Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD

- 1 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
Bryan Hauxwell and Ami Hauxwell, appellees,
v. Middle Republican Natural Resources
District et al., appellants.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 23, 2025. 	No. S-23-751.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
matter of law.
2. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A judgment or
final order rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified
by an appellate court for errors appearing on the record.
3. ____: ____: ____. When reviewing an order of a district court under
the Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the
inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by com-
petent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court, in reviewing a
district court’s judgment for errors appearing on the record, will not
substitute its factual findings for those of the district court where com-
petent evidence supports those findings.
5. Constitutional Law: Due Process. The determination of whether the
procedures afforded to an individual comport with the constitutional
requirements for procedural due process presents a question of law.
6. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently
reviews questions of law decided by a lower court.
7. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Where a lower court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question,
an appellate court also lacks the power to determine the merits of the
claim, issue, or question presented to the lower court.
8. Administrative Law: Natural Resources Districts: Words and
Phrases. A natural resources district is not an agency within the mean-
ing of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 07:57 AM CDT

- 2 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
9. Administrative Law: Waters: Natural Resources Districts: Appeal
and Error. Any person aggrieved by an order of a natural resources
district issued pursuant to the Nebraska Ground Water Management and
Protection Act may appeal the order, and the appeal shall be in accord-
ance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
10. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court
to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, the party must be appealing from a
final order or a judgment.
11. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. To be a final order under the first cat-
egory of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum. Supp. 2024), the order must
dispose of the whole merits of the case and leave nothing for the court’s
further consideration.
12. Final Orders. Finality serves the important purpose of promoting effi-
cient judicial administration and preventing piecemeal litigation.
13. Due Process: Trial. A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process.
14. Administrative Law: Due Process. A party appearing in an adjudica-
tion hearing before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process
protections similar to those given litigants in a judicial proceeding;
this includes the right to a hearing before an impartial, unbiased
decisionmaker.
15. Constitutional Law: Administrative Law: Judges. Rather than inquir-
ing into whether the judge or adjudicator is actually, subjectively biased,
the question is whether the average judge in his or her position is likely
to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias.
16. Administrative Law. Central to whether the average administrative
decisionmaker in a similar position is likely to be neutral is the extent
of separation between the investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative
roles in the case.
17. Criminal Law: Administrative Law: Due Process. In a criminal trial,
due process requires the strict separation of investigative, prosecutorial,
and adjudicative functions; in an administrative proceeding, due process
requires an adequate separation of investigative, prosecutorial, and adju-
dicative roles.
18. Administrative Law: Presumptions. Decisionmakers are accorded a
presumption of honesty and integrity, and of being qualified, unbi-
ased, and unprejudiced; administrative adjudicators serve with the same
presumption.
19. Administrative Law: Prosecuting Attorneys. An administrative pros-
ecutor or advocate, by definition, is partisan for a particular client or
point of view.

- 3 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
20. Constitutional Law: Prosecuting Attorneys. Generally, the role of
prosecutor is inconsistent with true objectivity, a constitutionally neces-
sary characteristic of an adjudicator.
Appeal from the District Court for Frontier County: James
E. Doyle IV, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Jeffrey M. Cox, of Dier, Osborn & Cox, P.C., L.L.O., and
Todd R. McWha, of Waite & McWha, for appellants.
George G. Vinton for appellees.
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Funke, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This appeal raises the question of whether a violation of
the appellees’ due process rights at a prior hearing before the
board of directors of a natural resources district tainted sub-
sequent hearings. The district court found that the earlier due
process violation infected the later hearings and, therefore,
reversed and vacated the penalties that the natural resources
district had imposed on the appellees. We disagree. As such,
we reverse the order of the district court and remand the cause
to the district court with directions as indicated below.
II. BACKGROUND
1. Factual Background
The appellees, Bryan Hauxwell and Ami Hauxwell, are
farmers who use ground water and surface water to irri-
gate properties located within the Middle Republican Natural
Resources District. Some of those properties are owned by
the Hauxwells. Other properties are owned by Ruggles Farms,
Inc., a corporation owned by the Hauxwells. Yet other proper-
ties are owned by third parties.
Since 2020, the Hauxwells have been involved in a dis-
pute with the Middle Republican Natural Resources District,

- 4 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
its chairperson, and its general manager (collectively NRD)
about 	the 	Hauxwells’ irrigation 	practices 	and 	the 	NRD’s
response to those practices. The dispute has spawned seven
separate lawsuits. Those lawsuits are described below only to
the extent necessary to understand the parties’ arguments on
appeal. Where relevant, other information is discussed later in
the opinion.
2. NRD Board’s 2020 Findings and Conclusions
and Subsequent Petition for Review
In April 2020, the NRD received a complaint about the
Hauxwells. The NRD investigated and allegedly found “numer-
ous direct violations” of the NRD’s rules and regulations,
including the use of ground water to irrigate acres that had
not been certified for irrigation, failure to install flowmeters
on regulated wells, and utilization of flowmeters that were
not working or permanently mounted. The NRD notified the
Hauxwells of its intent to issue a cease-and-desist order and
penalties. The notice also informed the Hauxwells of their
right to a hearing.
After this notice was sent, but before the hearing, the NRD’s
general manager and its board members exchanged emails
about the alleged violations and potential penalties. In one
email, a board member stated that Bryan “evidently doesn’t
think the rules apply to him” and proposed that the Hauxwells
“permanently lose their [ground water] allocation,” among
other things. In other emails, the general manager opined that
the Hauxwells “[were] not trying or thinking about the rules,”
while a board member expressed a desire to “squash” the
Hauxwells.
On August 17, 2020, the board held a hearing on the
Hauxwells’ alleged violations. The NRD’s general manager
testified as to the violations. In his own testimony, Bryan did
not appear to contest that the Hauxwells had engaged in the
practices described. However, Bryan testified that he “didn’t
think there was a problem with moving water from one place

