$1,080
Waterford crystal standing
cross jubilation, $40
Jubilation cross, $40
Mariposa pasta bowl, $70 	“Maraposa” bowl, $70
Cast iron and wicker
shelving unit, $110
Cast iron and wicker shelving
unit, $110
Refrigerator, $1,300 	Subzero refrigerator, $1,300
Freezer, $1,400 	Subzero freezer stand alone,
$1,400
Battery circular saw, $75 	Battery circular saw, $75
Chicken house, $600 	“A frame” chicken coop, $600
42 Brief for appellant at 39.

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(d) Valuation of Investment Account
Robert further claims the district court erred in valuing a
specific investment account at $232,360 “as of the date of
[the parties’] separation.” 43 Instead, Robert argues that the
district court should have valued the account at $141,568 as
of December 31, 2021. Robert argues that the district court
otherwise applied the December date to “nearly every asset
and debt” involved in the dissolution and that its failure to do
so here increased his equalization payment to Rebecca by over
$45,000 that “no longer existed.” 44 Rebecca counters that the
district court was within its discretion in valuing the account as
of the date of the parties’ separation.
[8,9] The purpose of assigning a date of valuation in a dis-
solution decree is to ensure that the marital estate is equitably
divided. 45 It is well settled that, generally, the date for valu-
ation of property included in the marital estate in a dissolu-
tion decree must be rationally related to the property being
divided. 46 We have declined to tie the hands of the district court
and mandate that it must use only one particular valuation date
in equitably dividing a marital estate. 47 The date of valuation is
reviewed for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. 48
We agree with Rebecca that there was no abuse of discre-
tion here. In his opening arguments at trial, counsel for Robert
claimed that “[w]e have reached an agreed upon valuation
date of December 31st, 2021.” However, counsel for Rebecca
disagreed, stating that the parties’ agreement was limited to
the date of valuation of the parties’ businesses and “not all the
other assets.”
43 Id. at 40.
44 Id.
45 Radmanesh v. Radmanesh, 315 Neb. 393, 996 N.W.2d 592 (2023).
46 Karas, supra note 34.
47 See id.
48 Radmanesh, supra note 45.

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The district court used dates other than December 31,
2021, to value other assets, whose valuations Robert does
not challenge. In particular, the district court used the date of
the parties’ separation in valuing similar accounts. We find
that choice of date to be rationally related to the specific
account at issue here. As Rebecca argues, the record shows
that the account was in Robert’s name and that, as such, she
“had no control over it after the date [the parties filed for
dissolution].” 49
(e) Award of Marital Home to Rebecca
Finally, Robert argues that it was “illogical” to award the
marital home, valued at $1.5 million, to Rebecca because she
“cannot afford it.” 50 Robert claims that Rebecca testified at
trial that even with child and spousal support, “it was going to
be difficult to afford her monthly living expenses if awarded
[the marital home].” 51 He also points to evidence of the
amount owed in mortgage payments and taxes on the property.
Rebecca disagrees.
We see no abuse of discretion here. Rebecca was awarded
primary physical custody of the children and, as Robert himself
testified at trial, the marital home had numerous improvements
made for the benefit of the children. Also, the district court
ordered Robert to pay Rebecca an equalization payment of
$614,272.23, a payment that would have been helpful in refi-
nancing the mortgage, as she argues.
4. Alimony
Robert’s fourth assignment of error concerns the district
court’s decision to award Rebecca alimony of $5,000 per
month for 9 years. Robert primarily argues that the alimony
49 Brief for appellee at 32.
50 Brief for appellant at 41.
51 Id.

