State v. Strawn

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
John G. Strawn, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 2, 2025. 	No. S-24-402.
1. Courts: Appeal and Error. Both the district court and a higher appel-
late court generally review appeals from the county court for error
appearing on the record.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the deci-
sion conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is
neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
3. Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently reviews questions
of law in appeals from the county court.
4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question
of law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
5. Convicted Sex Offender: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will
affirm a court’s ruling that a defendant must register under the Sex
Offender Registration Act if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found with a
firm conviction that the crime involved sexual contact.
Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County, Nathan
B. Cox, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for
Sarpy County, PaTricia A. Freeman, Judge. Judgment of
District Court affirmed.
Liam K. Meehan, of Higgins Law, for appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, Attorney 	General, 	and 	Melissa 	R.
Vincent for appellee.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:18 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
Funke, 	C.J., 	Miller-Lerman, 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik,
Freudenberg, and Bergevin, JJ.
Papik, J.
John G. Strawn entered into an agreement to plead no
contest to two counts of third degree assault. Pursuant to the
plea agreement, the State made no mention of sexual contact
when providing a factual basis for the charges at the plea hear-
ing. Based on information in the presentence investigation
report (PSR), however, the county court found that Strawn
had subjected a victim to sexual contact and ordered him
to register as a sex offender under Nebraska’s Sex Offender
Registration Act (SORA). Strawn appealed to the district court,
primarily challenging the county court’s determination that he
was required to register as a sex offender. The district court
rejected Strawn’s arguments and affirmed the judgment of the
county court. Strawn now appeals to us. Finding no merit to
his arguments, we too affirm.
BACKGROUND
Initial Charges and Plea Hearing.
Strawn was initially charged in county court with one count
of third degree sexual assault, one count of disturbing the
peace, one count of third degree assault, and one count of
third degree domestic assault. The State alleged in its initial
complaint that the victim of the third degree sexual assault
charge and the third degree assault charges was “J.B.” and
that the victim of the third degree domestic assault charge was
Dorine Blodgett.
Strawn and the State eventually entered into a plea agree-
ment. Under the plea agreement, Strawn agreed to enter no
contest pleas to two counts of third degree domestic assault.
The State agreed to dismiss the other charges.
At a plea hearing, the county court, prior to accepting
Strawn’s pleas, stated on the record that the parties had also
agreed that the factual basis provided by the State “would
not contain any element of a sexual assault, including any

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
evidence of sexual contact.” The county court stated that
such a factual basis on its own would not require that Strawn
register as a sex offender under SORA. The county court
advised Strawn, however, that if the PSR included evidence
“that might suggest you have to register [as a sex offender],
that could be a component of . . . the Court’s determination
based on your plea in this case.” The county court additionally
advised Strawn that it would make a determination regarding
Strawn’s obligation to register as a sex offender at the time
of sentencing. Strawn stated on the record that he understood.
Consistent with the plea agreement, Strawn entered no con-
test pleas to two counts of third degree assault. When asked to
provide a factual basis for the charges, the prosecutor stated
that on or about June 10, 2022, Strawn and a victim identi-
fied as “J.D.” “were involved in a physical event” and that
afterward, Strawn “further threaten[ed] J.D. by threatening to
contact her probation officer to ruin her involvement in [d]rug
[c]ourt.” Although the prosecutor referred to the victim as
“J.D.,” there appears to be no dispute that the prosecutor was
referring to the person identified as J.B. in the complaint. We
will thus refer to the victim as “J.B.” in this opinion.
The prosecutor continued by stating that on or about June
12, 2022, Blodgett confronted Strawn regarding the prior
incident and that an argument ensued in which Strawn told
Blodgett, “‘I will dig you right down and put you in the
ground.’” When asked if there was any objection to the factual
basis, Strawn’s counsel responded that he had “[n]o comment
on the State’s factual basis.”
The county court accepted Strawn’s no contest pleas and
found him guilty of the two counts of third degree assault.
The county court ordered the preparation of the PSR and
scheduled a subsequent sentencing hearing.
Sentencing Hearing.
A few days prior to the scheduled sentencing hearing, Strawn
filed a brief arguing that, under SORA, the county court could
not order him to register as a sex offender. The brief took

