Molczyk v. Molczyk

96 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
of DUI in Nebraska. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that a Colorado DWAI conviction could be used to enhance
the penalty for a Nebraska DUI. Accordingly, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded
to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand the cause to
the district court with directions to vacate Mitchell’s sentence
for fourth-offense DUI and to resentence him in accordance
with this opinion.
R eveRsed and Remanded with diRections.
R ichaRd L. moLczyk, JR., appeLLant, v.
keRRie k. moLczyk, appeLLee.
825 N.W.2d 435
Filed January 25, 2013. 	No. S-11-1095.
1. Judgments: Jurisdiction. A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual
dispute presents a question of law.
2. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently reviews ques-
tions of law decided by a lower court.
4. Divorce: Appeal and Error. In actions for dissolution of marriage, an appellate
court reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether there has been
an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
5. Courts: Jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of jurisdictional priority, when different
state courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same subject matter,
basic principles of judicial administration require that the first court to acquire
jurisdiction should retain it to the exclusion of another court. That is, a second
court lacks jurisdiction over the same matter involving the same parties.
6. Dismissal and Nonsuit: Jurisdiction. An order of dismissal or dismissal by
operation of law divests a court of jurisdiction to take any further action in
the matter.
7. Courts: Jurisdiction. In civil cases, a court of general jurisdiction has inherent
power to vacate or modify its own judgment at any time during the term in which
the court issued it.
8. Courts: Dismissal and Nonsuit: Jurisdiction: Pleadings: Motions to Vacate.
A court treats a motion to reinstate a case after an order of dismissal as a motion
to vacate the order, and a court normally has jurisdiction over a motion to vacate
an order of dismissal and reinstate a case.
9. Actions: Jurisdiction: Parties: Notice. A motion to reinstate a dismissed action,
of which the opposing party has notice, has jurisdictional priority over a later
complaint filed in a different court involving the same subject matter and the
same parties.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:40 AM CST

MOLCZYK v. MOLCZYK 	97
Cite as 285 Neb. 96
10. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Child Custody. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-2740(3) (Reissue 2008), the jurisdiction conferred on a county court to
decide custody issues refers to a county court sitting as a juvenile court and pro-
vides the juvenile court with concurrent jurisdiction over a custody determination
for an adjudicated juvenile, not exclusive jurisdiction.
11. 	Courts: Juvenile Courts: Child Custody: Time. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-2,113(2) (Reissue 2008), if a juvenile court judge consents to a transfer of a
custody case and the district court transfers the case to juvenile court, the case is
“filed” with the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, or the separate juvenile
court when a certified copy of the district court’s transfer order is filed in the
juvenile court.
12. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Divorce: Child Custody. Juvenile courts do
not acquire jurisdiction over a marital dissolution action or a custody proceed-
ing unless three conditions are met: (1) The juvenile court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the parties’ child; (2) the juvenile court judge consented to trans-
ferring the case to juvenile court; and (3) the district court has issued a transfer
order, a certified copy of which has been filed in the county court, sitting as a
juvenile court, or in the separate juvenile court.
13. Trial: Judges: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. An appellate court presumes
in a bench trial that the judge was familiar with and applied the proper rules of
law unless it clearly appears otherwise.
14. Child Support: Rules of the Supreme Court. Under the Nebraska Child
Support Guidelines, unless the minimum support rule applies, a parent’s total
support, child care, and health care obligations cannot reduce the obligor’s net
income below the minimum net monthly income for one person that will exceed
the federal poverty threshold.
15. Divorce: Child Support. In a marital dissolution action, to determine an obli-
gor’s net income for calculating support obligations, a court subtracts the fol-
lowing annualized deductions from the obligor’s gross income: taxes, FICA,
allowable retirement contributions, previous court-ordered child support to other
children, and allowable voluntary support payments to other children.
16. Child Support: Rules of the Supreme Court. Under the Nebraska Child
Support Guidelines, to determine if the obligor’s income exceeds the minimum
subsistence level, a court deducts the obligor’s support obligations that are speci-
fied in the guidelines from the obligor’s net income.
17. Divorce: Attorney Fees. In a marital dissolution action, an award of attorney
fees depends on a variety of factors, including the amount of property and ali-
mony awarded, the earning capacity of the parties, and the general equities of
the situation.
18. Property Division. The ultimate test for the appropriateness of a trial court’s
division of the marital estate is fairness and reasonableness as determined by the
facts of each case.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: James t.
GLeason, Judge. Affirmed.
Phillip G. Wright for appellant.

