Sherman T. v. Karyn N.

468 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
on lost wages and no damages were specifically apportioned,
the entire verdict is deemed compensation for lost wages. See
45 U.S.C. § 231(h)(2). Therefore, the entire award became
subject to RRTA taxes. See I.R.C. § 3121(a). Under the RRA,
the entire award is compensation subject to RRTA taxes that
must be paid by the employer.
The district court erred when it required that the parties
agree in writing that no portion of the general verdict could be
considered lost wages to avoid BNSF’s obligation to pay RRTA
taxes on Heckman’s entire award.
VI. CONCLUSION
We conclude that Heckman’s entire award was compensa-
tion subject to RRTA taxation. The district court erred in deny-
ing BNSF’s motion for satisfaction and discharge of judgment
and ordering that the parties agree in writing that no portion
of the general verdict was based on lost wages. Therefore, we
reverse the judgment and remand the cause with directions that
the district court enter a satisfaction and discharge of the judg-
ment upon proof of payment of $6,202.70 by BNSF to the IRS
on account of the lost wages paid to Heckman.
R eveRsed and Remanded with diRections.
sheRman t., individually and as next
fRiend of BRayden n., appellant,
v. K aRyn n., appellee.
837 N.W.2d 746
Filed August 16, 2013. 	No. S-12-515.
1. Trial: Courts. A court cannot err with respect to a matter not submitted to it
for disposition.
2. Appeal and Error. An issue not presented to or passed on by the trial court is not
appropriate for consideration on appeal.
3. Standing: Claims: Parties. To have standing, a litigant must assert the litigant’s
own rights and interests.
4. Motions to Dismiss: Rules of the Supreme Court: Jurisdiction: Pleadings:
Service of Process. When a motion to dismiss raises both Neb. Ct. R. Pldg.
§ 6-1112(b)(1) and § 6-1112(b)(6), the court should consider dismissal under
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:38 AM CST

SHERMAN T. v. KARYN N. 	469
Cite as 286 Neb. 468
§ 6-1112(b)(1) first and should then consider § 6-1112(b)(6) only if it determines
that it has subject matter jurisdiction. Similarly, when a motion to dismiss raises
§ 6-1112(b)(6) and any combination of § 6-1112(b)(2), (4), and (5), the court
should consider dismissal under § 6-1112(b)(2), (4), and (5) first and should then
consider dismissal under § 6-1112(b)(6) only if it determines that it has personal
jurisdiction and that process and service of process were sufficient.
5. Motions to Dismiss: Rules of the Supreme Court: Appeal and Error. An
appellate court reviews de novo a lower court’s dismissal of a complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(6).
6. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings. To prevail against a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. In cases in which a plaintiff does not
or cannot allege specific facts showing a necessary element, the factual allega-
tions, taken as true, are nonetheless plausible if they suggest the existence of the
element and raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
the element or claim.
7. Constitutional Law: Due Process: Equal Protection: Statutes: Presumptions:
Proof. Where a statute is challenged under either the Due Process Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause of the state and federal Constitutions, the general rule is
that legislation is presumed to be valid, and the burden of establishing the uncon-
stitutionality of the statute is on the one attacking its validity.
8. Due Process. The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives
a person of liberty or property; accordingly, when there is a claimed denial of due
process, a court must consider the nature of the individual’s claimed interest.
9. ____. A claim that one is being deprived of a liberty interest without due process
of law is typically examined in three stages. The question in the first stage is
whether there is a protected liberty interest at stake. If so, the analysis proceeds
to the second stage, in which it is determined what procedural protections are
required. Upon the resolution of that issue, the analysis moves on to the third and
final stage, in which the facts of the case are examined to ascertain whether there
was a denial of that process which was due.
10. Equal Protection. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications; it
simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who
are in all relevant aspects alike.
11. 	Equal Protection: Proof. The initial inquiry in an equal protection analysis
focuses on whether the challenger is similarly situated to another group for the
purpose of the challenged governmental action. Absent this threshold showing,
one lacks a viable equal protection claim. In other words, the dissimilar treatment
of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate equal protection rights.
12. ____: ____. In an equal protection challenge, once the challenger establishes
that he or she is similarly situated to another group, the analysis then focuses on
whether the challenger is receiving dissimilar treatment pursuant to the statute
at issue as compared to the similarly situated group. Such dissimilar treatment
caused by the statutory classification does not constitute a violation of the chal-
lenger’s right to equal protection if the statutory classification promotes a legiti-
mate government interest or purpose.