- 5 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
to the other” if there was a “pooling agreement,” or an agree-
ment to share ground water allocations over jointly farmed
properties. Bryan said he was unaware that the NRD had not
approved the Hauxwells’ pooling request. Bryan also said he
believed that during its inspections, the NRD would discover
and address any issues with meters or seals that were on the
wells of the properties he farmed. Ami testified similarly to
Bryan that she believed they had “extra water” available due
to pooling. Ami said she assumed their pooling agreement was
approved because she “hadn’t heard that it was not.”
The board went into closed executive session to deliberate.
The NRD’s general manager and its counsel who had pros-
ecuted the case against the Hauxwells “sat in” on the board’s
deliberations. At the conclusion of deliberations, the board
found that the Hauxwells had violated the NRD’s rules and reg-
ulations. Among other things, the board ordered the Hauxwells
to cease and desist irrigating acres that were not certified with
the NRD for ground water use. The board indicated that failure
to comply with the order could be enforced by an injunction
and civil penalties under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-745 (Reissue
2021). Also, as a penalty, the board imposed restrictions on the
Hauxwells’ use of ground water for irrigation.
The Hauxwells then filed a petition for review in the district
court for Frontier County, Nebraska, challenging the board’s
findings and conclusions on various grounds. Among those
grounds were the NRD’s alleged failure to comply with its
own rules and regulations regarding the enforcement of viola-
tions and its failure to give the Hauxwells sufficient notice of
the hearing.
The district court ruled in favor of the Hauxwells. In so
doing, the court found that the NRD had failed to comply with
specific rules and regulations that “benefit[ed] and provide[d]
safeguards to regulated users,” like the Hauxwells, by giv-
ing them an opportunity to remedy alleged violations with-
out a cease-and-desist order and in a manner that potentially
avoided penalties. The court also found that the Hauxwells

- 6 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
were not provided with adequate notice of the charges against
them or the potential penalties. The court thus remanded
the cause to the NRD with instructions to “proceed on the
alleged violations in accordance with the due process require-
ments discussed [in the court order] or to dismiss the alleged
violations.”
3. NRD Board’s 2021 Findings and Conclusions
and Subsequent Petition for Review
On June 3, 2021, a month after the district court remanded
the matter back to the board on the issue of its 2020 find-
ings and conclusions, the NRD purportedly “start[ed] anew” 1
by sending the Hauxwells another “Complaint and Notice of
Intent to Issue a Cease and Desist Order.” However, the com-
plaint involved the same violations that were addressed at the
2020 hearing.
Subsequently, on July 26, 2021, the NRD informed the
Hauxwells that ground water had been pumped on property
the Hauxwells leased from another landowner in violation of
a cease-and-desist order issued in a separate matter. The NRD
indicated that it had decided, at that time, not to pursue the
“legal remedies available to it” to secure compliance with the
cease-and-desist order, but it left open the option of doing so
in response to future violations.
Three days later, on July 29, 2021, the board conducted
a hearing on the June 3 complaint and notice of intent to
issue a cease-and-desist order. The NRD’s general manager
once more testified about the Hauxwells’ alleged violations,
although he acknowledged that at least some violations had
been “resolved.” The Hauxwells testified similarly that they
corrected the violations once they were notified of the issue.
Notably, at one point during the hearing, the Hauxwells
asked the NRD’s general manager whether he and the NRD’s
counsel were “going to participate” in the board’s deliberations
1 Reply brief for appellants at 10.

- 7 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
“again today.” The general manager said that neither he nor
counsel would “participate” or “sit in” on the deliberations.
Instead, the general manager said that the hearing officer
would serve as the board’s counsel during its deliberations.
When the Hauxwells then asked why the change was made,
the hearing officer interjected that it was “[his] decision to
exclude” the NRD’s counsel and staff from the board’s delib-
erations “in order to keep . . . distance between them and the
[b]oard who will be solely responsible for the decision.” The
hearing officer added that he viewed this as “part of the due
process that [the Hauxwells were] entitled to.”
Subsequently, on August 10, 2021, the board found that the
Hauxwells had violated the NRD’s rules and regulations and
participated in a violation of the cease-and-desist order as to
the other landowner’s property. Because there were not, at that
time, any continuing violations, the board concluded that no
new cease-and-desist order was warranted. However, the board
indicated that penalties for the violations would be considered
“at a separate hearing” to be “scheduled in due course.”
The Hauxwells then filed another petition for review in the
district court, asking that the board’s 2021 findings and con-
clusions be reversed and vacated on multiple grounds. One
ground was that the participation of the NRD’s counsel and
general manager in the board’s deliberations after the 2020
hearing had “tainted” the 2021 hearing.
The district court dismissed the petition. In so doing, the
court 	distinguished 	between 	what 	it 	characterized 	as 	the
Hauxwells’ violations of the NRD’s rules and regulations prior
to 2021 and their participation in the violation of the cease-
and-desist order in 2021. As to the pre-2021 violations, the
court reasoned that the NRD “took no further action” and did
not enter a cease-and-desist order. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the Hauxwells failed to present a justiciable issue
because “no existing rights of [theirs] were or are affected.”
As to the 2021 incident, the court similarly reasoned that the