98 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Amy Sherman, of Sherman & Gilner, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellee.
wRiGht, 	connoLLy, 	stephan, 	mccoRmack, 	and 	miLLeR-
L eRman, JJ.
connoLLy, J.
SUMMARY
In this marital dissolution appeal, we cut through a jurisdic-
tional jungle to determine whether the Douglas County District
Court, the Lancaster County District Court, or the Douglas
County Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over the action. After
the Douglas County District Court dismissed the original dis-
solution action for lack of prosecution, the appellant, Richard
L. Molczyk, Jr., moved to reinstate it. Before the court ruled
on Richard’s motion, the appellee, Kerrie K. Molczyk, filed a
second dissolution action in Lancaster County District Court.
At trial, the Douglas County District Court overruled Kerrie’s
motion 	to 	dismiss, 	concluding 	that 	its 	order 	to 	reinstate
Richard’s action related back to the date that Richard had filed
the motion. The court also concluded that it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter despite pending juvenile proceedings
involving two of the parties’ minor children.
On appeal, Richard claims that the court erred in these
determinations and lacked jurisdiction. We affirm. We deter-
mine that the Douglas County District Court had jurisdictional
priority over the Lancaster County District Court. Because the
parties did not comply with the procedural requirements for
transferring a case to juvenile court, the juvenile court did not
have jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
In March 2010, Richard filed a complaint for dissolution
of marriage from Kerrie. The parties were married in 1981
and had seven children, three of whom were minors when the
action was commenced. In May, Kerrie filed an answer and
countercomplaint for dissolution. In August, a deputy county
attorney filed a petition in the Douglas County Juvenile Court,
alleging that the juvenile court should adjudicate the parties’
11-year-old son under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue
2008) because of his school truancy.

MOLCZYK v. MOLCZYK 	99
Cite as 285 Neb. 96
In September 2010, the district court issued a temporary
order that, among other things, awarded custody of the par-
ties’ minor children to Richard, subject to Kerrie’s visitation
rights. On October 8, the court issued an order dismissing the
action for lack of prosecution. On October 25, Richard moved
the court to set aside its dismissal order and reinstate the case.
The motion did not state a hearing date, but it was served on
Kerrie’s counsel. On November 3, Kerrie filed a complaint
for dissolution in the Lancaster County District Court. Kerrie
admitted in her complaint that Richard had previously filed
a dissolution action in Douglas County but alleged that the
court had dismissed it. She did not, however, alert the court to
Richard’s motion to reinstate the dismissed case. On November
4, Richard was served with summons. On November 8, Kerrie
served Richard with notice that a hearing on her motion for
temporary orders was set for December 3 in the Lancaster
County District Court.
On November 12, 2010, in Douglas County, Kerrie’s attor-
ney filed a response to Richard’s motion to reinstate. In
an affidavit, the attorney averred that Kerrie had moved
to Lincoln and that she wished to file an action there if
the Douglas County District Court dismissed the case. The
attorney’s affidavit stated that Kerrie would be prejudiced
by a reinstatement order because relying on the dismissal,
she had forgone trial preparation and had taken action to
start the case again. Kerrie’s counsel admitted that she knew
about Richard’s motion to reinstate but argued that Richard
had not set a hearing date on the motion until November 9.
On November 15, the Douglas County District Court heard
Richard’s motion, reinstated the original case, and set aside
its dismissal order.
In January 2011, the trial began in the Douglas County
District Court. On the first day, Kerrie moved to dismiss the
action for lack of jurisdiction. She asked the court to take
judicial notice of its October 2010 order dismissing Richard’s
action for lack of prosecution. And she stated that the Lancaster
County District Court still had jurisdiction over the action,
which was pending. The court reviewed its file and the pro-
cedural history. Because Richard’s motion to reinstate was