470 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
13. Equal Protection: Statutes. In an equal protection challenge to a statute,
the level of judicial scrutiny applied to a particular classification may be
dispositive.
14. Constitutional Law: Statutes. Legislative classifications involving either a sus-
pect class or a fundamental right are analyzed with strict scrutiny, and legislative
classifications not involving a suspect class or fundamental right are analyzed
using rational basis review.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J.
michael coffey, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed
and remanded for further proceedings.
Willow T. Head, of Law Offices of Willow T. Head, P.C.,
L.L.O., for appellant.
Stephanie Weber Milone for appellee.
heavican, c.J., wRight, connolly, stephan, mccoRmacK,
milleR-leRman, and cassel, JJ.
heavican, c.J.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a paternity action
brought by Sherman T., who claims to be the biological father
of Brayden N. He filed an amended complaint with the district
court to establish paternity both as an individual and on behalf
of Brayden as “next friend.” Alternatively, Sherman asked
the district court to find Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1411 (Reissue
2008) unconstitutional, because it denied him due process and
equal protection under both the state and federal Constitutions.
Karyn N., Brayden’s mother, filed an answer and counterclaim
in response and later filed a motion to dismiss Sherman’s
amended complaint.
The district court dismissed with prejudice the amended
complaint filed by Sherman as an individual as untimely. The
court also dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice
as to Sherman’s filing as the next friend of Brayden, finding
suit may be brought on behalf of a child as next friend only
when said child lacks a guardian. Finally, the court dismissed
Karyn’s counterclaim without prejudice.

SHERMAN T. v. KARYN N. 	471
Cite as 286 Neb. 468
Sherman claims the district court erred in dismissing the
amended complaint filed by Sherman as an individual because
Karyn waived a statute of limitations defense. Sherman fur-
ther argues that the district court erred in dismissing Karyn’s
counterclaim and that the application of Nebraska’s paternity
statute to his case violates his rights to due process and equal
protection. We affirm in part and in part reverse the order of
the district court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Karyn is the biological mother of Brayden. Brayden was
born out of wedlock in 2005. Six years later, on September
15, 2011, Sherman filed a complaint, both individually and as
Brayden’s next friend, in the district court for Douglas County,
seeking to establish paternity.
Karyn moved to dismiss Sherman’s paternity complaint
on September 26, 2011. Karyn’s motion to dismiss asserted,
among other arguments, that Sherman’s complaint was filed
out of the 4-year statute of limitations for paternity actions pur-
suant to § 43-1411. Two days later, on September 28, Sherman
moved for leave to amend his complaint. The district court
granted Sherman leave to amend without considering Karyn’s
motion to dismiss. On October 13, Sherman filed his amended
complaint both individually and as Brayden’s “next friend,”
seeking to establish paternity.
In his amended complaint, Sherman again alleged that
he and Karyn had had sexual intercourse, which may have
resulted in the birth of Brayden, and that Sherman is believed
to be the father of Brayden. Sherman’s amended complaint
also requested that the 4-year statute of limitations period of
§ 43-1411 be tolled because Sherman was allegedly incapaci-
tated and receiving medical treatment out of the country around
the time of the child’s birth, and as such, Sherman lacked
actual knowledge of the child’s birth. In the event the district
court did not toll the 4-year statute of limitations, Sherman
requested an order finding that § 43-1411 is unconstitutional.
Sherman argued that the statute should be found unconstitu-
tional because:

472 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
A. The statute as applied would deny [Sherman] due
process and equal protection under the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I-3 of the
Nebraska State Constitution.
B. The statute as applied would deny [Sherman] due
process and equal protection and there is no compel-
ling public policy interests that currently exist to deny
[Sherman, the] alleged father[,] the opportunity to estab-
lish paternity and pursue parental rights under the facts
of this case. The results of strict application of the statute
would contradict the original legislative intent.
C. The statute, if not tolled[,] would be unconstitu-
tional as it would deny [Sherman] his fundamental consti-
tutional right to parent his child.
On October 24, 2011, Karyn entered a voluntary appear-
ance in the case. On November 16, Karyn filed an answer to
Sherman’s amended complaint, arguing numerous defenses
to Sherman’s claims, and filed a counterclaim to Sherman’s
amended complaint. Karyn’s counterclaim for child support
acknowledged that she and Sherman had sexual intercourse
and that Sherman may be the father of Brayden. The counter-
claim also mentioned that a separate paternity action, filed by
the State on behalf of Brayden, was already pending in which
both she and Sherman were named defendants. On November
18, Sherman filed a reply and answer to Karyn’s counterclaim,
praying for dismissal of Karyn’s counterclaim.
On November 23, 2011, the district court denied Karyn’s
first motion to dismiss. On February 3, 2012, Karyn filed a
second motion seeking dismissal of Sherman’s amended com-
plaint pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(1), (2), and
(6), and (d) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
lack of jurisdiction over the person, and failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, respectively. Specifically,
Karyn argued that Sherman’s individual action was barred by
the 4-year statute of limitations. Karyn’s motion also argued
that Sherman lacked standing to assert paternity as Brayden’s
“next friend.” Such cause of action, Karyn asserted, does not
belong to Sherman, but, rather, to Brayden in the event he

SHERMAN T. v. KARYN N. 	473
Cite as 286 Neb. 468
lacked a guardian. Since his birth, however, Karyn alleged that
Brayden has always been in her custody. Karyn also argued
that she had not been properly served with process. And
finally, Karyn contended that Sherman does not possess the
capacity to sue or be sued, because Sherman’s legal counsel
had advised that Sherman had suffered an aneurysm rupture
and paralysis.
On February 21, 2012, Sherman filed an objection to Karyn’s
motion to dismiss. Karyn’s motion to dismiss came on for a
hearing wherein both Sherman and Karyn were represented by
counsel. We have no record or transcript of the February 21
hearing on Karyn’s motion to dismiss.
Karyn’s motion to dismiss was granted by the district court
in a written order filed May 9, 2011. The district court held
that the amended complaint for paternity filed by Sherman as
an individual should be dismissed with prejudice because it is
barred by the statute of limitations. The court further found
that the amended complaint for paternity as the next friend of
Brayden should be dismissed with prejudice because a next
friend action may be brought only when the child at issue
lacks a guardian. The court found that pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-2608(a) (Reissue 2008), Karyn, as the biological
mother of Brayden, born out of wedlock, was Brayden’s “natu-
ral guardian,” and that therefore, a next friend could not act
on Brayden’s behalf. Finally, the court found that as Karyn’s
counterclaim was filed against “a Plaintiff who has no capacity
or standing to sue it constitutes an action against an individual
who is not a proper party plaintiff.” Therefore, the court then
dismissed Karyn’s counterclaim against Sherman without prej-
udice. The court made no findings regarding Karyn’s argument
that she had not been properly served with process; Karyn’s
allegation that Sherman’s claims should be dismissed because
he allegedly did not possess the capacity to sue; or Sherman’s
tolling argument and constitutional claims, both found in his
amended complaint.
This case was never consolidated with the separate action
brought by the State. Sherman now appeals. Upon reviewing
Sherman’s assignments of error, we find that the order of the

