Meiergerd v. Qatalyst Corp.

- 831 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
David Meiergerd, appellant, v. Qatalyst
Corporation and Roland Pinto, appellees.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed June 14, 2024. 	No. S-22-939.
1. Judgments. A judgment’s meaning is determined, as a matter of law, by
the contents of the judgment in question.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently
reviews questions of law decided by a lower court.
3. Judgments. Unless the language used in a judgment is ambiguous, the
effect of the judgment must be declared in the light of the literal mean-
ing of the language used.
4. Judgments: Words and Phrases. Ambiguity in a judgment exists when
a word, phrase, or provision therein has, or is susceptible of, at least two
reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings.
5. Judgments. If the language of a judgment is ambiguous, there is room
for construction.
6. ____. In ascertaining the meaning of an ambiguous judgment, resort
may be had to the entire record.
7. Judgments: Intent. Doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to have a
reasonable intendment to do justice and avoid wrong.
8. Interest: Intent: Words and Phrases. Legal interest is intended to
compensate ultimately victorious litigants for the value of money to
which they are entitled and of which they have been deprived during the
pendency of litigation.
9. Interest: Words and Phrases. Compound interest means interest on
interest, in that accrued interest is added periodically to the principal,
and interest is then computed upon the new principal thus formed.
10. Debtors and Creditors: Interest. In the absence of a contract or statute,
compensation in the form of compound interest is generally not allowed
to be computed upon a debt.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:34 AM CDT

- 832 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
Riedmann, Bishop, and Welch, Judges, on appeal thereto
from the District Court for Lancaster County, Susan I. Strong,
Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
Adam J. Kost, of Rembolt Ludtke, L.L.P., for appellant.
Christopher S. Bartling, of Bartling & Hinkle, P.C., for
appellees.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Miller-Lerman, J.
NATURE OF CASE
In an order filed in December 2022, the district court
for Lancaster County determined, among other things, that
Qatalyst Corporation and Roland Pinto, appellees, had paid
the correct amount of postjudgment interest and attorney
fees pursuant to a 2008 order on default judgment and sus-
tained their motion for satisfaction and discharge. David
Meiergerd, the creditor, appealed to the Nebraska Court of
Appeals and claimed that the district court had erred in its
computation of postjudgment interest. At issue at the Court
of Appeals and before us is the meaning of the language in
the 2008 order that awarded postjudgment interest “at the rate
of 16% compounded annually ($58.97 per day).” The Court
of Appeals affirmed the order of the district court, and we
granted Meiergerd’s petition for further review. Although our
reasoning differs in some respects from that of the Court of
Appeals, we affirm its decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In November 2007, Meiergerd filed a complaint in the
Lancaster County District Court seeking to recover on, inter
alia, a series of loans that occurred between Meiergerd and
the appellees. Meiergerd alleged that at that time, he was
a shareholder of Qatalyst Corporation and Pinto was the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
president of Qatalyst. Three promissory note claims, although
not directly at issue in this appeal, evidence a lending history
between Meiergerd and Qatalyst.
In counts III, IV, and V, Meiergerd requested judgments
in the principal amount of $55,000, $33,000, and $22,000,
respectively, and also sought interest and costs. Each promis-
sory note underlying these claims provided that “[a]ll past
due amounts of principal and/or interest and/or all other past-
due incurred charges shall bear interest after maturity at the
maximum amount of interest permitted by the Laws of the
State of Nebraska until paid.” Each promissory note further
provided that “[i]nterest on this debt evidenced by this Note
shall not exceed the maximum amount of non-usurious inter-
est that may be contracted for, taken, reserved, charged, or
received under law . . . .”
Rather than written promissory notes, this appeal arises
from allegations concerning unpaid oral loans detailed in count
VI for which Meiergerd requested a judgment against both
appellees. Count VI alleged that the appellees were in default
under their oral promises and sought a principal amount “plus
interest at the highest rate permitted by Nebraska law” from
respective dates of the loans. Meiergerd sought postjudg-
ment “interest as provided by law from the date of judgment
until paid.”
Summons was issued and service was perfected on each
appellee. In April 2008, Meiergerd filed a motion for default
judgment. With respect to count VI, the motion for default
judgment requested “a judgment in the amount of $163,547.12
with interest thereon at the highest legal rate plus attor-
ney[’]s fees and costs as allowed by the Court,” and also
sought “[c]ourt costs, legal fees[,] and other costs of collec-
tion.” To support the request for principal and interest, the
motion included a table listing, inter alia, the amounts of
each of the individual oral loans, an interest per day rate for
each loan, and the number of days from the date of the loan
through the date of the scheduled hearing.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
In May 2008, the district court granted Meiergerd’s motion
for default judgment. The order specifically found that the
motion for default judgment “is true and proper in all respects.”
As relevant to this appeal, the court ordered:
3. That [Meiergerd] have and recover from the [appel-
lees] under Counts III, IV, and V of the Complaint the
collection of three notes issued by Defendant Qatalyst
to the Plaintiff Meiergerd plus interest in the amount of
$133,344.44 plus post judgment [sic] interest thereon
from the date of Judgment at 16% compounded annually
($48.89 per day) until the satisfaction of the Judgment
and Court costs;
4. That [Meiergerd] have and recover from the [appel-
lees] under Count VI the collection of a series of loans
made by [Meiergerd] to the [Appellees] in the amount of
$163,547.12, post-judgment [sic] interest from the date
the Court enters judgment until satisfaction of judgment
at the rate of 16% compounded annually ($58.97 per
day) and court costs.
5. Attorney’s fees in the Amount of $3,462.02 . . . .
. . . .
7. The [appellees] are ordered to pay the costs of this
action.
(Emphasis supplied.) The stated per diem rate for postjudg-
ment interest in the district court’s order mirrored the per diem
rate for prejudgment interest requested in Meiergerd’s motion.
In 2022, the appellees initiated a separate proceeding in
the district court for Lancaster County in case No. CI 22-705,
captioned “Qatalyst Corporation and Roland Pinto v. David
Meiergerd,” in which they sought to vacate or amend the
judgment from the earlier proceedings. This new action was
ultimately dismissed because the court found that Meiergerd
held a valid and enforceable judgment against appellees and
that their collateral attacks on the judgment were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.

