State v. Jones

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Keloni Jones, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed April 24, 2025. 	No. S-24-618.
1. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews questions of
law independently of the lower court’s conclusion.
2. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial
court, an appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits.
3. Sentences: Time. A sentence validly imposed takes effect from the time
it is pronounced.
4. Sentences. When a valid sentence has been put into execution, the trial
court cannot modify, amend, or revise it in any way, either during or
after the term or session of court at which the sentence was imposed.
5. Sentences: Judges: Records. The circumstances under which a judge
may correct an inadvertent mispronouncement of a sentence are limited
to those instances in which it is clear that the defendant has not left the
courtroom; it is obvious that the judge, in correcting his or her language,
did not change in any manner the sentence originally intended; and no
written notation of the inadvertently mispronounced sentence was made
in the records of the court.
6. Sentences: Jurisdiction: Time. When a sentencing court pronounces an
invalid or erroneous sentence, it can correct the error while it still has
jurisdiction.
7. Sentences: Appeal and Error. When a sentencing error is noted on
direct appeal, an appellate court can modify the sentence. Alternatively,
an appellate court can vacate an invalid or erroneous sentence and
remand a cause to the sentencing court for imposition of a lawful
sentence.
8. Sentences: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Where the sentencing
court had jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction
over the crime for which the defendant was sentenced, the sentencing
court cannot modify a sentence after a direct appeal has concluded.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:21 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
9. Postconviction: Sentences: Appeal and Error. The holding in State
v. Davis, 317 Neb. 59, 8 N.W.3d 247 (2024), is limited to a situation
where (1) the pronouncement and written confirmation of an invalid
minimum term under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2204(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024)
is not raised to the sentencing court or to an appellate court, or otherwise
addressed before the sentence becomes final; (2) a postconviction court
erroneously finds the sentence to be void; (3) no appeal is taken from
that erroneous finding; and (4) the postconviction court then purports to
impose a new sentence.
10. Sentences: Appeal and Error. When sentences imposed within statu-
tory limits are alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court
must determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in
considering well-established factors and any applicable legal principles.
11. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists
only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable,
unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just
result in matters submitted for disposition.
12. Sentences. When imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge should con-
sider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experi-
ence, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or
record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as
well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence
involved in the commission of the crime.
13. ____. A sentencing court is not limited to any mathematically applied
set of factors, but the appropriateness of the sentence is necessarily a
subjective judgment that includes the sentencing judge’s observations
of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the defendant’s life.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: LeAnne
M. Srb, Judge. Affirmed.
Keith Dornan and Stuart J. Dornan, of Dornan, Troia,
Howard, Breitkreutz, Dahlquest & Klein, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss
for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Miller-Lerman, 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik,
Freudenberg, and Bergevin, JJ.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
Cassel, J.
INTRODUCTION
In this direct appeal, Keloni Jones challenges the district
court’s modification of a sentence it originally pronounced—
but orally altered hours later—and the excessiveness of the
sentences. Because as originally pronounced, one of the sen-
tences contained an invalid minimum term, so the sentenc-
ing court could modify it while it still had jurisdiction. And
because the sentences of imprisonment were within statutory
limits and were not clearly untenable, we affirm them.
BACKGROUND
Charges and Pleas
The State originally charged Jones with second degree mur-
der, a Class IB felony, and use of a deadly weapon (firearm) to
commit a felony, a Class IC felony. Pursuant to a plea agree-
ment, the State filed an amended information charging Jones
with manslaughter, a Class IIA felony, and possession of a
deadly weapon (firearm) during the commission of a felony,
a Class II felony. Jones entered pleas of no contest to the
charges in the amended information.
The State provided a factual basis to support the pleas.
According to the prosecutor, Jones was involved in an alterca-
tion outside of a bar in Omaha, Nebraska, on May 7, 2023.
A security guard at the bar broke up the altercation. At some
point, Jones withdrew a weapon from her purse and fired one
round into the guard’s chest, killing him. The court accepted
Jones’ pleas and found her guilty of both charges.
Sentencing
During a sentencing hearing, the district court orally pro-
nounced sentences of 20 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the
manslaughter conviction and 20 to 20 years’ imprisonment
plus 1 day for the possession of a deadly weapon conviction.
The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively and
gave Jones credit for 450 days of time served. No objections
were raised concerning the sentences. The court remanded