- 8 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
board’s findings and conclusions were not a final, appealable
order because they “left the determination of a penalty for
further consideration.”
The Hauxwells did not appeal the district court’s decision
dismissing their challenge to the 2021 findings and conclusions.
4. NRD Board’s 2022 Findings and Conclusions
and Present Petition for Review
On August 24, 2022, the board heard evidence regarding the
penalties for the violations that it found at the 2021 hearing.
The NRD’s general manager testified that the rule violations
at issue were “serious violations.” The general manager also
testified that he did not view the letter that the NRD sent to
the Hauxwells regarding the violation of the cease-and-desist
order as to the other landowner’s property to preclude the
NRD from imposing penalties in the future. But the general
manager acknowledged that the “only rules [violations] at
issue [were] those rules [violations] addressed at the . . . 2020
hearing” and that “absolutely no other rule violations [were] at
issue.” The general manager also acknowledged that approxi-
mately 10 of the board members at the 2022 hearing had been
on the board at the time of the 2020 hearing.
The Hauxwells did not testify at the hearing, but they pre-
sented evidence and arguments. Among the evidence presented
were the complete records of their prior lawsuits challenging
the board’s 2020 and 2021 findings and conclusions.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the board again found that
the Hauxwells had violated the NRD’s rules and regulations
and participated in a violation of the cease-and-desist order.
Based on those findings, as a penalty, the board restricted the
Hauxwells’ use of ground water for irrigation and their ability
to engage in pooling, among other things.
The Hauxwells then filed yet another petition for review in
the district court, challenging the board’s 2022 findings and
conclusions on multiple grounds. One ground was that the
“participat[ion]” of the NRD’s counsel and general manager in

- 9 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
the board’s deliberations after the 2020 hearing had “taint[ed]”
the deliberations after the 2021 hearing and “cause[d] the . . .
[b]oard not to be impartial.”
The district court agreed with the Hauxwells, reversing
the NRD’s 2022 findings and conclusions and vacating the
assessed penalties. The court began by noting that it had
reviewed de novo each of the Hauxwells’ “20 separate claims,”
as well as the record pertaining to each claim. However, the
court indicated that it found the Hauxwells’ due process claim
to be “dispositive” and that it focused on that claim without
determining the merits of the other claims.
Specifically, as to the Hauxwells’ due process claim, the
district court found that
the improper participation by the prosecutors in the July
29, 2021 deliberations carried over to and spread through
the August 24, 2022 hearing.
. . . .
By combining the advocacy and prosecutorial roles
with the decision-making function, [the NRD] attorney
and manager nullified the presumption of neutrality and
impartiality accorded the tribunal and interjected the ex
parte advocacy and prosecutorial influences of the agents
of the accusers into the decision-making, and in doing so,
violated the [Hauxwells’] due process rights. The result
produced from the July 29, 2021 hearing was then trans-
mitted to and became the foundation and basis for the
decisions in the August 24, 2022 hearing.
Here and elsewhere in its order, the court incorrectly stated
that the NRD’s counsel and general manager participated in
the board’s deliberations after the 2021 hearing. In fact, such
participation occurred after the 2020 hearing.
The NRD timely appealed the district court’s decision, and
we moved the matter to our docket. 2
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024).

- 10 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The NRD assigns, restated and reordered, that the district
court erred in (1) exercising jurisdiction over the board’s
findings that the Hauxwells violated the NRD’s rules and
regulations and the Nebraska Ground Water Management and
Protection Act (NGWMPA), 3 (2) reversing and vacating the
penalties against Ruggles Farms, (3) finding that the NRD’s
counsel and general manager were included in the board’s
decisionmaking process at the 2021 hearing, (4) finding that
the opportunity for a hearing provided to the Hauxwells did
not comport with due process, (5) failing to review the board’s
decision de novo on the record, (6) failing to make indepen-
dent factual determinations and reach independent conclu-
sions regarding the Hauxwells’ violations and the penalties
for such violations, (7) failing to find that the Hauxwells
violated the NRD’s rules and regulations and the NGWMPA,
(8) failing to approve the board’s order imposing penalties for
the Hauxwells’ violations, and (9) reversing and vacating the
penalties imposed on the Hauxwells.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
of law. 4
[2-4] A judgment or final order rendered by a district court
in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) 5 may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an
appellate court for errors appearing on the record. 6 When
reviewing an order of a district court under the APA for errors
appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision
3 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-701 to 46-756 (Reissue 2021).
4 Dylan H. v. Brooke C., 317 Neb. 264, 9 N.W.3d 439 (2024).
5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-901 to 84-920 (Reissue 2024).
6 Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part. v. Middle Republican NRD, 315 Neb. 596, 998
N.W.2d 41 (2023).