100 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
pending when Kerrie filed the second complaint in Lancaster
County on November 3, the court concluded that its order
reinstating the action related back to the date of Richard’s
motion to reinstate on October 25. The court concluded that
its order reinstating the action predated the filing of Kerrie’s
second action. It overruled Kerrie’s motion to dismiss, and the
trial proceeded.
Richard testified that a juvenile proceeding regarding the
parties’ youngest son was pending before the juvenile court,
and the court asked whether it had jurisdiction over him.
Richard’s attorney stated that the juvenile court would auto-
matically dismiss the case in about 31⁄2 months if there were
no further truancy problems. Richard also stated that there was
a pending juvenile proceeding regarding the parties’ youngest
daughter. This proceeding apparently resulted from her minor
in possession arrests in April and May 2010. Richard stated
that she had been complying with the juvenile court’s require-
ments and that the court had scheduled a final disposition for
the following week.
The district court heard testimony on two different dates,
January 27 and June 20, 2011. On July 20, before the court
entered a decree, Kerrie moved to withdraw her rest and
adduce evidence about an incident with the minor children
that happened after June 20. Richard responded with a motion
to withdraw his rest so the court could conduct an in cam-
era interview of the minor children. The court overruled
both motions.
In November 2011, the court issued its dissolution decree. It
awarded sole custody of the two children who were still minors
to Kerrie, with reasonable visitation, including a summer visi-
tation block, for Richard. It awarded Kerrie child support of
$1,327 per month for the two minor children and alimony of
$750 per month for 24 months, and then $600 per month for
an additional 36 months. It awarded Kerrie $4,000 in attor-
ney fees.
Richard moved for a new trial. Among other things, he
asserted that the court had failed to appoint a guardian ad
litem for the minor children and had failed to question them
about where they wished to live. At the hearing, the court

MOLCZYK v. MOLCZYK 	101
Cite as 285 Neb. 96
received Richard’s offer of affidavits with statements by the
parties’ children. It also received Kerrie’s offer of a police
report about an assault incident involving the minor children
and a notice from the Omaha Public Schools about the par-
ties’ youngest son’s continuing truancy. The court overruled
Richard’s motion.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Richard assigns that the court erred in (1) determining that
it had jurisdiction despite the pending dissolution action in
Lancaster County and the pending juvenile court proceedings
involving two of the minor children; (2) awarding Kerrie sole
custody of the minor children or, alternatively, not granting a
new trial; (3) awarding Kerrie alimony; (4) failing to equitably
divide the marital assets and liability; and (5) awarding Kerrie
attorney fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-4] A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual
dispute presents a question of law.1 Statutory interpretation
presents a question of law.2 We independently review questions
of law decided by a lower court.3 In actions for dissolution of
marriage, an appellate court reviews the case de novo on the
record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discre-
tion by the trial judge.4
ANALYSIS
JuRisdictionaL pRioRity
[5] We have recognized the doctrine of jurisdictional pri-
ority. Under this doctrine, when different state courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction over the same subject matter,
basic principles of judicial administration require that the first
court to acquire jurisdiction should retain it to the exclusion of
1 Strode v. Saunders Cty. Bd. of Equal., 283 Neb. 802, 815 N.W.2d 856
(2012).
2 Martin v. Ullsperger, 284 Neb. 526, 822 N.W.2d 382 (2012).
3 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659, 825 N.W.2d 149 (2012).
4 Marcovitz v. Rogers, 267 Neb. 456, 675 N.W.2d 132 (2004).

102 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
another court.5 That is, a second court lacks jurisdiction over
the same matter involving the same parties.6
Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-348 (Reissue 2008), a plaintiff
can commence a marital dissolution action in the district court
of any county in which one of the parties resides. Kerrie had
moved to Lincoln before filing her action in Lancaster County
District Court, and Richard continued to live in Douglas
County. So the district courts of either county could have
exercised jurisdiction over a dissolution action between them.
The question that we must resolve is this: Does a motion to
reinstate a dismissed complaint for marital dissolution in one
county divest another court of jurisdiction over a later com-
plaint filed in a different county?
[6-8] An order of dismissal or dismissal by operation of
law divests a court of jurisdiction to take any further action in
the matter.7 But in civil cases, a court of general jurisdiction
has inherent power to vacate or modify its own judgment at
any time during the term in which the court issued it.8 A court
treats a motion to reinstate a case after an order of dismissal
as a motion to vacate the order,9 and we have recognized that
a court normally has jurisdiction over a motion to vacate an
order of dismissal and reinstate a case.10
[9] It is true that a court has discretion to deny a motion to
vacate a case.11 But we conclude that for applying principles of
judicial administration, a motion to reinstate an action should
5 See, e.g., Washington v. Conley, 273 Neb. 908, 734 N.W.2d 306 (2007);
Holste v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 256 Neb. 713, 592 N.W.2d 894
(1999).
6 See In re Estate of Kentopp, 206 Neb. 776, 295 N.W.2d 275 (1980).
7 See, Davis v. Choctaw Constr., 280 Neb. 714, 789 N.W.2d 698 (2010);
Reid v. Evans, 273 Neb. 714, 733 N.W.2d 186 (2007); 27 C.J.S. Dismissal
and Nonsuit § 14 (2009).
8 See Destiny 98 TD v. Miodowski, 269 Neb. 427, 693 N.W.2d 278 (2005).
9 See, Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2d 764 (2000);
Roemer v. Maly, 248 Neb. 741, 539 N.W.2d 40 (1995).
10 See State v. Smith, 269 Neb. 773, 696 N.W.2d 871 (2005), citing R. V. R. R.
Co. v. McPherson, 12 Neb. 480, 11 N.W. 739 (1882).
11 See, e.g., Talkington v. Womens Servs., 256 Neb. 2, 588 N.W.2d 790
(1999).