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
the position that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B)
(Cum. Supp. 2020), Strawn could be ordered to register based
on his conviction for third degree assault only if there was
evidence of sexual penetration or sexual contact in both the
factual basis provided by the State and the PSR. Because there
was no reference to sexual penetration or sexual contact in the
factual basis provided at the plea hearing, Strawn argued, he
was not subject to SORA registration.
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the county court
noted that the PSR had been prepared and would be made a
part of the record for sentencing purposes. At the request of
Strawn’s counsel, the county court incorporated, as part of
the PSR, a sentencing memorandum with attached exhibits
prepared by Strawn’s counsel. The sentencing memorandum
included, among other things, additional argument that the
county court should not require Strawn to register as a sex
offender. Both the State and counsel for Strawn stated that they
did not have any other additions or corrections to the PSR.
The PSR included police reports summarizing a statement
J.B. made to police regarding her interactions with Strawn
on June 10, 2022. At that time, Strawn was dating and living
with Blodgett, J.B.’s mother. J.B. informed police that she was
staying at Strawn and Blodgett’s residence and that, during the
early morning hours, she was awakened by Strawn touching
her hair and forcefully kissing her. Later, J.B. reported, Strawn
grabbed her from behind so that she could feel his erect penis
on her backside. She eventually pushed him off and ran into a
bathroom and locked the door. The PSR also included a police
report regarding an officer’s conversation with J.B.’s brother-
in-law. J.B.’s brother-in-law reported to police that the day
after the incident, J.B. came to his place of work and discussed
the incident with him, and that she was visibly shaking and
appeared traumatized by the incident. He also reported that
while they were talking, Strawn called J.B. several times, and
that, when J.B. eventually answered on speakerphone, Strawn
said that “‘what happened last night won’t happen again.’”

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
After discussing the PSR with counsel for the parties, the
county court then stated there were two preliminary matters it
would address before pronouncing Strawn’s sentences. First,
the county court stated that it was required to notify Strawn
that because he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, “it may be unlawful for you to purchase or
possess a firearm” under federal law. The county court stated
that if Strawn had questions about whether federal law made
it illegal for him to purchase or possess a firearm, he should
speak with an attorney.
The county court stated it would next address whether
Strawn would be required to register as a sex offender under
SORA. The county court observed that it had informed Strawn
at the plea hearing that it would determine at sentencing
whether he would be required to register and also noted that
Strawn’s sentencing memorandum had addressed the issue.
The county court then asked the State if it wished to offer
argument on whether Strawn should be required to register.
The prosecutor responded that, pursuant to the plea agree-
ment, the State would not take a position on registration under
SORA. When the county court then asked Strawn’s counsel if
she had “any further arguments or comments” on the registra-
tion issue, counsel repeated the argument made in the sentenc-
ing brief and memorandum that under § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B),
Strawn could not be ordered to register because there was no
evidence of sexual penetration or sexual contact in the fac-
tual basis provided by the State at the plea hearing. Strawn’s
counsel also argued that Strawn should not be required to reg-
ister because a psychosexual evaluation had shown that there
was a low risk that he would reoffend.
Following argument by Strawn’s counsel, the county court
explained that it disagreed with Strawn’s contention that with-
out reference to sexual penetration or sexual contact in the
factual basis, he could not be required to register under
SORA. The county court went on to explain that while the fac-
tual basis did not refer to sexual penetration or sexual contact,

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
the PSR included information that on June 10, 2022, Strawn
had engaged in conduct that met the definition of sexual con-
tact under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318 (Cum. Supp. 2024), and
that it would therefore require Strawn to register under SORA.
The county court then gave the State and counsel for
Strawn the opportunity to make arguments regarding sentenc-
ing. Strawn declined the opportunity to comment. The county
court proceeded to impose sentences for Strawn’s convictions.
It sentenced Strawn to 24 months of probation with various
conditions, including a 60-day period of confinement in the
county jail.
Strawn appealed to the district court.
District Court Appeal.
Strawn filed a statement of errors in the district court. In
it, he asserted that the county court erred (1) by finding that
SORA registration could be required when there was no ref-
erence to sexual penetration or sexual contact in the factual
basis for the plea, (2) by finding that registration was required
without a specific finding that the victims were credible, (3)
by ordering SORA registration without affording him proce-
dural due process, and (4) by determining Strawn was subject
to notice of the federal firearm prohibition under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9) (2018).
The district court accepted briefs from the parties regarding
the issues presented on appeal and then issued a written opin-
ion. The district court rejected each of Strawn’s arguments and
affirmed the judgment of the county court.
Strawn appealed again and filed a petition to bypass the
Nebraska Court of Appeals. We granted the petition to bypass.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Strawn assigns four errors on appeal, three pertaining to
the county court’s order that he register as a sex offender
under SORA and one regarding the county court’s advisement
that his conviction may result in federal law prohibiting him
from possessing or purchasing firearms. Each of Strawn’s