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STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
Jones to the custody of the sheriff and adjourned the sentenc-
ing hearing.
Some 3 hours later, the court reconvened counsel and Jones
for a hearing. The court stated that it wished to “correct an
inadvertent mispronouncement of the sentence that [it] origi-
nally intended to pronounce.” The trial judge explained the
situation as follows:
[A]s soon as the Court realized that the sentence I pro-
nounced was inadvertently not correct, by that time . . .
Jones was already taken from the courtroom because of
everything going on. The Sheriffs have a job that they
have to do and they had to take her immediately down
to the Correctional Center, so she wasn’t even in the
building when the Court called up to see if she could be
brought back to the courtroom.
And I say that because I would have just handled this
pretty much immediately had [I] not had other things
going on. Once I stepped back into my chambers and
realized that I had inadvertently mispronounced the sen-
tence, I had not yet made it a part of the written record.
Nothing’s been filed in this case and the sentence I
imposed did state — verbally I did state what I intended
the sentence to be, so I wanted to point that out.
So at this time I am going to find it appropriate to
reimpose the sentence upon you . . . .
The court modified the sentence for manslaughter to a term
of imprisonment of 19 years 364 days to 20 years. It gave
credit for the 450 days that Jones served toward that sentence.
For the possession of a deadly weapon conviction, the court
imposed the same sentence that it previously pronounced, i.e.,
a term of imprisonment of 20 years to 20 years plus 1 day, to
run consecutive to the sentence for manslaughter.
Jones appealed, and we granted the State’s petition to bypass
review by the Nebraska Court of Appeals. 1
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Cum. Supp. 2024).

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STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Jones assigns three errors related to sentencing. She alleges
that the district court (1) erred in modifying a valid sentence,
(2) erred in applying the doctrine of inadvertent mispronounce-
ment, and (3) abused its discretion by imposing excessive
prison sentences.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] This appeal presents a question of law. An appellate
court reviews questions of law independently of the lower
court’s conclusion. 2
[2] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, an appel-
late court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statu-
tory limits. 3
ANALYSIS
Before delving into Jones’ assignments of error, we pro-
vide context to understand her arguments. First, we set forth
statutory provisions concerning the minimum and maximum
terms for the felonies to which Jones pled no contest. Next,
we review case law touching on a court’s ability to change a
sentence it has pronounced. Then, we discuss our recent deci-
sion in State v. Davis. 4
Sentences for Class II and
Class IIA Felonies
We begin with the statutory requirements for a Class II
felony and a Class IIA felony. Two sentencing statutes are
important.
The first sentencing statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105(1)
(Cum. Supp. 2024), sets forth penalties for the 10 classes of
felonies. A Class II felony is punishable by a minimum term
of 1 year’s imprisonment and a maximum term of 50 years’
2 State v. Geller, ante p. 441, 16 N.W.3d 365 (2025).
3 Id.
4 State v. Davis, 317 Neb. 59, 8 N.W.3d 247 (2024).

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STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
imprisonment. 5 For a Class IIA felony, there is no minimum
term, and the maximum term is 20 years’ imprisonment. 6
The second statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2204(1) (Cum.
Supp. 2024), provides additional requirements for the mini-
mum and maximum terms of a sentence for certain classes of
felonies, including Class II and Class IIA felonies. It provides,
in relevant part:
The maximum term shall not be greater than the maxi-
mum limit provided by law, and:
(a) The minimum term fixed by the court shall be any
term of years less than the maximum term imposed by the
court; or
(b) The minimum term shall be the minimum limit
provided by law. 7
With these statutes in mind, we examine the sentences origi-
nally pronounced by the district court. For the Class II felony
of possession of a deadly weapon (firearm) during the com-
mission of a felony, the court pronounced a sentence of 20 to
20 years’ imprisonment plus 1 day. The sentence is within the
statutory range of § 28-105 and complies with § 29-2204(1)(a).
It is a valid sentence.
For the Class IIA felony of manslaughter, the court orally
pronounced a sentence of 20 to 20 years’ imprisonment. It
is within the statutory range of § 28-105(1), but it does not
comply with § 29-2204(1) because the minimum term was not
less than the maximum term, nor was it the minimum provided
by law, i.e., no imprisonment. Thus, the sentence contains an
invalid minimum term.
The district court realized that the latter sentence was
invalid. After Jones had left the courtroom, but before a writ-
ten sentencing order had been entered on the court’s records,
the court recalled counsel and Jones to alter the sentence it
5 See § 28-105(1).
6 See id.
7 § 29-2204(1).