MOLCZYK v. MOLCZYK 	103
Cite as 285 Neb. 96
be treated the same as the commencement of an action. Judicial
administration principles require the elimination of unneces-
sary litigation and the promotion of judicial efficiency and
economy.12 Courts enforce the jurisdictional priority doctrine to
promote judicial comity and avoid the confusion and delay of
justice that would result if courts issued conflicting decisions
in the same controversy.13 Under these principles, we hold that
a motion to reinstate a dismissed action, of which the oppos-
ing party has notice, has jurisdictional priority over a later
complaint filed in a different court involving the same subject
matter and the same parties.
A motion to reinstate a dismissed case might raise other
concerns if the opposing party had commenced a new action
without notice that the motion to reinstate had been filed.
But court filings are generally effective when filed,14 and the
record shows that Richard gave notice of his motion. We con-
clude that the Douglas County District Court obtained juris-
diction on the date that Richard filed his motion to reinstate
the dismissed action. Thus, the Douglas County District Court
has exclusive concurrent jurisdiction over the matter and the
Lancaster County Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the
second action.
pendinG JuveniLe pRoceedinGs did not
depRive the distRict couRt
of JuRisdiction
As stated, Richard raises a second jurisdictional argument.
He claims that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide
the custody of the two minor children because of pending
juvenile proceedings involving them. At oral arguments, we
questioned whether the juvenile proceedings are still pend-
ing because the record suggests that the court has probably
terminated the cases and the issue is moot. But Richard’s
counsel did not clarify the mootness issue. So we explain
12 See In re Estate of Kentopp, supra note 6.
13 See Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 224 Cal. App. 3d 781, 274
Cal. Rptr. 147 (1990).
14 See Johnson v. Johnson, 282 Neb. 42, 803 N.W.2d 420 (2011).

104 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
why the juvenile proceedings did not deprive the district court
of jurisdiction.
Section 43-247 of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is the primary
statute, but not the only statute, setting out a juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. In the first paragraph of § 43-247, the Legislature
has broken down a juvenile court’s jurisdiction into exclusive
or concurrent classifications depending on the type of adjudi-
cation at issue. Section 43-247 provides that a juvenile court
has “exclusive original jurisdiction” over “any juvenile defined
in subdivision (3) of this section, and as to the parties and
proceedings provided in subdivisions (5), (6), and (8) of this
section.” The term “[p]arties” is defined to mean “the juvenile
. . . and his or her parent, guardian, or custodian.”15 Under
subsection (5), the juvenile court has jurisdiction over “[t]he
parent, guardian, or custodian of any juvenile described in this
section.” So for adjudications under subsection (3), a juvenile
court has exclusive jurisdiction over the juvenile and his or her
parent, guardian, or custodian.
In In re Guardianship of Rebecca B. et al.,16 a 2000 case,
we held that when a juvenile court has assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over a juvenile under § 43-247(3), a county court
lacks jurisdiction to conduct a guardianship proceeding for the
juvenile. We recognized that the Legislature has given county
courts concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile courts over guard-
ianship proceedings. But we held that a county court’s jurisdic-
tion must yield to the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction for
a juvenile adjudicated under subsection (3).
Later, in Ponseigo v. Mary W.,17 we held that a district court
lacks jurisdiction to hear a grandparent visitation action after
the juvenile court has obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the
grandchild through an adjudication under § 43-247(3). But as
the Nebraska Court of Appeals has explained, after this hold-
ing, the Legislature amended § 43-247.18
15 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245(15) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
16 In re Guardianship of Rebecca B. et al., 260 Neb. 922, 621 N.W.2d 289
(2000).
17 Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72, 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003).
18 See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63, 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009).