- 11 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 7 An appel-
late court, in reviewing a district court’s judgment for errors
appearing on the record, will not substitute its factual findings
for those of the district court where competent evidence sup-
ports those findings. 8
[5,6] The determination of whether the procedures afforded
to an individual comport with the constitutional requirements
for procedural due process presents a question of law. 9 An
appellate court independently reviews questions of law decided
by a lower court. 10
V. ANALYSIS
1. Jurisdiction
[7] Before we can reach the legal issues presented for
review, we must first address several jurisdictional issues
raised by the parties. 11 The Hauxwells challenge the district
court’s jurisdiction over the entire matter. The NRD, in turn,
challenges the district court’s jurisdiction over the board’s
2021 findings and conclusions that the Hauxwells violated the
NRD’s rules and regulations and the NGWMPA and over the
penalties imposed as to Ruggles Farms. Where a lower court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of
a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the
power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or ques-
tion presented to the lower court. 12 However, for the rea-
sons set forth below, we reject the parties’ challenges to our
jurisdiction.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 In re Interest of Jordon B., 316 Neb. 974, 7 N.W.3d 894 (2024).
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., State ex rel. Constance v. Evnen, 317 Neb. 600, 10 N.W.3d 763
(2024).
12 E.g., Charter West Bank v. Riddle, 314 Neb. 263, 989 N.W.2d 428 (2023).

- 12 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
(a) NRD’s Failure to File 2021 and 2022
Findings and Conclusions With Court Did
Not Deprive Court of Jurisdiction
The Hauxwells’ argument that we lack jurisdiction over this
matter in its entirety is based on their view that the NRD’s
2021 and 2022 findings and conclusions were part of the
same proceeding as the 2020 findings and conclusions. The
Hauxwells claim that because the district court remanded the
proceeding involving the 2020 findings and conclusions to
the NRD, the NRD was required under § 84-917(5)(b)(ii) of
the APA to file its 2021 and 2022 findings and conclusions
with the district court. Insofar as the NRD failed to do this,
the Hauxwells argue that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
The NRD, on the other hand, argues that the 2021 and 2022
findings and conclusions involved a separate proceeding and
that, as such, it had no obligation to file them with the dis-
trict court.
Ultimately, we need not resolve the question of whether one
proceeding or multiple proceedings were involved here. This
is because even if the 2021 and 2022 findings and conclusions
were part of the same proceeding as the 2020 findings and
conclusions, as the Hauxwells argue, the filing requirements
upon which they rely cannot be seen to apply here. To explain
why this is the case, we briefly review the relevant statutes.
[8,9] Section 84-917 of the APA prescribes, in relevant part,
that when a court reviews an agency decision:
(5)(a) . . . The court may affirm, reverse, or modify
the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings.
(b)(i) If the court determines that the interest of justice
would be served by the resolution of any other issue not
raised before the agency, the court may remand the case
to the agency for further proceedings.
(ii) The agency shall affirm, modify, or reverse its find-
ings and decision in the case by reason of the additional

- 13 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
proceedings and shall file the decision following remand
with the reviewing court.
A natural resources district is not an agency within the mean-
ing of the APA. 13 However, under the NGWMPA, any person
aggrieved by an order of a natural resources district issued pur-
suant to the NGWMPA may appeal the order, and the appeal
shall be in accordance with the APA. 14
The Hauxwells do not, as an initial matter, argue that the
remand here was to resolve any issue not raised before the
board. Instead, they propose an interpretation of the APA that
would require the board to file its decisions with the court,
not only in remands under § 84-917(5)(b)(i) for the resolu-
tion of other issues not raised before the board, but also in
other remands under § 84-917(5)(a). However, such an inter-
pretation is inconsistent with the structure and history of
the statute. 15
The filing requirements are located in § 84-917(5)(b), along
with the provisions regarding remands for the resolution of
other issues not raised before an agency. The provisions regard-
ing other remands, in contrast, are in a separate subsection,
§ 84-917(5)(a). Indeed, prior to 2020, they were in their own
section and not part of § 84-917(5) at all. 16 We find this struc-
ture to be indicative of the scope of the filing requirements
13 See § 84-901(1). See, also, Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn NRD, 294 Neb.
46, 881 N.W.2d 892 (2016).
14 See § 46-750. See, also, Medicine Creek v. Middle Republican NRD, 296
Neb. 1, 892 N.W.2d 74 (2017).
15 Cf., Daniel B. Listwa, Comment, Uncovering the Codifier’s Canon: How
Codification Informs Interpretation, 127 Yale L.J. 464 (2017) (role of
section numbers adopted by legislators in statutory interpretation); Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 256 (2012) (role of “statutory history” in interpretation) (emphasis
omitted).
16 See 2020 Neb. Laws, L.B. 889, § 1.

- 14 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
and, in particular, their application only to remands for the
resolution of other issues not raised before the agency. 17 We
also observe that the Hauxwells’ interpretation would render
§ 84-917(5)(b)(i) superfluous because there would be no need
to discuss remands for the resolution of other issues not raised
before the agency separately if all decisions on remand were
required to be filed with the district court. 18
Alternatively, the Hauxwells suggest that the remand in
the matter of the 2020 findings and conclusions was for the
resolution of other issues not raised before the board. The
Hauxwells observe that the matter of the NRD’s compliance
with its own rules and regulations regarding the enforcement
of violations was not raised at the 2020 hearing before the
board. As such, the Hauxwells argue that the remand of the
2020 findings and conclusions was effectively a remand for
the consideration of an issue not raised before the board.
However, that argument ignores the plain language of the
district court’s order remanding the matter of the 2020 find-
ings and conclusions. In that order, the court did not seek the
NRD’s views on any matter related to the NRD’s compliance
with its rules and regulations. 19 Instead, the court directed
the NRD to give the Hauxwells a hearing that comported
with specific due process requirements or dismiss the alleged
violations.
17 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 540, 135 S. Ct. 1074,
191 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2015) (considering, among other things, “position” of
section within relevant chapter and title of code in determining term’s
meaning); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S. Ct.
1127, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1982) (similar).
18 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Patrick W., 316 Neb. 381, 4 N.W.3d 833
(2024).
19 Cf. Barrios v. Commissioner of Labor, 25 Neb. App. 835, 914 N.W.2d
468 (2018) (remanding matter for consideration of whether agency was
estopped from seeking reimbursement of benefits paid to plaintiff).