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STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
had imposed for manslaughter. We turn to our case law on a
court’s ability to modify a sentence.
Case Law on Modifying
Pronounced Sentence
Several factors play into whether a sentencing court may
modify a sentence it has pronounced. Those factors include
whether the court imposed a valid sentence, whether the court
inadvertently mispronounced the sentence, and whether the
court imposed an invalid sentence.
[3,4] A sentence validly imposed takes effect from the time
it is pronounced. 8 When a valid sentence has been put into
execution, the trial court cannot modify, amend, or revise it in
any way, either during or after the term or session of court at
which the sentence was imposed. 9 Any attempt to modify it is
of no effect, and the original sentence remains in force. 10
[5] There are limited circumstances when a sentencing judge
may correct a mispronounced sentence, even if that sentence
was otherwise valid. The circumstances under which a judge
may correct an inadvertent mispronouncement of a sentence
are limited to those instances in which it is clear that the
defendant has not left the courtroom; it is obvious that the
judge, in correcting his or her language, did not change in any
manner the sentence originally intended; and no written nota-
tion of the inadvertently mispronounced sentence was made in
the records of the court. 11
[6] When a sentencing court pronounces an invalid or
erroneous sentence, it can correct the error while it still has
jurisdiction. 12 Long ago, we stated that “[t]he general rule is
that if the original sentence is invalid, it is of no effect and the
8 State v. Geller, supra note 2.
9 Id.
10 See State v. Lessley, 301 Neb. 734, 919 N.W.2d 884 (2018).
11 State v. Geller, supra note 2.
12 See State v. Shelby, 194 Neb. 445, 232 N.W.2d 23 (1975). See, also, State
v. Beverlin, 244 Neb. 615, 508 N.W.2d 271 (1993).

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STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
court may then impose any sentence which could have been
validly imposed in the first place.” 13 In State v. Lessley, 14 the
court imposed an invalid sentence of 20 to 20 years’ imprison-
ment for a Class II felony. After a discussion with counsel, the
court added 1 day’s imprisonment to the maximum term. On
direct appeal, we determined that because the sentence of 20
to 20 years’ imprisonment was invalid, it was subject to modi-
fication. We thus affirmed the modified sentence of 20 to 20
years’ imprisonment plus 1 day.
[7] Similarly, when a sentencing error is noted on direct
appeal, 	an 	appellate 	court 	can 	modify 	the 	sentence. 15
Alternatively, an appellate court can vacate an invalid or erro-
neous sentence and remand a cause to the sentencing court for
imposition of a lawful sentence. 16
[8] But where the sentencing court had jurisdiction over the
defendant and subject matter jurisdiction over the crime for
which the defendant was sentenced, the sentencing court can-
not modify a sentence after a direct appeal has concluded. 17
When a judgment is attacked in a way other than by proceed-
ing in the original action to have it vacated, reversed, or modi-
fied, or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement,
the attack is a collateral attack. 18 Absent an explicit statutory
or common-law procedure permitting otherwise, only a void
13 State v. Blankenship, 195 Neb. 329, 331, 237 N.W.2d 868, 869 (1976).
14 State v. Lessley, supra note 10.
15 See, e.g., State v. Rivera-Meister, ante p. 164, 14 N.W.3d 1 (2024); State
v. Gleaton, 316 Neb. 114, 3 N.W.3d 334 (2024); State v. Mabior, 314 Neb.
932, 994 N.W.2d 65 (2023), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 1073,
218 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2024); State v. Samayoa, 292 Neb. 334, 873 N.W.2d
449 (2015); State v. Williams, 282 Neb. 182, 802 N.W.2d 421 (2011).
16 See, e.g., State v. Guzman, 305 Neb. 376, 940 N.W.2d 552 (2020); State
v. Kantaras, 294 Neb. 960, 885 N.W.2d 558 (2016); State v. Conover, 270
Neb. 446, 703 N.W.2d 898 (2005); State v. Mentzer, 233 Neb. 843, 448
N.W.2d 409 (1989).
17 See State v. McAleese, 311 Neb. 243, 971 N.W.2d 328 (2022).
18 State v. Barnes, 303 Neb. 167, 927 N.W.2d 64 (2019).