- 835 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
Subsequently, in the original case in which the judgments
had been entered, the court granted the appellees’ motion for
revivor. In September 2022, the appellees filed a “Motion for
Satisfaction and Discharge of Judgments” related to the judg-
ment against them on count VI in the principal amount of
$163,547.12 and attorney fees in the amount of $3,462.02. The
district court conducted a hearing on the motion, including the
issue of associated postjudgment interest at which evidence
was adduced. In its order on the motion, the district court cal-
culated the amount of postjudgment interest due to Meiergerd
under count VI by multiplying the per diem rate stated in the
2008 order, $58.97, by the number of days between the date
of the 2008 order (May 5, 2008) and the date of payment
(September 21, 2022). This calculation results in 5,252 days
at $58.97 per day, for a total of $309,710.44 in postjudgment
interest. The court found that the appellees’ checks had satis-
fied the amount due on the judgment, including postjudgment
interest, costs, and attorney fees. It sustained the appellees’
motion to satisfy and discharge the judgment with respect to
count VI.
Meiergerd appealed to the Court of Appeals and asserted
that the computation of the amount due and owing in the sat-
isfaction of judgment improperly used the specified per diem
rate, but failed to apply compound interest on the postjudg-
ment amount. He contends that the district court’s approval
of this daily rate disregards the language in the 2008 order
that stated that postjudgment interest would be “compounded
annually.” Under Meiergerd’s calculation, the postjudgment
interest on count VI would be $1,214,164.89 as of September
21, 2022, far more than the $309,710.44 balance approved by
the district court. He argued that the parenthetical “$58.97 per
day” in the 2008 order referenced the first year only, because
in subsequent years, interest would compound on the new bal-
ance that would include interest accrued.
In 	the 	memorandum 	opinion 	that 	affirmed 	the 	district
court’s order, the Court of Appeals suggested that the words