- 15 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
(b) NRD Board’s 2021 Order Was
Not Final and Appealable
The NRD, in turn, challenges the district court’s “exercising
jurisdiction” over the board’s 2021 findings and conclusions
that the Hauxwells violated the NRD’s rules and regulations
and the NGWMPA. The NRD appears to base this argument
solely on its view that the 2021 findings and conclusions were
a final, appealable order, despite the district court’s ruling to
the contrary. As such, the NRD argues that the Hauxwells’ fail-
ure to appeal the district court’s decision regarding the 2021
findings and conclusions precludes the courts from reviewing
the Hauxwells’ “underlying violations” in conjunction with
the present petition for review. 20 The Hauxwells counter that
the 2021 findings and conclusions were not a final, appealable
order because, among other things, they “did not dispose of
the whole merits of the claim but instead left the determination
of a penalty for further consideration.” 21
[10] For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an
appeal, the party must be appealing from a final order or
a judgment. 22 Every direction of a court or judge, made or
entered in writing and not included in a judgment, is an
order. 23 A “final order” is defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
(Cum. Supp. 2024) as (1) an order affecting a substantial right
in an action, when such order in effect determines the action
and prevents a judgment; (2) an order affecting a substantial
right made during a special proceeding; (3) an order affecting
a substantial right made on summary application in an action
after a judgment is entered; and (4) an order denying a motion
for summary judgment when such motion is based on the
20 Brief for appellant at 25.
21 Brief for appellees at 36.
22 Saint James Apt. Partners v. Universal Surety Co., 316 Neb. 419, 5
N.W.3d 179 (2024).
23 Id. See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024) (defining
“judgment” as “final determination” of parties’ rights).

- 16 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
assertion of sovereign immunity or the immunity of a govern-
ment official. 24
[11,12] In particular, we have said that to be a final order
under the first category of § 25-1902(1), the order must dispose
of the whole merits of the case and leave nothing for the court’s
further consideration. 25 “Finality is central to our inquiry and
serves ‘the important purpose of promoting efficient judicial
administration’ and preventing ‘piecemeal litigation.’” 26
We agree with the Hauxwells that the board’s 2021 findings
and conclusions were not a final, appealable order as defined
in § 25-1902. The parties do not suggest that a special proceed-
ing, a summary application, or a motion for summary judgment
based on the assertion of immunity was involved. Instead, they
dispute whether the 2021 findings and conclusions determined
the action.
Specifically, the NRD argues that the 2021 findings and
conclusions determined the action because the Hauxwells were
found to have violated the NRD’s rules and regulations, and
the board has discretion as to whether to impose penalties
for violations. In other words, the NRD argues that because
the matter could have ended with the finding of violations,
the 2021 findings and conclusions were a final order. The
Hauxwells disagree.
Given the specific language of the board’s 2021 find-
ings and conclusions, we find the NRD’s arguments here
to be untenable. Even if a board generally has discretion as
to whether to impose penalties for violations, as the NRD
claims, the board in this case expressly stated that penalties
for the Hauxwells’ violations would be considered “at a sepa-
rate hearing” to be “scheduled in due course.” In so doing,
the board reserved an issue, an action that commentators have
recognized “often prevents [an] order from being final and
24 Saint James Apt. Partners, supra note 22.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 428, 5 N.W.3d at 189.

- 17 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
appealable.” 27 As such, the 2021 findings and conclusions
cannot be said to have “dispose[d] of the . . . merits of the
case and [left] nothing” for the board’s consideration. 28 To
the contrary, insofar as penalties were not addressed in the
2021 findings and conclusions, the Hauxwells’ ground water
allocations remained unrestricted and the “status quo” was
“preserv[ed].” 29
We similarly reject the NRD’s argument that even if the
2021 findings and conclusions were not a final order, it was
still appealable under the NGWMPA. The NGWMPA permits
“[a]ny person aggrieved by any order” of a natural resources
district to appeal the order. 30 However, even assuming that we
were to construe “any order” as broadly as the NRD suggests,
the Hauxwells cannot be seen to have been “aggrieved” by the
2021 findings and conclusions that they violated the NRD’s
rules and regulations and the NGWMPA 31 so long as the pen-
alty for those violations remained to be determined.
As we have explained, persons are “aggrieved” for pur-
poses of the NGWMPA insofar as they have standing. 32
Common-law standing, in turn, generally focuses on whether
the litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact. 33 That
injury must be concrete in both a qualitative and a temporal
27 Daniel L. Real, Nebraska Appellate Practice and Procedure § 5:14 at 52
(2024).
28 Saint James Apt. Partners, supra note 22, 316 Neb. at 428, 5 N.W.3d at
189. See, also, Paxton v. Paxton, 314 Neb. 197, 989 N.W.2d 420 (2023);
Ginger Cove Common Area Co. v. Wiekhorst, 296 Neb. 416, 893 N.W.2d
467 (2017); Selma Development v. Great Western Bank, 285 Neb. 37, 825
N.W.2d 215 (2013).
29 Tilson v. Tilson, 299 Neb. 64, 75, 907 N.W.2d 31, 38 (2018).
30 § 46-750.
31 See id.
32 See, e.g., Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. North Platte NRD, 280 Neb.
533, 788 N.W.2d 252 (2010).
33 In re Application A-19594, 315 Neb. 311, 995 N.W.2d 655 (2023).