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
assignments of error is phrased in terms of errors he asserts
the county court made, as opposed to errors made by the
district court on appeal. Although it would have been more
precise in this appeal for Strawn to assign error to the district
court’s affirmance of the county court’s judgment, his assign-
ments are sufficient to advise us of the issues submitted for
decision and are thus reviewable. See State v. Jennings, 308
Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (2021).
With respect to SORA registration, Strawn assigns the
county court erred (1) by determining that he could be
required to register even though the factual basis did not refer
to sexual penetration or sexual contact, (2) by requiring him
to register without making a specific credibility finding, and
(3) by denying him procedural due process. As to the firearms
advisement, Strawn assigns that the county court erred by
“subjecting [him] to the federal firearm prohibition.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-3] Both the district court and a higher appellate court gen-
erally review appeals from the county court for error appear-
ing on the record. State v. Avey, 288 Neb. 233, 846 N.W.2d
662 (2014). When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing
on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the deci-
sion conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence,
and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Id. An
appellate court independently reviews questions of law in
appeals from the county court. Id.
[4] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. State
v. Strong, ante p. 525, 17 N.W.3d 170 (2025).
ANALYSIS
Absence of Evidence of Sexual
Contact in Factual Basis.
Before the county court, the district court, and now before
us, Strawn has consistently argued that, because the State
made no mention of sexual penetration or sexual contact when

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
asked to provide a factual basis for the charges to which he
had agreed to plead no contest, the county court could not
order him to register under SORA. Strawn claims both the
text of SORA and our opinion in State v. Norman, 282 Neb.
990, 808 N.W.2d 48 (2012) (Norman I), compel this outcome.
Neither does.
As we have previously explained, SORA provides that
persons 	convicted 	of 	certain 	listed 	offenses 	that 	are 	not
necessarily sexual in nature can nonetheless be required to
register. See id. Relevant to this case, third degree assault
is among the offenses that fall into that category, though
§ 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) provides a limitation as to when regis-
tration is required for individuals convicted of such offenses.
Under § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B), in order for SORA to apply to
such offenses, “a court shall have found that evidence of sex-
ual penetration or sexual contact, as those terms are defined in
section 28-318, was present in the record, which shall include
consideration of the factual basis for a plea-based conviction
and information contained in the presentence report.”
Strawn reads this language to provide that a person can be
ordered to register based on a plea-based conviction for third
degree assault only if there is evidence of sexual penetration
or sexual contact in both the factual basis provided at the plea
hearing and in a PSR. He emphasizes that the word “and”
separates “the factual basis for a plea-based conviction” and
“information contained in the presentence report.” Pointing to
a case from this court, he argues that the use of the word “and”
signifies a “conjunctive list.” See In re Interest of Levanta S.,
295 Neb. 151, 167, 887 N.W.2d 502, 514 (2016).
We agree with Strawn about the meaning of the word “and”
in this context but disagree with his reading of the provision
as a whole. The text of § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) does not state
that the trial court must find sexual penetration or sexual con-
tact in both the factual basis and the PSR. It says the court
must find sexual penetration or sexual contact “in the record.”
§ 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) (emphasis supplied). The language goes