- 836 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
“compounded annually” are subject to two conflicting inter-
pretations. The Court of Appeals ultimately interpreted the
word “compound” to mean “[t]o put together, combine, or
construct” as provided in Black’s Law Dictionary 346 (10th
ed. 2014). The court determined that the “‘per day’” rate in
the 2008 default order was a reflection of the annual inter-
est rate and that “the only way to harmoniously construe
the district court’s specific ‘per day’ rate with the preceding
words ‘compounded annually’” is to interpret the expression
to mean “‘to put together, combine, or construct’” annu-
ally, or calculated annually. Meiergerd v. Qatalyst Corp., No.
A-22-939, 2023 WL 8224531 at *4 (Neb. App. Nov. 28, 2023)
(selected for posting to court website). The Court of Appeals
found that this interpretation gives effect to every word and
part and brings all parts into harmony. The court also noted
that Meiergerd himself utilized the daily rates in his motion
for default judgment, which provided some indication that
the “interest ‘compounded annually ($58.97 per day)’ meant
interest calculated annually rather than annually compounding
interest.” Id. at *5.
We granted Meiergerd’s petition for further review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Meiergerd assigns, restated, that the Court of Appeals erred
as a matter of law when it affirmed the order of the district
court and interpreted the 2008 order to require the appel-
lees to pay only simple interest, calculated annually on the
principal of the oral loans, from the date that the judgment
was entered.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1,2] A judgment’s meaning is determined, as a matter of
law, by the contents of the judgment in question. Zeiler v.
Reifschneider, 315 Neb. 880, 1 N.W.3d 880 (2024). An appel-
late court independently reviews questions of law decided by a
lower court. Id.

- 837 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
ANALYSIS
The parties disagree about the proper amount of post-
judgment interest due under the 2008 order and whether the
judgments have been satisfied by the appellees. As explained
below, we conclude that the 2008 order was ambiguous with
respect to the manner of calculating postjudgment interest,
and, contrary to Meiergerd’s assertion, we determine that the
2008 order provided for simple interest and did not introduce
compound interest that had not been requested by Meiergerd or
supported by prior conduct between the parties. Accordingly,
we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Legal Principles for Determining
the Meaning of Judgments.
[3,4] A judgment’s meaning is determined, as a matter of
law, by the contents of the judgment in question. Ramaekers
v. Creighton University, 312 Neb. 248, 978 N.W.2d 298
(2022). Unless the language used in a judgment is ambigu-
ous, the effect of the judgment must be declared in the light
of the literal meaning of the language used. Id. Ambiguity in
a judgment exists when a word, phrase, or provision therein
has, or is susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflict-
ing interpretations or meanings. Id.
[5-7] If the language of a judgment is ambiguous, there is
room for construction. Id. In ascertaining the meaning of an
ambiguous judgment, resort may be had to the entire record.
Id. Doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to have a reasonable
intendment to do justice and avoid wrong. Id.
The 2008 Order for Default Judgment Was Ambiguous
With Respect to the Manner of Calculating
Postjudgment Interest.
With respect to count VI, the 2008 order provided that the
appellees pay Meiergerd “$163,547.12, [and] post-judgment
[sic] interest from the date the Court enters judgment until
satisfaction of judgment at the rate of 16% compounded