- 18 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
sense. 34 The complainant must allege an injury to itself that is
distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and the
alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. 35
The alleged harm to the Hauxwells, however, is not actual or
imminent. The NRD points to the fact that the Hauxwells were
found to have violated the NRD’s rules and regulations, even if
no penalties were imposed. The NRD also argues that natural
resources districts consider “[farmers’] history of compliance
. . . when evaluating eligibility for other NRD programs” and
“determining appropriate penalties for any future violations.” 36
But those harms are conjectural or hypothetical. 37
(c) Ruggles Farms Was Hauxwells’ Alter Ego
The NRD also argues that we lack jurisdiction to con-
sider the “[a]ssessment of [v]iolations and [p]enalties” as to
Ruggles Farms and properties owned by Ruggles Farms. 38 The
NRD claims that Ruggles Farms was “named” as a “potential
violator[]” in the 2021 complaint, that Ruggles Farms was
“found” in 2021 to have violated the NRD’s rules and regula-
tions, that Ruggles Farms was “notified” of the 2022 hearing,
and that the 2022 findings and conclusions “set forth penalties
for violations” by Ruggles Farms. 39 As such, the NRD argues
that because Ruggles Farms did not petition for review of the
2021 and 2022 findings and conclusions, the district court
lacked jurisdiction over the penalties as to it. The Hauxwells
take a different view, arguing that Ruggles Farms was “not
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Reply brief for appellants at 14.
37 See, e.g., In re Application A-18503, 286 Neb. 611, 838 N.W.2d 242
(2013); Frenchman-Cambridge Irr. Dist. v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 281 Neb.
992, 801 N.W.2d 253 (2011).
38 Brief for appellants at 25.
39 Id.

- 19 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
named as a party,” but instead was treated as the Hauxwells’
alter ego. 40
An alter ego is “[a] corporation used by an individual or
a subservient corporation in conducting personal business.” 41
Generally, we have discussed alter egos in equitable actions
seeking to “pierce the corporate veil” and impose liability on
an individual or subservient corporation for alleged fraud, ille-
gality, or injustice by the alter ego. 42 However, we have also
recognized alter egos in other contexts. 43
Based on the record on appeal, we agree with the Hauxwells
that Ruggles Farms was treated as their alter ego in these pro-
ceedings. This is not to say that there are not factors that could
be seen to support the view that Ruggles Farms was a separate
party. Most notably, counsel for the Hauxwells entered an
appearance on behalf of Ruggles Farms at the 2022 hearing.
However, the record as a whole shows that Ruggles Farms was
not treated as a separate party.
While the 2021 complaint was addressed to Ruggles Farms,
as well as the Hauxwells, and included separate spaces for
Bryan, Ami, and Ruggles Farms to sign the request for a hear-
ing, it was otherwise directed to the Hauxwells. It began by
advising the Hauxwells that they “both in [their] individual
capacities and in [their] capacities as owners, members, and/
or operators of Ruggles Farms” may have violated the NRD’s
rules and regulations and/or the NGWMPA. The complaint
then noted multiple violations, none of which were alleged to
have been committed by Ruggles Farms. Ruggles Farms was
40 Brief for appellees at 13.
41 Black’s Law Dictionary 94 (10th ed. 2014).
42 E.g., 407 N 117 Street v. Harper, 314 Neb. 843, 852, 993 N.W.2d 462,
471 (2023). See, e.g., Medlock v. Medlock, 263 Neb. 666, 642 N.W.2d 113
(2002).
43 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Amea R., 282 Neb. 751, 807 N.W.2d 736
(2011); Prochaska v. Douglas Cty., 260 Neb. 642, 619 N.W.2d 437 (2000);
Pratt v. Western Bridge & Construction Co., 116 Neb. 553, 218 N.W. 397
(1928).

- 20 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
not even mentioned in the letter that the NRD subsequently
sent to the Hauxwells regarding the violation of the cease-
and-desist order. Ruggles Farms did not appear personally
or through an attorney at the 2021 hearing, and evidence at
the 2021 hearing concerned violations on property owned by
Ruggles Farms.
Similarly, as to the 2022 hearing, the notices referenced
“Ruggles Farms, Inc./Bryan and Ami Hauxwell.” This could
be read to indicate violations by Ruggles Farms, as well as
the Hauxwells. However, the forward slash between “Ruggles
Farms, Inc.” and “Bryan and Ami Hauxwell” could be equally
understood to indicate the two were synonymous.
2. No Violation of Hauxwells’
Due Process Rights
Having found that we have jurisdiction over the present
matter, we next turn to the NRD’s argument that the district
court erred in finding that the Hauxwells’ due process rights
were violated because we find this argument to be dispositive.
The NRD assigns other errors; however, an appellate court is
not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to
adjudicate the case and controversy before it. 44
The NRD argues that the record shows that its counsel
and general manager participated in the board’s deliberations
after the 2020 hearing, and not after the 2021 hearing, as the
district court stated. Accordingly, the NRD argues that the
district court’s conclusion that the 2022 hearing was tainted
by this participation at the 2021 hearing was not supported
by the record. The Hauxwells, on the other hand, argue that
the district court’s reference to the 2021 hearing was merely
a typographical error and that the record supports the district
court’s finding that their due process rights were violated on
this and other grounds.
44 Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp, 317 Neb. 690, 11 N.W.3d 371 (2024).