MOLCZYK v. MOLCZYK 	105
Cite as 285 Neb. 96
The Legislature was apparently concerned that district courts
had interpreted our decision in Ponseigo to mean that they did
not have jurisdiction to decide the custody of children who
were subject to a juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction. So in
2008, the Legislature enacted L.B. 280,19 which was intended
to expand the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to include custody
determinations for juveniles whom the court has adjudicated
under § 43-247(3).20 The Legislature was concerned that such
a child’s custody could remain in limbo in a custody dispute
because the juvenile court had no authority to determine cus-
tody disputes and the district court believed it lacked jurisdic-
tion to do so.
Thus, the Legislature amended some statutes related to a
juvenile court’s jurisdiction to give juvenile courts authority to
decide custody disputes over adjudicated children. In the fol-
lowing statutes, the italicized language represents the amended
language that the Legislature added.
L.B. 280 amended § 43-247(11) to give juvenile courts
concurrent original jurisdiction over a “paternity or custody
determination for a child over which the juvenile court already
has jurisdiction.” It also amended Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-517(7)
(Cum. Supp. 2012) to give county courts “[c]oncurrent original
jurisdiction with the district court in domestic relations matters
as defined in section 25-2740 and with the district court and
separate juvenile court in paternity or custody determinations
as provided in section 25-2740.”
Richard relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2740(3) (Reissue
2008), the language of which was also amended in 2008 by
L.B. 280. Section 25-2740(1) defines “[d]omestic relations
matters” to include proceedings under “sections 42-347 to
42-381,” which include proceedings for “dissolution, sepa-
ration, annulment, custody, and support.” It further defines
“custody determinations” to mean “proceedings to determine
custody of a child under section 42-364.” Section 25-2740(2)
and (3) set out the following jurisdiction rules:
19 See 2008 Neb. Laws, L.B. 280.
20 See In re Interest of Ethan M., supra note 18.

106 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this sec-
tion, in domestic relations matters, a party shall file his or
her petition or complaint and all other court filings with
the clerk of the district court. The party shall state in the
petition or complaint whether such party requests that
the proceeding be heard by a county court judge or by a
district court judge. . . . Such proceeding is considered a
district court proceeding, even if heard by a county court
judge . . . .
(3) In addition to the jurisdiction provided for paternity
or custody determinations under subsection (2) of this
section, a county court or separate juvenile court which
already has jurisdiction over the child whose paternity
or custody is to be determined has jurisdiction over such
paternity or custody determination.
[10] Under § 25-2740(3), the jurisdiction conferred on a
county court to decide custody issues clearly refers to a county
court sitting as a juvenile court because the court must have
already obtained jurisdiction over the child. But § 25-2740(3)
provides a juvenile court with concurrent jurisdiction over a
custody determination for an adjudicated juvenile, not exclu-
sive jurisdiction. This reading of § 25-2740(3) is consistent
with § 43-245(8) of the juvenile code, which provides that
“[n]othing in the Nebraska Juvenile Code shall be construed to
deprive the district courts of their habeas corpus, common-law,
or chancery jurisdiction or the county courts and district courts
of jurisdiction of domestic relations matters as defined in sec-
tion 25-2740.”
Moreover, reading § 25-2740(3) consistently with other
statutes on the subject shows that the Legislature did not give
juvenile courts original jurisdiction over dissolution actions. It
is true that § 24-517(7) gives county courts concurrent original
jurisdiction with the district courts over domestic relations mat-
ters, which includes dissolutions. But the jurisdiction conferred
on a separate juvenile court or county court sitting as a juvenile
court is more limited. Section 42-348 of the marital dissolution
statutes provides the following:
All 	proceedings 	under 	sections 	42-347 	to 	42-381
[domestic relations actions] shall be brought in the district