474 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
district court dismissing Sherman’s claims with prejudice and
Karyn’s counterclaim without prejudice should be affirmed in
part and in part reversed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Sherman assigns that (1) Karyn waived the statute of limita-
tions defense when she filed a counterclaim seeking affirma-
tive relief and that therefore, the matter should not be time
barred and dismissed; (2) the district court erred in dismissing
Karyn’s counterclaim on its own motion; (3) the 4-year statute
of limitations provided in § 43-1411 is unconstitutional and
violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal
Constitutions; and (4) the 4-year statute of limitations provided
in § 43-1411 is unconstitutional and violates the Due Process
Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The determination of which statute of limitations applies is
a question of law.1 Standing is a jurisdictional component of a
party’s case because only a party who has standing may invoke
the jurisdiction of a court.2 A question of jurisdiction is a ques-
tion of law.3
An appellate court reviews a district court’s order granting
a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting all allegations in the
complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party.4 To prevail against a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege suf-
ficient facts, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.5 In cases in which a plaintiff does not or
cannot allege specific facts showing a necessary element, the
1 Manker v. Manker, 263 Neb. 944, 644 N.W.2d 522 (2002).
2 Governor’s Policy Research Office v. KN Energy, 264 Neb. 924, 652
N.W.2d 865 (2002).
3 Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Struss, 261 Neb. 435, 623
N.W.2d 308 (2001).
4 Moats v. Republican Party of Neb., 281 Neb. 411, 796 N.W.2d 584 (2011),
cert. denied 565 U.S. 882, 132 S. Ct. 251, 181 L. Ed. 2d 145.
5 Doe v. Board of Regents, 280 Neb. 492, 788 N.W.2d 264 (2010).

SHERMAN T. v. KARYN N. 	475
Cite as 286 Neb. 468
factual allegations, taken as true, are nonetheless plausible if
they suggest the existence of the element and raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the element
or claim.6
ANALYSIS
Whether District Court Erred in Dismissing
Sherman’s Claim as Time Barred.
On appeal, Sherman raises the argument for the first time
in this matter that Karyn’s counterclaim for child support, in
which she alleges that she and Sherman had sexual relations
and that Sherman may be the father of Brayden, acts as a judi-
cial admission. Sherman contends that such judicial admission
“constitutes a waiver of all controversy” with respect to the
statute of limitations issue raised in Karyn’s motion to dismiss
Sherman’s amended complaint.7 As such, Sherman argues the
district court erred in dismissing his claim as time barred by
the 4-year statute of limitations provided in § 43-1411.
[1,2] The record indicates, however, that Sherman failed to
raise this “waiver” argument before the district court. We have
held that a court cannot err with respect to a matter not submit-
ted to it for disposition8 and that an issue not presented to or
passed on by the trial court is not appropriate for consideration
on appeal.9 Thus, without considering whether Karyn waived
the statute of limitations defense, we find that Sherman’s first
assignment of error is without merit.
Whether District Court Erred in Dismissing
Karyn’s Counterclaim on Its Own Motion.
[3] Sherman’s second assignment of error addresses whether
the district court erred in dismissing Karyn’s counterclaim
without prejudice “on its own motion.” (This court notes that
Sherman prayed for dismissal of Karyn’s counterclaim in his
6 Id.
7 Brief for appellant at 14.
8 Huber v. Rohrig, 280 Neb. 868, 791 N.W.2d 590 (2010).
9 Countryside Co-op v. Harry A. Koch Co., 280 Neb. 795, 790 N.W.2d 873
(2010).