- 21 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
[13-17] A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process. 45 A party appearing in an adjudication hearing
before an agency or tribunal is entitled to due process protec-
tions similar to those given litigants in a judicial proceed-
ing; this includes the right to a hearing before an impartial,
unbiased decisionmaker. 46 Rather than inquiring into whether
the judge or adjudicator is actually, subjectively biased, the
question is whether the average judge in his or her position
is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional
potential for bias. 47 Central to whether the average administra-
tive decisionmaker in a similar position is likely to be neutral
is the extent of separation between the investigative, prosecu-
torial, and adjudicative roles in the case. 48 In a criminal trial,
due process requires the strict separation of investigative,
prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions; in an administrative
proceeding, due process requires an adequate separation of
investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative roles. 49
[18] Recently, in Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part. v. Middle
Republican NRD, 50 we addressed the combination of prosecu-
torial and adjudicative roles. There, the attorneys who pros-
ecuted the cases against two landowners on behalf of a natural
resources district were also “included in the decisionmaking
process of the [b]oard to determine if those violations had
been proved.” 51 We agreed that this arrangement violated the
landowners’ due process rights. 52 In so finding, we recognized
45 Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part., supra note 6.
46 Id.
47 Id. See, also, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 195
L. Ed. 2d 132 (2016); Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868,
129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009).
48 Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part., supra note 6.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 615, 998 N.W.2d at 56.
52 Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part., supra note 6.

- 22 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
that decisionmakers are accorded a presumption of honesty and
integrity, and of being qualified, unbiased, and unprejudiced;
administrative adjudicators serve with the same presumption. 53
We also recognized that administrative procedures at the local
level have “traditionally been relaxed” as a “natural conse-
quence of limited resources in local government.” 54
[19,20] Nonetheless, we found that the differences between
the prosecutorial and adjudicative roles were such that the
probability of bias was too high to be constitutionally permis-
sible under the circumstances. 55 We reasoned that an admin-
istrative prosecutor or advocate, by definition, is partisan for
a particular client or point of view. 56 As such, we concluded
that generally, the role of prosecutor is inconsistent with true
objectivity, a constitutionally necessary characteristic of an
adjudicator. 57 We therefore found that the NRD “no longer
enjoyed the presumption of honesty and integrity.” 58 We simi-
larly found that notwithstanding the flexibility afforded to it,
the NRD “crossed the line by having its attorneys participate
in both the prosecution and adjudicatory process of the case.” 59
The parties here dispute the application of Uhrich & Brown
Ltd. Part. Ultimately, we find that Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part.
is distinguishable because there, the same persons played both
prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles at the same hearing where
the challenged resolutions were made. Here, in contrast, the
prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles were combined at a prior
hearing. This distinction is determinative.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 606, 998 N.W.2d at 51, 52.
55 See id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 615, 998 N.W.2d at 56.
59 Id. at 615, 998 N.W.2d at 57.

- 23 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
As other courts have found, the remedy for a violation of
procedural due process in an administrative hearing is gener-
ally a new hearing. 60 However, the Hauxwells were effec-
tively afforded a new hearing after the due process violation
at issue. After the 2020 hearing where the NRD’s counsel and
general manager participated in the board’s deliberations, the
NRD filed a new complaint and subsequently held hearings
on that complaint in 2021 and 2022. It is not alleged that the
NRD’s counsel or general manager participated in the delib-
erations at those later hearings.
Instead, the Hauxwells argue that a new hearing was insuf-
ficient to cure the due process violation because the new
hearing involved the same violations and was heard by many
of the same board members. The Hauxwells also point to
emails that board members exchanged with the NRD’s general
manager prior to the 2020 hearing. The Hauxwells claim that
those emails show that the board was biased against them.
Collectively, these arguments amount to a claim that the board
members had prejudged the matter. But, as commentators have
noted, prejudgment challenges “rarely succeed.” 61
For example, in Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 62 the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected a company’s claim that the Federal
Trade Commission (the Commission) had prejudged the issues,
was prejudiced and biased against the industry, and would not
give a fair hearing to the industry generally and the company
60 See, e.g., 624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Housing Authority, 193 N.E.3d 381
(Ind. 2022); State ex rel. Womack v. Sloan, 2017 Ohio 8708, 152 Ohio St.
3d 32, 92 N.E.3d 836 (2017); Hanig v. City of Winner, 692 N.W.2d 202
(S.D. 2005); Hartland Sportsmen’s Club v. Delafield, 393 Wis. 2d 496,
947 N.W.2d 214 (Wis. App. 2020); Hall v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 5th
792, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186 (2016); Dept. of Highway and Motor Veh. v.
Corcoran, 133 So. 3d 616 (Fla. App. 2014).
61 2 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 6:10 at 358 (3d
ed. 2010).
62 Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S. Ct. 793, 92 L. Ed.
1010 (1948).