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awarded was “excessive based on the evidence.” 52 Rebecca
counters that the award of alimony was warranted based on
the parties’ respective financial circumstances and assets,
among other things.
[10,11] In dividing property and considering alimony upon
a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider four fac-
tors: (1) the circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of
the marriage, (3) the history of contributions to the marriage,
and (4) the ability of the supported party to engage in gain-
ful employment without interfering with the interests of any
minor children in the custody of each party. 53 In addition to
the specific criteria listed in § 42-365, a court should consider
the income and earning capacity of each party and the general
equities of the situation. 54
[12,13] The purpose of alimony is to provide for the con-
tinued maintenance or support of one party by the other when
the relative economic circumstances make it appropriate. 55
In reviewing an alimony award, an appellate court does not
determine whether it would have awarded the same amount
of alimony as did the trial court, but whether the trial court’s
award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a substantial
right or a just result. 56 The ultimate criterion is one of reason-
ableness. 57 An appellate court is not inclined to disturb the
trial court’s award of alimony unless it is patently unfair on
the record. 58
Based on the record before us, we see nothing unten-
able with the district court’s award of alimony to Rebecca.
52 Id.
53 Seivert v. Alli, 309 Neb. 246, 959 N.W.2d 777 (2021). See, also, § 42-365.
54 Seivert, supra note 53.
55 Simons v. Simons, 312 Neb. 136, 978 N.W.2d 121 (2022).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.

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The district court considered the relevant factors, including
Robert and Rebecca’s respective financial circumstances, 59
their 	18-year 	marriage, 	and 	the 	evidence 	that 	Rebecca
worked part time for most of that period to care for the par-
ties’ children.
Robert’s primary argument to the contrary is that the “pro-
cess” that the district court used to “determine income for
alimony purposes . . . was unfair” because it overstated his
income and understated Rebecca’s. 60 Robert specifically takes
issue with the manner in which Rebecca’s expert determined
the parties’ respective incomes. However, the income that the
district court attributed to Robert came from evidence that
he himself presented. The district court stated that Robert
made between $312,842 and $390,000 per year. Those num-
bers match numbers given by Robert in exhibit 6 and exhibit
302, respectively. Furthermore, the evidence that Robert pre-
sented, and upon which the district court relied, took into
account his “lowest-earning year,” 61 something that Robert
faults Rebecca’s expert and, apparently, the district court for
failing to do.
Granted, the district court did not rely on Robert’s evidence
as to Rebecca’s income. According to Robert’s evidence,
Rebecca had an average annual income of $138,806. Instead,
the district court relied on Rebecca’s evidence in impliedly
concluding 	that 	she 	had 	an 	average 	annual 	income 	of
$81,429. Robert essentially argues that his higher number
should have been adopted because Rebecca’s lower number
did not reflect the fact that her income in 2020 and 2021
was, he claims, exceptionally low because she relied on
59 See, e.g., Ainslie v. Ainslie, 249 Neb. 656, 545 N.W.2d 90 (1996) (wife’s
trust funds, while not subject to division in property settlement, were
properly taken into account in determining alimony).
60 Brief for appellant at 41.
61 Id. at 43.

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retained earnings from her business to pay her expenses in
those years. However, even if the district court had adopted
Robert’s number, Rebecca’s income would still have been
less than her monthly expenses (excluding attorney fees).
That factor was one of the primary reasons for the award of
alimony here. 62
Robert seems to suggest that despite only working part
time during the marriage, Rebecca should not be seen to
have “sacrifice[d] her own personal career advancement,” but
instead to have “continued to run a successful business.” 63
Rebecca’s business could perhaps be seen to have been “suc-
cessful” during the marriage insofar as it provided her income
and, at times, employed other dentists. However, it was not
unreasonable to conclude that however successful the business
was when Rebecca worked 1 to 2 days per week, it would
have been more successful had she worked full time. We also
note there was no evidence of other dentists who worked for
Rebecca at the time of the trial.
Robert also points to our case law stating that a party’s ali-
mony obligation is to be set according to the income he or she
has available after his or her child support obligations, if any,
have been accounted for, with the apparent implication that
the award here is improper under that standard. 64 However, by
Robert’s own calculations, his monthly income after his child
support and alimony obligations have been paid is $18,294,
62 See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 246 Neb. 55, 516 N.W.2d 612 (1994) (finding
no abuse of discretion where district court’s alimony award tends to even
out disparity in parties’ financial resources and provides wife with means
to partially recapture standard of living that she and husband jointly put
together during their 19 years of marriage); Pyke v. Pyke, 212 Neb. 114,
321 N.W.2d 906 (1982) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in Karas, supra note 34; recognizing that one policy underlying § 42-365
is to minimize any substantial and unnecessary disruption in lives of
parties occasioned by reason of dissolution).
63 Brief for appellant at 43.
64 See, e.g., Wiedel v. Wiedel, 300 Neb. 13, 911 N.W.2d 582 (2018).