MOLCZYK v. MOLCZYK 	107
Cite as 285 Neb. 96
court of the county in which one of the parties resides.
Proceedings may be transferred to a separate juvenile
court or county court sitting as a juvenile court which
has acquired jurisdiction pursuant to section 43-2,113.
Certified copies of orders filed with the clerk of the court
pursuant to such section shall be treated in the same man-
ner as similar orders issued by the court.
Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,113 (Reissue 2008), the
Legislature clearly intended that a separate juvenile court or a
county court sitting as a juvenile court could acquire jurisdic-
tion over dissolution proceedings only if the court has already
adjudicated the parties’ child and other specified conditions
are met:
(2) A juvenile court created in a separate juvenile court
judicial district or a county court sitting as a juvenile
court in all other counties shall have and exercise juris-
diction within [its district] with the county court and dis-
trict court in all matters arising under Chapter 42, article
3, when the care, support, custody, or control of minor
children under the age of eighteen years is involved.
Such cases shall be filed in the county court and district
court and may, with the consent of the juvenile judge, be
transferred to the docket of the separate juvenile court or
county court.
Although the second sentence in § 43-2,113(2) refers to
a county court, when this sentence is read consistently with
the first sentence, the Legislature obviously meant a county
court sitting as a juvenile court. Moreover, § 43-2,113 is part
of a group of statutes specifically addressing separate juve-
nile courts.21
The problem is that the second sentence does not clarify
who should “file” a case with the county court. And we can-
not read this sentence to require a party to commence a dis-
solution action in both the district court and the county court
if the juvenile court has previously acquired jurisdiction over
one of the parties’ children and the party wishes the juvenile
court to decide the custody issues. This interpretation would
21 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-2,111 to 43-2,127 (Reissue 2008).

108 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
obviously lead to jurisdictional confusion or duplication, and
we try to avoid a statutory construction that would lead to
an absurd result.22 Equally important, requiring parties to
file a dissolution action in county court is inconsistent with
§ 42-348, which requires all dissolution actions to be filed in
district court.
[11] Instead, we believe that the answer lies in § 42-348.
As noted, § 42-348 provides that “[c]ertified copies of orders
filed with the clerk of the court pursuant to [§ 43-2,113] shall
be treated in the same manner as similar orders issued by the
court.” So we construe the requirement in § 43-2,113(2) that
these “cases shall be filed in the county court and district
court” to mean that a party must file an action or proceeding
to resolve custody disputes in district court, which can lead to
a transfer to the juvenile court if a party obtains the juvenile
court judge’s consent to a transfer. Under § 43-2,113(2), if a
juvenile court judge consents to a transfer and the district court
transfers the case to juvenile court, the case is “filed” with the
county court, sitting as a juvenile court, or the separate juvenile
court when a certified copy of the district court’s transfer order
is filed in the juvenile court.
[12] Under this construction, §§ 42-348 and 43-2,113(2)
give a county court, sitting as a juvenile court, or a separate
juvenile court concurrent jurisdiction over dissolutions or cus-
tody determinations only if specified procedures are followed.
Juvenile courts do not acquire jurisdiction over a marital dis-
solution action or a custody proceeding unless three conditions
are met: (1) The juvenile court has already acquired jurisdiction
over the parties’ child; (2) the juvenile court judge consented to
transferring the case to juvenile court; and (3) the district court
has issued a transfer order, a certified copy of which has been
filed in the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, or in the
separate juvenile court.
As stated, L.B. 280 amended § 43-247(11) to give juve-
nile courts concurrent original jurisdiction over a custody
determination for a child whom the juvenile court already
has jurisdiction. But when read consistently with §§ 42-348
22 See City of North Platte v. Tilgner, 282 Neb. 328, 803 N.W.2d 469 (2011).

MOLCZYK v. MOLCZYK 	109
Cite as 285 Neb. 96
and 43-2,113(2), the juvenile court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over a custody determination unless a party has previously
filed a complaint for a dissolution or a custody modification in
district court. Because a juvenile court does not have concur-
rent, original jurisdiction over a dissolution action or custody
dispute in the sense that a party can commence an action or
proceeding in that court, the jurisdictional priority doctrine
does not apply. Here, the record does not show that the parties
complied with the procedural requirements for transferring
the dissolution action to the juvenile court. So the pending
juvenile proceedings involving the parties’ minor children did
not affect the district court’s jurisdiction to decide the cus-
tody issues.
the couRt did not abuse
its discRetion
Regarding the actual decree, Richard contends that the court
abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate and award-
ing Kerrie custody, alimony, and attorney fees. He first argues
that the court failed to consider the best interests factors for
custody determinations or the wishes of the minor children. He
premises his argument on the court’s language in the decree.
In the decree, the court stated that “[Kerrie] is a fit and proper
person to be awarded the sole care, custody and control of the
two minor children of the parties.” Because the court did not
state that Kerrie’s custody of the children was in their best
interests, Richard argues that the decree shows the court failed
to consider their interests.
[13] We disagree. We presume in a bench trial that the
judge was familiar with and applied the proper rules of law
unless it clearly appears otherwise.23 Under those rules, there
was ample evidence to support the court’s custody determina-
tion. It would unduly lengthen this opinion and add little to
our jurisprudence to detail the parties’ parental shortcomings.
It is sufficient to say the evidence showed that Kerrie had
been the children’s primary caretaker and that Richard’s tem-
porary custody of them had not been in their best interests.
23 Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb. 215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011).