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STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
judgment may be collaterally attacked. 19 A sentence outside
of the period authorized for a valid crime is erroneous only;
it is not a void sentence. 20 Thus, we have stated that “there is
no recognized criminal procedure which authorizes a sentenc-
ing court to reopen a criminal case after the judgment has
become final in order to vacate and correct an alleged sentenc-
ing error.” 21
State v. Davis
Because Jones relies on State v. Davis, 22 we will discuss
that case in some detail now. There, the sentencing court
pronounced and memorialized a sentence of 20 to 20 years’
imprisonment for a Class II felony, which sentence, as dis-
cussed above, does not comply with § 29-2204(1). The inva-
lidity was not raised to or recognized by the sentencing court
or the Court of Appeals on direct appeal. The defendant sub-
sequently moved for postconviction relief, asserting that the
sentence was void. The postconviction court agreed, and the
State did not appeal that determination. The postconviction
court subsequently imposed a new sentence of 19 years 11
months to 20 years’ imprisonment.
Upon the prisoner’s appeal and the State’s cross-appeal, we
began our analysis by considering the postconviction court’s
authority to resentence the prisoner. We stated that we were
addressing a collateral attack rather than a direct appeal and
that postconviction relief permitted a collateral attack upon
a criminal judgment. We then looked to cases where the sen-
tencing court failed to affirmatively state a minimum term. 23
In those cases, we determined that by operation of law, the
minimum sentence was the minimum imposed by law. We
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 State v. McAleese, supra note 17, 311 Neb. at 248, 971 N.W.2d at 332.
22 State v. Davis, supra note 4.
23 State v. Gass, 269 Neb. 834, 697 N.W.2d 245 (2005); State v. Schnabel,
260 Neb. 618, 618 N.W.2d 699 (2000).

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stated that similar to those cases, where a court fails to set
the minimum term at less than the maximum term under
§ 29-2204(1)(a), the sentencing court has failed to pronounce
a valid minimum term. We reasoned:
[I]n both situations, by operation of law, the minimum
sentence should default to the minimum provided by law.
We hold that when a sentencing court imposes an inde-
terminate sentence but that sentence fails to pronounce a
valid minimum term under § 29-2204(1)(a), the minimum
term shall be the minimum imposed by law pursuant to
§ 29-2204(1)(b). This could happen where the pronounced
minimum term is equal to or greater than the maximum
term, or where the pronounced minimum term is less than
the statutory minimum under § 28-105. 24
In Davis, we decided that the law supplied a valid mini-
mum term of 1 year’s imprisonment, which meant that the
initial sentence was not void and could not be modified. We
concluded that discussion by stating that matters relating to
sentences imposed within statutory limits were not a basis
for postconviction relief, that the postconviction court plainly
erred by sustaining the motion for postconviction relief, and
that the court lacked authority to resentence the prisoner.
Davis presented a sentencing challenge in a peculiar pro-
cedural posture. Issues that could have and should have been
raised sooner were not. As the case law discussed above dem-
onstrates, the sentence’s noncompliance with § 29-2204(1)
easily could have been fixed by the sentencing court prior to
the filing of the direct appeal or by the Court of Appeals on
appeal if it had been assigned as error or noted by the State
as plain error. But it was not, and the sentence could not be
modified after the direct appeal concluded. 25
The 	postconviction 	proceedings 	compounded 	the 	error.
Although we have long held that a sentence outside the period
24 State v. Davis, supra note 4, 317 Neb. at 66, 8 N.W.3d at 252.
25 See State v. McAleese, supra note 17.