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and he does not suggest he is unable to support himself on
that amount.
5. No Abuse of Discretion in Awarding
Rebecca Attorney Fees
Robert argues the district court erred in awarding Rebecca
$30,000 in attorney fees “solely based upon the disparity in
income and financial status of the parties.” 65 Robert implic-
itly acknowledges that Rebecca’s attorney fees were siz-
able. However, he claims this was because the case was an
“extremely complicated” one that lasted over 2 years due
to factors other than his actions. 66 Robert also suggests that
Rebecca was well compensated without the award of attorney
fees. Robert argues that Rebecca received the marital home,
“a $614,272.23 judgment to equalize the marital estate,” and
alimony of $5,000 per month for 9 years, “leav[ing him] with
less available monthly income than [she has].” 67 Rebecca dis-
agrees. Among other things, Rebecca argues that the amount
of attorney fees awarded to her is a fraction of the fees that
she incurred during the proceedings. She also argues that she
has yet to pay off her attorney fees.
[14-16] Attorney fees and expenses may be recovered in
a civil action only where provided for by statute or when a
recognized and accepted uniform course of procedure has
been to allow recovery of attorney fees. 68 A uniform course
of procedure exists in Nebraska for the award of attorney
fees in dissolution cases. 69 In awarding attorney fees in a dis-
solution action, a court shall consider the nature of the case,
the amount involved in the controversy, the services actually
performed, the results obtained, the length of time required
65 Brief for appellant at 47.
66 Id. at 48.
67 Id.
68 Beatty v. Poitier, ante p. 56, 21 N.W.3d 295 (2025).
69 Dycus v. Dycus, 307 Neb. 426, 949 N.W.2d 357 (2020).

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for preparation and presentation of the case, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions raised, and the customary charges
of the bar for similar services. 70
Here, because both parties assert the case was compli-
cated, we presume that it was such. There was a significant
amount at issue; the marital home alone was valued at $1.5
million. The affidavit of Rebecca’s current attorney reflected
558 hours of work at $225 per hour. However, Rebecca was
represented by other attorneys at the start of the proceedings
and, in total, incurred $225,576.83 in attorney fees. We also
note that Rebecca’s total attorney fees are less than the fees
incurred by Robert and that the hourly rate of Rebecca’s cur-
rent attorney is less than that of Robert’s attorney. Although
Rebecca did not prevail on every argument she made during
the proceedings, she was awarded primary physical custody
of all three children and final decisionmaking authority as to
the children. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
the district court abused its discretion in awarding Rebecca
$30,000 in attorney fees.
That conclusion is not altered by the financial consider-
ations that Robert noted above. The record here shows that the
district court took the equalization payment into consideration
when awarding attorney fees but concluded the amount of that
payment was not equal to the “mortgage remaining on the
marital home, which [Robert] has requested [Rebecca] either
pay or refinance.” Similarly, as to the alimony awarded to
Rebecca, the record shows that the district court deducted the
amount that Rebecca was paying for attorney fees from her
monthly expenses when determining spousal support. In other
words, the district court did not effectively count that amount
against Robert twice.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Robert’s
assignments of error regarding the parenting plan, the allocation
70 Id.

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of the children’s extracurricular expenses, the division of the
marital estate, and the award of alimony and attorney fees to
Rebecca are without merit. As such, we affirm the order of the
district court.
Affirmed.