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
on to clarify that the record the trial court must consider in
determining whether the defendant engaged in sexual penetra-
tion or sexual contact includes the factual basis and the PSR.
The effect of the conjunctive “and” in this context is to direct
trial courts to consider both the factual basis and the PSR
when determining whether an offense involved sexual pen-
etration or sexual contact. It does not condition a registration
obligation on evidence of sexual penetration or sexual contact
being found in both the factual basis and the PSR. Strawn’s
argument asks us to read meaning into the statute that is not
reflected in its text, contrary to our well-established principles
of statutory interpretation. See State v. Clausen, ante p. 375,
385, 15 N.W.3d 858, 866 (2025) (“[a]s we often say, it is not
within the province of the courts to read meaning into a stat-
ute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of
a statute”).
Strawn’s reliance on Norman I is also unavailing. In that
case, the defendant also entered a no contest plea to a third
degree assault charge. Following a sentencing hearing dur-
ing which both the State and the defendant offered evidence
relevant to SORA registration, the trial court ordered the
defendant to register under SORA. In explaining that ruling,
however, the trial judge stated that he was requiring registra-
tion based on statements in the factual basis offered at the
plea hearing alone. The defendant later appealed and argued
that the trial court denied him procedural due process. We
agreed with the defendant, finding that the trial court denied
the defendant procedural due process “when it ignored the
evidentiary record and instead based its decision” as to SORA
registration “solely on the State’s assertion of sexual contact
in the factual basis for the plea.” Norman I, 282 Neb. at 1011,
808 N.W.2d at 65. Contrary to Strawn’s contention otherwise,
our reversal in Norman I was premised on the district court’s
decision to ignore evidence introduced at the sentencing hear-
ing, not on any requirement in § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) that
there be evidence of sexual penetration or sexual contact in

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
both the factual basis and the PSR. Strawn’s first assignment
of error is meritless.
Absence of Specific Credibility Finding.
Strawn next contends that the county court erred by requir-
ing that he register under SORA without making a specific
finding that the victims of the assaults to which he entered no
contest pleas were credible. Although the county court stated
at the sentencing hearing that it had “an obligation to con-
sider credibility of the information” contained within the PSR,
Strawn apparently takes the position that the county court was
obligated to make an express finding that information within
the PSR was provided by credible individuals. We disagree.
Strawn points to no source of authority that supports his
argument that the county court was required to make express
findings of credibility. In Norman I, this court determined what
must be shown in order for a defendant convicted of an offense
covered by § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B) to be subject to SORA’s
registration requirements. There, we said that registration is
required if the trial court “make[s] a finding, based on clear
and convincing evidence, [that] the defendant committed an act
of sexual penetration or sexual contact related to the incident
that gave rise to the defendant’s conviction.” Norman I, 282
Neb. at 1011, 808 N.W.2d at 65. We said nothing that would
suggest that trial courts must make an express credibility find-
ing before requiring a defendant to register.
To the extent Strawn more broadly argues that the district
court erred by finding that he committed an act of sexual
contact, we also must disagree. A prior decision of this court
establishes how appellate courts are to analyze such challenges.
After we reversed the district court’s initial registration order
in Norman I, we remanded the cause to the district court. On
remand, the district court again ordered the defendant to reg-
ister under SORA, and the defendant again appealed to us,
arguing that the district court erred by finding that his crime
involved sexual contact. See State v. Norman, 285 Neb. 72, 824
N.W.2d 739 (2013) (Norman II).