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authorized by statute is erroneous—but not void 26—the post-
conviction court in Davis determined that the sentence was
void. This determination could have been appealed by the
State 27 but was not. An appeal was taken from resentencing.
This presented an issue as to whether the appeal from the new
sentence was a postconviction appeal or another direct appeal.
[9] “Just as ‘bad facts make bad law,’ so too odd facts
make odd law.” 28 Amidst the morass presented by Davis, we
attempted to carve out an answer to fit this procedural out-
lier. Our decision did not, and did not purport to, overrule
our jurisprudence discussed above concerning the ability to
modify an invalid sentence before it becomes final. Our hold-
ing was intended to be limited to the unique circumstances
of Davis; regrettably, we failed to explicitly state so, and
neither party requested a rehearing. We take this opportunity
to expressly limit the reach of Davis to what should be a
rare confluence of events: (1) the pronouncement and written
confirmation of an invalid minimum term under § 29-2204(1)
is not raised to the sentencing court or to an appellate court,
or otherwise addressed before the sentence becomes final;
(2) a postconviction court erroneously finds the sentence to
be void; (3) no appeal is taken from that erroneous finding;
and (4) the postconviction court then purports to impose a
new sentence.
Suffice it to say, Davis has no application to the situa-
tion before us. Here, we are presented with a challenge to a
26 See, e.g., State v. Barnes, supra note 18; Meyer v. Frakes, 294 Neb. 668,
884 N.W.2d 131 (2016); State v. Woodruff, 205 Neb. 638, 288 N.W.2d
754 (1980); Hickman v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 66, 231 N.W. 510 (1930);
McElhaney v. Fenton, 115 Neb. 299, 212 N.W. 612 (1927); In re Fanton,
55 Neb. 703, 76 N.W. 447 (1898).
27 See State v. Thieszen, 295 Neb. 293, 887 N.W.2d 871 (2016) (postconviction
court’s vacating sentence was final order).
28 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed.
2d 520 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting; Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.,
join).

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sentence that was rendered by the original sentencing court and
brought before the sentence became a final judgment by the
entry of a final mandate of an appellate court. 29 We turn now
to Jones’ assertions of error.
Modification of Sentence
Jones’ first two assignments of error allege that the court
erred in modifying the sentence for manslaughter. To start, we
reject Jones’ contention that Davis “is directly on point with
the issue here.” 30 As discussed above, Davis has no applica-
tion under the circumstances presented by Jones’ appeal. Nor
does State v. Schnabel 31 assist Jones. Unlike that case, the
court here did affirmatively state a minimum sentence. The
problem is that the minimum term initially set by the court
was invalid. And because the court did not initially pronounce
a valid sentence, 32 we agree with Jones that the doctrine of
inadvertent mispronouncement does not apply.
As our case law demonstrates, an invalid sentence may be
modified by a sentencing court prior to the filing of an appeal.
That is what happened here. Before the invalid sentence had
been rendered or entered on the court’s records, the court
recalled counsel and Jones and imposed a sentence containing
a valid minimum term. The modified sentence of a term of
imprisonment of 19 years 364 days to 20 years for a Class IIA
felony is within the statutory range set forth in § 28-105 and
complies with § 29-2204(1). That takes us to Jones’ argument
that the sentences of imprisonment were excessive.
Excessiveness of Sentences
[10,11] 	Jones 	challenges 	the 	severity 	of 	the 	sentences
imposed, characterizing them as “draconic and unjust.” 33 When
29 See State v. Ali, 312 Neb. 975, 981 N.W.2d 821 (2022).
30 Brief for appellant at 20.
31 State v. Schnabel, supra note 23.
32 See State v. Geller, supra note 2.
33 Brief for appellant at 35.

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sentences imposed within statutory limits are alleged on appeal
to be excessive, the appellate court must determine whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion in considering well-
established factors and any applicable legal principles. 34 A
judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or
rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-
ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in
matters submitted for disposition. 35
[12,13] When imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge
should consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3)
education and experience, (4) social and cultural background,
(5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and
(6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the
offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the com-
mission of the crime. 36 However, the sentencing court is not
limited to any mathematically applied set of factors, but the
appropriateness of the sentence is necessarily a subjective
judgment that includes the sentencing judge’s observations of
the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. 37
Jones urges a sentence of probation. But the sentencing
court stated that it considered the factors identified above,
along with the grounds set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2260
(Reissue 2016), for imposing or withholding a sentence of
imprisonment. After doing so, the court specifically found
that a sentence of probation would not be appropriate because
it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and would
promote disrespect for the law.
Jones contends that the court must not have found any miti-
gating circumstances because it imposed nearly the maximum
34 State v. Vaughn, 314 Neb. 167, 989 N.W.2d 378 (2023), cert. denied ___
U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 241, 217 L. Ed. 2d 109.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.