476 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
reply filed with the district court.) Sherman does not have
standing to assert this alleged error. To have standing, a litigant
must assert the litigant’s own rights and interests.10 Sherman
cites no legal authority showing that he may force Karyn to
proceed on her own claim brought through her counterclaim.
Thus, as Sherman lacks standing to assert that the district court
erred in dismissing Karyn’s counterclaim, Sherman’s second
assignment of error is without merit.
Whether 4-Year Statute of Limitations Provided
in § 43-1411 Is Unconstitutional and Violates
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of State and Federal Constitutions.
Finally, Sherman requests, as argued in both his amended
complaint and appellate brief, that this court find the 4-year
statute of limitations as set forth in § 43-1411 is unconstitu-
tional as applied to the facts of his case pursuant to the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal
Constitutions. Section 43-1411 provides that a paternity action
may be instituted by “(1) the mother or the alleged father of
such child, either during pregnancy or within four years after
the child’s birth . . . or (2) the guardian or next friend of such
child or the state, either during pregnancy or within eighteen
years after the child’s birth.”
We note that during oral argument, counsel for Sherman
affirmatively answered the question of whether Sherman was
making a facial constitutional challenge to § 43-1411. As
such facial challenge does not appear anywhere in Sherman’s
amended complaint filed with the district court or his appel-
late brief filed with this court, we do not construe his assign-
ment of error as facially challenging the constitutionality of
§ 43-1411. Rather, we construe Sherman’s amended complaint
and appellate brief as assigning an “as applied” constitu-
tional challenge.
[4] Although the district court’s order does not set forth its
precise reasoning, it implicitly found no merit to Sherman’s
constitutional claims. First, Karyn’s motion asked for dismissal
10 Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, 282 Neb. 121, 802 N.W.2d 66 (2011).

SHERMAN T. v. KARYN N. 	477
Cite as 286 Neb. 468
of Sherman’s amended complaint for lack of subject matter and
personal jurisdiction and for the failure to state a claim. Karyn
also argued in her motion that Sherman lacked capacity to sue
or be sued. We have previously concluded that when a motion
to dismiss raises both § 6-1112(b)(1) and § 6-1112(b)(6), the
court should consider dismissal under § 6-1112(b)(1) first
and should then consider § 6-1112(b)(6) only if it determines
that it has subject matter jurisdiction.11 Similarly, when a
motion to dismiss raises § 6-1112(b)(6) and any combination
of § 6-1112(b)(2), (4), and (5), the court should consider dis-
missal under § 6-1112(b)(2), (4), and (5) first and should then
consider dismissal under § 6-1112(b)(6) only if it determines
that it has personal jurisdiction and that process and service of
process were sufficient.12
Clearly, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction of
an action to determine paternity of a child. See Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-1411.01 (Reissue 2008). Similarly, the court could easily
have determined that because of Karyn’s voluntary appear-
ance, the portion of the motion contesting the court’s personal
jurisdiction over her clearly lacked merit. Thus, we assume
that the district court first found no merit to the grounds
attacking subject matter or personal jurisdiction and then con-
sidered the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim. The
district court explicitly addressed and rejected Sherman’s argu-
ment that he is a next friend, and the order simply concludes
that the statute of limitations bars Sherman’s individual action.
In so doing, the district court implicitly rejected Sherman’s
constitutional arguments which were raised in his amended
complaint. Similarly, the district court implicitly found no
merit in Sherman’s argument that the running of § 43-1411
should be tolled.
[5,6] We construe the district court’s order as dismissing
Sherman’s constitutional claims for failure to state a claim
pursuant to § 6-1112(b)(6). We review such cases de novo.13
11 Doe, supra note 5.
12 Id.
13 See id.