110 	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Kerrie
sole custody.
[14] Nor did the court abuse its discretion in awarding Kerrie
alimony and attorney fees. We reject Richard’s claim that the
court’s award of alimony left him with income below the pov-
erty threshold. Under the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines,
unless the minimum support rule applies,24 a parent’s total sup-
port, child care, and health care obligations cannot reduce the
obligor’s net income below the minimum net monthly income
for one person that will exceed the federal poverty threshold.25
Currently, the guidelines set the minimum subsistence level at
$931,26 and Richard does not contest that level.
[15,16] In a marital dissolution action, to determine an
obligor’s net income for calculating support obligations, a
court subtracts the following annualized deductions from the
obligor’s gross income: taxes, FICA, allowable retirement
contributions, previous court-ordered child support to other
children, and allowable voluntary support payments to other
children.27 Under the Nebraska Child Support Guidelines,
to determine if the obligor’s income exceeds the minimum
subsistence level, a court deducts the obligor’s support obli-
gations that are specified in the guidelines from the obligor’s
net income.28
The record shows that Richard’s gross monthly income was
$7,607 and his net income was $4,916. Richard’s support obli-
gations totaled $2,077. So after deducting his support obliga-
tions, Richard’s remaining income was $2,839, well above the
minimum subsistence level. Moreover, the parties were married
for almost 30 years, and for many of these years, Kerrie stayed
at home to care for their seven children. The court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding Kerrie alimony.29
24 See Neb. Ct. R. § 4-209.
25 See Neb. Ct. R. § 4-218 (rev. 2012).
26 See id.
27 See Neb. Ct. R. § 4-205.
28 See Gress v. Gress, 274 Neb. 686, 743 N.W.2d 67 (2007).
29 See Schaefer v. Schaefer, 263 Neb. 785, 642 N.W.2d 792 (2002).

MOLCZYK v. MOLCZYK 	111
Cite as 285 Neb. 96
[17] Similarly, the court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Kerrie attorney fees. In a marital dissolution action,
an award of attorney fees depends on a variety of factors,
including the amount of property and alimony awarded, the
earning capacity of the parties, and the general equities of the
situation.30 The court awarded Kerrie $4,000 in attorney fees,
and the record showed that she had incurred over $11,000
in attorney fees. In contrast to Richard’s income, the record
showed that Kerrie earned a monthly gross salary of $1,776
and a monthly net salary of $1,529.
[18] Finally, the ultimate test for the appropriateness of a
trial court’s division of the marital estate is fairness and rea-
sonableness as determined by the facts of each case.31 After
reviewing the record, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in dividing the marital assets and liabilities.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Richard invoked the jurisdiction of the
Douglas County District Court by moving to reinstate the dis-
missed action before Kerrie filed a second action in Lancaster
County. Because Kerrie had notice of his motion, we conclude
that the Douglas County District Court was reinvested with
jurisdiction over the matter and that Kerrie could not initiate
a new action in a different court until after the court ruled on
Richard’s motion to reinstate.
We conclude that the pending juvenile proceedings involv-
ing the parties’ two minor children did not prevent the district
court from exercising jurisdiction over the custody issues in the
dissolution action. The parties did not comply with the proce-
dural requirements for transferring the case to juvenile court.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Kerrie custody, alimony, and attorney fees. Nor did it
abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate.
affiRmed.
heavican, C.J., participating on briefs.
casseL, J., not participating.
30 See id.
31 See Gangwish v. Gangwish, 267 Neb. 901, 678 N.W.2d 503 (2004).