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possible sentence for manslaughter, as well as a lengthy sen-
tence for the possession of a deadly weapon conviction. In
reviewing the sentences imposed, we recognize that Jones,
who was 25 years old at the time of the preparation of the
presentence report, had a minimal prior criminal record con-
sisting only of a speeding infraction and a shoplifting charge,
for which she received juvenile diversion. She graduated from
high school and had been steadily employed. Further, the pro-
bation officer stated in the presentence report that Jones will
have already served 450 days in jail by the time of sentenc-
ing, that Jones’ trauma could be addressed through proba-
tion, and that a significant amount of incarceration would not
be warranted.
We are also mindful that Jones faced much greater criminal
exposure prior to entering a plea agreement. The State origi-
nally charged Jones with second degree murder, punishable by
20 years’ to life imprisonment, and use of a deadly weapon
(firearm) to commit a felony, punishable by a mandatory mini-
mum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment and a maximum sen-
tence of 50 years’ imprisonment. In deciding the appropriate
sentence, a sentencing court can account for the fact that the
defendant received a substantial benefit from a plea bargain
agreement. 38 Similarly, in considering an excessive sentence
argument, an appellate court can take into account benefits a
defendant received as part of the plea bargain. 39
Further, we have viewed the surveillance video footage that
captured the assault on Jones, as well as Jones’ subsequent
shooting of the guard. A few things stand out. For one, the
assault on Jones was violent. But the altercation was broken
38 State v. Morton, 310 Neb. 355, 966 N.W.2d 57 (2021). See, also, State v.
Hurd, 307 Neb. 393, 949 N.W.2d 339 (2020); State v. Bridgmon, 196 Neb.
714, 246 N.W.2d 57 (1976).
39 See, State v. Ellen, 243 Neb. 522, 500 N.W.2d 818 (1993); State v. Gibbs,
238 Neb. 268, 470 N.W.2d 558 (1991); State v. Swift, 194 Neb. 515, 233
N.W.2d 572 (1975); State v. Leek, 192 Neb. 640, 223 N.W.2d 489 (1974);
State v. Weidenfeller, 189 Neb. 505, 203 N.W.2d 784 (1973).

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up, and Jones’ assailant was walking away as Jones yelled at
her and tried to get by the guard. Jones then shot the guard.
She did not act surprised or remorseful. The video displays an
appalling lack of compassion by Jones toward the guard. She
did not render aid to him. Instead, she walked past him as he
lay dying on the ground. She walked off a short distance, then
turned around and walked past him again. This was a senseless
crime that resulted in the loss of a person’s life. We see no
abuse of discretion by the sentencing court in its imposition of
sentences of imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
As explained above, we conclude the following:
• The decision in Davis 40 is expressly limited to a situation
where (1) the pronouncement and written confirmation of
an invalid minimum term under § 29-2204(1) is not raised
to the sentencing court or to an appellate court, or otherwise
addressed before the sentence becomes final; (2) a postcon-
viction court erroneously finds the sentence to be void; (3)
no appeal is taken from that erroneous finding; and (4) the
postconviction court then purports to impose a new sentence.
• Because the sentencing court initially imposed a sentence
with an invalid minimum term, it had the power to modify the
sentence before entering its written judgment.
• The sentences of imprisonment were not clearly untenable.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Affirmed.
40 State v. Davis, supra note 4.
Papik, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that, under
the circumstances, the district court could modify the sen-
tence it initially pronounced for Keloni Jones’ manslaughter
conviction. As the majority opinion explains, the initially
pronounced sentence for that conviction was invalid under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2204(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024) because the

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. JONES
Cite as 318 Neb. 840
minimum term was not less than the maximum term, nor was
it the minimum term provided by law. And, as the majority
opinion also explains, our cases have held that a trial court can
modify an invalid sentence while it retains jurisdiction. See,
e.g., State v. Shelby, 194 Neb. 445, 232 N.W.2d 23 (1975).
I am less certain about the majority opinion’s limiting the
holding of State v. Davis, 317 Neb. 59, 8 N.W.3d 247 (2024),
to its facts. I agree that Davis placed us in a highly unusual
procedural situation that bears little resemblance to this case.
Even so, it seems to me that the decision we reach today is
at least in tension with our conclusion in Davis that the sen-
tence of the defendant in that case defaulted to the statutory
minimum by operation of law. Should we in some future case
somehow find ourselves on the same ground in which we
found ourselves in Davis, I would be open to reconsidering
whether that decision was correct.
Freudenberg, J., joins in this concurrence.