478 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
To prevail against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. In cases in
which a plaintiff does not or cannot allege specific facts show-
ing a necessary element, the factual allegations, taken as true,
are nonetheless plausible if they suggest the existence of the
element and raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of the element or claim.14
[7] Where a statute is challenged under either the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the state
and federal Constitutions, the general rule is that legisla-
tion is presumed to be valid, and the burden of establishing
the unconstitutionality of the statute is on the one attacking
its validity.15
[8,9] It is apparent that Sherman is advancing a procedural
due process claim in that Sherman asserts he should be able
to establish paternity outside of the 4-year limitations period
provided in the statute he challenges. The Due Process Clause
applies when government action deprives a person of liberty
or property; accordingly, when there is a claimed denial of due
process, a court must consider the nature of the individual’s
claimed interest.16 A claim that one is being deprived of a
liberty interest without due process of law is typically exam-
ined in three stages. The question in the first stage is whether
there is a protected liberty interest at stake. If so, the analysis
proceeds to the second stage, in which it is determined what
procedural protections are required. Upon the resolution of
that issue, the analysis moves on to the third and final stage, in
which the facts of the case are examined to ascertain whether
there was a denial of that process which was due.17
[10] Sherman also advances an equal protection claim in his
amended complaint. The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
14 Id.
15 See Connelly v. City of Omaha, 284 Neb. 131, 816 N.W.2d 742 (2012).
16 In re Interest of S.J., 283 Neb. 507, 810 N.W.2d 720 (2012), cert. denied
___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 837, 184 L. Ed. 2d 663 (2013); In re Interest of
S.C., 283 Neb. 294, 810 N.W.2d 699 (2012).
17 Id.

SHERMAN T. v. KARYN N. 	479
Cite as 286 Neb. 468
Amendment, § 1, mandates that no state shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
This clause does not forbid classifications; it simply keeps
governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons
who are in all relevant aspects alike.18
[11] We have held that the initial inquiry in an equal protec-
tion analysis focuses on whether the challenger is similarly
situated to another group for the purpose of the challenged
governmental action. Absent this threshold showing, one lacks
a viable equal protection claim. In other words, the dissimi-
lar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate
equal protection rights.19
[12-14] Once the challenger establishes that he or she is
similarly situated to another group, the analysis then focuses on
whether the challenger is receiving dissimilar treatment pursu-
ant to the statute at issue as compared to the similarly situated
group.20 Such dissimilar treatment caused by the statutory clas-
sification does not constitute a violation of the challenger’s
right to equal protection if the statutory classification promotes
a legitimate government interest or purpose.21 In an equal
protection challenge to a statute, the level of judicial scru-
tiny applied to a particular classification may be dispositive.22
Legislative classifications involving either a suspect class or a
fundamental right are analyzed with strict scrutiny, and legisla-
tive classifications not involving a suspect class or fundamental
right are analyzed using rational basis review.23
We find Sherman’s amended complaint states both a plau-
sible due process claim and an equal protection claim on
its face. First, in accepting all the factual allegations pled
regarding Sherman’s constitutional claims as true and draw-
ing all reasonable inferences in favor of Sherman, such factual
18 State v. Rung, 278 Neb. 855, 774 N.W.2d 621 (2009).
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 Id.

480 	286 NEBRASKA REPORTS
allegations suggest the existence of the elements required to
show both a due process and an equal protection violation.
Further, the factual allegations raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of these two constitutional
claims. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal
of Sherman’s constitutional claims and remand the cause for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
CONCLUSION
As Sherman failed to argue before the district court that
Karyn waived the statute of limitations defense and, as such,
the district court erred in dismissing his paternity action,
Sherman’s first assignment of error is meritless. We also find
that Sherman does not have standing to challenge the dismissal
of Karyn’s counterclaim. Thus, Sherman’s second assignment
of error is meritless. Finally, as noted above, based upon the
record before us, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
Sherman’s constitutional claims and remand the cause for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
affiRmed in paRt, and in paRt ReveRsed and
Remanded foR fuRtheR pRoceedings.
in Re estate of ina wegneR odenReideR, deceased.
chRisty l. neel, appellee, v. RoBeRt
wegneR et al., appellants.
837 N.W.2d 756
Filed August 16, 2013. 	No. S-12-579.
1. Decedents’ Estates: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews probate cases
for error appearing on the record made in the county court.
2. Decedents’ Estates: Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions
of law in a probate matter, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of
the determination reached by the court below.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law
that an appellate court independently reviews.
4. Trial: Waiver: Appeal and Error. A litigant’s failure to make a timely objection
waives the right to assert prejudicial error on appeal.