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
annually ($58.97 per day) and court costs.” The parties sub-
mit differing interpretations of the postjudgment portion of
the order based on the tension between the language “com-
pounded annually” and “$58.97 per day.” Meiergerd contends
that the postjudgment provision is for compound interest and
that therefore, $1,214,164.89, rather than $309,710.44, is
needed to satisfy the judgment as of September 21, 2022. He
suggests that the $58.97 applies only for the first year after
entry of the judgment, since the interest would compound
thereafter. The appellees claim that the manner of calculation
is simple interest, that it is computed annually, and that this
is confirmed by the per diem interest calculation. For the oral
loans in count VI with principals totaling $132,671.20, the
appellees argue that the judgment was satisfied by their pay-
ments of $309,710.44.
[8,9] “Legal interest is intended to compensate ultimately
victorious litigants for the value of money to which they are
entitled and of which they have been deprived during the
pendency of litigation.” 44B Am. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury
§ 1 at 24 (2017). “‘Compound interest’ means interest on
interest, in that accrued interest is added periodically to the
principal, and interest is then computed upon the new prin-
cipal thus formed.” Id., § 41 at 72. See Sanford v. Lundquist,
80 Neb. 414, 118 N.W. 129 (1908). Compound interest differs
from a simple interest rate that is a percentage rate applied
only to the principle of the loan.
Because of its use of both “compounded annually” and
“$58.97 per day,” the language in the 2008 order can reason-
ably be read to have conflicting meanings, and we conclude the
district court’s 2008 order is ambiguous. Because the order is
ambiguous, we turn to the record to ascertain its meaning.
The Order Was for Simple Interest.
By reference to the record in this case, we focus on the acts
and words of the parties, their court filings, and the evidence
at the hearing on the motion for satisfaction and judgment.

- 839 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
[10] Past agreements between Meiergerd and Qatalyst had
limited interest to no more than the interest permitted under
Nebraska law. And in the absence of a contract or statute,
compensation in the form of compound interest is generally
not allowed to be computed upon a debt. See, Ashland State
Bank v. Elkhorn Racquetball, Inc., 246 Neb. 411, 520 N.W.2d
189 (1994); Abbott v. Abbott, 188 Neb. 61, 195 N.W.2d 204
(1972). Further, nothing in the record explicitly explains the
district court’s use of the word “compounded” in its provision
for postjudgment interest. In our view, we find no evidence
in prior dealings that would suggest that the parties explicitly
or impliedly agreed to a 16-percent compound interest rate on
the principal of these oral loans or agreed that the manner of
calculating an interest rate would increase significantly after
a judgment.
Meiergerd’s 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment 	informs 	our
understanding of the postjudgment issue, and we note it is
referenced by the district court in its judgment. The order
specifically found that “the Motion for Default Judgment of
the Plaintiff Meiergerd is true and proper in all respects and
should be granted.” Meiergerd’s motion so referenced had
sought interest on the oral loans of count VI at a simple inter-
est rate. It included a detailed chart applying this rate to the
principal on the oral loans from the date of each loan. The
chart supporting prejudgment simple interest also included
a daily rate based on a 16-percent annual interest rate. This
daily interest rate proposed by Meiergerd is consistent with
the daily rate the district court explicitly ordered for future
interest on the judgment.
Doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to have a reason-
able intendment to do justice and avoid wrong. Ramaekers v.
Creighton University, 312 Neb. 248, 978 N.W.2d 298 (2022).
Since the record lacks evidence of a contract or statute that
would allow compound postjudgment interest on the loans in
this case, we will not assume that the district court imposed
compound interest disfavored in law.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
316 Nebraska Reports
MEIERGERD v. QATALYST CORP.
Cite as 316 Neb. 831
CONCLUSION
The 2008 order on default judgment as to count VI was
ambiguous as it pertained to postjudgment interest, and we
conclude that the district court and Court of Appeals properly
ascertained its meaning. Because the appellees satisfied the
judgment with respect to count VI and attorney fees, in accord-
ance with the proper meaning of the 2008 order, the decision
of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the order of the district
court that granted appellees’ motion for satisfaction and dis-
charge of judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.