- 24 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
in particular. The company pointed to the fact that before the
operative complaint was filed, members of the Commission
had issued reports and testified to Congress that the industry
engaged in unlawful practices. 63 The company maintained that
as a result of those statements, the Commission should have
been disqualified from hearing the complaint against it. 64 The
Court disagreed.
The Court reasoned that “the fact that the Commission
had [previously] entertained such views . . . did not neces-
sarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably
closed on the subject.” 65 The Court also reasoned that “[h]ad
the entire membership of the Commission [been] disqualified
in the proceedings against these respondents, [the] complaint
could not have been acted upon by the Commission or by any
other government agency.” 66 The Court found that such an
outcome would “to a large extent defeat” Congress’ purpose
in creating the Commission. 67 The Court further observed that
Congress had made no provision for such contingency. 68 “It
[had] not directed that the Commission disqualify itself under
any circumstances,” provided for substitute commissioners, or
authorized another government agency to hold hearings, make
findings, and issue cease-and-desist orders in these matters. 69
Subsequently, in Pangburn v. C. A. B., 70 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit took a similar view in a case
where a board that regulated aviation services was alleged to
have prejudged “a concrete and specific factual determina-
tion.” In that case, a pilot challenged the board’s order finding
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id., 333 U.S. at 701.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Pangburn v. C. A. B., 311 F.2d 349, 356 (1st Cir. 1962).

- 25 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
that the pilot’s negligence caused a crash and imposing pen-
alties. 71 The pilot argued that his due process rights had been
violated because prior to issuing the order, the board had
issued a public report fixing pilot error as the cause of the
crash. 72 The pilot claimed that the report’s issuance had pre-
cluded him from obtaining an impartial tribunal. 73
The appellate court rejected this claim. In so doing, the
court pointed to an earlier situation where the conclusion
that the board reached regarding a pilot was contrary to the
conclusion the board had previously reached in its accident
report, with the apparent implication that this showed that
adjudicators’ minds are not irrevocably closed. 74 The court also
reasoned that the board would be unable to fulfill its statutory
duties to adjudicate pilots’ cases and prepare accident reports
under the pilot’s theory. 75 As such, the court concluded that
“the mere fact that a tribunal has had contact with a particular
factual complex in a prior hearing, or indeed has taken a public
position on the facts,” was not “enough to place that tribunal
under a constitutional inhibition to pass upon the facts in a
subsequent hearing.” 76 Instead, “more is required.” 77
Under the reasoning of Cement Institute and Pangburn, the
Hauxwells’ due process rights cannot be seen to have been
violated here. The Hauxwells’ argument to the contrary is
ultimately that the board members’ minds were “irrevocably
closed” because of their prior comments and counsel’s par-
ticipation in the board’s deliberations after the 2020 hearing.
However, as explained in Cement Institute and illustrated in
Pangburn, this view is untenable, particularly in light of the
71 Pangburn, supra note 70.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 358.
77 Id.

- 26 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
presumption of honesty and integrity afforded to decision-
makers. 78 We also observe that like in Cement Institute and
Pangburn, the board in this case would have been disquali-
fied from performing its statutory duties under the Hauxwells’
theory. 79 At the hearing, the Hauxwells admitted to viola-
tions of the NRD’s rules and regulations and the NGWMPA,
although they disputed whether the violations were knowing
and willful. The NGWMPA tasks natural resources districts
with enforcing such violations. 80 And as the NRD argues, there
are no provisions for the board to “delegat[e] [its] responsibili-
ties to another panel or to other individuals.” 81
Because 	we 	disagree 	with 	the 	district 	court 	that 	the
Hauxwells’ due process rights were violated under the facts
and circumstances of this case, we reverse the district court’s
order and remand the cause to the district court with direc-
tions to rule on the other claims in the Hauxwells’ petition for
review. The district court indicated that it had reviewed those
claims de novo on the record but that it addressed only the
Hauxwells’ due process claim because it found that claim to
be dispositive.
In 	reversing 	and 	remanding, 	we 	are 	cognizant 	of 	the
Hauxwells’ argument that we could affirm the district court’s
order based on other alleged violations of their due process
78 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 61 S. Ct. 999 85
L. Ed. 1429 (1941) (adjudicators “assumed to be men of conscience and
intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on
the basis of its own circumstances”).
79 Cf., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d
392 (1980) (common-law “Rule of Necessity,” under which judge—even
though he or she has interest in case—has duty to hear and decide case
if it cannot otherwise be heard, prevails over disqualification standards);
Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351, 357 (10th Cir. 1936) (“disqualification
will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the
premises”).
80 See, e.g., § 46-707(1)(h) (issuance of cease-and-desist orders); § 46-746
(imposition of penalties).
81 Reply brief for appellants at 13.

- 27 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 1
rights. An appellate court has the discretion to affirm, as it
deems appropriate, a correct result that was reached below for
the wrong reason. 82 However, in our discretion, we find it bet-
ter to have the district court rule on the Hauxwells’ alternative
arguments in the first instance, and we express no view on the
merits of those arguments at this time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The parties’ challenges to our jurisdiction are without merit.
However, the district court incorrectly found that the violation
of the Hauxwells’ due process rights at a prior hearing before
the NRD board tainted the subsequent hearings. Accordingly,
we reverse the order of the district court and remand the cause
to the district court with directions as set forth above.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
82 State v. Jones, 317 Neb. 559, 10 N.W.3d 747 (2024).