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
[5] In Norman II, we determined that when a defendant
challenges a trial court’s finding that a defendant engaged in
sexual penetration or sexual contact for purposes of SORA
registration, appellate courts should review under a sufficiency
of the evidence standard, but one that incorporates the clear
and convincing evidence quantum of proof. Accordingly, an
appellate court will affirm a court’s ruling that a defendant
must register under SORA if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have
found with a firm conviction that the crime involved sexual
contact. Norman II, supra.
Under this standard of review, Strawn cannot show that the
county court erred by ordering him to register under SORA.
Strawn does not argue that the PSR lacked any evidence that
he subjected J.B. to sexual contact. Indeed, Strawn’s counsel
admitted at oral argument that he was not disputing that J.B.’s
account of the incident reflected in police reports within the
PSR, if true, would meet the statutory definition of sexual
contact. Instead, Strawn argues only that J.B.’s allegations
lacked credibility.
Strawn’s attack on J.B.’s credibility is not the stuff of a
successful sufficiency of the evidence challenge. When a
party argues that there was insufficient evidence, we often
emphasize that an appellate court “does not resolve con-
flicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or
reweigh the evidence.” See, e.g., State v. Perry, ante p. 613,
619, 17 N.W.3d 504, 510 (2025) (emphasis supplied). And
we made clear in Norman II that challenges to determinations
that a defendant engaged in sexual contact for purposes of
SORA registration are to be reviewed like other sufficiency
of the evidence challenges. Norman II, 285 Neb. at 76, 824
N.W.2d at 743 (“[a]nd, as with any sufficiency claim, . . . we
do not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibil-
ity of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
Strawn argues that other language in our opinion in Norman
II indicates that this court can and should independently assess
the credibility of J.B.’s account even while analyzing the suf-
ficiency of the evidence. In Norman II, after we had concluded
that there was sufficient evidence of sexual contact, the opin-
ion went on to “express one final note on the issue of credibil-
ity.” 282 Neb. at 79, 824 N.W.2d at 744. There, we said that
“one could argue” that the trial court in Norman II could not
have made a credibility determination regarding the account
of a victim who did not testify before the trial court or that
an appellate court “would not necessarily be required to defer
to such a credibility determination because the [trial] court
had the same evidence before it as we do—that being a cold
record.” 282 Neb. at 79, 824 N.W.2d at 744-45. To the extent
this dicta suggests that appellate courts may independently
assess credibility when a defendant challenges a trial court’s
finding that a defendant engaged in sexual penetration or sex-
ual contact for purposes of SORA registration, it is inconsistent
with the holding of the case and it is disapproved.
In any event, in this case other information in the PSR—such
as the information reported to police by J.B.’s brother-in-law—
tended to corroborate J.B.’s allegations regarding Strawn’s con-
duct on June 10, 2022. We conclude that the information in the
PSR, taken together, could lead a rational trier of fact to have
found with a firm conviction that Strawn subjected J.B. to sex-
ual contact. Strawn’s second assignment of error is meritless.
Procedural Due Process.
Strawn challenges the county court’s SORA registration
requirement in one other respect: He argues that he was denied
procedural due process. Once again, one of our Norman opin-
ions provides guidance as to how this challenge should be
analyzed.
In Norman I, we found that SORA registration implicates
a liberty interest of the defendant and therefore certain pro-
cedural safeguards are required before registration can be
ordered pursuant to § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B). In particular, we

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held that before a defendant can be ordered to register pur-
suant to § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(B), the trial court must give the
defendant notice that SORA registration is being considered
and that a hearing will be held; that the trial court must then
hold a hearing at which the defendant has the opportunity to
dispute evidence in the record regarding sexual penetration or
sexual contact; and that the trial court must finally determine
whether the defendant subjected the victim to sexual penetra-
tion or sexual contact based on evidence adduced at the hear-
ing, as well as the factual basis and the PSR.
Here, Strawn acknowledges that the county court provided
him with notice that SORA registration was a possibility. He
also concedes that a hearing was provided at sentencing regard-
ing SORA registration. He argues, however, that the county
court erred by determining that he was required to register
under SORA before considering sentencing arguments made by
his counsel later in the sentencing hearing.
We can discern no violation of Strawn’s right to procedural
due process. As Strawn concedes, the county court provided
him with notice that SORA registration was under consider-
ation and that the issue would be resolved at the sentencing
hearing. Prior to that hearing, the county court received a
brief and a sentencing memorandum addressing SORA reg-
istration that were submitted by Strawn’s counsel. Then, at
the sentencing hearing, Strawn’s counsel repeated arguments
against SORA registration that were made in the brief and
sentencing memorandum. And while Strawn’s counsel made
additional arguments regarding sentencing later in the hearing,
the county court did nothing to prevent counsel from making
arguments relevant to SORA registration while the registra-
tion issue was under consideration. The county court afforded
Strawn procedural due process.
Firearms Advisement.
Strawn’s final assignment of error requires little discus-
sion. As mentioned above, Strawn argues that the county court
erred by “subjecting” him to a federal firearms prohibition.

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STATE v. STRAWN
Cite as 318 Neb. 859
The county court did no such thing. The county court advised
Strawn that as a result of his convictions, “it may be unlaw-
ful” for him to purchase or possess firearms under federal law
and suggested that if he had questions about that issue, he
should consult with an attorney. Even if, as Strawn contends
on appeal, his convictions do not qualify as a “misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence,” for purposes of the federal fire-
arms restriction set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the district
court’s advisement imposed no firearms prohibition.
CONCLUSION
Because Strawn’s assignments of error are without merit,
we affirm.
Affirmed.